A  SHORT  HISTORY  OF  THE 
UNITED  STATES  NAVY 


From  a  photogravure,  copyrighted,  1896,  by  A.  W.  Elson  &  Co.,  Bostc 

U.  S.  S.   CONSTITUTION 


A  SHORT  HISTORY 

OF  THE 

UNITED  STATES  NAVY 


BY 

CAPTAIN  GEORGE  R.  CLARK,  U.S.N. 
PROFESSOR  WILLIAM  O.  STEVENS,  PH.D. 
INSTRUCTOR  CARROLL  S.  ALDEN,  PH.D. 
INSTRUCTOR  HERMAN  F.  KRAFFT,  LL.B. 

OF  THE  DEPABTMENT  OF   ENGLISH,  UNITED   STATE3   NAVAL   ACADKMT 


PHILADELPHIA  &   LONDON 

J.  B.  LIPPINCOTT   COMPANY 

1911 


COPYRIGHT,  1910 
BY  GEORGE  R.  CLARK 


COPYRIGHT,  1911 

BT  J.  B.  LlPPINCOTT  COMPANT 


Published  May,  1911 


Printed  by  J.  B.  Lippincott  Company 
The  Washington  Square  Press,  Philadelphia,  U.S.A. 


PREFACE 

This  history  owed  its  origin  to  the  need  of  a  work  suit 
able  in  scope  and  treatment  as  a  text-book  for  the  midship 
men  of  the  United  States  Naval  Academy.  Since,  in  a 
tentative  form,  it  has  been  used  by  them  with  gratifying 
results,  there  is  hope  that  it  may  prove  of  interest  and  value 
to  others  whose  time  for  this  subject  is  limited.  It  has 
been  written  with  certain  definite  aims,  the  principal  of 
which  are  the  following:  First,  to  present  a  record  of 
exactly  what  happened,  without  personal,  sectional,  or 
national  prejudice.  Second,  to  regard  naval  events  from 
the  professional  rather  than  the  picturesque  point  of  view ; 
for  example,  to  emphasize  the  maneuvering  and  gunnery 
in  an  action  rather  than  the  smoke  and  blood.  Third,  to 
suppress  the  trivial  and  bring  out  the  important,  not 
neglecting  the  services  of  officers  in  time  of  peace.  Fourth, 
to  give,  whenever  possible,  the  original  sources,  such  as 
letters  from  secretaries  of  the  navy,  and  official  reports 
of  officers. 

These  official  reports,  we  feel,  are  of  singular  value. 
The  fighter  writes  as  he  shoots — straight  to  the  mark.  He 
may  be  prejudiced  in  favor  of  his  own  flag,  but  his  account 
is  usually  more  sportsmanlike  than  are  the  corresponding 
accounts  of  his  countrymen  who  were  not  there  to  see,  and 
has  a  unique  interest  that  no  rewriting  ever  attains.  In 
the  following  pages  will  be  found  reports  by  both  friends 
and  foes. 

For  the  use  of  copyrighted  material  in  this  book  grate 
ful  acknowledgments  are  due  to  Admiral  Mahan,  Sea 
Power  in  its  Relations  to  the  War  of  1812,  Admiral 

223078 


4  Preface 

Farragut,  etc. ;  Loyall  Farragut,  Life  of  David  Glasgow 
Farragut;  the  Century  Company,  Battles  and  Leaders  of 
the  Civil  War. 

To  the  other  members  of  the  English  Department  of 
the  Naval  Academy,  who  have  been  most  helpful  with 
criticism  and  suggestion,  we  desire  to  express  our  hearty 
appreciation. 

GEORGE  E.  CLARK. 


May,  1911. 


CONTENTS 

JHAPTER  PAGE 

PREFACE  3 

I.    THE  NAVY  IN  THE  REVOLUTION 9 

II.     THE  REVOLUTION  (CONTINUED).     THE  CRUISES  OF 

JOHN  PAUL  JONES 24 

III.  THE   BEGINNINGS  OF  A  NEW  NAVY  AND  THE  WAR 

WITH  FRANCE 42 

IV.  THE  WAR  WITH  TRIPOLI 61 

V.     THE  WAR  WITH  TRIPOLI  (CONTINUED) 76 

VI.     THE  WAR  OF  1812.    CAUSES  AND  EARLY  EVENTS...     93 
VII.     THE  CAPTURES  OF  THE  GUERRIERE  AND  THE  MACE 
DONIAN  109 

VIII.     A  VICTORY  AND  A  DEFEAT 126 

IX.     THE  SLOOP  ACTIONS  OF  THE  WAR 144 

X.     THE  BATTLE  OF  LAKE  ERIE 161 

XL    THE  CRUISE  OF  THE  ESSEX 175 

XII.     THE  BATTLE  OF  LAKE  CHAMPLAIN  AND  THE  CON 
CLUSION  OF  THE  WAR 189 

XIII.  MINOR  OPERATIONS 203 

XIV.  THE  MEXICAN  WAR.     PERRY'S  EXPEDITION  TO  JAPAN  220 
XV.     THE  CIVIL  WAR  :  THE  FIRST  YEAR 238 

XVI.     THE  BATTLE  OF  HAMPTON   ROADS  :  THE  DESTRUC 
TION  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND  AND  THE  CONGRESS  255 
XVII.     THE  BATTLE  OF  HAMPTON  ROADS  (CONTINUED)  :  THE 

MONITOR  AND  THE  MERRIMAC 273 

XVIII.     OPERATIONS  ON  THE  WESTERN  RIVERS 288 

XIX.     OPERATIONS  ON  THE  LOWER  MISSISSIPPI 310 

5 


6  Contents 

XX.    THE  BATTLE  OF  MOBILE  BAY 330 

XXI.     THE  WAR  ON  ALBEMARLE  SOUND 348 

XXII.    ACTIONS  IN  FOREIGN  WATERS 365 

XXIII.  THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 388 

XXIV.  THE  NAVY  IN  THE  YEARS  OF  PEACE 406 

XXV.     WAR  WITH  SPAIN  :  THE  BATTLE  OF  MANILA  BAY.  .  .  426 

XXVI.     THE  WEST  INDIAN  CAMPAIGN 445 

XXVII.     EVENTS  SINCE  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 462 

AUTHORITIES 481 

INDEX  . ,  487 


ILLUSTRATIONS 

PAGE 

U.  S.  Ship-of-the-Line  Columbus  at  Anchor 45 

Frigate  with  her  Sails  loosed  to  dry 47 

U.  S.  Sloop-of-War  Albany  under  full  Sail 49 

U.  S.  S.  Louisville 291 

C.  S.  S.  Tennessee 341 

PLATES 

U.  S.  S.  Constitution Frontispiece 

Paul  Jones 24 

A  32-Pound  Carronade 42 

A  24-Pound  Long  Gun 42 

Edward  Preble 70 

Stephen  Decatur,  Jr 118 

Oliver  H.  Perry 164 

David  Porter 176 

Thomas  Macdonough 190 

George  Bancroft 218 

Delivery  of  the  President's  Letter 232 

Andrew  H.  Foote 290 

David  G.  Farragut 310 

David  D.  Porter 388 

The  New  Navy  and  the  Old 406 

George  Dewey 426 

U.  S.  S.  Delaware. ..  .  462 


8  Illustrations 

MAPS  AND  DIAGRAMS 

Lake  Champlain 16 

Cruises  of  the  Ranger  and  the  Bonhomme  Richard 28 

The  Bonhomme  Richard  and  the  Serapis 33 

Scene  of  the  War  with  France 55 

The  Barbary  States 63 

Harbor  of  Tripoli 79 

The  Constitution  and  the  Guerriere Ill 

The  United  States  and  the  Macedonian 120 

The  Constitution  and  the  Java 128 

The  Chesapeake  and  the  Shannon 138 

The  Frigate  and  the  Sloop  Actions  of  the  War  of  1812 145 

The  Lake  Campaigns,  1812-1814 162 

The  Battle  of  Lake  Erie 169 

The  Cruise  of  the  Essex 181 

The  Battle  of  Lake  Champlain 194 

Japan 228 

Battle  of  Port  Royal 246 

Hampton  Roads 265 

Transverse  Section  through  Turret  of  Original  Monitor 275 

Operations  on  the  Western  Rivers 289 

Island  No.  10 300 

Battle  of  Mobile  Bay 333 

Albemarle  and  Pamlico  Sounds 349 

Cushing's  Launch  and  Torpedo 357 

The  Cruise  of  the  Alabama 373 

The  Kearsarge  and  the  Alabama 381 

Second  Attack  on  Fort  Fisher 402 

The  Arctic  Regions 417 

Battles  of   Manila 438 

The  West  Indian  Campaign 448 


A  SHORT  HISTORY 

OF  THE 

UNITED  STATES  NAVY 


THE  NAVY  IN  THE  REVOLUTION 

CAUSES  OF  NAVAL  ACTIVITY  IN  THE  COLONIES 

THE  Revolution  was,  from  the  very  nature  of  things, 
a  military  rather  than  a  naval  war,  but  the  little  Ameri 
can  Navy  that  now  sprang  into  being  showed  the  utmost 
daring  in  attacking  the  mistress  of  the  seas.  Although 
England  had  the  most  powerful  navy  of  the  time,  she 
could  use  it  to  small  advantage  against  the  extensive 
coast  line  of  America,  3000  miles  from  home.  This  length 
of  coast  line,  with  the  scattering  of  the  British  Navy  that 
it  necessitated,  made  it  possible  for  the  heterogeneous, 
poorly  equipped  beginnings  of  the  Revolutionary  Navy 
to  act  like  swarms  of  hornets  on  their  giant  enemy. 

As  the  Continental  Army  seemed  to  spring  up  out  of 
the  soil,  so  the  navy  seemed  to  spring  up  out  of  the  sea. 
When,  on  May  11,  1775,  a  party  of  Maine  woodsmen, 
armed,  for  the  most  part,  with  pitchforks  and  axes,  and 
fired  by  the  news  of  the  battle  of  Lexington,  captured 
with  a  lumber  sloop  an  armed  British  schooner  off 
Machias,  Me.,  O'Brien,  their  leader,  quickly  armed  his 
sloop  with  the  captured  cannon  and  ammunition,  and 

9 


10  The  United  States  Navy 

put  to  sea  in  quest  of  prizes.  Without  a  commission, 
letter  of  marque,  or  legal  authority  of  any  sort,  this  free 
booter  captured  several  prizes  and  sent  them  to  Machias. 
O'Brien's  example  was  quickly  followed  by  others.  Our 
coasts  soon  swarmed  with  the  privateers  of  New  England, 
and  those  of  Massachusetts  were  particularly  successful. 

The  daring  and  success  of  these  privateers  so  angered 
Admiral  Graves,  the  commander  of  the  British  fleet  on 
the  coast,  that  he  reduced  to  ashes  the  town  of  Falmouth 
(now  Portland),  Me.,  thus  leaving  the  inhabitants  shelter 
less  at  the  beginning  of  the  bleak  New  England  winter. 
Smarting  already  under  the  wrongs  that  precipitated  the 
war,  the  hardy  coast  dwellers  of  the  new  world,  whose 
rights  to  fisheries  and  navigation  had  been  curtailed  by 
shortsighted  acts  of  Parliament,  hardly  needed  this  act 
of  Admiral  Graves  to  spur  them  to  building  ships  of 
war. 

Other  causes  contributed  to  the  beginning  of  a  naval 
force  along  the  Atlantic  coast.  The  colonists,  from  their 
origin  and  environment,  were  naturally  seafarers.  Some 
of  the  New  England  Colonies  even  before  the  Revolution 
had  made  remarkable  progress  in  ship-building,  fishing, 
and  commerce ;  they  were  thus  not  unprepared  to  furnish 
vessels  and  daring  sailors.  Then,  too,  the  country,  being 
new  and  largely  agricultural,  needed  manufactured 
articles,  clothing,  and  munitions  of  war;  and  these  things 
had  to  be  either  captured  from  the  enemy,  or  brought 
from  European  countries,  at  the  risk  of  seizure  by  British 
men-of-war.  In  order  to  capture  from  English  supply 
ships  designed  for  Boston  articles  much  needed  by  his 
troops,  Washington,  in  the  fall  of  1775,  fitted  out  several 
small  vessels,  manned  by  soldiers,  under  the  command  of 
army  officers.  Washington  had  the  entire  management 
of  this  fleet.  One  of  these  ships,  the  Lee,  whose  com- 


The  Marine  Committee  11 

mission,  as  well  as  that  of  her  captain,  John  Manly, 
was  signed  by  Washington,  captured  the  Nancy,  "an 
ordnance  ship  .  .  .  containing,  besides  a  large  mortar 
upon  a  new  construction,  several  pieces  of  brass  cannon, 
a  large  quantity  of  small  arms  and  ammunition,  with  all 
manner  of  tools,  utensils,  and  machines  necessary  for 
camps  and  artillery,  in  the  greatest  abundance.  The  loss 
of  this  ship  was  much  resented  in  England. ' ' x  Altogether 
Washington's  fleet  captured  about  thirty-five  prizes.2 

Thus  not  only  the  bitter  feelings  of  resentment  against 
tyranny,  coupled  in  numerous  instances  with  motives  of 
personal  gains  from  prize  money,  but  also  the  needs  of 
the  Continental  Army  quickly  gave  birth  to  a  hetero 
geneous  collection  of  ships.  This  was  composed  partly 
of  privateers,  partly  of  vessels  owned  and  commissioned 
by  individual  Colonies,  and  partly  of  vessels  commissioned 
by  Congress. 

THE  MARINE  COMMITTEE 

A  letter  from  General  Washington,  reporting  the  burn 
ing  of  Falmouth,  was  read  in  Congress,  November  1, 
1775;  and  Congress  acted  promptly.  The  following  day 
it  voted  $100,000  for  a  naval  armament  and  appointed  a 
committee  to  buy  the  ships.  A  few  weeks  later  it 
appointed  a  second  committee,  which  suggested  a  fleet  of 
thirteen  vessels  ranging  from  32  to  24  guns,  to  be  ready 
by  March,  1776,  and  recommended  the  appointment  of  a 
third  committee  to  supervise  their  construction  and  equip 
ment.  The  report  was  adopted  by  Congress.  In  the  third 
committee,  known  as  the  Marine  Committee,  there  were 
thirteen  members,  one  for  each  colony.  Its  personnel 
was  practically  the  same  as  that  of  the  second  committee, 


1Dodsley's  Annual  Register,  London,   1776,  p.   147. 

1  Paullin,  The  Navy  of  the  American  Revolution,  p.  65. 


12  The  United  States  Navy 

and  included  such  men  as  Robert  Morris,  John  Hancock, 
and  Samuel  Chase,  a  remarkable  body  of  men,  who  worked 
with  the  greatest  ardor  and  patriotism. 

The  Marine  Committee  administered  our  naval  affairs 
from  December,  1775,  to  December,  1779.  It  was  the 
forerunner  of  our  Navy  Department,  but  its  functions 
were  far  more  complex.  Like  the  Congress  of  its  day,  it 
exercised  legislative,  judicial,  and  executive  powers, 
always,  however,  under  the  direction  of  that  body;  and 
the  same  weaknesses,  the  lack  of  an  administrative  head 
and  of  actual  authority  over  the  States,  hampered  the 
committee  as  they  did  Congress. 

Some  of  the  confusion  with  which  the  Marine  Com 
mittee  struggled  is  suggested  by  the  fact  that  naval 
officers  then,  instead  of  being  commissioned  by  the  Presi 
dent  with  the  consent  of  the  Senate,  might  be  appointed 
in  any  one  of  the  following  ways:  by  the  Marine  Com 
mittee  itself,  by  its  subordinate  boards  at  Philadelphia 
and  Boston,  by  any  naval  commander,  by  recruiting 
agents,  by  commissioners  abroad,  or  even  by  local  authori 
ties  in  the  several  States.  Further,  besides  building  and 
equipping  ships  of  war  and  directing  their  movements, 
the  committee  had  to  hold  courts-martial,  send  abroad 
dispatches  and  diplomatic  agents,  and  trade  American 
produce  for  European  munitions  of  war.  Under  such 
conditions  it  is  remarkable  that  the  committee  accom 
plished  as  much  as  it  did. 

As  the  Marine  Committee  proved  to  be  a  clumsy 
administrative  machine,3  it  was  superseded  in  1779  by  a 
"Board  of  Admiralty,"  consisting  of  three  commissioners 
and  two  members  of  Congress,  which  was  in  power  until 
1781.  Finally,  Robert  Morris  was  appointed  "Agent  of 
Marine,"  and  he  managed  very  efficiently  what  was  left 

*  Paullin,  The  Navy  of  the  American  Revolution,  p.  182,  ff. 


The  First  Fleet  13 

of  the  American  Navy.  By  this  time,  Congress  realized 
that  an  administrative  department,  especially  in  time  of 
war,  must  be  under  one  head. 

THE  FIRST  AMERICAN  FLEET 

The  first  naval  committee  bought  and  fitted  out  two 
24-gun  frigates,  the  Alfred  and  the  Columbus,  and  two 
brigs,  the  Andrea  Doria  and  the  Cabot,  and  supplied 
them  with  powder  and  muskets  borrowed  from  the 
Pennsylvania  Committee  of  Safety.  On  December  22, 
1775,  Congress  organized  the  first  "American  fleet"  by 
granting  commissions  to  Esek  Hopkins,  commander-in- 
chief  of  the  fleet;  Dudley  Saltonstall,  captain  of  the 
Alfred;  Abraham  Whipple,  captain  of  the  Columbus; 
Nicholas  Biddle,  captain  of  the  Andrea  Doria;  and  John 
Burroughs  Hopkins,  captain  of  the  Cabot.  John  Paul 
Jones  headed  a  list  of  thirteen  lieutenants  commissioned 
at  the  same  time. 

By  the  end  of  January,  1776,  the  committee  had  added 
to  this  fleet  the  sloops  Providence  and  Hornet  and 
the  schooners  Wasp  and  Fly.  For  these  first  eight 
vessels  of  the  navy  the  committee  had  spent  $134,333. 
With  this  tiny  force,  the  commander-in-chief  was  ordered 
to  proceed  directly  to  Chesapeake  Bay  to  attack  the 
British  fleet  of  Lord  Dunmore;  then,  if  successful,  he 
was  to  proceed  to  the  Carolinas  and  attack  the  British 
force  there,  and  thence  he  was  to  sail  to  Rhode  Island 
and  ' '  attack,  take,  and  destroy  all  the  enemy 's  naval  force 
that  you  may  find  there. ' '  This  was  the  gigantic  task  of 
a  fleet  of  eight  vessels  carrying  110  guns,  and  manned  by 
landsmen  or,  at  least,  men  without  naval  discipline.  To 
oppose  this  force,  the  British  had  in  American  waters,  or 
on  the  way  hither,  seventy-eight  men-of-war  mounting 
2078  guns.  In  Commodore  Hopkins'  fleet,  only  forty 


14  The  United  States  Navy 

guns  threw  shot  of  nine  pounds  or  more  in  weight,  while 
the  seventy-eight  British  ships  on  this  coast  had  at  least 
500  18-pounders  and  heavier  guns.  The  orders  of  the 
Marine  Committee  to  the  commander-in-chief  of  the  navy, 
Esek  Hopkins,  were  therefore  foredoomed  to  failure. 

Perhaps  Commodore  Hopkins  himself  foresaw  the 
futility  of  trying  to  adhere  too  strictly  to  his  orders,  for, 
instead  of  going  to  Chesapeake  Bay,  he  proceeded  to 
Nassau  in  the  Bahamas,  which  he  captured.  After  taking 
a  large  quantity  of  shot  and  shell,  besides  some  eight 
cannon,  fifteen  mortars,  and  other  munitions  of  war,  he 
sailed  northward  with  the  Governor  and  Lieutenant- 
Governor  as  prisoners.  As  he  neared  his  destination, 
Rhode  Island,  he  came  upon  his  Majesty's  ship  Glasgow, 
of  20  guns,  Captain  Tyringham  Howe,  which  single- 
handed,  inflicted  considerable  damage  on  Hopkins'  fleet, 
and  made  good  its  escape.  The  loss  of  the  British  was 
four  men;  that  of  the  Americans,  twenty-four,  among 
the  latter  two  lieutenants. 

This  injury  inflicted  upon  a  fleet  by  a  single  vessel 
which  escaped  showed  little  tactical  skill  on  the  part  of 
the  officers  of  the  American  fleet.  As  Commodore  Hopkins 
had,  besides,  disobeyed  his  orders,  he  was  court-martialed 
and  finally  dismissed. 

Commodore  Hopkins  was  the  only  man  to  hold  the 
rank  "commander-in-chief  of  the  navy."  This  title  was 
later  merged  in  that  of  the  President  of  the  United  States. 
During  the  rest  of  the  Revolutionary  War,  the  only  com 
missioned  officers  in  the  navy  were  captains  and  lieu 
tenants  ;  but  Congress,  evidently  providing  for  the  future, 
fixed  the  relative  ranks  of  army  and  navy  officers  as 
follows :  admiral  equivalent  to  general,  vice-admiral  equiv 
alent  to  lieutenant-general,  rear-admiral  to  major-general, 
commodore  to  brigadier-general,  captain  of  a  ship  of  forty 
guns  and  upwards  to  colonel,  captain  of  a  ship  of  twenty 


Arnold  on  Lake  Champlain  15 

to  forty  guns  to  lieutenant-colonel,  captain  of  a  ship  of 
ten  to  twenty  guns  to  major,  and  lieutenant  in  the  navy 
to  captain.  This  table,  taken  from  the  British  regulations 
of  those  times,  has,  in  the  main,  continued  in  force  to  our 
day. 

IMPORTANT  NAVAL  EVENTS  DURING  THE  REVOLUTION 

From  our  standpoint  it  will  hardly  be  profitable  to 
follow  all  of  the  various  actions  fought  by  the  little  United 
States  Navy  during  the  Revolution.  Paullin,  in  his  Navy 
of  the  American  Revolution,  makes  the  total  number  of 
vessels  under  the  Continental  Congress  forty-two.  These 
were  practically  all  annihilated  before  the  end  of  the 
war;  but  the  heroic  struggles  of  this  early  navy  were 
not  without  result.  In  considering  them,  we  shall  outline 
the  work  of  Benedict  Arnold  on  Lake  Champlain,  of 
Wickes,  Conyngham,  and  especially  Jones,  in  British 
waters,  and  of  Biddle,  Barry,  and  others  on  the  American 
seaboard;  and  we  shall  not  omit  some  mention  of  the 
State  navies  and  the  privateers,  as  well  as  of  the  assist 
ance  rendered  by  France. 

THE  FIRST  BATTLE  OF  LAKE  CHAMPLAIN 

The  possession  of  Lakes  Champlain  and  George  was 
felt  early  in  the  war  to  be  of  strategic  importance.  Not 
only  did  these  lakes  furnish  an  excellent  waterway  from 
Canada  to  the  Colonies,  but  it  was  the  design  of  the 
British  that  Carleton's  army  from  Canada  should  rendez 
vous  about  Albany  and  thereby  cut  off  all  communica 
tions  between  the  northern  and  southern  Colonies.  The 
American  Army  had  invaded  Canada  in  September,  1775, 
and  during  the  following  winter  it  had  held  Governor 
Guy  Carleton  shut  up  in  Quebec.  On  the  arrival  of  a 


16  The  United  States  Navy 


LAKE  CHAMPLAIN 


Arnold  on  Lake  Champlain  17 

British  fleet  with  reinforcements,  the  Americans  retreated 
to  Crown  Point,  where  they  arrived  on  July  3,  1776. 
Brigadier-General  Benedict  Arnold,  who,  earlier  in  his 
career  as  a  West  India  merchant,  had  at  times  commanded 
his  own  ships,  started  immediately  to  build  a  fleet  on  the 
lakes  in  competition  with  the  British.  Late  in  July,  he 
was  appointed  by  Gates  to  the  command  of  the  naval 
forces  on  the  lakes.  By  October,  he  was  able  to  muster 
one  sloop,  three  schooners,  eight  gondolas,  and  four 
galleys.  These  vessels  mounted  altogether  ninety-four 
cannon,  from  2-pounders  to  18-pounders,  and  they  were 
manned  by  700  officers  and  men,  according  to  Arnold,  ' '  a 
wretched  motley  crew;  the  marines  the  refuse  of  every 
regiment,  and  the  seamen  few  of  them  ever  wet  with  salt 
water. ' '  Arnold  chose  for  his  flagship  one  of  the  galleys, 
the  Congress,  a  vessel  of  fifty-foot  keel  and  of  thirteen- 
foot  beam,  mounting  one  18-pounder,  one  12-pounder, 
and  two  6-pounders. 

But  the  British,  with  their  greater  resources  in  skilled 
seamen  and  in  manufactured  articles,  won  this  race  in 
building  a  fleet.  Captain  Charles  Douglas,  who  had 
charge  of  the  construction  work  of  the  enemy,  had  ready 
in  twenty-eight  days  a  full-rigged  ship,  the  Enterprise, 
carrying  eighteen  12-pounders.  She  had  been  begun  at 
Quebec,  and  had  been  brought  from  the  St.  Lawrence  up 
the  Richelieu.  The  Enterprise  was  of  180  tons  burden, 
and  greatly  exceeded  in  size  and  armament  any  of 
Arnold's  fleet.  Early  in  October,  General  Sir  Guy  Carle- 
ton,  thanks  to  Captain  Douglas'  energy  in  ship-ouilding, 
had  under  his  command  one  ship,  two  schooners,  one 
radeau  (raft),  one  large  gondola,  twenty  gunboats  and 
four  armed  tenders.  The  British  fleet  in  the  St.  Lawrence 
furnished  C'arleton  with  700  experienced  officers  and 
seamen.  The  enemy  also  had  a  large  detachment  of  sav 
ages  under  Major  Thomas  Carleton. 

2 


18  The  United  States  Navy 

The  first  squadron  battle  to  be  fought  by  Americans, 
"a  strife  of  pygmies  for  the  prize  of  a  continent,"  as 
Mahan  styles  it,  was  begun  on  October  11,  1776.  Arnold 
was  lying  in  wait  for  Carleton  behind  Valcour  Island,  not 
far  from  the  site  of  a  later  battle  of  Lake  Champlain 
(September  11,  1814),  where  the  struggle  was  again  for 
the  control  of  this  great  waterway. 

As  the  British  van,  coming  down  under  a  fair  north 
wind,  with  full  press  of  sail,  passed  the  Americans  before 
discovering  Arnold's  fleet,  Carleton 's  heavier  vessels  had 
to  beat  back  slowly  to  help  his  hard-pressed  gunboats. 
The  Americans  fought  desperately  from  eleven  o'clock 
in  the  morning  till  five  o'clock  that  afternoon.  With  the 
British  attacking  in  front  and  the  Indians  occupying  the 
shore  in  the  rear,  Arnold  was  indeed  "between  the  devil 
and  the  deep  sea."  That  night,  however,  under  cover  of 
the  lake  mist,  he  slipped  through  the  British  line  to  Ticon- 
deroga.  The  British  gave  chase,  and  on  the  two  days 
following  they  continued  the  battle.  Finally,  Arnold 
beached  his  boats,  and  fought  with  desperate  courage 
until  his  men  had  fired  their  gondolas  and  taken  refuge 
in  the  woods.  Most  of  Arnold's  vessels  were  either  capt 
ured  or  destroyed.  In  this  battle  the  enemy  captured 
110  prisoners,  among  them  being  General  Waterbury,  the 
second  in  command.  Arnold,  with  the  rest  of  his  men, 
made  good  his  escape  to  Crown  Point. 

Although  Arnold  had  lost  his  fleet,  the  delay  which  he 
thus  forced  on  Carleton  was  of  the  greatest  advantage  to 
the  Americans.  "Never  had  any  force,"  says  Mahan, 
*  *  big  or  small,  lived  to  better  purpose,  or  died  more  glori 
ously  ;  for  it  had  saved  the  lake  for  that  year. ' '  The  delay 
compelled  Carleton  to  give  up  his  plan  of  joining  Howe 
to  the  south.  When,  next  year,  Burgoyne,  renewing  the 
attempt,  invaded  New  York,  he  had  not  the  aid  which 


Cruises  of  Wickes  and  Conyngham          19 

Carleton  could  have  relied  on  in  1776.  Hence  Arnold's 
work  on  the  lakes  opened  the  way  for  the  surrender  of 
Burgoyne  at  Saratoga.4 


WICKES  AND  CONYNGHAM  IN  EUROPEAN  WATERS 

Nothing  illustrates  so  completely  the  daring  and  enter 
prise  of  the  Americans,  save  possibly  the  boldness  of 
certain  privateersmen,  as  the  harrying  of  the  British  coast 
by  Wickes,  Conyngham,  and  Jones.  In  the  fall  of  1776, 
Captain  Lambert  Wickes,  of  the  16-gun  brig  Reprisal, 
while  carrying  Benjamin  Franklin  to  France,  captured 
two  prizes.  The  next  .spring,  the  Lexington  joined  the 
Reprisal,  and  these  two  vessels  captured  about  fifteen 
prizes.  With  these  the  cruisers  returned  to  France ;  but, 
as  the  latter  country  was  ostensibly  at  peace  with  England, 
the  vessels  were  ordered  to  leave.  After  disposing  of  the 
prizes  clandestinely  to  French  merchants,  the  Lexing 
ton  quickly  refitted  and  sailed  from  Morlaix  on  Sep 
tember  18,  1777.  She  was  captured  shortly  after  by  the 
Alert,  and  her  officers  and  men  were  taken  to  Plymouth 
and  thrown  into  Mill  prison  on  a  charge  of  high  treason. 
Richard  Dale,  who  later  distinguished  himself  on  the 
Bonhomme  Richard  under  Jones,  was  one  of  these 
prisoners;  but  he  made  his  escape  a  year  later  by  boldly 
walking  past  the  guards,  dressed  in  a  British  uniform. 
On  the  insistence  of  the  British,  the  Reprisal  also  left 
France;  she  foundered  on  her  way  home,  off  the  Banks 
of  Newfoundland,  and,  with  the  exception  of  one  of  the 
crew,  all  hands,  including  the  brave  Wickes,  were  lost. 

The  reckless  daring  and  success  of  Captain  Conyng 
ham  in  harrying  British  commerce,  strained  almost  to  the 
breaking  point  the  relations  between  England  and  France. 

**  Clowes,  Royal  Navy,  iii,  368. 


20  The  United  States  Navy 

The  American  Commissioners  at  Paris,  through  an  agent, 
had  bought  a  cutter  at  Dover,  and  had  then  manned  and 
equipped  her  at  Dunkirk,  naming  her  the  Surprise. 
Congress,  over  the  signature  of  John  Hancock,  as  presi 
dent,  had  issued  blank  commissions  to  the  American  Com 
missioners  in  France;  it  was  such  a  commission,  dated 
March  1,  1777,  that  Benjamin  Franklin  and  Silas  Deane, 
the  commissioners,  had  filled  out  with  the  name  of  Gus- 
tavus  Conyngham,  authorizing  him  to  sail  in  the  Sur 
prise  as  a  captain  of  the  American  Navy.  A  great  deal  of 
difficulty  was  encountered  in  getting  the  Surprise  out 
of  Dunkirk.  Captain  Conyngham  "took  his  arms  out  of 
his  ship  and  said  he  should  load  it  with  merchandise  for 
one  of  the  ports  in  Norway.  As  this  declaration  was  sus 
pected,  security  was  demanded.  Two  persons,  Hodge 
and  Allen,  became  responsible  for  him.  Conyngham 
actually  left  the  port  of  Dunkirk  without  arms,  but  he 
caused  sailors,  cannon,  and  ammunition  to  be  sent  out 
to  him  in  the  night,  while  he  was  in  the  road,  off  Dunkirk ; 
and  he  shortly  after  took  the  English  packet  boat,  Prince 
of  Orange.  As  soon  as  this  came  to  the  knowledge  of 
the  French  Government,  Hodge,  one  of  the  securities, 
was  arrested,  and  conducted  to  the  Bastille.  The  packet 
boat  was  restored  to  the  British  Government  without  the 
form  of  process.  After  six  weeks  of  confinement,  Hodge 
was  released. ' ' 5 

Shortly  after  this,  Conyngham  captured  the  Harwich 
packet  and  took  it  to  a  French  port.  This  open  violation 
of  neutrality  so  enraged  the  British,  that  their  ambassador 
threatened  to  leave  France  if  Conyngham  and  his  prize 
were  not  at  once  given  up.  The  French  Government 
imprisoned  the  captain  and  crew  of  the  Surprise,  and 


5  Sparks,   Diplomatic   Correspondence,   i,    292,   note    (Franklin 
and  Deane  to  the  Committee  of  Foreign  Affairs,  May  25,  1777). 


Cruises  of  Wickes  and  Conyngham         21 

returned  the  vessel  to  her  owners.  But  before  England 
could  enforce  her  demand  for  the  delivery  of  Conyngham 
and  his  men  to  the  sloops  of  war  sent  over  for  this  pur 
pose,  the  Americans,  by  some  intrigue,  had  been  released 
and  sent  to  sea  in  another  cutter,  the  Revenge,  a  vessel 
provided  and  equipped  partly  by  the  American  Commis 
sioners,  and  partly  on  private  account.  It  seems  prob 
able  that  Hodge,  a  Philadelphia  merchant,  and  perhaps 
some  others,  were  pecuniarily  interested,  at  least  in  the 
later  cruises  of  this  cutter. 

The  Revenge  captured  many  prizes,  and  on  two 
occasions  boldly  sailed  in  disguise  into  British  ports  and 
refitted.  As  Deane  wrote  to  Robert  Morris  in  August, 
1777:  "  Conyngham 's  cruise  effectually  alarmed  Eng 
land,  prevented  the  great  fair  at  Chester,  occasioned 
insurance  to  rise,  and  even  deterred  the  English  merchants 
from  shipping  goods  in  English  bottoms  at  any  rate,  so 
that  in  a  few  weeks  forty  sail  of  French  ships  were  loading 
in  the  Thames  on  freight — an  instance  never  known 
before.  ...  In  a  word,  Conyngham,  by  his  first  and 
second  bold  expeditions,  is  become  the  terror  of  all  the 
eastern  coast  of  England  and  Scotland,  and  is  more 
dreaded  than  Thurot 6  was  in  the  late  war. ' ' 7 

On  a  later  cruise,  Conyngham  sent  most  of  his  prizes 
to  Ferrol,  Spain,  and  thus  his  depredations  on  British 
commerce  embarrassed  France  and  the  American  Com 
missioners  less  than  former  expeditions  had  done.  In 
1778,  Captain  Conyngham  was  captured,  and  while  in 
prison  he  was  treated  with  such  severity,  that  Congress, 

6  A  French  corsair  who  did  great  damage  in  commerce-destroy 
ing  expeditions  against  British  shipping  during  the  Seven  Years 
War. 

7Wharton,  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  ii,  379-380    (Deane  to 

Morris,  Aug.  23,  1777). 


22  The  United  States  Navy 

in  a  resolution  on  July  17,  of  that  year,  protested  against 
a  treatment  "contrary  to  all  dictates  of  humanity  and 
the  practice  of  civilized  nations." 


NAVAL  PRISONERS,  PRIZES,  AND  THEIR  EFFECTS  ON 
NEUTRALITY 

This  matter  of  naval  prisoners  in  England,  combined 
with  the  violations  of  neutral  rights  committed  by  our 
vessels,  was  a  great  source  of  worry  to  the  American  Com 
missioners.  These  officials,  having  merely  the  status 
of  private  citizens  in  France,  were  treated  by  the  French 
court  with  all  civility,  but  they  could  not  yet  be  openly 
received  or  recognized.  Hence  their  work  required  the 
utmost  tact  and  delicacy.  That  naval  prisoners  in  Eng 
land  were  treated  with  extreme  harshness  is  admitted  even 
by  British  authorities.  This  cruelty  was  undoubtedly 
due  partly  to  the  low  conditions  of  prison  systems  in 
England,  as  indeed  in  other  parts  of  Europe  in  the 
eighteenth  century.  One  of  the  reasons  for  the  cruises 
of  American  vessels  in  British  waters  was  to  capture 
Englishmen  in  retaliation  for  the  treatment  of  Americans 
in  Forton  prison  at  Portsmouth,  Mill  prison  at  Plymouth, 
and  the  prison  ship  Jersey  at  Brooklyn. 

"The  British  Government  resisted  the  exchange  of 
prisoners  taken  in  European  waters  on  three  grounds: 
(1)  This  involved  a  recognition  of  belligerent  rights  in 
the  insurgents.  (2)  The  American  prisoners  could  be 
kept  out  of  harm's  way  in  England;  the  same  condition 
did  not  apply  to  British  prisoners  taken  by  American 
vessels,  as  long  as  France  refused  to  permit  such  prisoners 
to  be  landed  and  imprisoned  on  her  shores.  (3)  British 
seamen,  being  far  more  numerous  than  American,  ex- 


Neutrality  of  France  and  Spain  23 

change  would  tell  more  favorably  for  the  latter  than  for 
the  former. "  8    • 

To  end  their  sufferings,  some  of  these  prisoners  in 
England  enlisted  in  the  British  Navy,  or  in  whaling  fleets, 
while  others  escaped  from  prison.  Conyngham  and  sixty 
companions,  in  November,  1779,  burrowed  their  way  out 
of  captivity,  thus  ''committing  treason  through  his 
Majesty's  earth,"  as  Conyngham  remarked.  It  was  long 
after  the  secret  treaty  between  France  and  the  United 
States  was  signed  in  February,  1778,  before  Franklin 
could  persuade  the  English  to  take  a  more  liberal  view 
as  regards  exchanging  prisoners.  In  fact,  the  first  ex 
change  was  not  effected  till  March,  1779.  The  Americans, 
before  the  treaty  with  France,  had  to  confine  their  captives 
taken  in  British  waters  on  shipboard,  or  let  them  go. 
After  the  treaty  and  after  the  breaking  out  of  war 
between  Spain  and  England  in  1779,  these  men  were 
imprisoned  in  France  and  Spain.  So,  likewise,  the  ques 
tion  of  the  disposition  of  prizes  captured  in  European 
waters  was  a  difficult  one  before  the  treaty.  Many  prizes 
were  taken  to  France,  where  they  were  secretly  sold, 
in  spite  of  official  orders  commanding  the  American 
captains  to  leave  port  with  their  prizes.  Indeed,  it  is 
very  probable  that,  if  hostilities  between  France  and 
England  had  not  for  other  causes  broken  out  in  1778, 
the  countries  would  have  gone  to  war  because  of  the  con 
nivance  of  the  French  at  these  breaches  of  neutrality. 

8  Wharton,  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  ii,  724,  note   (Franklin, 
Lee,  and  Adams  to  the  President  of  Congress,  Sept.  17,  1778). 


II 

THE  REVOLUTION  (CONTINUED)— THE 
CRUISES  OF  JOHN  PAUL  JONES 

JONES'S  EARLIER  CRUISES 

PAUL  JONES'S  early  career  during  the  Revolution  may 
be  briefly  told.  On  May  10,  1776,  he  received  the  12- 
gun  brig  Providence  as  his  first  independent  command. 
On  this  vessel  he  carried  troops  and  convoyed  merchant 
men,  and  so  skilful  was  he  in  eluding  the  numerous 
British  cruisers,  that  Congress  promoted  him  in  August 
to  the  full  rank  of  captain,  with  orders  to  cruise  for 
prizes  along  the  Atlantic  coast.  In  September,  1776,  by 
a  bold  maneuver,  he  escaped  from  the  28-gun  frigate 
Solebay.  He  later  eluded  the  British  frigate  Mil  ford, 
captured  sixteen  prizes,  and  destroyed  other  vessels. 
Some  time  after  this,  while  in  command  of  the  Alfred, 
Captain  Jones  took  the  British  brig  Mellisli,  laden  with 
military  supplies.  On  the  way  home,  Jones  was  again 
chased  by  the  Milford,  and  as  he  was  accompanied  by  a 
convoy  of  prizes,  he  skilfully  lured  the  Milford  away 
from  the  prizes,  under  cover  of  night,  so  that  the  latter 
got  safely  to  an  American  port,  and  then  Jones,  by 
superior  seamanship,  escaped  from  his  pursuer. 

Captain  Jones  was,  on  June  14,  1777,  put  in  command 
of  the  new  18-gun  ship,  Ranger,  built  at  Portsmouth, 
N.  H.  What  the  motives  were  for  sending  Jones  to 
foreign  waters  is  not  quite  clear.  His  knowledge  of 
British  shores  and  his  success  in  American  waters,  were 
doubtless  contributing  factors.  Jones  was  looked  upon 
24 


From  the  painting  by  Cecilia  Beaux,  copyrighted,  1906,  by  U%§.  Tyival 

PAUL  JONES       'j'l'iaiai 


The  Cruise  of  the  Ranger  25 

by  some  of  his  colleagues  as  lukewarm  to  America, 
because  he  was  a  native  of  Scotland  and  had,  from  natural 
motives  of  generosity,  been  lenient  to  British  prisoners. 
Also  he  had  often  boasted  of  his  being  a  citizen  of  the 
world  and  of  his  having  drawn  his  sword  for  the  rights 
of  man.  These  last  were  ideas  of  the  times,  the  fore 
runners  of  the  French  Revolution.  But  it  appears  from 
numerous  statements  in  his  correspondence  that  his  loy 
alty  to  America  gradually  outgrew  these  earlier  dreams  of 
cosmopolitan  citizenship,  and  if  acts  speak  louder  than 
words,  Jones  was  far  more  loyal  to  the  cause  of  the  Col 
onies  than  many  of  his  self-seeking  colleagues.  But  the 
jealousy  of  the  inactive  Commodore  Hopkins,  who  looked 
with  eyes  askance  at  the  strenuous  successes  of  his  young 
subordinate,  may  have  had  some  effect  in  sending  Jones 
to  a  difficult  task  far  from  home  waters.  This  feeling 
against  Jones  seems  also  to  have  existed  in  Congress.  On 
the  reorganization  of  the  navy  on  October  10,  1776, 
thirteen  men  were  promoted  over  Jones's  head.  Some 
years  later,  in  a  letter  to  Robert  Morris,  Jones  writes: 
"Rank,  which  opens  the  door  to  glory,  is  too  near  the 
heart  of  every  man  of  true  military  feeling,  to  be  given 
up  in  favor  of  any  other  man  who  has  not,  by  the  achieve 
ment  of  some  brilliant  action,  or  by  known  and  superior 
abilities,  merited  such  preference.  If  this  be  so,  how 
must  I  have  felt,  since,  by  the  second  table  of  captains  in 
the  navy,  adopted  by  Congress  on  the  10th  of  October, 
1776,  I  was  superseded  in  favor  of  thirteen  persons,  two 
of  whom  were  my  junior  lieutenants  at  the  beginning; 
the  rest  were  only  commissioned  into  the  Continental 
Navy  on  that  day;  and  if  they  had  any  superior  ability, 
these  were  not  then  known,  nor  have  since  been  proved. 
I  am  the  eldest  sea  officer  (except  Captain  Whipple)  on 
the  Journal,  and  under  the  commission  of  Congress,  re 
maining  in  the  service. ' ' 


26  The  United  States  Navy 

Whatever  the  motives  in  sending  him  to  Europe  may 
have  been,  Jones  started  at  once  to  prepare  his  ship  for 
his  long  cruise.  The  selection  of  the  commissioned  and 
warrant  officers  of  the  Ranger  was  entrusted  to  a  com 
mittee  of  three  men — William  Whipple,  the  New  Hamp 
shire  member  of  the  Marine  Committee,  John  Langdon, 
Continental  agent  at  Portsmouth,  and  John  Paul  Jones, 
the  new  commander  of  the  vessel.  This  illustrates  one  of 
the  various  ways  by  which  selections  of  this  kind  were 
made — surely  not  a  bad  way,  inasmuch  as  it  gave  the 
man  who  was  to  command  the  vessel  a  voice  in  the  choos 
ing  of  the  men  who  were  to  serve  under  him.  The 
Ranger  is  said  to  have  been  the  first  vessel  to  fly  the 
Stars  and  Stripes,  then  recently  adopted. 

Jones  arrived  at  Nantes  in  December,  1777,  and  from 
there  he  sailed  in  February,  1778,  for  Quiberon  Bay,  in 
convoy  of  some  American  merchantmen.  This  was  just 
about  the  time  that  the  secret  treaty  was  made  between 
the  United  States  and  France.  Jones,  in  his  orders,  had 
been  warned  to  be  very  careful  about  the  rights  of  the 
latter  country  as  a  neutral  nation.  Although  Franklin 
was  doing  his  utmost  to  have  the  United  States  recog 
nized  by  France,  thinking  that  this  act  would  involve  the 
French  in  trouble  with  the  English,  still  any  unwarranted 
breaches  of  neutrality  might  at  the  crucial  moment  spoil 
the  plans  of  the  American  Commissioners  at  Paris.  Cap 
tain  Jones  writes  very  proudly  of  the  fact  that,  at 
Quiberon  Bay,  on  February  14,  1778,  the  Ranger  was 
the  first  American  vessel  to  exchange  salutes  with  a 
foreign  nation.  Jones  sent  a  boat  back  and  forth  to  the 
French  flagship  in  his  effort  to  get  the  French  admiral  to 
return  gun  for  gun,  but,  at  length  the  American  com 
mander  reluctantly  consented  to  a  salute  of  two  guns  less 
than  his  own.  This  incident  shows  Jones's  pride  in  his 
adopted  country;  it  also  shows  a  willingness  on  the  part 


The  Ranger  and  the  Drake  %7 

of  France  to  do  a  generous  and  overt  act  towards  recog 
nition  of  the  new  nation. 

On  April  10,  1778,  Jones  left  Brest  and  sailed  straight 
for  the  English  coast.  His  first  attempt  was  to  set  fire 
to  the  great  quantity  of  shipping  in  the  harbor  of  White- 
haven.  Landing  early  on  the  morning  of  the  22d,  he 
easily  captured  the  forts.  But,  because  of  a  hitch  in  his 
plans,  the  day  was  well  advanced  and  the  people  were 
crowding  to  the  shore  in  thousands  before  he  reached  the 
shipping.  He  had  to  content  himself  with  setting  fire  to 
one  ship,  with  the  hope  that  the  flames  would  spread  to 
the  200  or  more  vessels  in  the  harbor.  The  attempt  was 
not  successful,  but  its  daring  strongly  impressed  the 
British. 

Shortly  after  these  events,  Jones  stood  over  to  the 
Scotch  shore,  where,  with  one  boat  and  a  very  small  party, 
he  made  a  landing  at  St.  Mary's  Isle.  The  American 
captain  did  this  with  the  purpose  of  capturing  the  Earl 
of  Selkirk  as  a  hostage  for  the  better  treatment  of  our 
prisoners  in  England.  As  this  nobleman  was  not  at  home, 
the  sailors  contented  themselves  with  the  taking  of  the 
silverware  of  the  castle,  which  Jones  himself  bought  from 
his  men  and  returned  to  the  Countess  of  Selkirk  with  a 
chivalrous  letter  full  of  apologies. 

THE  RANGER-DRAKE  BATTLE 

On  the  morning  of  the  24th  of  April,  1778,  Jones 
appeared  off  Carrickfergus  on  the  northeast  coast  of 
Ireland  opposite  Whitehaven,  and  lured  out  the  British 
sloop  of  war  Drake,  20  guns,  which  came  to  investi 
gate  the  "suspicious  stranger."  Hails  were  exchanged, 
whereupon,  says  Jones,  "the  Drake  being  astern  of  the 
Ranger,  I  ordered  the  helm  up  and  gave  the  first  broad 
side.  The  action  was  warm,  close,  and  obstinate.  It  lasted 


The  United  States  Navy 


an  hour  and  four  minutes,  when  the  enemy  called  for 
quarter;  her  fore  and  main  topsail  yards  being  both  cut 


SHETLAND  I5LANDS 

'"•-,       CRUISES  OFTHE RANGER 
AND  THE  BONHOMME  RICHARD 


CRUISES  OF  THE  RANGER  AND  THE  BONHOMME  RICHARD 

away,  and  down  on  the  cap ;  the  topgallant  yard  and 
mizzen-gaff  both  hanging  up  and  down  along  the  mast; 
the  second  ensign  which  they  had  hoisted  shot  away,  and 


The  War  in  Home  Waters  29 

hanging  on  the  quarter-gallery  in  the  water;  the  jib  shot 
away,  and  hanging  in  the  water;  her  sails  and  rigging 
entirely  cut  to  pieces;  her  masts  and  yards  all  wounded, 
and  her  hull  also  very  much  galled.  I  lost  only  Lieutenant 
Wallingford  and  one  seaman  killed,  and  six  wounded. 
The  loss  of  the  enemy  in  killed  and  wounded  was  far 
greater,  .  .  .  forty-two  men.  The  captain  and  the  lieu 
tenant  were  among  the  wounded. ' ' 

It  is  fair  to  state  that  the  Drake,  though  nominally 
the  equal  of  the  Ranger,  was  almost  as  unprepared  for 
battle  as  the  ill-starred  Chesapeake  in  her  encounter 
with  the  Leopard.  The  Drake's  crew  were  new,  her 
only  officers  were  the  captain,  and  a  lieutenant  who  had 
come  on  board  at  the  last  moment  as  a  volunteer ;  she  had 
no  gunner,  no  cartridges  had  been  filled,  and  no  prepara 
tions  had  been  made  for  handling  the  powder. 

BlDDLE  AND  BARRY  IN  AMERICAN  WATERS 

While  Jones  was  thus  winning  honors  in  British  waters, 
the  ships  at  home  could  accomplish  little  against  the  tre 
mendous  British  Navy.  But  some  of  our  captains,  like 
Biddle  and  Barry,  deserve  mention  for  their  heroic 
struggles  in  a  losing  game.  On  the  32-gun  frigate 
Randolph,  the  first  of  the  thirteen  frigates  built  by 
Congress,  Captain  Nicholas  Biddle  fought  in  West  Indian 
waters  the  British  64-gun  ship-of-the-line  Yarmouth. 
After  an  hour's  hard  fighting,  a  shot  from  the  Yarmouth 
exploded  the  Randolph's  magazine  and  blew  her  to  frag 
ments.  Of  the  latter 's  crew  of  315  men  only  four  were 
found  alive. 

In  the  Lexington,  Captain  John  Barry  captured,  in 
April,  1776,  the  British  sloop  Edward.  Barry  was 
later  promoted  to  the  Effingham,  but  this  vessel  was 
destroyed  in  the  Delaware.  In  the  Raleigh,  32,  Captain 


30  The  United  States  Navy 

Barry  fell  in  with  the  enemy's  50-gun  ship  Experiment 
and  the  frigate  Unicorn,  in  September,  1778.  He  kept 
up  a  running  fight  for  two  days,  and,  when  the  wind 
died  out,  he  finally  beached  his  ship  on  the  coast  of 
Maine  and  escaped  with  his  men.  Some  time  before  this, 
Captain  Barry  had,  with  twenty-seven  men,  boarded  the 
British  armed  schooner  Alert  in  the  Delaware.  He 
captured  116  men  and  officers,  and  sank  the  schooner  and 
two  transports.  Barry  was  one  of  the  bravest  naval 
officers  of.  the  Revolution ;  he  was,  if  anything,  too  daring. 
But  it  was  useless  for  the  American  frigates  to  fight  the 
powerful  British  ships-of-the-line.  At  the  end  of  1778, 
only  four  of  the  thirteen  frigates  were  left. 

THE  BATTLE  BETWEEN  THE  BONHOMME  RICHARD 
AND  THE  SERAPIS 

Meanwhile  France  and  England  had  gone  to  war,  and 
in  1779  Spain  leagued  herself  with  America  against  Eng 
land.  The  joint  fleets  of  France  and  Spain  entered  the 
Channel  and  even  threatened  a  descent  on  the  English 
coast. 

Seemingly,  France  could  now  render  effective  aid  to 
Paul  Jones,  yet  he  found  great  difficulty  in  persuading 
the  French  to  give  him  a  new  command.  The  Minister 
of  Marine,  De  Sartine,  had  promised  him  again  and  again 
specific  ships,  but  the  powerful  aristocracy  in  the  French 
Navy  prevented  De  Sartine  from  fulfilling  his  promise 
to  a  foreigner,  who  was  regarded  by  many  as  an  advent 
urer.  The  impetuous  Jones  chafed  under  these  repeated 
disappointments,  and  wrote  many  letters  to  Franklin, 
De  Sartine,  and  even  to  the  King.  When,  after  five 
months  of  waiting,  Jones's  patience  was  exhausted,  he 
went  in  person  to  the  court  and  received  the  old  hulk 
Duras,  of  40  guns.  He  had  learned  the  wisdom  of 


Cruise  of  the  Bonhomme  Richard  31 

one  of  Franklin's  adages  in  the  latter 's  Poor  Richard's 
Almanac,  if  you  want  a  thing  done,  do  it  yourself; 
otherwise,  send.  In  gratitude  to  his  friend  Franklin, 
Jones  rechristened  the  Duras  the  Bonhomme  Richard. 

To  this  vessel  were  added  four  other  ships:  the 
Alliance,  36;  the  Pallas,  30;  the  Cerf,  18;  and  the 
Vengeance,  12.  The  new  Alliance,  the  only  American 
ship  in  the  squadron,  Congress  had  put  in  command 
of  Pierre  Landais,  a  Frenchman,  in  compliment  to  France. 
The  squadron  was  hastily  got  ready  at  L 'Orient.  Some 
American  prisoners,  about  100,  recently  exchanged  by 
England,  gave  Jones  the  nucleus  of  an  American  crew 
on  the  Bonhomme  Richard,  but  otherwise  the  officers 
and  crews  were  a  motley  and  cosmopolitan  assemblage, 
except  those  of  the  Pallas  and  the  Vengeance,  which 
were  French.  Indeed,  the  fact  that  Landais'  crew  were 
largely  British  may  add  some  extenuating  circumstances 
to  the  strange  conduct  of  the  "half  crazy"  Landais  during 
the  battle.  On  the  other  hand  Richard  Dale,  Jones's  first 
lieutenant,  had  unusual  ability  and  did  excellent  service. 

The  relation  of  the  American  commodore  to  his 
squadron  was  peculiar.  The  representative  of  the  French 
Minister  of  Marine,  in  giving  Jones  the  squadron,  had 
forced  him  to  sign  a  paper,  by  which,  instead  of  being  the 
superior  officer,  he  became  only  one  of  equal  rank  with  his 
subordinates.  This  made  the  squadron  a  confederacy 
rather  than  a  unit. 

After  repeated  delays,  Captain  Jones  finally  set  sail 
from  L  'Orient  on  August  14,  1779.  He  proceeded  up  the 
wrest  coast  of  Ireland  with  the  purpose  of  circumnavi 
gating  the  British  Isles.  On  August  26,  the  Cerf  and 
two  French  privateers  wrhich  had  attached  themselves  to 
the  squadron  a  few  days  before  were  separated  in  a  gale, 
and  never  rejoined  the  fleet.  On  the  cruise  Jones  took 
some  ships  as  prizes  and  destroyed  others.  He  had  con- 


32  The  United  States  Navy 

siderable  difficulty  with  his  French  captains,  especially 
Landais,  in  regard  to  the  disposal  of  prizes,  and  he  could 
make  no  important  move  without  much  discussion  with 
his  colleagues.  Indeed,  Landais  showed  an  insubordina 
tion  that  boded  ill  for  the  success  of  any  concerted 
movement. 

Having  rounded  the  Orkneys,  Jones  intended  to 
destroy  the  shipping  at  Leith,  but  he  was  frustrated  by 
the  dilatory  co-operation  of  the  captains  of  the  Pallas 
and  the  Vengeance.  On  September  23,  at  dawn,  his 
lookout  sighted  a  large  ship  rounding  Flamborough  Head. 
By  noon  it  .became  apparent  that  a  Baltic  fleet  of  forty 
merchantmen,  under  convoy  of  two  British  men-of-war 
were  heading  northeast.  The  merchantmen,  at  the  signal 
of  danger,  scattered  in  flight  toward  Scarborough.  The 
warships,  which  were  the  Serapis,  a  new  frigate  of  50 
guns,  and  the  Countess  of  Scarborough,  20,  under  the 
command  of  Captain  Pearson,  then  took  a  position 
between  the  Baltic  fleet  inshore  and  their  enemy.  Jones 
now  stood  for  the  Serapis  and  ordered  his  captains  to 
form  the  line  of  battle,  an  order  to  which  Landais  paid 
no  attention.  Instead  of  maintaining  his  place  behind  the 
Richard,  Landais,  availing  himself  of  the  better  sailing 
qualities  of  the  Alliance,  forged  ahead  to  ascertain  the 
power  of  the  enemy.  Then  he  went  to  windward  out 
of  gunshot  and  remained  there  until  the  battle  began. 
Landais  had  already  hailed  Cottineau  in  the  Pallas, 
saying  that  if  the  enemy  had  a  ship  of  more  than  fifty 
guns  their  only  course  was  to  run  away.  This  insub 
ordinate  and  cowardly  speech,  uttered  in  the  presence  of 
the  crews  of  both  ships,  shows  what  sort  of  officer  Landais 
was.1 


1Mahan,  Jones  in  the  Revolution    (Scribner's  Magazine,  xxiv, 
207). 


The  Bonhomme  Richard  and  the  Serapis     33 


At  six  P.M.  the  Serapis  came  about  and  steered 
westward  with  the  Scarborough  in  her  wake.  Jones 
kept  his  vessel  bows  on  toward  the  enemy  to  keep  the 
British  in  the  dark  as  to  the  number  of  his  guns.  His 
only  hope  Avas  in  a  close  encounter.  Thus  it  was  that, 
when  at  seven  P.M.  Jones  came  within  range,  the  battle 


USER  APIS 

O  BONHOttME  RICHARD 


O  \FtAMBOROUGH 

.     * — '  ff£AD 


From  Mahan's  article  in  Scribner's  Magazine,  XXIV,  210,  by  permission 

THE  BONHOMME  RICHARD  AND  THE  SERAPIS 

opened  with  both  ships  gradually  running  on  parallel 
courses  -toward  Flamborough  Head.  The  wind  at  this 
time  was  southwest. 

Jones  answered  Pearson's  hail  evasively,  and  imme 
diately  followed  this  up  with  a  shot.  At  the  very  first 
exchange  of  broadsides,  two  of  the  three  18-pounders  on 
the  starboard  side  of  the  Richard  burst,  killing  and 
wounding  most  of  their  crews  and  blowing  up  the  deck 
above.  These  guns  had  to  be  entirely  abandoned,  leaving 
only  the  12-  and  9-pounders. 

3 


34  The  United  States  Navy 

Of  this  stage  of  the  battle  Jones  says  in  his  report : 2 
"  The  battle,  thus  begun,  was  continued  with  unre 
mitting  fury.  Every  method  was  practised  on  both  sides 
to  gain  an  advantage,  and  rake  each  other ;  and  I  must 
confess  that  the  enemy's  ship,  being  much  more  manage 
able  than  the  Richard,  gained  thereby  several  times  an 
advantageous  situation,  in  spite  of  my  best  endeavors  to 
prevent  it.  As  I  had  to  deal  with  an  enemy  of  greatly 
superior  force,  I  was  under  the  necessity  of  closing  with 
him,  to  prevent  the  advantage  which  he  had  over  me  in 
point  of  maneuver.  It  was  my  intention  to  lay  the 
Richard  athwart  the  enemy's  bow,  but  as  that  operation 
required  great  dexterity  in  the  management  of  both  sails 
and  helm  and  some  of  our  braces  being  shot  away,  it 
did  not  exactly  succeed  to  my  wishes.  The  enemy 's  bow 
sprit,  however,  came  over  the  Bonhomme  Richard's  poop 
by  the  mizzenmast,  and  I  made  both  ships  fast  together 
in  that  situation,  which  by  the  action  of  the  wind  on  the 
enemy's  sails,  forced  her  stern  close  to.  the  Richard's 
bow,  so  that  the  ships  lay  square  alongside  of  each  other, 
the  yards  being  all  entangled,  and  the  cannon  of  each  ship 
touching  the  opponent's  side.  When  this  position  took 
place,  it  was  eight  o'clock,  previous  to  which  the  Richard 
had  received  sundry  18-pound  shots  below  the  water,  and 
leaked  very  much." 

Although  Jones  had  lashed  the  vessels  together,  the 
Serapis'  crew  were  on  the  alert  for  any  attempt  at 
boarding.  Pearson  evidently  recognized  his  great  advan 
tage  in  maneuvering,  and  at  the  moment  of  fouling  had 
let  go  an  anchor,  hoping  thus,  by  means  of  the  tide  and 
the  wind,  to  wrench  the  vessels  apart.  But  the  ships  held 
fast.  As  up  to  this  stage  of  the  battle  the  Serapis 


Mones's  report  may  be  found   in   Stewart's  John  Paul  Jones 
Commemoration,  pp.  139,  ff. 


The  Bonhomme  Richard  and  the  Serapis     35 

had  fought  only  her  port  guns,  the  starboard  lower  ports 
were  closed.  Since  now  the  close  contact  of  the  vessels 
prevented  the  opening  of  these  ports,  Pearson  fired 
through  them.  So  near  to  each  other  were  the  gun 
crews,  that,  according  to  Dale,  the  men  had  to  run  the 
rammers  into  the  opponent's  ports  to  load  their  pieces, 
and  Pearson  tells  us  that  the  muzzles  of  the  guns  touched 
the  sides  of  the  enemy's  ship.  During  this  part  of  the 
fight,  the  damage  done  to  the  American  vessel  by  the 
more  powerful  18-pounders  of  the  enemy  was  terrible. 
Says  Jones:  "The  rudder  was  entirely  cut  off  the  stern 
frame,  and  the  transoms  were  almost  wholly  cut  away. 
The  timbers  of  the  lower  deck  especially,  from  the  main 
mast  to  the  stern,  being  greatly  decayed  with  age,  were 
mangled  beyond  any  power  of  description. ' ' 

.  In  the  course  of  this  terrible  pounding,  Jones's  battery 
of  12-pounders  was  entirely  silenced  and  abandoned.  In 
his  report  he  continues : 

"I  had  now  only  two  pieces  of  cannon,  9-pounders, 
on  the  quarter-deck  that  were  not  silenced,  and  not  one 
of  the  heavier  cannon  was  fired  during  the  rest  of  the 
action.  The  purser,  Mr.  Mease,  who  commanded  the  guns 
on  the  quarter-deck,  being  dangerously  wounded  in  the 
head,  I  was  obliged  to  fill  his  place,  and  with  great  diffi 
culty  rallied  a  few  men,  and  shifted  over  one  of  the  lee 
quarter-deck  guns,  so  that  we  afterward  played  three 
pieces  of  9-pounders  upon  the  enemy.  The  tops  alone 
seconded  the  fire  of  this  little  battery  and  held  out  bravely 
during  the  whole  of  the  action;  especially  the  main  top, 
where  Lieutenant  Stack  commanded.  I  directed  the  fire 
of  one  of  the  three  cannon  against  the  main-mast,  with 
double-headed  shot,  while  the  other  two  were  exceedingly 
well  served  with  grape  and  canister  shot  to  silence  the 
enemy's  musketry,  and  clear  her  decks,  which  was  at  last 
effected." 


36  The  United  States  Navy 

The  condition  of  the  Richard  was  becoming  more 
and  more  desperate ;  her  hold  was  filling  with  water  and 
she  was  on  fire  in  several  places.  The  master-at-arms, 
who  had  charge  of  the  prisoners  in  the  Richard's  hold, 
either  thinking  the  old  vessel  was  doomed,  or  inspired  by 
treachery,  had  released  them.  The  prisoners  would  natu 
rally  have  joined  battle  against  the  crew  of  the  Richard, 
assisting  their  countrymen  in  the  Serapis,  but  Dale 
shrewdly  put  them  to  work  at  the  pumps,  telling  them 
that  the  enemy's  plight  was  worse,  and  that  their  own 
safety  depended  on  keeping  the  Richard  afloat.  Just 
before  this,  the  gunner,  in  a  state  of  panic,  had  loudly 
clamored  for  quarter,  and  was  in  the  act  of  striking  the 
colors,  when  Jones  hurled  his  pistol  at  the  fellow,  break 
ing  his  skull.  In  the  silence  that  followed,  Pearson  gave 
the  order  to  board,  but  the  men  who  attempted  to  carry 
out  this  command  were  quickly  repelled.  To  Pearson's 
query  whether  the  Americans  had  surrendered,  Jones 
gave  the  answer  that  has  since  become  one  of  the  watch 
words  of  the  navy,  ' '  I  have  not  yet  begun  to  fight ! ' ' 

Although  the  Richard  was  hopelessly  inferior  in 
her  batteries,  the  force  aloft,  armed  with  muskets  and 
grenades,  finally  turned  the  tide  of  victory.  The  British 
had  been  driven  out  of  their  own  tops,  and  the  Americans 
dexterously  climbed  along  the  interlaced  rigging  of  the 
two  ships,  and  thus  kept  the  deck  of  the  Serapis  clear 
of  defenders.  Says  Pearson  in  his  report,  "From  the 
great  quantity  and  variety  of  combustible  material  they 
threw  upon  our  decks,  chains,  and  in  short  into  every 
part  of  the  ship,  we  were  on  fire  no  less  than  ten  or  twelve 
times  in  different  parts  of  the  ship,  and  it  was  with  the 
greatest  difficulty  and  exertion  at  times  that  we  were  able 
to  get  it  extinguished. ' ' 3 

3Dodsley's  Annual  Register,  xxii,  310. 


The  Bonhomme  Richard  and  the  Serapis     37 

A  very  important  part  in  this  fight  was  played  by  a 
marine  in  the  maintop  of  Jones's  flagship  who  succeeded 
in  dropping  a  hand-grenade  into  the  open  hatch  of  the 
Serapis.  A  terrific  explosion  followed,  "the  flames  of 
which/'  says  Pearson,  "running  from  cartridge  to  car 
tridge  all  the  way  aft,  blew  up  the  whole  of  the  people 
and  officers  that  were  quartered  abaft  the  mainmast ;  from 
which  unfortunate  circumstance  all  those  guns  were 
rendered  useless  for  the  remainder  of  the  action,  and  I 
fear  the  greatest  part  of  the  people  will  lose  their  lives. ' ' 
Pearson  was  a  brave  fighter,  but  this  catastrophe  on  his 
own  ship  must  have  had  much  to  do  with  the  final  dis 
organizing  of  his  men. 

At  this  crisis  the  Alliance  made  her  appearance.  She 
had  once  before  early  in  the  action  sailed  around  the 
combatants  and  fired  her  broadsides  so  recklessly  at  the 
entangled  vessels  that  she  did  as  much  damage  to  the 
Richard  as  to  the  enemy.  Of  her  second  attack,  Jones 
says:  "Landais  discharged  a  broadside  full  into  the 
stern  of  the  Richard.  We  called  to  him  for  God's  sake 
to  forbear  firing  into  the  Bonhomme  Richard;  yet  he 
passed  along  the  off  side  of  the  ship  and  continued 
firing.  There  was  no  possibility  of  his  mistaking  the 
enemy 's  ship  for  the  Richard,  there  being  the  most  essen 
tial  difference  in  their  appearance  and  construction; 
besides,  it  was  then  full  moonlight,  and  the  sides  of 
the  Richard  were  all  black,  while  the  sides  of  the  prizes 
were  yellow.  Yet,  for  the  greater  security,  I  showed 
the  signal  of  our  reconnoissance,  by  putting  out  three 
lanterns,  one  at  the  head,  another  at  the  stern,  and  the 
third  in  the  middle,  in  a  horizontal  line.  Every  tongue 
cried  that  he  was  firing  into  the  wrong  ship,  but  nothing 
availed;  he  passed  round,  firing  into  the  Richard's  head, 
stern,  and  broadside,  and  by  one  of  his  volleys  killed 
several  of  my  best  men,  and  mortally  wounded  a  good 


38  The  United  States  Navy 

officer  on  the  forecastle.  My  situation  was  really  deplor 
able.  The  Richard  received  various  shot  under  water 
from  the  Alliance;  the  leak  gained  on  the  pump,  and  the 
fire  increased  much  on  board  both  ships." 

However,  Captain  Pearson  was  even  more  discouraged 
by  the  reappearance  of  the  Alliance  than  Jones.  In  fact, 
he  ascribes  his  final  defeat  to  Landais.  But  probably 
owing  to  his  ignorance  of  the  eccentricities  of  the  French 
man  's  character,  he  did  not  realize  the  damage  the  latter 
was  doing  to  Jones's  ship.  Mahaii  thinks  that  it  was  the 
superiority  above  decks  of  the  Bonhomme  Richard  which 
finally  turned  the  scales.4  At  the  moment  of  surrender, 
the  mainmast  of  the  Serapis,  at  which  Jones  had  for 
some  time  been  discharging  one  of  his  9-pounders,  went 
by  the  board.  The  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was  excep 
tionally  heavy  on  both  sides;  that  of  the  Richard  being 
116  men,  and  of  the  Serapis  129. 5 

The  Countess  of  Scarborough,  the  second  of  the  two 
vessels  under  Captain  Pearson,  was  captured  after  an 
hour's  hard  fighting  by  the  Pallas.  The  latter  seems  to 
have  been  the  only  one  of  Jones's  ships  that  rendered 
assistance.  The  Vengeance  took  no  part  in  the  action. 
The  Baltic  fleet  was  allowed  to  escape  because,  as  Jones 
says,  "I  myself  was  in  no  condition  to  pursue,  and  none 
of  the  rest  showed  any  inclination  to  do  so."  Unques 
tionably,  Landais  was  jealous  of  the  American  commodore, 
as  was  evident  from  numerous  acts  of  his  on  the  cruise. 

The  honors  in  this  battle  were  decidedly  in  favor  of 
Jones,  who,  in  an  old  vessel,  transformed  into  a  one-decker 
by  the  necessary  abandonment  early  in  the  action  of  her 
useless  18-pounders,  had  fought  to  a  finish  a  new  frigate, 
which,  though  classed  as  a  "forty-four,"  carried  in  reality 

*Mahan,  Scribner's  Magazine,  xxiv,  210. 

6  Paullin,  Navy  of  the  American  If  evolution,  p.  297. 


Jones's  Later  Career  39 

fifty  guns.  The  Pallas  had  her  match  in  the  Countess 
of  Scarborough;  the  Alliance  did  as  much  harm  as  good ; 
and  the  remaining  vessel  under  Jones  took  no  part 
in  the  battle.  Thus  Pearson,  instead  of  sacrificing  his  two 
vessels  to  save  the  Baltic  fleet  against  a  vastly  superior 
force,  had  in  reality  matched  his  two  better  vessels  against 
two  of  Jones's  squadron,  and  the  escape  of  the  Baltic 
fleet  was  an  accident  so  far  as  Pearson* was  concerned. 
There  is  not  the  slightest  doubt  that  Pearson  was  a  brave 
officer  and  fought  as  long  as  there  was  any  hope  of  suc 
cess,  but  he  was  matched  against  a  man  of  indomitable 
courage.  As  Captain  A.  S.  Mackenzie  says,  "The 
Richard  was  beaten  more  than  once;  but  the  spirit  of 
Jones  could  not  be  overcome. ' ' 6 

After  the  battle,  Captain  Jones  tried  hard  to  keep 
the  Richard  afloat.  She  was  on  fire  in  various  parts, 
and  at  the  same  time  the  water  was  gaining  in  her  hold 
in  spite  of  three  pumps  that  were  kept  constantly  at 
work.  The  fire  was  extinguished,  but  on  account  of  the 
increasing  volume  of  water,  she  had  to  be  abandoned, 
and  on  the  morning  of  the  25th,  with  her  flag  still  flying, 
the  victorious  old  hulk  sank  beneath  the  waves. 

In  the  Serapis  Jones  now  sailed  for  the  Texel,  where 
he  arrived  on  October  3.  British  men-of-war  were  lying 
in  wait  to  capture  him,  but  he  watched  his  opportunity 
and  sailed  boldly  through  the  English  Channel,  reaching 
Groix  in  February,  1780.  He  returned  to  America  the 
next  year. 

For  his  brilliant  victory,  Jones  was  knighted  by 
France,  and  presented  a  sword  by  the  King.  On  his 
return  to  America  in  1781,  Congress  gave  him  a  vote  of 
thanks,  and  appointed  him  to  command  the  74-gun  ship 
America,  then  building  at  Portsmouth,  N.  H.  As  the 

"Mackenzie,  Life  of  Paul  Jones,  i,  205. 


40  The  United  States  Navy 

war  was  practically  over,  Jones 's  services  as  a  naval  officer 
were  no  longer  needed.  In  1783  he  was  sent  to  Paris  to 
conduct  negotiations  regarding  prizes  of  the  Bonhomme 
Richard.  Jones  later  accepted  a  commission  in  the 
Russian  Navy  as  vice-admiral,  but  his  experience  in 
Russia  was  not  a  happy  one.  He  returned  to  Paris,  where 
he  spent  most  of  the  remaining  years  of  his  life,  honored 
by  the  French,  the  intimate  friend  of  such  men  as  Morris 
and  Lafayette.  In  this  city  Jones  died  July  18,  1792. 
Of  our  greatest  naval  officer  during  the  Revolution,  Napo 
leon  is  said  to  have  remarked  to  Berthier  in  1805,  after 
the  battle  of  Trafalgar,  "Had  Jones  lived  to  this  day, 
France  might  have  had  an  admiral." 

CONCLUSION  OF  THE  WAR 

While  the  navy  was  winning  honors  in  Europe,  impor 
tant  events  were  happening  in  home  waters.  Captain 
Nicholson,  in  the  U.  S.  S.  Trumbull,  saw  some  hard 
fighting,  but  in  1781  the  Trumbull  was  forced  to  sur 
render  to  the  Iris  and  the  General  Monk.  It  is  a  strange 
irony  of  fate  that  the  Iris,  formerly  the  Hancock,  and 
the  first  of  the  original  thirteen  frigates  of  Congress, 
should  thus  have  received  the  surrender  of  the  Trumbull, 
the  last  of  the  unlucky  thirteen.  Captain  Barry,  in  the 
Alliance,  made  a  successful  cruise  and  captured  a  number 
of  prizes.  In  an  encounter  with  an  unknown  vessel, 
probably  the  Sibylle,  on  March  10,  1783,  he  fought  the 
last  sea  fight  of  the  Revolution,  in  which  he  was  unsuc 
cessful,  since  the  Alliance  had  to  relinquish  her  prey  on 
the  appearance  of  two  British  frigates. 

There  yet  remain  two  classes  of  ships  that  deserve  brief 
mention,  privateers  and  State  navies.  From  the  beginning 
of  the  war  there  were  swarms  of  American  privateers  that 
did  great  damage  to  British  commerce,  though  it  must 


Conclusion  of  the  War  41 

be  admitted,  also,  that  English  privateers  preyed  exten 
sively  on  American  merchantmen.  State  navies  were 
maintained  by  all  the  States  but  two  for  the  protection 
of  their  coasts.  Their  vessels  were  chiefly  small,  and  of 
shallow  draft,  designed  for  river  and  harbor  defense. 
One  of  them,  the  Hyder  Ali,  mounting  sixteen  6-pounders, 
and  commanded  by  Captain  Barney  of  the  Pennsylvania 
Navy,  made,  in  March,  1782,  a  brilliant  capture  of  the 
English  brig  General  Monk,  mounting  sixteen  12-pounders. 

Meanwhile  a  strong  French  fleet  under  De  Grasse  had 
rendered  aid  of  the  greatest  importance  to  the  land  forces, 
co-operating  with  Washington.  When  in  1781  the  British 
power  in  America  was  confined  to  two  centres,  one  at 
New  York  and  the  other  in  the  Chesapeake,  with  the 
intervening  country  in  the  hands  of  the  Americans,  com 
munications  between  the  British  forces  depended  wholly 
on  the  sea.7 

De  Grasse,  who  was  in  the  West  Indies,  by  means  of 
a  French  frigate  as  a  dispatch  boat,  perfected  all  plans 
with  General  Washington  for  a  concerted  attack  on  York- 
town.  While  the  British  admirals,  Rodney,  Hood,  and 
Graves,  were  in  distant  parts  hunting  De  Grasse,  "a 
sudden  march  of  Washington  brought  him  to  the  front 
of  the  English  troops  at  a  moment  when  the  French  fleet 
held  the  sea,  and  the  army  of  Cornwallis  was  driven  by 
famine  to  a  surrender  as  humiliating  as  that  of 
Saratoga."8 

7  Mahan,  Influence  of  Sea  Power,  p.  385. 

8  Green,  Short  History  of  the  English  People,  p.  748. 


Ill 

THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  A  NEW  NAVY  AND  THE 
WAR  WITH  FRANCE 

THE  BEGINNINGS  OF  A  NEW  NAVY 

IN  the  chaos  that  followed  the  Revolutionary  War, 
all  that  remained  of  the  Continental  Navy  disappeared. 
The  ship-of-the-line  America,  which  had  been  completed 
shortly  after  the  conclusion  of  peace,  was  presented  by 
the  United  States  to  the  King  of  France,  in  token  of 
gratitude  for  the  timely  aid  of  France  during  the  war. 
The  three  ships  that  survived  the  Revolution,  the  Deane, 
the  Washington,  and  the  Alliance,  were  sold;  and  after 
the  disposal  of  the  last  of  these  in  1785,  the  United  States 
had  not  a  single  armed  vessel. 

With  an  empty  treasury  and  an  overwhelming  public 
debt,  the  new-born  nation  was  in  no  condition  to  maintain 
a  navy ;  but  stronger  than  the  reason  of  economy  was  the 
prevailing  notion  that  an  army  and  a  navy  were  dangerous 
to  the  liberties  of  a  republic.  Years  after  the  country  had 
settled  into  its  quiet  and.  ordered  career  under  the  Con 
stitution,  when  it  was  evident  that  a  navy  cost  less  than 
the  annual  tribute  to  pirates  or  extra  insurance  on  ships 
and  cargoes,  the  same  cry  of  monarchism  continued  to  be 
heard. 

Yet  very  soon  after  the  close  of  the  Revolutionary  War 
the  necessity  of  a  navy  began  to  be  felt.  A  treaty  of 
peace,  in  1785,  between  Spain  and  Algiers,  opened  the 
Atlantic  to  the  Algerian  pirates,  and  in  July  of  the  same 
year  led  to  the  capture  of  the  American  schooner 
Mariaf^  -Five  days  later,  the  ship  Dauphin  of  Phila 
delphia  was  seized,  and  the  crews  of  both  vessels  were 

42 


A  32-PouNDER  CARRONADE"        ,    ,  -,     ., 
(Taken  from  H.  M.  S.  Cyane,llSl6J'^   \    '".,"' 


A  24-PouNDER  LONG  GUN 

(Taken  from  H.  M.  S.  Confiance,  1814.    This  and  the  carronade  shown  above  are 
now  at  the  U.  S.  Naval  Academy; 


Trouble  with  Algiers  43 

taken  into  Algiers  as  slaves.  At  this  time  our  consul- 
general  at  Paris,  Thomas  Barclay,  was  conducting  a  suc 
cessful  negotiation  of  a  treaty  of  peace  with  the  Emperor 
of  Morocco.  The  costs  of  this  treaty  amounted  to  less 
than  $10,000  in  presents,  with  no  annual  tribute  for  the 
future ;  and  it  was  hoped  that  some  equally  good  treaty 
might  be  made  with  Algiers. 

The  capture  of  the  Maria  and  the  Dauphin,  how 
ever,  complicated  the  situation  because,  in  addition 
to  the  cost  of  a  treaty,  the  prisoners  would  have  to  be 
ransomed  on  whatever  terms  the  Dey  of  Algiers  chose. 
It  was  soon  evident  that  he  was  in  no  hurry  to  conclude 
a  treaty  with  America,  for  the  prospect  of  preying  on 
the  shipping  of  a  weak  nation  was  highly  attractive.  The 
United  States  made  three  distinct  efforts  to  treat  with  the 
Dey  of  Algiers  and  all  were  failures,  the  last  being  en 
trusted  to  John  Paul  Jones,  who  died  before  the  orders 
reached  him.  By  the  time  a  fourth  envoy  was  dispatched, 
the  Dey  refused  to  give  him  audience,  and  at  the  same 
time  a  treaty  of  peace  between  Portugal  and  Algiers  made 
still  freer  for  the  corsairs  the  highway  into  the  Atlantic. 
This  treaty,  in  1793,  was  negotiated  by  the  English 
consul-general,  apparently  with  no  authority  from  Portu 
gal.  At  this  time  the  British  Government  was  frankly 
subsidizing  the  Barbary  states  to  prey  on  the  shipping  of 
rival  nations,  especially  America — a  policy  which  was 
maintained  until  the  United  States  made  her  own  terms 
in  the  Mediterranean  by  force  of  arms. 

Taking  instant  advantage  of  the  treaty  with  Portugal, 
Algerian  corsairs  swarmed  into  the  Atlantic  and,  in: 
the  course  of  one  month,  captured  eleven  American 
vessels.  By  this  time  Algiers  held  thirteen  American 
pri/es,  and  their  crows  to  the  number  of  119,  seven  of 
whom  died  in  captivity. 

This  disgraceful  situation  at  last  prompted  Congress 


44  The  United  States  Navy 

X 

to  measures  of  force.  On  March  27,  1794,  the  President 
signed  an  act  providing  for  six  frigates,  four  of  forty- 
four  guns,  and  two  of  thirty-six,  for  the  purpose  of  pro 
tection  against  Algiers.  The  act,  however,  wyas  careful 
to  make  clear  that  there  was  no  intention  of  inaugurating 
a  permanent  navy,  saying  that  "if  a  peace  should  take 
place  between  the  United  States  and  the  regency  of 
Algiers,  no  farther  proceeding  shall  be  had  under  this 
act. ' '  The  fact  remains,  nevertheless,  that  this  law  marks 
the  beginning  of  the  permanent  American  Navy. 

Work  on  the  frigates  was  promptly  begun ;  and,  fortu 
nately,  the  design  of  the  new  vessels  was  left  to  the 
finest  ship-builder  in  the  country,  Joshua  Humphreys.  It 
is  a  significant  compliment  to  his  skill  that  toward  the 
close  of  the  War  of  1812,  England  built  frigates  "exactly 
upon  the  plan  of  the  large  American  frigates, ' ' 1  which 
had  been  constructed  according  to  his  designs.  His  idea 
was,  "  that  the  vessels  should  combine  such  qualities  of 
strength,  durability,  swiftness  of  sailing,  and  force,  as  to 
render  them  superior  to  any  frigate  belonging  to  the 
European  Powers."  His  chief  innovations  were  pro 
visions  for  heavier  batteries  than  had  hitherto  been 
attempted  for  frigates,  much  thicker  scantlings,  finer  lines, 
and  spars  longer  and  stouter  than  those  of  any  British 
frigate.  The  President,  for  example,  had  a  thicker  side 
by  one  inch  than  the  British  74-gun  ship-of-the-line  Hero, 
and  a  mainmast  a  foot  longer  than  that  of  a  British  64- 
gun  ship. 

TYPES  OF  SHIPS  AND  GUNS 

It  is  worth  noting  what  the  term  "frigate"  meant  at 
the  close  of  the  18th  century.  The  victories  of  Rodney  and 
of  Nelson  were  won  with  fleets  of  "ships-of-the-line." 

1  London  Times,  March  17,  1814. 

3  Report  of  Gen.  Knox,  Secretary  of  War,  December  27,  1794. 


Types  of  Ships  and  Guns 


45 


46  The  United  States  Navy 

These  were  heavy  vessels  of  two  or  three  gun  decks,  carry 
ing  from  seventy-five  to  125  guns.  The  "  frigate  "  was, 
like  the  "  ship-of-the-line, "  ship-rigged,  but  distinguished 
by  having  only  one  gun  deck  below  the  spar  deck.  Being 
speedier  than  the  heavy  ship-of-the-line,  the  frigate  was 
getrerally  used  for  scout  duty;  she  was  the  "  cruiser  " 
of  this  periotb'^ 

A  third  class  was  the  " sloop  of  war."  This,  the 
smallest  type^was  distinguished  by  the  fact  that  all  her 
armament  was  mounted  on  the  spar  deck.  These  "sloops" 
were  sometimes  ship-rigged,  sometimes  brigs  or  schooners, 
and  they ~vaT fed  widely  in  tonnage.  The  ship-rigged  sloops 
were  fretjCfSntry  spoken  of  as  "corvettes."  Between  the 
ship-of-the-line  and  the  frigate  there  was  an  intermediary 
class,  the  "razee,"  which  was  simply  a  ship-of-the-line 
that  had  been  cut  down  one  deck,  but  was  still  of  greater 
size  and  heavier  metal  than  the  frigate.  As  a  type  it  is 
unimportant;  but  the  other  three  classes,  "ship-of-the- 
line,"  "frigate,"  and  "sloop,"  were  standard  types  till 
the  days  of  steam  and  steel. 

The  naval  guns  of  the  period  may  be  divided  into 
two  classes,  long;  guns  and  short  guns,  or  "carronades. " 
Both  were  cast  iron  tubes,  thicker  at  the  breech  than  at 
the  muzzle,  and  of  smooth  bore.  The  long  gun  was  cast 
heavy  and  long,  to  bear  a  heavy  charge  and  to  strike  a 
distant  target ;  while  the  carronade  was  short  and  wide- 
muzzled,  designed  to  throw  a  heavy  shot,  with  a  small 
charge  of  powder,  at  close  quarters.  The  carronade 
(named  from  the  village  of  Carron  in  Scotland  where  the 
type  of  gun  was  first  cast)  was  high  in  favor  in  Nelson's 
day  because  of  its  tremendous  smashing  qualities  in  a 
yard-arm  fight.  The  usual  practice  was  to  mount  the 
carronades  and  lighter  long  guns  on  the  spar  deck  of  a 
frigate,  and  to  equip  the  gun  deck  with  the  heavier  long 
guns.  These  carronades  and  long  guns  Avere  graded 


Types  of  Ships  and  Guns 


47 


48  The  United  States  Navy 

according  to  the  weight  of  shot  they  threw.  At  the  end 
of  the  18th  century  the  long  42-pounder  represented  the 
most  formidable  naval  ordnance  of  the  day,  but  the  long 
guns  on  a  frigate  usually  varied  from  twelves  to  twenty- 
fours  and  the  short  ones  from  twenty-fours  to  forty-twos. 
All  these  guns  were  mounted  on  wooden  carriages;  the 
recoil  threw  the  gun  inboard  as  far  as  the  breeching 
would  allow,  and  when  it  was  reloaded  it  was  run  out 
again  by  hand  tackles.  Indeed,  all  the  labor  connected 
with  the  loading,  aiming  and  firing  of  a  gun  was  done 
by  hand.  Elevating  was  done  by  means  of  a  handspike 
under  the  breech  where  a  wooden  wedge,  called  a  '  *  quoin, ' ' 
was  inserted  when  the  desired  angle  was  reached.  As  a 
rule,  there  were  no  sights ;  when  the  matter  of  sights  was 
called  to  the  attention  of  Nelson  in  1801,  he  objected  to 
them  on  the  ground  that  ships  should  always  be  at  such 
close  quarters  that  missing  would  become  impossible.  This 
contempt  of  accurate  aim  sheds  some  light  on  the  low 
state  of  British  gunnery  during  our  War  of  1812. 

Firing  was  done  on  some  ships  by  flint  locks,  but 
these  missed  so  often  that  the  priming  quill  was  more 
popular.  This  was  a  split  quill,  full  of  powder,  inserted 
in  the  touch-hole  of  the  gun.  The  cartridge  had  already 
been  punctured  by  a  sharp  wire  thrust  through  the  touch- 
hole,  so  that  when  a  slow  match  in  the  hands  of  the 
captain  of  the  gun  touched  off  the  powder  in  the  quill, 
the  discharge  followed  almost  instantaneously.  All  the 
men  were  assigned  to  the  guns  of  one  broadside,  a  large 
crew  to  each  gun,  every  man  of  whom  had  a  definite  duty 
to  perform.  In  case  a  ship  had  to  fight  both  broadsides 
v  at  once,  half  the  crew  of  each  gun  ran  to  the  corresponding 
gun  on  the  opposite  side. 

The  number  of  guns  a  ship  carried  gave  her  her  rating 
within  her  own  class.  The  ships-of-the-line  ranged  from 
"74's"  to  "120's,"  frigates  from  "28's"  to  "44  V  but 


Types  of  Ships  and  Guns 


49 


50  The  United  States  Navy 

the  technical  rating  was  always  below  the  actual  number 
of  guns  carried.  The  "44-gun"  frigate  Constitution, 
for  example,  carried  fifty-four  guns  in  her  battle  with  the 
Java. 

In  accordance  with  the  act  of  March  27,  1794,  six 
frigates  were  laid  down  as  follows : 

N/  Constitution,  44  guns,  1576  tons,  costing  $302,719,  at 
Boston. 

President,  44  guns,  1576  tons,  $220,910,  at  New  York. 

United  States,  44  guns,  1576  tons,  $299,336,  at  Phila 
delphia. 

Chesapeake,  36  guns,  1244  tons,  $220,678,  at  Norfolk.3 

Congress,  36  guns,  1268  tons,  $197,246,  at  Portsmouth. 

Constellation,  36  guns,  1265  tons,  $314,212,  at  Bal 
timore. 

It  is  interesting  to  compare  figures  like  these  with 
those  of  one  of  our  latest  battleships,  the  North  Dakota: 
ten  12-inch  guns,  20,000  tons,  costing  approximately 
$8,000,000. 

On  the  fifth  of  June  of  the  same  year,  six  captains 
were  selected  in  the  following  order :  John  Barry,  Samuel 
Nicholson,  Silas  Talbot,  Joshua  Barney,  Richard  Dale,  and 
Thomas  Truxtun.  All  of  these  men  had  distinguished 
themselves  in  the  struggle  for  independence.  Captain 
Barney,  however,  feeling  that  he  was  unjustly  rated  with 
reference  to  the  men  above  him,  declined  to  serve,  and 
James  Sever  was  appointed  sixth  captain,  ranking  after 
Truxtun.  The  lieutenants  were  to  be  selected  by  the 
captains,  the  first  lieutenant  of  Barry  ranking  the  first 
lieutenant  of  Nicholson,  etc. 

Meanwhile,  efforts  were  continued  to  arrange  a  treaty 
with  Algiers;  and  finally,  toward  the  close  of  the  year 
1795,  a  humiliating  treaty  was  ratified  by  the  Senate, 
requiring  the  United  States  to  pay  Algiers  maritime  stores 

8  The  Chesapeake  was  intended  originally  to  be  a  forty- four. 


Causes  of  the  War  with  France  51 

to  the  value  of  $21,600  annually.  The  cost  of  obtaining 
this  treaty,  including  ransom  of  captives,  amounted  to 
nearly  a  million  dollars. 

The  law  provided  that  nothing  more  was  to  be  done 
on  the  frigates  if  peace  was  arranged,  but  three  were  so 
far  constructed  that  Congress  authorized  their  completion. 
The  perishable  material  of  the  other  three  was  ordered 
sold,  and  the  rest  kept  in  storage  for  future  use.  In  1797 
the  'three  frigates  completed  were  launched  in  the  follow 
ing  order:  the  United  States,  ^  July  10,  at  Philadelphia; 
the  Constellation,  September  7,  at  Baltimore ;  and  the 
Constitution,  September  20,  at  Boston.  Captain  Barry 
commanded  the  United  States,  Captain  Nicholson,  the 
Constitution,  and,  as  it  happened,  Truxtun,  the  fifth 
on  the  list,  who  had  been  appointed  to  command  the  36-gun 
Constellation,  got  to  sea  with  his  command,  while  his 
seniors,  Captains  Talbot  and  Dale,  were  forced  into  other 
occupations,  because  their  frigates  were  not  completed. 
This  point,  later,  gave  rise  to  a  question  of  seniority 
between  these  two  and  Captain  Truxtun,  because  at  the 
time  it  was  not  clear  whether  Talbot  and  Dale  had  been 
retired  or  merely  put  on  furlough. 

According  to  the  terms  of  the  above  treaty,  as  we  have 
seen,  the  difficulties  with  Algiers  were  settled  by  the 
payment  of  a  large  annual  tribute  and  a  cash  payment  at 
the  time  of  nearly  a  million  dollars.  The  last  item  alone 
would  Have  been  sufficient  to  build  and  equip  three  44-gun 
frigates,  which  could  have  gone  far  toward  protecting  our 
shipping,  and  might  even  have  blockaded  Algiers,  and 
forced  a  peace  on  terms  of  honor. 

WAR  WITH  FRANCE 

Long  before  the  first  three  frigates  were  launched, 
other  enemies  than  Algiers  had  appeared.  In  the  tremen 
dous  conflict  between  Napoleon  and  England,  French  and 


52  The  United  States  Navy 

English  cruisers  and  privateers  alike  plundered  American 
merchantmen.  A  treaty  ofjj  amity,  commerce,  and  navi 
gation,"  in  1795,  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States,  temporarily  relieved  the  burden  of  British  oppres 
sion,  but  only  increased  the  hostility  of  the  French.  In 
1797,  the  Secretary  of  State  reported  that  documents 
concerning  the  capture  of  thirty-two  ships,  brigs,  and 
schooners  lay  in  the  department,  while  the  newspapers  had 
reported  some  308  others,  all  by  French  cruisers.  In  many 
cases,  these  captures  were  attended  with  great  inhumanity 
toward  the  unlucky  crews.  Finally,  to  bring  their  inso 
lence  to  a  climax,  early  in  1798,  French  privateers  began 
to  make  captures  in  American  harbors. 

This  was  too  much  even  for  the  Congress  of  that  day, 
and  in  April  of  the  same  year  an  act  was  passed  authoriz 
ing  the  building,  purchase,  or  hire  of  "  a  number  of  vessels 
not  exceeding  twelve  ...  to  be  armed,  fitted,  and 
manned."  On  April  30,  1798,  the  office  of  the  Secretary 
of  the  Navy  was  established,  to  which  Benjamin  Stoddert 
of  Georgetown,  D.  C.,  was  appointed.  Several  other  acts 
followed  in  quick  succession,  authorizing  the  further  exten 
sion  of  the  navy;  more  especially  the  building  of  the 
three  frigates  suspended  in  1796,  and  the  establishing  of  a 
marine  corps.  Further,  all  treaties  with  France  were 
declared  voici^  and  rules  were  made  governing  the  capture 
of  prizes.  The  entire  naval  force  authorized  by  these  acts 
consisted  of  twelve  ships  of  not  less  than  32  guns,  twelve 
ships  of  not  less  than  20  nor  exceeding  24  guns,  and  six 
not  exceeding  18  guns,  besides  galleys  and  revenue  cutters. 

Of  this  force,  Captain  Richard  Dale,  in  the  Ganges, 
24  guns,  was  the  first  to  get  to  sea,  followed  in  a  few  days 
by  Captain  Truxtun  in  the  frigate  Constellation,  36 
guns,  and  Captain  Stephen  Decatur  (senior),  in  the  cor 
vette  Delaware,  of  20  guns.  These  vessels  were  under 
orders  to  capture  only  such  French  ships  as  they  found 
guilty  of  hostile  acts,  but  it  was  only  a  matter  of  a  few 


The  Baltimore  Affair  53 

days  before  the  Delaware  took  the  Croyable,  a  French 
privateer  of  14  guns,  caught  red-handed  off  the  American 
coast.  This  vessel  was  taken  into  the  service,  under  the 
name  Retaliation,  and  put  under  the  command  of  Lieu 
tenant  William  Bainbridge. 

By  the  time  the  other  ships  were  ready  for  sea,  the 
administration  had  decided  to  carry  on  a  vigorous  offen 
sive  campaign  in  the  West  Jtndies  instead  of  merely  patrol 
ling  the  Atlantic  coast.  Accordingly,  during  the  winter 
of  1798-9,  the  fleet  was.,  divided  into  three  squadrons, 
with  definite  cruising  grounds  assigned  to  each.  The 
frigates  President,  Chesapeake,  and  Congress  were  as 
yet  unfinished,  and  the  greater  number  of  the  vessels  in 
the  "squadrons  were  merchantmen  hastily  transformed 
into  men-of-war.  Nevertheless  upon  the  mere  sailing  of 
these  squadrons  for  the  West  Indies,  the  'rates  of  insur 
ance  fell  off,  in  some  cases  as  much  as  fifty  per  cent ;  for 
one  of  the  important  duties  of  these  men-of-war  was  the 
safe  conduct  of  fleets  of  American  merchantmen. 

While  thus  convoying  a  fleet  from  Charleston  to 
Havana,  Captain  Phillips,  of  the  20-gun  sloop  Balti 
more,  underwent  an  experience  that  cost  him  his  epaulets 
and  aroused  in  the  nation  a  feeling  of  bitterness  against 
Great  Britain  that  did  not  subside  till  after  the  War  of 
1812.  Shortly  before  reaching  Havana,  November  16, 
1798,  Captain  Phillips  ran  into  a  British  squadron.  Sig 
naling  his  convoy  to  scatter  and  make  every  effort  to 
reach  port,  he  himself  bore  up  to  meet  the  flagship,  hoping 
to  divert  attention  from  the  merchantmen.  On  being 
invited  aboard  the  flagship,  he  was  coolly  informed  that 
the  British  commodore,  Loring,  would  impress  all  of  the 
Baltimore's  crew  who  did  not  have  American  "protec 
tion  papers."  Phillips  protested,  but  he  was  in  a  difficult 
situation.  He  had  been  provided  with  no  commission  to 
prove  that  the  Baltimore  was  a  public  vessel,  he  had 
been  strictly  ordered  to  avoid  all  hostile  acts  toward 


54  The  United  States  Navy 

British  men-of-war,  "even  if  they  were  in  the  act  of 
capturing  American  vessels,"  and,  finally,  he  lay  under 
the  guns  of  an  overwhelming  force.  At  last  he  submitted. 
Fifty-five  of  the  Baltimore's  crew  were  taken  off,  but 
of  these  fifty  were  returned.  As  Loring  refused  to  accept 
the  surrender  of  the  American  corvette,  Phillips  continued 
to  Havana.  On  his  return  to  the  United  States,  he  made 
a  detailed  report  of  the  affair  to  the  Department,  with 
the  result  that  he  was  promptly  dismissed  from  the 
service  by  Secretary  Stoddert. 

Immediately  after  this  incident,  the  Secretary  issued 
orders  to  each  of  the  commanders  of  the  squadrons  in  the 
West  Indies  in  the  following  vein :  ' '  Sir — It  is  the  posi 
tive  command  of  the  President  that  on  no  pretense  what 
ever  you  permit  the  public  vessels  of  war  under  your 
command  to  be  detained  or  searched,  nor  any  of  the 
officers  belonging  to  her  to  be  taken  from  her  by  the  ships 
or  vessels  of  any  foreign  nation,  so  long  as  you  are  in  a 
capacity  to  repel  such  outrage  on  the  honor  of  the  Amer 
ican  flag.  If  force  should  be  exerted  to  compel  your 
submission  you  are  to  resist  that  force  to  the  utmost  of 
your  power,  and  when  overpowered  by  superior  force,  you 
are  to  strike  your  flag  and  thus  yield  your  vessel  as  well 
as  your  men,  but  never  your  men  without  your  vessel. 

Four  days  after  the  Baltimore  outrage,  the  Retaliation, 
Lieutenant  William  Bainbridge,  was  overhauled  off 
Guadeloupe,  by  two  French  frigates,  Insurgente  and 
Volontier,  and  compelled  to  strike.  It  was  due  to  Bain- 
bridge's  quick  wit,  shortly  after  his  surrender,  that  the 
other  two  American  sloops,  the  Montezuma  and  the 
Norfolk,  which  happened  to  be  in  the  neighborhood,  were 
not  taken  also.  The  Insurgente  was  rapidly  overhauling 
them,  when  the  captain  of  the  Volontier,  turning  to  Bain- 
bridge,  asked  him  the  force  of  the  American  vessels. 

"The  ship  carries  twenty-eight  12-pounders,  and  the 
brig  twenty  9-pounders, ' '  he  replied. 


The  Constellation  and  the  Insurgente        55 

Surprised  at  such  force,  the  Frenchman  instantly 
recalled  the  Insurgente  and  did  not  realize  the  decep 
tion  till  her  captain  came  aboard  and  reported  the  facts. 
In  the  meantime,  the  two  sloops  made  good  their  escape. 

On  the  9th  of  February,  1799,  the  Constellation 
sighted  a  large  sail  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  island  of 
Nevis.  The  stranger  hoisted  American  colors  as  Captain 
Truxtun  bore  down  on  her,  but  was  unable  to  answer  the 


SCENE  OF  TJf£  WAR  WITH  FRANCE 


HAITI 
-      ~-v 


SCENE  OF  THE  WAR  WITH  FRANCE 

private  signals  which  he  displayed.  She  soon  declared 
herself  an  enemy  by  raising  the  tricolor  and  firing  a  gun 
to  windward.  The  following  account  is  from  Captain 
Truxtun's  report  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  dated  on 
the  10th  of  February,  the  day  after  the  battle: 

"I  continued  bearing  down  on  her,  and  at  a  quarter 
past  three  P.M.  she  hailed  me  several  times;  and  as  soon 
as  I  got  in  a  position  for  every  shot  to  do  execution,  I 
answered  by  commencing  a  close  and  successful  engage 
ment,  which  lasted  until  about  half-past  four  P.M.,  when 


56  The  United  States  Navy 

she  struck  her  colors  to  the  U.  S.  Ship  Constellation, 
and  I  immediately  took  possession  of  her.  She  proved  to 
be  the  celebrated  French  national  frigate  Insurgente, 
of  40  guns  and  409  men,  lately  out  from  France,  com 
manded  by  Monsieur  Barreaut,  and  is  esteemed  one  of  the 
fastest-sailing  ships  in  the  French  Navy.  I  have  been 
much  shattered  in  my  rigging  and  sails,  and  my  foretop- 
mast  rendered,  from  wounds,  useless — you  may  depend  the 
enemy  is  not  less  so.  The  high  state  of  our  discipline,  with 
the  gallant  conduct  of  my  officers  and  men,  would  have 
enabled  me  to  have  made  a  more  formidable  enemy  yield, 
had  the  fortune  of  war  thrown  him  in  my  way.  As  it  is, 
I  hope  the  President  and  my  country  will,  for  the  present, 
be  content  with  a  very  fine  frigate  being  added  to  our 
navy.  I  must  not  omit  in  this  hasty  detail  to  do  justice 
to  M.  Barreaut;  for  he  defended  his  ship  manfully,  and 
from  my  raking  him  several  times  fore  and  aft,  and  being 
athwart  his  stern,  ready  with  every  gun  to  fire,  when  he 
struck  his  colors,  we  may  impute  the  conflict  not  being 
more  bloody  on  our  side;  for  had  not  these  advantages 
been  taken,  the  engagement  would  not  have  ended  so 
soon;  for  the  Insurgente  was  completely  officered  and 
manned." 

The  total  loss  of  the  Constellation  amounted  to  two 
badly  wounded  and  one  slightly  wounded.  Early  in  the 
action  one  man  was  shot  by  the  third  lieutenant  for  desert 
ing  his  quarters.  The  loss  of  the  Insurgente  amounted 
to  twenty-nine  killed  and  forty-one  wounded.  Both 
frigates  were  rated  at  36,  but  the  American  broadside  was 
fully  one-third  heavier  than  the  French. 

During  the  action  with  the  Insurgente,  Midship 
man  David  Porter,  who  was  stationed  in  the  foretop  of 
the  Constellation,  saved  the  wounded  foretopmast  from 
falling  over  by  going  aloft,  under  fire,  cutting  away 
the  slings  of  the  yards  and  letting  them  down.  Porter 
had  another  and  more  trying  proof  of  his  coolness  and 


The  Constellation  and  the  Vengeance        57 

gallantry  after  the  action,  when  he  and  Lieutenant  John 
Rodgers  were  sent  with  a  prize  crew  of  eleven  men  to 
take  possession  of  the  captured  frigate.  A  gale  which 
arose  after  the  battle  separated  the  two  vessels  before  all 
the  prisoners  could  be  transferred  to  the  Constellation, 
and  the  two  young  officers  found  themselves  forced  to 
navigate  a  ship  whose  decks  were  still  strewn  with  dead 
and  wounded,  and  whose  spars,  sails,  and  rigging  were 
cut  to  pieces,  some  of  which  encumbered  the  decks — a 
situation  made  critical  by  the  sjtorm^  .  But  the  worst 
danger  lay  in  the  fact  that,  before  the  surrender,  the 
hatches  had  been  thrown  overboard,  and  the  prize  crew  of 
two  officers  and  eleven  men  had  the  task  of  guarding 
173  prisoners,  as  well  as  navigating  a  crippled  ship  in  a 
gale.  A  heavily-armed  sentinel  was  placed  at  each  hatch 
way,  with  orders  to  fire  at  the  first  prisoner  that  attempted 
to  come  on  deck ;  and  during  the  three  nights  and  two 
days  that  passed  before  the  ship  reported  to  Truxtun  at 
St.  Kitts,  neither  Rodgers  nor  Porter  could  take  a  single 
minute  of  sleep  or  even  rest.  These  two  officers  rose  sub 
sequently  to  distinction  in  positions  of  command,  but  they 
never  afterward  had  to  go  through  a  more  trying  test  of 
their  courage  and  efficiency. 

During  the  year  1799,  American  operations  in  the 
West  Indies  were  hampered  by  the  fact  that  enlistments 
had  been,  by  law,  for  only  one  year.  Every  ship,  there 
fore,  had  to  leave  her  station  during  this  year  and  go  to 
the  United  States  for  fresh  crews ;  and  the  French  priva 
teers  that  made  Guadeloupe  their  base  were  quick  to  take 
advantage  of  these  enforced  absences.  On  the  whole, 
however,  the  French  gained  little  beyond  a  brief  respite. 

The  second  frigate  action  of  the  war  also  fell  to 
Truxtun  and  the  Constellation.  On  the  morning, of, Feb 
ruary  1,  1800,  while  about  fifteen  miles  west  of  Basse 
Terre,  the  Constellation  sighted  a  ship  which  soon  proved 
to  be  a  French  frigate,  the  Vengeance.  Captain  Truxtun 


58  The  United  States  Navy 

immediately  gave  chase ;  but,  owing  to  the  light  wind,  it 
was  not  till  eight  o'clock  on  the  evening  of  the  2d  that 
he  was  able  to  close.  The  Frenchman,  without  waiting  to 
hear  the  hail  of  the  American,  opened  fire  with  his  stern 
and  quarter  guns,  which  he  directed  at  the  Constellation's 
rigging. 

Captain  Truxtun  then  gave  orders,  ' '  not  to  throw  away 
a  single  charge  of  powder  and  shot,  but  to  take  good  aim 
and  fire  directly  into  the  hull  of  the  enemy."  A  few 
minutes  later,  he  gained  a  gq^d  position  on  the  weather 
quarter  of  the  Vengeange*  which  enabled  the  American 
batteries  to  reply /^^b^harp  action  followed,  lasting  till 
about  1  A.M.,  when  the  Vengeance  stopped  firing  and 
sheered  off  as  if  to  escape.  Just  as  Captain  Truxtun  was 
trimming  his  shattered  rigging  to  come  alongside  and  take 
possession,  his  mainmast  fell  over  the  side.  As  the  Con 
stellation  was  now  unable  to  pursue  the  Vengeance,  the 
latter  made  good  her  escape. 

In  his  report  of  this  action,  Captain  Truxtun  gave  the 
American  loss  as  fourteen  killed  and  twenty-five  wounded. 
The  only  officer  killed  was  Midshipman  Jarvis,  who  was 
stationed  in  the  maintop  and  who,  though  warned  of  the 
dangerous  condition  of  the  mast,  refused  to  leave  his 
quarters  without  orders.  The  casualties  of  the  Vengeance 
are  put  at  fifty  killed  and  110  wounded.  She  was  a  beaten 
ship,  and  was  saved  from  capture  only  by tRe'  f all  of  the 
Constellation's  mainmast.  Her  first  lieutenant  stated 
some  years  afterward  that  the  tricolor  was  struck  two  or 
three  times;  but,  owing  to  the  darkness  and  smoke,  this 
fact  evidently  was  not  perceived  by  the  officers  of  the 
Constellation.  While  it  is  impossible  to  state  the  precise 
armament  of  the  French  frigate  during  this  action,  owing 
to  the  disparity  of  the  reports,4  all  the  authorities  are 

4  According  to  the  lowest  estimate,  that  of  an  American 
prisoner  on  the  Vengeance,  she  carried  fifty-four  grins,  firing  516  Ibs. 
at  a  broadside.  The  Constellation  fired  a  broadside  of  only  372  Ibs. 


Conclusion  of  the  War  59 

agreed  in  a  considerable  superiority  in  weight  of  metal 
over  that  of  the  Constellation. 

The  third  encounter  with  a  French  man-of-war  took 
place,  October  12,  1800,  between  the  frigate  Boston  of 
36  guns  and  the  sloop  Berceau  of  24.  The  French  ship 
was  taken  only  after  a  long  and  stubborn  running  fight, 
in  which  the  honors  belong  to  the  French  captain,  Senez. 

But  the  real  work  of  the  war  lay  in  the  capture -of  the 
privateers  that  swarmect  out  of  the  French  ports -of  the 
West  Indies,  and  there  "were  many  spirited  combats 
between,  our  smaller  vessels  and  those  privateers.  One 
particularly  gallant  exploit  was  performed  by  Lieutenant 
Isaac  Hull,  who  ran  into  Port  Plate  in  broad  daylight, 
spiked  the  guns  of  the  fort,  and  surprised  and  carried 
away  one  of  the  best  equipped  and  most  successful  of  the 
French  privateers.  Mention  also  must  be  made  of  the 
famous  cruise  of  the  schooner  Enterprise,  under  Lieu 
tenant  John  Shaw,  who,  in  ei^lit  months,  captured  six 
privateers  and  recaptured  eleven  American  merchantmen. 
This  is  only  the  beginning  of  the  fame  of  this  little  vessel ; 
for  she  came  to  be  regarded,  next  to  the  Constitution,  as 
the  "lucky"  vessel  of  the  navy. 

The  foregoing  naval  operations  against  France  covered 
in  all  about  two  years  and  a  half ;  at  the  end  of  that  time, 
February  1,  1801,  they  were  terminated  by  a  treaty  of 
peace,  which  had  been  under  way  for  several  njonths.  By 
the  terms  of  this  treaty  each  side  was  to  return  to  the  other 
all  government  vessels  that  had  been  captured.  This 
provision  was  greatly  to  the  advantage  of  France,  because 
none  of  our  men-of-war  had  been  taken  save  the  Retalia 
tion,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  had  originally  been  a  French 
privateer.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Insurgente,  the  Berceau, 
and  a  small  cruiser,  the  Vengeance,  had  been  taken  by 
American  ships.  The  Insurgente,  dispatched  to  the  West 
Indies  early  in  the  fall  of  1800,  was  never  heard  from 
again.  The  other  two  were  turned  over  to  France.  Of  the 


60  The  United  States  Navy 

eighty-four  vessels  remaining  in  the  hands  of  the  United 
States  at  the  close  of  hostilities,  thirteen  were  released, 
and  one  was  sunk,  leaving  seventy  lawful  prizes  for  the 
American  Navy. 

The  war,  while  never  formally  declared,  and  existing 
only  in  the  West  Indies,  was  of  great  benefit  to  the  young 
American  Navy. r^TEe*  large  increase  in  exports  due  to 
the  protection  afforded  by  our  cruisers,  and  their  brilliant 
successes  in  battle,  gave  the  navy  a  standing  and  popu 
larity  that  it  needed  in  the  days  when  the  maintenance  of 
a  man-of-war  seemed,  to  many,  a  threat  of  monarchy.  To 
the  personnel  of  the  navy,  also,  it  gave  a  practical  train 
ing  in  warfare  and  self-confidence.  The  heroes  of  the 
war  with  Tripoli  and  the  second  war  with  Great  Britain 
received  their  schooling  as  midshipmen  or  lieutenants  in 
the  West  Indian  campaigns. 

A  point,  also,  which  cannot  be  overlooked  is  the  fact 
that  during  these  campaigns,  while  American  men-of-war 
were  co-operating  with  the  British  in  fighting  the  French, 
an  "Act  for  the  Better  Government  of  the  Navy  of  the 
United  States"  was"  passed "tJy" "Congress,  embodying  a 
set  of  regulations  "tat^fi'aTmosTwOrd  for  word  from  the 
rules  that  governed  the  navy  of  Great  Britain.  In  sh,ort, 
the  discipline  and  traditions  of  the  British  service  were 
then  adopted  as  the  standards  of  our  own.  Had  the 
United  States  been  allied  with  France  against  England 
at  this  time,  and  had  the  practice  of  the  French  Navy 
been  accepted  as  our  own,  the  results  would  have  been 
unfortunate,  since  the  discipline  of  the  French  men-of- 
war  was  at  that  time  demoralized  by  the  levelling  ideas  of 
the  French  Revolution.  The  point  is  aptly  expressed  in 
the  remark  of  the  Duke  of  Wellington,  "I  believe  in  free 
speech,  but  not  on  board  a  man-of-war." 


IV 

THE  WAR  WITH  TRIPOLI 

AN  INSULT  BY  ALGIERS 

THE  treaties  of  peace  bought  from  Morocco  in  1786, 
Algiers  in  1795,  Tripoli  in  1796,  and  Tunis  in  1797,  by  no 
means  settled  the  difficulties  between  American  ships  and 
Barbary  corsairs.  Indeed,  the  following  incident,  for 
which  the  Dey  of  Algiers  was  responsible,  was  character 
istic  of  the  attitude  of  all  the  Barbary  rulers  at  that  time. 

In  1800,  when  only  twenty-six  years  old,  William 
Bainbridge  was  promoted  to  the  rank  of  captain,  having 
served  but  two  years  in  the  navy.  In  these  two  years, 
however,  he  had  come  into  public  notice,  especially  on 
account  of  his  experience  in  the  dungeons  of  Guadeloupe 
during  the  war  with  France.  He  was  assigned  the  George 
Washington,  of  24  guns,  one  of  the  ships  purchased  for 
the  navy  at  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  with  France,  with 
orders  to  carry  the  annual  tribute  to  Algiers.  Captain 
Bainbridge  thus  had  the  distinction  of  commanding  the 
first  American  man-of-war  to  enter  the  Mediterranean, 
but  the  honor  was  over-shadowed  by  the  humiliating 
nature  of  his  mission.  Bad  as  this  was,  the  sequel  was  so 
much  worse  that  it  may  fairly  be  described  as  the  most 
mortifying  incident  in  the  record  of  the  navy. 

When  the  Washington  arrived  in  September,  1800,  the 
Dey  of  Algiers  was  having  difficulties  with  the  _S.ultan  of 
Turkey — the  over-lord  of  the  Barbary  rulers — because  the 
Algerians  had  made  peace  with  Napoleon  at  a  time  when 
Turkey  was  fighting  him.  In  order  to  conciliate  his 
master,  the  Dey  of  Algiers  wished  to  send  presents  to 
Constantinople,  and  for  this  purpose  requested  the  loan 

61 


62  The  United  States  Navy 

of  the  American  man-of-war.  Naturally,  the  American 
consul  and  Captain  Bainbridge  protested ;  but  the  George 
Washington  was  anchored *un3eF  tne  "batteries  of  Algiers, 
in  a  position  where  she  could  not  escape,  and  the  Dey 
threatened  to  declare  war  instantly  if  the  request  was 
refused.  As  there  were  at  this  time  in  the  Mediterranean 
a  large  number  of  American  merchantmen  which  would 
probably  have  been  captured  if  the  Dey  had  made  good 
his  threat  of  war,  Bainbridge  felt  himself  forced  to  yield 
and  play  errand  boy  for  the  Dey  of  Algiers.  The  latter 
aggravated  the  humiliation  by  compelling  the  American 
captain  to  hoist  the  Algerian  flag  at  the  main,  an  act  that 
virtually  put  the  George  Washington  out  of  commission 
and  transferred  her  to  the  Algerian  Navy.  As  soon  as 
Bainbridge  cleared  the  harbor,  however,  he  hauled  down 
the  Algerian  colors  and  hoisted  his  own. 

At  Constantinople  he  had  the  satisfaction  of  being 
received  with  honor  as  the  representative  of  a  new  nation, 
while  the  Algerian  ambassador  was  given  scant  courtesy. 
During  the  visit,  also,  the  Turkish  admiral  gave  .Captain 
Bainbridge  a  "firman,"  or  passport,  which  insured  him 
resptectful  treatment  in  all  Turkish  ports.  On  returning 
to  Algiers,  the  American  was  careful  to  anchor  out  of 
range  of  the  batteries  and  promptly  refused  the  demand 
of  the  Dey  that  he  make  a  second  trip  to  Constantinople 
During  an  audience  with  the  Dey,  Bainbridge  countered 
a  fierce  threat  of  instant  war  by  displaying  the  Turkish 
"firman."  This  frightened  the  pirate  into  such  respect 
that  thereafter  Captain  Bainbridge  and  his  ship  were 
inviolate.  When  the  Dey  declared  war  with  France,  under 
the  Sultan's  orders,  Bainbridge,  by  using  the  authority  of 
his  "firman,"  compelled  him  to  allow  the  French  subjects 
in  his  city  forty-eight  hours  to  leave  the  country.  As  it 
appeared  that  the  unfortunate  exiles  had  no  other  way 
of  leaving  Algiers  and  escaping  slavery,  Bainbridge  took 


The  Errand  of  the  George  Washington       63 


64  The  United  States  Navy 

them  on  board  the  George  Washington,  and  conveyed  them 
to  Alicante,  whence  they  made  their  way  home.  For  this 
service  he  received  the  thanks  of  Napoleon. 


THE  FIRST  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR  WITH  TRIPOLI 

Meanwhile,  the  Bey  of  Tripoli  also  was  making  trouble. 
Although  he  had  concluded  a  treaty  with  the  United 
States  in  1796,  realizing  in  two  or  three  years  that  he  had 
not  made  so  good  a  bargain  as  his  neighbors,  Algiers  and 
Tunis,  he  felt  obliged  to  demand  more  than  the  treaty 
called  for.  Efforts  to  settle  the  matter  on  a  reasonable 
basis  failed,  and  the  Bey  became  more  and  more  insolent. 
At  last,  in  February,  1801,  he  repudiated  the  former 
treaty,  and,  the  following  May,  declared  war.  The  nego 
tiations  had  been  dragging  on  for  so  long,  however,  that 
American  merchantmen  had  had  a  fair  warning,  and  the 
Tripolitan  cruisers  captured  little  or  nothing. 

As  soon  as  it  became  evident  that  diplomacy  would 
fail,  a  squadron  of  "observation"  was  assembled  at 
Hampton  Roads,  toward  the  end  of  May,  with  orders  to 
visit  the  Barbary  ports  and  open  hostilities  with  any  or  all 
of  the  states  that  had  declared  war;  or,  at  least,  to  help 
diplomatic  relations  by  a  show  of  armed  force.  This 
squadron  consisted  of  the  frigates  President,  44  guns, 
flagship,  Captain  James  Barron;  Philadelphia,  36  guns, 
Captain  Samuel  Barron  (brother  of  James  Barron)  ; 
Essex,  32  guns,  Captain  William  Bainbridge;  and  the 
schooner  Enterprise,  12  guns,  Lieutenant  Andrew  Sterrett. 
These  vessels  were  placed  under  the  command  of  Commo 
dore  Richard  Dale,  famous  as  Paul  Jones's  first  lieutenant 
in  the  battle  between  the  Bonhomme  Richard  and  the 
Serapis. 

The  news  of  the  declaration  of  war  on  the  part  of 
Tripoli  did  not  reach  the  United  S-tates  until  after  the 


The  Declaration  of  War  65 

squadron  had  sailed,  but  the  ships  fortunately  arrived  at 
Gibraltar  just  in  time  to  intercept  the  passage  of  two 
Tripolitan  corsairs  that  were  in  port,  clearly  bound  for  a 
raid  in  the  Atlantic.  Leaving  the  Philadelphia  to  block 
ade  them  in  Gibraltar,  Commodore  Dale  dispatched  the 
Essex  to  collect  the  American  ships  in  neutral  ports  and 
convoy  them  to  the  Atlantic,  while  with  the  remainder  of 
his  squadron  he  cruised  along  the  Barbary  coast.  The 
Bey  *  of  Tripoli  was  somewhat  disturbed  by  the  appear 
ance  of  the  American  ships  and  offered  to  treat  for  peace, 
but,  though  Dale  remained  eighteen  days  off  the  harbor, 
nothing  was  accomplished.  At  the  end  of  that  time,  he 
was  forced  to  put  in  for  fresh  water  at  Malta,  where  he 
arrived  in  the  middle  of  August. 

Meanwhile,  on  the  first  of  that  month,  a  spirited  action 
had  taken  place  between  the  schooner 


_  carried  twelve  guns  and  ninety- 

four  men,  and  the  latter,  fourteen  guns  and  eighty  men, 
the  two  vessels  were  very  evenly  matched.  That  the  result 
was  so  one-sided,  is  chiefly  due  to  the  skill  with  which 
Lieutenant  Sterrett  handled  his  vessel,  never  allowing 
himself  to  be  boarded,  and  time  and  again  raking  his 
antagonist  at  close  range.  The  following  is  his  report  to 
Commodore  Dale: 

"I  have  the  honor  to  inform  you  that  on  the  first  of 
August,  I  fell  in  with  a  Tripolitan  ship-of-war,  called  the 
Tripoli,  mounting  fourteen  guns,  commanded  by  Reis 
Mahomet  Sous,  An  action  commenced  immediately  at 
pistol  shot,  which  continued  three  hours  with  incessant 
firing.  She  then  struck  her  colors.  The  osarnage  on  board 
was  dreadful,  she  having  twenty  men  killed  and  thirty 
wounded  ;  among  the  latter  was  the  captain  and  the  first 
lieutenant.  Her  mizzenmast  went  over  the  side.  Agree- 

1  The  title  of  this  ruler  is  variously  given  as  "  Bey,"  "  Bashaw/' 
or  "Pasha." 


66  The  United  States  Navy 

able  to  your  orders  I  dismantled  her  of  everything  but  an 
old  sail  and  spar.  With  heartfelt  pleasure  I  add,  that  the 
officers  and  men  throughout  the  vessel  behaved  in  the 
most  spirited  and  determined  manner,  obeying  every 
command  with  promptitude  and  alertness.  We  had  not  a 
man  wounded,  and  sustained  no  material  damage  in  our 
hull  or  rigging. ' ' 

For  this  brilliant  exploit,  Sterrett  received  the  thanks 
of  Congress  and  a  sword,  while  an  extra  month's  pay  was 
awarded  to  his  officers  and  men.  The  reason  that  the 
Tripoli,  mounting  fourteen  guns,  commanded  by  Reis, 
being  destroyed,  was  that  the  commodore's  orders  from 
the  President  did  not  allow  him  to  take  prizes.  Jefferson 
held  that,  under  the  Constitution,  war  had  to  be  declared 
by  Congress,  that  all  he  could  direct  the^uadron  to  do, 
therefore,  was  to  act  on  the  defensive.  This  strict  inter 
pretation  of  the  Constitution  undoubtedly  tied  Dale's 
hands  somewhat  up  to  the  time  (February,  1802)  when 
Congress  passed  an  act  that  gave  the  President  full  war 
powers.  Still  one  would  expect  from  Paul  Jones 's  favorite 
lieutenant  more  than  the  barren  results  of  the  first  year 
of  the  Tripolitan  War.  The  blockade,  which  at  first  had 
been  very  annoying  to  the  Bey  of  Tripoli,  was  gradually 
relaxed,  and,  after  the  departure  of  Commodore  Dale  for 
the  United  States  in  March,  1802,  apparently  amounted 
to  nothing.  This  blockade  duty  fell  chiefly  on  the  Phila 
delphia,  Captain  Samuel  Barron,  which,  though  in  winter 
quarters  at  Syracuse,  was  under  orders  from  Dale  to  make 
occasional  excursions  to  Tripoli  and  Tunis  during  the 
spring.  According  to  the  report  of  William  Eaton,  our 
consul  at  Tunis,  she  appeared  but  once  off  Tripoli  during 
the  winter1  and  spring,  and  that  only  for  six  hours.  Cap 
tain  Barron  made  the  excuse  that  the  northerly  winds  were 
' '  very  common  and  excessively  heavy, ' '  and  prevented  his 
looking  into  Tripoli. 


The  Second  Year  of  the  War  67 

Consul  Eaton,  who  criticised  Barren's  inefficiency,  is 
an  interesting  figure  in  the  story  of  our  war  with  Tripoli. 
A  veteran  of  the  Revolution  and  a  captain  in  the  army  at 
the  time  he  was  appointed  our  representative  in  Tunis 
(1797),  he  threw  himself  into  the  war  with  characteristic 
energy,  and  spoke  his  opinions  without  tact  or  reserve. 
His  bitter  criticisnj  of  Bainbridge  for  submitting  the  flag 
to  the  insult  it  received  from  the  Dey  of  Algiers,  and  his 
equally  scathing  remarks  about  Captain  Samuel  Barron, 
awoke  against  him  the  hostility,  not  only  of  Bainbridge 
and  the  Barrons,  but  of  all  the  naval  officers  on  the  station, 
for  they  felt  that  his  strictures  had  involved  the  honor 
of  the  service.  Perhaps  it  was  on  account  of  this  hostility 
that,  when  he  suggested  attacking  Tripoli  in  the  rear  by 
raising  a  force  to  the  support  of  Harriet,  the  deposed 
brother  of  the  reigning  Bey,  Yusuf,  his  plan  was  disap 
proved,  by  all  the  officers  in  the  squadron.  His  idea  was 
to  collect  an  army  of  adventurers  under  the  banner  of  the 
rightful  ruler,  Hamet,  with  which  to  attack  Tripoli  in 
the  rear;  and,  by  a  joint  assault  on  land  and  sea,  drive 
Yusuf  out  of  the  city  or,  at  least,  bring  him  to  terms. 

THE  SECOND  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR 

The  custom  of  enlisting  men  for  one  year  embarrassed 
the  navy  in  the  first  year  of  the  war  with  Tripoli  as  it 
had  done  in  the  war  with  France,  for  all  of  Dale's  ships 
had  to  be  sent  home  on  account  of  the  expiration  of  the 
terms  of  enlistment.  The  next  enlistments,  therefore,  were 
made  for  two  years  instead  of  one.  The  command  of  the 
second  squadron  was  given  to  Commodore  Truxtun,  the 
hero  of  the  French  War.  Unfortunately,  as  there  seems 
to  have  been  a  scarcity  of  captains  at  the  time,  no  one 
was  appointed  to  command  his  flagship,  the  Constellation. 
To  act  as  captain  for  his  own  flagship,  Truxtun  felt  to  be 


68  The  United  States  Navy 

a  descent  in  grade,  and,  therefore,  declined  the  post. 
Since  this  amounted  to  a  resignation,  it  cost  the  nation  an 
officer  of  the  type  most  needed  to  prosecute  the  war  against 
Tripoli.  The  idea  that  departmental  obstinacy  was  behind 
the  action  in  Truxtun's  case  is  suggested  by  the  fact  that 
Richard  V.  Morris,  his  successor,  was  given  an  acting 
captain  for  the  flagship,  without  anything  more  being  said 
about  it. 

In  the  spring  of  1802,  the  ships  under  Morris  set  sail 
for  the  Mediterranean,  fme  after  another,  as  soon  as  they 
were  ready  for  sea.  The  squadron  in  the  order  of  their 
sailing,  consisted  of  the  following:  the  Chesapeake,  flag 
ship,  36 ;  the  Adams,  28 ;  the  New  York,  36 ;  the  John 
Adams,  28 ;  the  Constellation,  36 ;  and  the  Enterprise,  12. 
There  were  still  on  the  station,  the  Philadelphia,  Boston, 
Essex,  and  George  Washington;  but  the  first  and  last  of 
these  soon  left  for  the  United  States. 

The  story  of  the  operations  that  followed  is  a  mass  of 
confusing  detail.  Great  things  were  looked  for  from  this 
naval  force,  and  the  Bey  of  Tripoli  was  expected  to  submit 
at  once.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  during  this  second  year  of 
the  war  the  United  States  lost  ground.  The  blockade  was 
ineffectual  except  to  irritate 'Tunis  and  Morocco.  In 
May,  1803,  the  Americans  made  feeble  overtures  to  buy 
peace ;  but,  meanwhile,  an  American  vessel,  the  Franklin, 
had  been  seized^  and  her  crew  put  in  irons.  These  had  to 
be  ransomed  through  Algiers^  fo.,E  $35*000.  Consul  Eaton, 
also,  who  was  unable  to  get  further  in  his  plan  on  account 
of  a  quarrel  with  Commodore  Morris,  left  for  the  United 
States.  During  the  summer  of  1803,  however,  two  Tripoli- 
tan  cruisers  were  destroyed  by  the  squadron,  and  there 
were  also  some  vigorous  skirmishes  against  the  enemy's 
gunboats,  in  which  the  younger  officers  won  distinction. 
But  the  results  were  nothing. 

In   September,   Commodore  Morris  received  a  letter 


Arrival  of  Commodore  Preble  69 

from  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  announcing  that  he  was 
suspended  from  duty  and  ordered  home.  The  following 
spring,  a  court  of  inquiry,  composed  unfortunately  of 
officers  junior  to  Morris,  found  him  "censurable  for  his 
inactive  and  dilatory  conduct  of  the  squadron  under  his 
command. ' ' 2  Though  for  some  reason  no  court-martial 
followed,  Morris  was  summarily  dismissed  from  the  service 
by  President  Jefferson. 

COMMODORE  PREBLE 

While  the  court  of  inquiry  was  sitting  on  the  case  of 
Captain  Morris,  a  new  squadron  was  being  prepared,  under 
the  command  of  Captain  Edward  Preble.  The  task  of 
fitting  out  the  ships,  especially  the  flagship  Constitution, 
consumed  so  much  of  the  summer  of  1803,  that  it  was 
August  before  the  new  commodore  could  set  sail  for  the 
Mediterranean.  He  had  the  following  vessels  in,, ...bis 
squadron,  named  in  the  order  of  sailing:  Nautilus,  12, 
Lieutenant  Richard  Somers;  Philadelphia,  36,  Captain 
William  Bainbridge;  Vixen,  12,  Lieutenant  John  Smith; 
Constitution,  flagship,  44,  Lieutenant  Robinson,  acting 
captain;  Siren,  16,  Lieutenant  Charles  Stewart;  Argus, 
16,  Lieutenant  Stephen  Decatur,  Jr.  The  Enterprise,  12, 
Lieutenant  Isaac  Hull,  already  on  the  station,  was  to  be- 
included;  but  Hull,  being  senior  to  Decatur,  was  to 
exchange  commands  with  him,  because  the  Argus  was 
rated  above  the  Enterprise.  The  small  schooners  and  brigs 
of  this  squadron  were  built  and  fitted  to  cruise  in  the 
shoal  waters  about  Tripoli,  where  the  heavier  frigates 
could  not  follow. 

The   new    commodore,    like   his   predecessors,    was   a 

2  Captain  Samuel  Barren,  who  had  himself  been  criticised  by 
Eaton  for  "  inactive  and  dilatory  conduct "  in  his  blockade  of 
Tripoli,  was  president  of  this  court. 


70  The  United  States  Navy 

veteran  of  the  Revolutionary  War.  lie  came  from  New 
England,  and  was  personally  little  known  to  the  service, 
especially  as  all  the  other  officers,  with  the  exception  of 
Hull,  came  from  the  Southern  or  Middle  States.  His 
naturally  vieltrrrt  Temper  was  not  improved  by  ill  health, 
and  he  had  iron  ideas  about  .discipline.  He  reciprocated 
the  distrust  which  the  younger  officers  felt  toward  their 
hot-tempered,  "taut"  commander,  for  he  complained  that 
they  were  only  "school-boys."  In  fact,  all  the  com 
manders  of  his  flotilla  were  under  thirty  and  their  lieu 
tenants  even  younger.  A  year  later,  however,  the  mutual 
regard  between  Preble  and  his  young  officers  amounted 
to  warm  affection. 

The  situation  that  confronted  Commodore  Preble  was 
not  reassuring.  During  the  two  years  and  a  half  since 
war  had  been  declared,  the  American  Navy  had  gained  no 
decided  advantage;  on  the  contrary,  the  other  Barbary 
powers,  especially  Morocco,  were  growing  more  and  more 
restless  and  insolent,  as  is  shown  by  the  following  incident : 
Shortly  after  Bainbridge  arrived  at  Gibraltar  in  the 
Philadelphia,  he  lejirnejl  that  two  Tripolitan  cruisers  were 
off  Cape  de  Gat.  While  in  search  of  them  he  fell  in  with 
a  vessel  belonging  to  the  Emperor  of  Morocco,  which  upon 
investigation,  proved  to  be  the  American  brig  Celia,  with 
the  captain  and  seven  of  the  crew  confined  below  decks. 
When  Bainbridge  threatened  to  hang  the  Moorish  com 
mander  for  piracy,  the  latter  produced  an  order  from  the 
Governor  of  Tangiers,  authorizing  him  to  capture  Amer 
ican  vessels.  Bainbridge  then  returned  to  Gibraltar  with 
his  prize,  and,  upon  the  arrival  of  the  Constitution,  re 
ported  to  Preble  the  case  of  the  Celia. 

The  commodore,  realizing  that  Morocco  must  be  dealt 
with  promptly,  dispatched  the  Vixen  and  the  Philadelphia 
to  blockade  Tripoli  while  he,  with  the  remainder  of  the 
squadron,  joined  with  Commodore  Rodgers  and  the  home- 


EDWARD  PKEBLE 


The  Loss  of  the  Philadelphia  71 

bound  frigates,  New  York,  Boston,  and  John  Adams,  to 
make  a  demonstration  at  Tangiers.  The  display  of  this 
naval  force  had  instant  effect.  The  Emperor  nastily 
shifted  the  responsibility  for  the  capture  of  the  Celia  on 
the  Governor  of  Tangiers — whom  he  publicly  disgraced — 
and  tried  to  placate-the  American  officers  by  gifts.  The 
negotiations  concluded  with  a  ratification  of  the  old  treaty 
of  1786,  without  any  payment  whatever  on  the  part  of 
the  United  States. 

Meanwhile  the  Vixen  and  the  Philadelphia,  had  taken 
up  their  station,  blockading  the  port  of  Tripoli  on  October 
17.  About  a  fortnight  later  Bainbridge  received  informa 
tion  of  two  Tripolitan  war  vessels  cruising  in  the  Medi 
terranean.  Judging  that  they  were  probably  going  west 
ward  toward  the  Straits,  he  dispatched  the  Vixen  to  look 
for  them  off  Cape  Bon,  a  station  also  which  he  thought 
much  safer  for  the  little  schooner  than  the  coast  of  Tripoli, 
at  a  time  when  the  autumn  gales  had  begun. 

Towards  the  end  of  October  (1803)  the  Philadelphia 
was  driven  away  by  one  of  these  storms.  As  she  was 
returning  to  her  station  on  the  morning  of  the  31st,  she 
sighted  a  Tripolitan  vessel  making  for  the  harbor.  The 
following  account,  adapted  from  Captain  Bainbridge 's 
report  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  describes  the  disaster 
that  resulted : 

' '  Misfortune  necessitates  my  making  the  most  distress 
ing  communication  of  my  life,  and  it  is  with  deep  regret 
that  I  inform  you  of  the  loss  of  the  United  States  frigate 
Philadelphia,  under  my  command,  by  being  wrecked  on 
rocks  between  four  and  five  leagues  to  the  eastward  of 
the  town  of  Tripoli.  The  circumstances  relating  to  this 
unfortunate  event  are  as  follows : 

"At  nine  A.M.,  being  about  five  leagues  to  the  eastward 
of  Tripoli,  I  saw  a  ship  inshore  of  us,  standing  before 
the  wind  to  the  westward.  I  immediately  gave  chase, 


72  The  United  States  Navy 


,», 


whereupon  she  hoisted  Tripolitan  colors  and  continued  her 
course  very  near  the  shore.  About  eleven  o'clock  I  had 
approached  the  shore  to  seven  fathoms  of  water,  and 
commenced  firing  at  her,  continuing  our  fire  and  running 
before  the  wind  until  half-past  eleven.  Being  then  in 
seven  fathoms  of  water  and  finding  our  fire  ineffectual  to 
prevent  her  getting  into  Tripoli,  I  gave  up  the  pursuit, 
and  was  bearing  off  the  land,  when  we  ran  on  the  rocks, 
in  twelve  feet  of  water  forward,  and  seventeen  feet  abaft. 
Immediately  we  lowered  a  boat  from  the  stern,  sounded, 
and  found  the  greatest  depth  of  water  astern.  Accord 
ingly,  I  laid  all  sails  aback ;  loosed  topgallant  sails,  and  set 
a  heavy  press  of  sail  canvas  on  the  ship,  with  the  wind 
blowing  fresh,  to  back  her  off.  I  also  cast  three  anchors 
away  from  the  bows,  started  the  water  in  the  hold,  hove 
overboard  the  guns,  excepting  some  abaft  to  defend  the 
ship  against  the  gunboats  which  were  then  firing  on  us. 
But  I  found  all  this  ineffectual.  Then  I  made  the  last 
resort  of  lightening  her  forward  by  cutting  away  the  fore 
mast,  which  carried  the  main  topgallant  mast  with  it. ' ' 

In  testifying  before  the  court  of  inquiry  held  in,  June, 
1805,  Lieutenant  David  Porter  added  a  few  more  details 
to  Captain  Bainbridge's  account  at  this  point.  After  the 
resort  of  cutting  away  the  foremast  had  failed  to  release 
the  Philadelphia's  bows,  "orders  were  then  given  to  the 
ship 's  carpenter  to  go  forward  and  bore  holes  through  the 
ship's  bottom,  and  the  gunner  to  drown  the  magazine  by 
turning  the  cock  and  securing  the  key.  Orders  were  then 
given  to  destroy  everything  that  could  be  rendered  of 
any  use  to  the  enemy. ' ' 

"Striking  on  the  rocks,"  continues  Captain  Bain- 
bridge,  "was  an  accident  not  possible  for  me  to  guard 
against  by  any  intimation  of  charts  as  no  such  shoals  were 
laid  down  on  any  on  board.  Every  careful  precaution 
(by  keeping  three  leads  heaving)  was  made  use  of,  on 


The  Loss  of  the  Philadelphia  73 

approaching  the  shore  to  effect  the  capture  of  the  Tripoli- 
tan  cruiser ;  and,  after  the  ship  struck  the  rocks,  all  pos 
sible  measures  were  taken  to  get  her  off.  I  determined 
not  to  give  her  up  as  long  as  a  hope  remained,  although 
all  the  while  we  were  annoyed  by  gunboats,  which  took 
their  position  in  such  a  manner  that  we  could  not  bring 
our  guns  to  bear  on  them,  not  even  after  cutting  away  a 
part  of  the  stern  to  effect  it. 

"We  stood  the  fire  of  the  gunboats  for  four  hours. 
By  the  end  of  that  time,  as  my  officers  and  I  had  no  hope 
of  getting  the  frigate  off  the  rocks,  and  we  could  see  a 
reinforcement  coming  out  from  Tripoli — which  there  was 
not  the  smallest  chance  of  our  injuring  by  resistance — we 
decided,  in  order  to  save  the  lives  of  brave  men,  that 
there  was  no  alternative  but  the  distressing  one  of  hauling 
our  colors  down  and  submitting  to  the  enemy,  whom 
chance  had  befriended.  .  .  . 

"The  gunboats,  in  attacking,  fired  principally  at  our 
masts.  Had  they  directed  their  shot  at  the  hull,  they 
undoubtedly  would  have  killed  many.  .  .  .  The  ship 
was  taken  possession  of  a  little  after  sunset,  and  in  the 
course  of  the  evening  I,  and  all  the  officers,  with  part  of 
the  crew  were  brought  ashore  and  carried  before  the 
Pasha.  .  .  .  We  had  lost  everything  but  what  was  on 
our  backs,  and  even  part  of  that  was  taken  off." 

The  attempts  to  scuttle  the  ship  proved  to  be  failures ; 
for,  two  days  later,  she  was  floated  off  the  reef  at  high 
tide,  her  guns  were  raised  and  remounted  by  her  captors, 
and  she  was  towed  into  Tripoli  practically  as  good  as  ever. 

The  Kaliusa  reef,  on  which  the  Philadelphia  struck, 
was,  as  Bainbridge  says,  not  located  on  the  charts;  and 
yet  it  is  so  extensive  as  to  make  the  omission  noteworthy, 
for  it  stretches  several  miles  parallel  to  the  coast,  here  and 
there  broken  by  channels.  It  only  intensifies  the  mis 
fortune  of  Bainbridge  to  know  that  if  he  had  kept  on  a 


74  The  United  States  Navy 

little  farther  before  bearing  up,  he  would  have  passed 
through  one  of  these  channels  safely.  If,  also,  he  had  held 
his  course  toward  Tripoli,  in  the  wake  of  the  ketch,  he 
would  have  escaped  grounding. 

The  imprisonment  of  the  Philadelphia's  people  turned 
out  to  be  a  long  one;  but,  for  the  officers,  at  least,  not 
especially  severe.  They  were  allowed  free  intercourse, 
and,  through  the  kind  efforts  of  the  Danish  consul,  Nissen, 
were  able  to  buy  back  their  books.  By  means  of  these 
books,  Captain  Bainbridge  with  his  first  lieutenant,  David 
Porter,  conducted  for  the  midshipmen  the  first  'traval 
school  in  the  history  of  the  American  service.  Through 
Mr.  Nissen,  also,  Captain  Bainbridge  was  enabled  to  carry 
on  a  secret  correspondence  with  Commodore  Preble. 
Throughout  their  long  captivity  the  officers  wore  away 
the  heavy  hours  in  laying  futile  plans  for  escape.  The 
men,  however,  received  none  of  the  consideration  shown 
to  the  officers.  They  were  ill-fed,  worse  lodged,  and 
worked  and  beaten  like  slaves ;  but  they  seem  to  have  stood 
their  captivity  surprisingly  well.  There  were  but  six 
deaths  and  very  little  sickness  during  the  whole  nineteen 
months  of  captivity. 

Captain  Bainbridge 's  officers,  realizing  his  distress  of 
mind,  were  hardly  in  their  prison  quarters  before  they 
drew  up  a  memorial  to  assure  him  of  their  sympathy  and 
respect.  ' '  Wishing  to  express  our  full  approbation  of  your 
conduct,  concerning  the  unfortunate  affair  of  yesterday, ' ' 
it  ran,  "we  do  conceive  .  .  .  that  every  exertion  was 
made  and  every  expedient  tried  to  get  her  off  and  to  defend 
her,  which  either  courage  or  abilities  could  have  dictated. ' ' 
Commodore  Preble,  also,  as  soon  as  he  heard  the  unwel 
come  news,  wrote  Bainbridge  a  comforting  letter,  with 
out  even  a  hint  of  criticism. 

But  the  latter  had  every  reason  to  feel  depressed.  His 
career  in  the  navy,  though  brief,  had  been  singularly  un- 


The  Loss  of  the  Philadelphia  75 

fortunate.  During  the  French  War  he  had  been  captured 
and  imprisoned ;  he  was  still  smarting  under  the  criticism 
of  Eaton  and  others  for  the  mortifying  incident  of  the 
George  Washington;  and  this  final  disaster  strengthened 
the  hands  of  the  Bey  of  Tripoli  to  an  extent  hitherto  not 
conceivable. 

If  Commodore  Preble  had  realized  the  seriousness  of 
his  task  on  taking  command  of  the  third  squadron,  he  now 
felt  the  difficulties  of  his  situation  increased  tenfold  by 
the  loss  of  the  Philadelphia.  The  Tripolitans  now  pos 
sessed  in  the  Philadelphia  a  larger  fighting  ship  than  they 
had  ever  owneabefore,  and  at  the  same  time  the  loss  to 
the  American  squadron  amounted  to  a  large  proportion  of 
its  force,  for  it  left  but  a  single  frigate,  the  Constitution, 
besides  the  small  brigs  and  schooners.  In  this  way,  Preble 's 
operations  were  crippled  at  the  very  outset;  an^. tlte-mere 
holding  for  ransofft  of*-  3QO""American  prisoners  gave  the 
Bey  of  Tripoli  a  further  tremendous  advantage,  for  he 
knew  that  the  officers,  especially,  had  influential  friends 
who  would  bring  pressure  upon  the  Government  to  accept 
almost  any  terms  of  peace  that  he  might  dictate. 


THE  WAR  WITH  TRIPOLI  (CONTINUED) 

THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  PHILADELPHIA 

THE  news  of  the  capture  of  the  Philadelphia  imme 
diately  suggested  the  idea  of  cutting  her  out  or  destroy 
ing  her.  Bainbridge  outlined  a  plan  in  one  of  his  secret 
letters  to  Preble,  and,  even  before  this  was  received,  Preble 
and  Decatur  had  been  discussing  a  similar  course  of  action. 
As  soon  as  the  subject  was  mentioned  by  the  commodore, 
Decatur  eagerly  volunteered  to  cut  out  the  Philadelphia 
with  his  ship,  the  Enterprise;  so  that,  when  Lieutenant 
Stewart  arrived  in  the  Siren  and  offered  to  perform  the 
same  service,  Preble  informed  him  that  Decatur  was 
already  promised  the  honor.  The  commodore,  believing 
that  it  was  impossible  to  save  the  frigate,  decided  not  to 
try  to  cut  her  out  but  to  destroy  her  at  her  moorings.  The 
scheme  was  greatly  helped  by  the  capture  of  a  Tripolitan 
ketch,  the  Mastico,  whose  Mediterranean  rig  would  enable 
her  to  slip  into  the  harbor  without  raising  the  suspicion 
that  the  Enterprise  would  have  been  sure  to  create. 

When  Decatur  assembled  the  officers  and  men  of  the 
Enterprise,  told  them  of  the  intended  expedition  and 
called  for  volunteers,  every  officer,  man,  and  boy  stepped 
forward.  From  this  number,  five  officers — Lieutenants 
James  Lawrence,  Joseph  Bainbridge,  and  Jonathan 
Thorn,1  Surgeon  Lewis  Hermann,  Midshipman  Thomas 
Macdonough — and  sixty- two  men  were  chosen.  To  these 
were  added  five  officers  from  the  Constitution — Midship 
men  Ralph  Izard,  John  Rowe,  Charles  Morris,  Alexander 

1  Decatur  was  evidently  unwilling  to  discriminate  between  his 
lieutenants,  for  he  took  them  all. 
76 


The  Burning  of  the  Philadelphia  77 

Laws,  and  John  Davis — and  a  Sicilian  pilot,  Salvatore 
C'atalano,  who  was  familiar  with  the  harbor  of  Tripoli. 
Catalano  was,  for  many  years  afterward,  a  sailing-master 
in-  our  navy.  On  February  15,  the  day  before  the  destruc 
tion  of  the  frigate,  Lieutenant  Stewart  sent  a  boat  to  the 
Intrepid  with  Midshipman  Thomas  0.  Anderson  and  six 
men.  The  boat  party  remained  on  board  the  Intrepid, 
and  shared  in  the  attack  on  the  Philadelphia.  The  fol 
lowing  story  of  the  expedition  is  arranged  from  the  auto 
biography  of  Charles  Morris,  one  of  the  midshipmen 
detailed  from  the  Constitution: 

"The  brig  Siren,  Lieutenant  Stewart,  was  to  accom 
pany  us,  to  assist  with  her  boats,  and  to  receive  the  crew 
of  the  ketch  (which  had  been  named  the  Intrepid)  in 
case  of  her  destruction,  which  was  considered  probable. 
The  officers  were  told  to  take  only  a  single  change  of 
linen,  and  no  time  was  allowed  to  prepare  stores,  as  we 
embarked  within  an  hour  after  receiving  notice  and  sailed 
immediately,  on  the  evening  of  the  3d  of  February,  1804. 
Combustibles  had  been  previously  prepared  and  placed  in 
the  vessel,  with  ship 's  provisions  for  two  or  three  weeks ' 
supply.  A  Maltese  [Catalano]2  had  also  been  obtained  to 
accompany  us  into  the  harbor,  with  which  he  was  well 
acquainted.  We  arrived  in  sight  of  Tripoli  about  the 
10th,  but  the  wind  was  fresh  from  the  westward,  with 
strong  indications  of  an  approaching  gale. "  .  .  .  [Because 
of  the  heavy  sea  the  entrance  was  decided  to  be  unsafe.] 
"The  attempt  was  abandoned  for  a  time,  and  the  vessels 
weighed  again  to  get  beyond  the  view  of  the  town  before 
daylight.  This  was  not  done  without  some  difficulty,  as 
the  gale  increased  rapidly.  It  continued  for  four  or  five 
days  with  great  violence,  and  drove  us  considerably  to 

a  A  native  of  Palermo,  he  apparently  joined  the  squadron  at 
Malta  and  is  referred  to  by  Preble,  also,  as  a  "  Maltese." 


78  The  United  States  Navy 

the  eastward,  and  at  one  time  nearer  the  coast  than  was 
agreeable. 

"Our  situation  on  board  was  far  from  comfortable. 
The  commander,  three  lieutenants,  and  the  surgeon  occu 
pied  the  very  small  cabin.  Six  midshipmen  and  the  pilot 
had  a  platform  laid  on  the  water-casks,  whose  surface 
they  covered  when  they  lay  down  to  sleep,  and  at  so  small 
a  distance  below  the  deck  that  their  heads  could  reach  it 
when  seated  on  the  platform.  The  marines  had  corre 
sponding  accommodations  on  the  opposite  side,  and  the 
sailors  had  only  the  surface  of  the  casks  in  the  hold.  To 
these  inconveniences  were  added  the  want  of  any  room  on 
the  deck  for  exercise,  and  the  attacks  of  innumerable 
vermin,  which  our  predecessors,  the  slaves,  had  left  behind 
them.  The  provisions  proved  to  be  decayed  and 
offensive.  .  .  . 

*  *  On  the  morning  of  the  16th,  we  again  obtained  sight 
of  Tripoli,  with  light  winds,  pleasant  weather,  and  a 
smooth  sea,  and  stood  in  for  the  town.  By  arrangement, 
the  Siren  kept  far  without  us  during  the  day,  and  her 
appearance  had  been  so  changed  as  to  lull  all  suspicion  of 
her  being  a  vessel  of  war.  The  lightness  of  the  wind 
allowed  us  to  keep  up  all  appearance  of  an  anxious  desire 
to  reach  the  harbor  before  night,  without  bringing  us  too 
near  to  require  any  other  change  than  the  use  of  drags 
which  could  not  be  seen  from  the  city.  All  the  crew  were 
also  kept  below,  excepting  six  or  eight  persons  at  a  time, 
that  suspicion  might  not  be  awakened  by  unusual  num 
bers;  and  such  as  were  visible  were  dressed  as  Maltese. 

"As  the  evening  advanced,  our  drags  were  taken  in, 
so  that  we  were  within  two  miles  of  the  eastern  entrance 
at  dark,  the  Siren  being  some  three  miles  without  us. 
The  concerted  arrangements  were  for  the  ketch  to  wait  for 
the  boats  of  the  Siren  to  join  us  after  dark,  that  they  might 
accompany  us  to  the  attack ;  but  as  the  sun  descended,  the 


The  Burning  of  the  Philadelphia  79 


§ 


I 


80  The  United  States  Navy 

wind  grew  fainter,  and  there  was  good  reason  to  appre 
hend  that  any  delay  in  waiting  for  the  boats  might  render 
it  very  difficult  for  the  ketch  to  reach  the  ship.  Decatur, 
therefore,  determined  to  proceed  without  waiting,  and 
accompanied  his  decision  with  the  remark,  'the  fewer  the 
number,  the  greater  the  honor.'  One  boat  from  the  Siren, 
with  six  men,  had  joined  us  a  few  days  before,  and  was 
still  with  us. 

"The  final  arrangements  were  now  made,  and  the 
respective  duties  of  the  several  officers,  which  had  been 
previously  allotted,  were  again  specified  and  explained. 
The  presumed  number  of  our  enemy  was  stated,  and  the 
necessity  of  our  utmost  exertions  enjoined  upon  us.  The 
watchword  'Philadelphia,'  was  issued  to  be  used  as  a 
means  of  recognition ;  and  as  we  advanced  into  the  harbor, 
strict  silence  was  enjoined  and  observed.  The  injunction, 
however,  appeared  to  be  unnecessary.  No  one  appeared  to 
be  disposed  to  enter  into  conversation,  but  [each]  to  be 
absorbed  by  his  own  reflections.  My  own  thoughts  were 
busy,  now  reverting  to  friends  at  home,  now  to  the  perils 
we  were  about  to  meet.  Should  I  be  able  to  justify  the 
expectations  of  the  former  by  meeting  properly  the 
dangers  of  the  latter?  .  .  .  The  officers  and  crew  were 
directed  to  conceal  themselves  as  much  as  possible,  except 
ing  some  six  or  eight.  Most  of  the  officers  could  be  dis 
tinguished  by  their  dress,  and  they  required  concealment 
more  than  the  sailors.  Fortunately,  owing  to  the  loss  of 
some  articles,  which  had  been  replaced  by  loan  from  the 
crew,  my  own  dress  corresponded  with  theirs,  which 
enabled  me  to  keep  near  Decatur,  who  I  supposed  would 
naturally  be  among  the  first  to  leave  the  ketch.  The  wind 
wafted  us  slowly  into  the  harbor,  the  water  was  smooth, 
and  the  young  moon  gave  light  enough  to  distinguish 
prominent  objects.  One  battery  was  passed,  and  the 
Philadelphia  was  in  view  near  several  smaller  vessels,  and 


The  Burning  of  the  Philadelphia  81 

the  white  walls  of  the  city  and  its  batteries  were  before  us. 
We  steered  directly  for  the  frigate,  and  at  last  the  anxious 
silence  was  broken  by  a  hail  from  her,  demanding  our 
character  and  object.  Then  might  be  seen  the  eager  move 
ment  of  the  heads  of  the  officers  and  crew  who  were 
stretched  on  the  deck,  ready  to  leap  forward  at  the  word 
of  their  commander,  but  still  resting  in  silence.  The 
conversation  was  kept  up  between  the  frigate  and  the 
ketch  through  our  pilot,  acting  under  the  dictation  of 
Decatur.  We  alleged  the  loss  of  our  anchors  during  the 
last  gale,  which  was  true,  as  a  reason  for  wishing  to  make 
fast  to  the  frigate  till  morning,  and  permission  was 
obtained;  but  just  as  the  ketch  was  about  coming  in  con 
tact  with  the  frigate,  the  wind  shifted,  blowing  lightly 
directly  from  the  frigate,  and  it  left  us  at  rest  abeam  and 
about  twenty  yards  from  her.  This  was  a  moment  of 
great  anxiety.  We  were  directly  under  her  guns,  motion 
less  and  powerless,  except  by  exertion  which  might  betray 
our  character.  The  Siren's  boat  was,  however,  in  tow, 
and  was  leisurely  manned  and  took  a  rope  to  make  fast 
to  the  ship.  She  was  met  by  a  boat  with  another  rope, 
when  both  were  united,  and  each  boat  returned  to  its 
vessel.  This  rope  was  passed  along  the  deck  and  hauled 
upon  by  the  crew  as  they  lay  stretched  upon  it,  and  the 
vessels  brought  gradually  nearer  each  other.  When  the 
vessels  were  nearly  in  contact,  the  suspicions  of  the  enemy 
appeared  to  be  aroused,  and  the  cry  of  'Americanos!' 
resounded  through  the  ship.  In  a  moment,  we  were  near 
enough,  and  the  order  '  board ! '  was  given ;  and  with  this 
cry,  our  men  were  soon  on  the  decks  of  the  frigate.  The 
surprise  had  been  complete;  there  was  no  time  for  any 
preparation,  and  the  enemy  made  scarcely  any  show  of 
resistance.  A  few  were  killed,  one  was  made  prisoner, 
and  the  remainder  leaped  overboard  and  probably  reached 
their  cruisers  which  were  anchored  near  the  ship. 
6 


82  The  United  States  Navy 

"The  plan  of  attack,  prescribed  by  our  commander, 
was  for  united  action  which  was  to  obtain  possession  of 
the  ship,  with  the  exception  of  a  boat  to  intercept  com 
munication  with  the  shore,  and  for  the  surgeon  and  a 
few  men  to  secure  the  ketch  to  the  ship.  When  posses 
sion  was  secured,  each  lieutenant,  with  a  midshipman  and 
specified  men,  was  to  receive  a  portion  of  the  prepared 
combustibles,  and  distribute  them  in  designated  parts  of 
the  berth  deck,  and  in  the  forward  store  rooms,  and  a 
smaller  party  under  a  midshipman  to  do  the  same  in  the 
cockpit,  and  there  await  orders  to  set  fire,  that  all  might 
be  done  at  the  same  time,  and  give  all  a  chance  for  safe 
retreat.  The  party  for  the  cockpit  was  assigned  to  my 
charge.  My  object  in  keeping  near  Lieutenant  Decatur 
when  we  were  approaching  the  ship  was  that,  by  watching 
his  actions,  I  should  be  governed  by  these  rather  than  by 
his  orders  when  the  boarding  should  take  place.  It  was 
well  that  this  course  was  taken,  for  Decatur  had  leaped 
to  the  main  chain  plates  of  the  frigate,  before  the  order 
to  board  was  given.  I  had  leaped  with  him,  and,  probably, 
more  favored  by  circumstances,  was  able  to  reach  the 
deck  by  the  time  he  had  gained  the  rail.  The  enemy  were 
already  leaping  over  the  opposite  side,  and  made  no  resist 
ance  ;  but  Decatur,  under  the  supposition  that  he  was  the 
first  on  board,  was  about  to  strike  me,  when  I  accidentally 
turned  and  stayed  his  uplifted  arm  by  the  watchword 
and  mutual  recognition.  On  my  way  to  my  station,  after 
examining  the  cabin,  and  when  passing  forward,  we  met 
again  under  similar  circumstances.  Passing  through  the 
wardroom,  which  I  found  deserted,  I  awaited  in  the  cock 
pit  the  men  who  had  gone  for  the  combustibles.  These 
were  so  delayed  that  we  had  none  when  the  order  was 
given  to  set  fire;  but  as  they  came  a  moment  after,  they 
were  distributed,  and  fire  communicated  before  we  left 
our  station.  In  the  meantime,  the  fire  on  the  deck  above 


The  Burning  of  the  Philadelphia  83 

us  had  communicated  so  rapidly  that  it  was  with  no  small 
difficulty  and  danger  that  our  party  reached  the  spar 
deck  by  the  forward  hatchways.  All  the  others  had 
already  joined  the  ketch,  except  Decatur,  who  remained 
on  the  rail  till  all  others  were  on  board;  and  the  bow  of 
the  ketch  had  already  swung  off  from  the  ship  when  he 
joined  us  by  leaping  into  the  rigging  of  the  ketch.  In 
less  than  twenty  minutes  the-skip.,  had  been  carried,  the 
combustibles  distributed  and  set  on  fire,  and  all  our  party 
were  again  on  board  the  ketch.  By  great  exertions  the 
two  vessels  were  separated  before  the  fire,  which  was 
pouring  from  the  ports  of  the  ship,  enveloped  the  ketch 
also. 

"Up  to  this  time,  the  ships  and  batteries  of  the  enemy 
had  remained  silent,  but  they  were  now  prepared  to  act; 
and  when  the  crew  of  the  ketch  gave  three  cheers,  in 
exultation  of  their  success,  they  received  the  return  of  a 
general  discharge  from  the  enemy.  The  confusion  of  the 
moment  probably  prevented  much  care  in  their  direction, 
and  though  we  were  under  the  fire  of  nearly  a  hundred 
pieces  for  half  an  hour,  the  only  shot  which  struck  the 
ketch  was  one  through  the  topgallant  sail.  We  were  in 
greater  danger  from  the  ship,  whose  broadside  commanded 
the  passage  by  which  we  were  retreating,  and  whose  guns 
were  loaded  and  were  discharged  as  they  became  heated. 
We  escaped  these  also,  and  while  urging  the  ketch  onward 
with  sweeps,  the  crew  were  commenting  upon  the  beauty 
of  the  spray  thrown  up  by  the  shot  between  us  and  the 
brilliant  light  of  the  ship,  rather  than  calculating  any 
danger  that  might  be  apprehended  from  the  contact.  The 
appearance  of  the  ship  was  indeed  magnificent.  .  .  . 
Favored  by  a  light  breeze  our  exertions  soon  carried  us 
beyond  the  range  of  their  shot,  and  at  the  entrance  of 
the  harbor  we  met  the  boats  of  the  Siren,  which  had  been 
intended  to  co-operate  with  us,  whose  crews  rejoiced  at 


84  The  United  States  Navy 

our  success,  while  they  grieved  at  not  having  been  able 
to  participate  in  it.  ...  The  success  of  this  enterprise 
added  much  to  the  reputation  of  the  navy  both  at  home 
and  abroad." 

In  confirmation  of  this  final  remark  of  Morris,  it  may 
be  added  that  Nelson,  who  was  then  blockading  Toulon, 
generously  described  the  exploit  as  "the  most  bold  and 
daring  act  of  the  age." 


THE  BOMBARDMENT  OF  TRIPOLI 

During  the  winter  and  spring  of  1804,  Commodore 
Preble  maintained  as  strict  a  blockade  on  Tripoli  as  the 
weather  would  allow,  and  kept  two  or  three  of  his  vessels 
cruising  the  Mediterranean  in  search  of  any  Tripolitan 
that  might  have  taken  advantage  of  a  gale  to  escape. 
Meanwhile,  he  arranged  with  the  King  of  Sicily  for  the 
use  of  six  small,  'flat'-b'o'ttomed  gunboats  and  two  bomb 
vessels,  together  with  some  extra  guns  and  ninety-six 
Neapolitan  seamen.  As  soon  as  these  vessels  were  ready, 
he  proceeded  to  bombard  Tripoli  with  his  entire  force. 
Aside  from  the  gunboats,  which  carried  one  long  24- 
pounder  apiece,  and  the  bomb-ketches,  each  of  which 
mounted  a  13-inch  mortar,  the  American  attacking  force 
consisted  of  the  frigate  Constitution,  the  brigs  Siren, 
Argus,  and  Scourge,  and  the  schooners  Vixen,  Nautilus, 
and  Enterprise.  The  schooners  and  brigs,  however, 
mounted  nothing  but  carronades,  and  the  only  guns  fit 
for  the  purpose  of  bombardment  were  the  long  guns  of 
the  Constitution  and  of  the  unwieldy  gunboats.  Against 
this  force  was  a  walled  city,  strongly  fortified,  mounting 
115  guns,  most  of  them  heavy.  Besides  these,  the  Tripoli- 
tans  had  a  navy  of  a  brig,  two  schooners,  two  large 
galleys  and  nineteen  gunboats.  The  complement  of  men 


The  Bombardment  of  Tripoli  85 

on  these  vessels  alone  amounted  to  more  than  all  under 
Preble's  command. 

It  was  not  till  August  3d  that  the  weather  permitted 
an  attack.  Under  cover  of  the  bombs  and  the  fire  from 
the  heavier  vessels,  the  six  gunboats,  in  two  divisions, 
advanced  to  attack  the  two  divisions  of  Tripolitan  gun 
boats  which  had  advanced  beyond  the  line  of  rocks  that 
sheltered  the  harbor.  The  rest  of  the  enemy's  shipping 
and  the  batteries  opened  at  once  in  reply.  Of  the  two 
divisions  of  American  gunboats,  Lieutenant  Richard 
Somers  commanded  the  first  division,  Nos.  1-3 ;  and  Lieu 
tenant  Stephen  Decatur  the  second-,  Nos.  4-6. 

The  following  from  Treble's  report  to  the  Depart 
ment  describes  the  attack: 

"In  an  instant  the  enemy's  shipping  and  batteries 
opened  a  tremendous  fire,  which  was  promptly  returned 
by  the  whole  squadron  at  grape  shot  distance;  at  the 
same  time,  the  second  division  of  three  boats,  led  by  the 
gallant  Captain  3  Decatur,  was  advancing  with  sails  and 
oars  to  board  the  eastern  division  of  the  enemy,  consisting 
of  nine  gunboats.  Our  boats  gave  the  enemy  showers  of 
grape  and  musket  balls  as  they  advanced ;  the  Tripolitans, 
however,  soon  closed,  and  the  pistol,  sabre,  pike,  and 
tomahawk  were  made  use  of  by  our  brave  tars. 

' '  Captain 3  Somers,  being  in  a  dull  sailer,  made  the 
best  use  of  his  sweeps,  but  was  not  able  to  fetch  far 
enough  to  windward  to  engage  the  same  division  of  the 
enemy's  boats  which  Captain  Decatur  fell  in  with;  he, 
however,  gallantly  bore  down  with  his  single  boat  on  five 
of  the  enemy 's  western  division,  and  engaged  within  pistol 
shot,  defeated  and  drove  them  within  the  rocks  in  a  shat 
tered  condition  and  with  the  loss  of  a  great  number  of 
men. 

8 "  Captain  "  by  courtesy,  as  he  was  in  command  of  a  division. 


86  The  United  States  Navy 

"Lieutenant  [James]  Decatur,  in  No.  2,  was  closely 
engaged  with  one  of  the  enemy's  largest  boats  of  the 
eastern  division,  which  struck  to  him,  after  having  lost  a 
large  proportion  of  men ;  and  at  the  same  instant  that  that 
brave  officer  was  boarding  her  to  take  possession,  he  was 
treacherously  shot  through  the  head  by  the  captain  of 
the  boat  that  had  surrendered ;  which  base  conduct  enabled 
the  poltroon  (with  -the  assistance  received  from  other 
boats)  to  escape.  .  .  .  Captain  Decatur,  in  No.  4,  after 
having  with  distinguished  bravery  boarded  and  carried 
one  of  the  enemy  of  superior  force,  took  his  prize  in  tow 
and  gallantly  bore  down  to  engage  a  second,4  which,  after 
a  severe  and  bloody  conflict,  he  also  took  possession  of. 
.  .  .  Lieutenant  Trippe,  of  the  Vixen,  in  No.  6,  ran 
alongside  one  of  the  enemy 's  large  boats,  which  he  boarded 
with  only  Midshipman  Henley  and  nine  men — his  boat 
falling  off  before  any  more  could  get  on  board ;  thus  was 
he  left  to  conquer  or  to  perish,  with  the  odds  of  thirty-six 
to  eleven.  The  Turks,  however,  could  not  withstand  the 
ardor  of  this  brave  officer  and  his  assistants — in  a  few 
minutes  the  decks  were  cleared  and  her  colors  hauled 
down.  .  .  .  Lieutenant  Trippe  received  eleven  sabre 
wounds,  some  of  which  were  very  severe ;  he  speaks  in 
the  highest  terms  of  Mr.  Henley,  and  those  who  followed 
him.  .  .  . 

"Lieutenant  Decatur  was  the  only  officer  killed,  but 


4  Decatur  believed  that  this  second  vessel  was  the  one  that 
had  struck  to  his  brother  a  few  moments  before,  and  that  in  killing 
her  commander  he  had  avenged  his  brother's  death.  Morris, 
however,  agreeing  with  Preble,  says  in  his  memoiis  that  the 
treacherous  pirate  escaped.  At  all  events,  Stephen  Decatur  very 
nearly  lost  his  own  life  in  'his  hand  to  hand  grapple  with  the 
Tripolitan  commander.  One  of  his  seamen,  Reuben  James,  already 
wounded,  interposed  his  own  head  to  catch  the  blow  of  the  scimitar, 
aimed  for  Decatur. 


The  Bombardment  of  Tripoli  87 

in  him  the  service  has  lost  a  valuable  officer.  .  .  .  The 
enemy  must  have  suffered  very  much  in  killed  and 
wounded,  both  among  their  shipping  and  on  shore.  Three 
of  their  gunboats  were  sunk  in  the  harbor,  several  of 
them  had  their  decks  nearly  cleared  of  men  by  our  shot, 
and  a  number  of  shells  burst  in  the  town  and  batteries, 
which  must  have  done  great  execution. " 

On  the  7th  of  August,  four  days  later,  the  squadron 
again  bombarded  Tripoli,  but  on  this  occasion  none  of  the 
enemy's  vessels  advanced  to  attack  at  close  quarters. 
During  this  attack,  gunboat  No.  95  blew  up,  killing  and 
wounding  eighteen  of  her  crew.  Among  the  killed  were 
Lieutenant  Caldwell  and  Midshipman  Dorsey. 

The  same  day  brought  the  frigate  John  Adams  with 
the  new  commissions  of  the  officers  connected  with  the 
destruction  of  the  Philadelphia,  and  with  the  unwelcome 
news  that  Preble  would  be  superseded  in  command  by 
Captain  Samuel  Barron,  This  was  apparently  unavoid 
able,  as  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  was  careful  to  point 
out  to  Commodore  Preble,  because  Barron  was  senior 
to  him ;  but  the  fact  hurt  Preble,  and  aroused  the  indigna 
tion  of  every  officer  under  him.  The  outcome  more  than 
justified  their  feeling. 

Meanwhile,  Preble  pushed  his  operations  with  all  vigor. 
Under  a  hundred  difficulties  such  as  lack  of  water,  lack 
of  men,  insufficient  or  worthless  stores,  and  scurvy,  Preble 
maintained  his  blockade,  and  three  times  again  bombarded 
the  city  with  all  his  guns.  This  policy  so  greatly  disturbed 
the  Bey,  that  he  began  to  moderate  very  decidedly  his 
terms  of  ransom  and  peace. 

6 The  three  Tripolitan  gunboats  that  had  been  captured  (see 
page  86)  were  rerigged  and  taken  into  service  as  Nos.  7,  8,  9. 


88  The  United  States  Navy 


THE  INTREPID  DISASTER 

The  summer  campaign  of  1804,  however,  closed  with 
a  melancholy  episode.  "Desirous  of  annoying  the  enemy 
by  all  the  means  in  my  power, ' '  wrote  Commodore  Preble 
to  the  Department  in  his  report,  "I  directed  to  be  put  in 
execution  a  long  contemplated  plan  of  sending  a  fire 
ship,  or  infernal,  into  the  harbor  of  Tripoli  in  the  night  for 
the  purpose  of  endeavoring  to  destroy  the  enemy's  ship 
ping  and  shatter  the  Pasha's  castle  and  town.  Captain 
Somers,  of  the  Nautilus,  having  volunteered  his  services, 
had,  for  several  days  before  this  period,  been  directing 
the  preparation  of  the  ketch  Intrepid,  assisted  by  Lieu 
tenants  Wadsworth  and  Israel.  About  100  barrels  of 
powder  and  150  fixed  shells  were  apparently  judiciously 
disposed  on  board  her.  The  fuses,  leading  to  the  maga 
zine  where  all  the  powder  was  deposited,  were  calculated 
to  burn  a  quarter  of  an  hour. 

"September  4,  the  Intrepid  being  prepared  for  the 
intended  service,  Captain  Somers  and  Lieutenant  Wads- 
worth  made  choice  of  two  of  the  fastest  rowing  boats  in 
the  squadron  for  bringing  them  out  after  reaching  their 
destination  and  firing  the  combustible  materials  which 
were  to  communicate  with  the  fuses.  Captain  Somers' 
boat  was  manned  with  four  seamen  from  the  Nautilus, 
and  Lieutenant  Wadsworth 's  with  six  from  the  Constitu 
tion.  Lieutenant  Israel  accompanied  them.  At  eight  in 
the  evening,  the  Intrepid  was  under  sail  and  standing 
for  the  port  with  a  leading  breeze  from  the  eastward. 
The  Argus,  Vixen,  and  Nautilus  convoyed  her  as  far  as 
the  rock.  On  her  entering  the  harbor,  several  shots  were 
fired  at  her  from  the  batteries.  In  a  few  minutes,  when 
she  had  apparently  nearly  gained  the  intended  place  of 
destination,  she  suddenly  exploded,  without  her  people's 
having  previously  fired  the  room  filled  with  splinters 
and  other  combustibles.  These  were  intended  to  create  a 


The  Intrepid  Disaster  89 

blaze  in  order  to  deter  the  enemy  from  boarding  while 
the  fire  was  communicating  to  the  fuses  which  led  to  the 
magazine.  The  effect  of  the  explosion  stunned  their 
batteries  into  profound  silence — not  a  gun  was  afterward 
fired  for  the  night.  The  shrieks  of  the  inhabitants  in 
formed  us  that  the  town  was  thrown  into  the  greatest 
terror  and  consternation  by  the  explosion  of  the  maga 
zine  and  the  bursting  and  falling  of  shells  in  all  direc 
tions.  The  whole  squadron  awaited  with  the  utmost 
anxiety  to  learn  the  fate  of  the  adventurers  from  a  signal 
previously  agreed  on  in  case  of  success — but  waited  in 
vain;  no  signs  of  their  safety  were  to  be  observed.  The 
Argus,  Vixen,  and  Nautilus  hovered  around  the  entrance 
of  the  port  till  sunrise,  when  they  had  a  fair  view  of  the 
whole  harbor — not  a  vestige  of  the  ketch  or  boats  was  to 
be  seen.  One  of  the  enemy's  largest  gunboats  was  missing 
and  three  others  were  seen  very  much  shattered  and 
damaged,  which  the  enemy  were  hauling  on  shore. 

"From  these  circumstances,  I  am  led  to  believe  that 
those  boats  were  detached  from  the  enemy's  flotilla  to 
intercept  the  ketch  without  suspecting  her  to  be  a  fire 
ship.  The  boat  afterwards  missing  suddenly  boarded  her. 
The  gallant  Somers  and  the  heroes  of  his  party,  observing 
the  other  three  boats  surrounding  them,  and  no  prospect 
of  escape  from  them,  .  .  .  put  a  match  to  the  train 
leading  directly  to  the  magazine,  which  at  once  blew  the 
whole  into  the  air,  and  terminated  their  existence.  My 
conjectures  respecting  this  affair  are  founded  on  a  reso 
lution  which  Captain  Somers  and  Lieutenants  Wadsworth 
and  Israel  had  formed,  neither  to  be  taken  by  the  enemy 
nor  suffer  him  to  get  possession  of  the  powder  on  board 
the  Intrepid.  They  expected  to  enter  the  harbor  without 
discovery,  but  had  declared  that  if  they  should  be  dis 
appointed  and  the  enemy  should  board  them  before  they 
reached  the  point  of  destination  in  such  force  as  to  leave 
them  no  hopes  of  safe  retreat,  that  they  would  put  a  match 


90  The  United  States  Navy 

to  the  magazine  and  blow  themselves  and  the  enemy  up 
together — determined  as  there  was  no  exchanging  of 
prisoners,  that  their  country  should  never  pay  ransom 
for  them,  nor  the  enemy  receive  a  supply  of  powder 
through  their  means." 

Captain  Bainbridge  was  permitted  to  see  the  bodies 
when  they  came  ashore  the  next  day,  but  all  were  so 
mangled  as  to  make  recognition  out  of  the  question. 
According  to  him,  no  damage  whatever  was  done  the  Tripo- 
litans;  so  that  Preble  was  probably  mistaken  in  his  idea 
regarding  the  injury  sustained  by  the  enemy's  gunboats. 

The  loss  of  the  Intrepid' 's  crew  was  felt  deeply 
throughout  the  squadron.  Somers,  especially,  seemed  to 
have  a  brilliant  future  in  store  for  him,  having  many  fine 
qualities  in  common  with  Decatur,  whose  dearest  friend 
he  had  been  from  boyhood.  After  the  war,  the  officers 
of  the  squadron  subscribed  to  the  erection  of  the  monu 
ment,  now  in  the  United  States  Naval  Academy  grounds, 
honoring  the  memory  of  the  six  comrades  who  fell  before 
Tripoli:  Somers,  Caldwell,  James  Decatur,  Wadsworth, 
Israel,  and  Dorsey. 

THE  FINAL  YEAR  OF  THE  WAR 

Shortly  after  the  Intrepid  disaster,  Commodore 
Barron  arrived  with  the  frigates  President  and  Constella 
tion,  bringing  as  passenger  Tobias  Lear,  former  consul- 
general  to  Algiers,  who  had  full  powers  to  negotiate  with 
the  Bey  of  Tripoli ;  and  in  December  Commodore  Preble 
sailed  for  New  York  on  the  John  Adams.  The  new  com 
modore  had  under  his  flag  about  twice  the  force  that 
Preble  had  commanded,  but  the  glory  of  the  war  ended 
with  Preble 's  departure  from  the  Mediterranean.  Com 
modore  Barron  was,  at  the  time,  in  wretched  health  and 
soon  became  incapable  of  command.  When,  finally,  he 
was  compelled  to  give  up  his  duties,  in  the  spring  of  1805, 
he  was  succeeded  by  Commodore  Rodgers.  The  latter  then 


Eaton  s  Expedition  91 

had  under  his  pennant  five  frigates  and  seven  schooners 
and  brigs,  the  largest  of  all  the  American  squadrons 
assembled  before  Tripoli. 

Meanwhile,  the  energetic  Eaton  had  managed  to  inter 
est  the  authorities  of  Washington  in  his  scheme  of  backing 
the  deposed  Harriet  in  an  effort  to  regain  his  throne  by 
means  of  a  land  attack  against  Tripoli.  Eaton  was  author 
ized  to  go  to  Egypt  and  do  what  lie  could,  relying  on  such 
assistance  as  the  fleet  could  afford.  Starting  at  Cairo, 
he  collected  a  motley  array  of  Arabs  and  freebooters, 
including  Harriet  -and  some  of  Harriet's  officials.  This 
horde  he  drove  by  sheer  force  of  will  through  the  desert 
to  the  frontiers  of  the  province  of  Tripoli,  and  captured 
the  city  of  Derne.6  The  attack  on  the  city  was  led  in 
person  by  Eaton,  who  was  shot  through  the  wrist  in  the 
final  charge.  The  fall  of  Derne  thoroughly  frightened 
the  Bey,  and  Eaton  was  looking  forward  to  a  triumphant 
march  on  Tripoli  when  he  was  met  by  the  humiliating 
news  that  he  must  abandon  Derne,  because  peace  had 
already  been  concluded  on  the  10th  of  June,  1805.  Consul 
Lear,  who  disliked  Eaton  and  had  opposed  his  plans,  had 
during  Eaton's  operation  hastily  agreed  to  a  treaty  of 
peace  with  the  Bey  of  Tripoli,  involving  the  payment  of  a 
ransom  of  $60,000  for  the  captives  from  the  Philadelphia. 
Apparently,  neither  Rodgers  nor  Bainbridge  made  any 
objection  to  the  terms;  but  that  any  money  should  have 
been  paid  when  a  large  fleet  lay  off  the  batteries  of  Tripoli 
and  Eaton  with  an  army  threatened  a  revolution  in  the 
province  itself,  seems  inexcusable.7 

8  In  this  attack  Eaton  was  supported  by  the  fire  of  the  sloop 
Hornet,  the  brig  Argus,  and  the  schooner  Nautilus. 

7  Commodore  Preble  wrote  to  Eaton  that  he  was  sure  "the 
Senate  feel  that  just  sense  of  indignation  which  they  ought  at  the 
sacrifice  of  national  honor  which  has  been  made  by  an  ignominious 
negotiation."  Preble  Papers,  quoted  by  Allen,  Our  Navy  and  the 
*Barbary  Corsairs,  p.  254. 


92  The  United  States  Navy 

The  treaty  was  satisfactory,  however,  in  that  it  did 
away  with  all  annual  tribute  for  the  future.  Ilamet,  who 
was  left  in  the  lurch  at  Derne,  became  thereafter  a  pen 
sioner  of  the  United  States.  Eaton  was  honored  by  the 
State  of  Massachusetts  with  a  grant  of  10,000  acres  of 
land ;  but  he  was  embittered  by  the  outcome  of  his  efforts 
to  secure  an  honorable  peace,  and  up  to  his  death  in  1811, 
he  was  engaged  in  disputes  over  that  brilliant  but  luckless 
expedition. 

The  war  with  Tripoli  was  the  beginning  of  the  move 
ment  of  the  civilized  world  to  shake  off  the  yoke  of  the 
Barbary  pirates.  The  operations  of  our  little  fleet,  under 
Preble,  brought  honor  to  the  nation  and  to  the  service  in 
the  eyes  of  Europe,  and  at  the  same  time  they  gave  a 
practical  schooling  in  warfare  to  the  officers  of  all  grades, 
but  especially  to  the  younger  men,  who  later  won  fame 
in  the  War  of  1812. 

In  the  popular  mind,  the  hero  of  the  Tripolitan  War 
was  Stephen  Decatur,  and  there  is  no  question  as  to  his 
distinction  in  the  brilliant  personal  qualities  of  courage 
and  dash.  But  the  officer  who  deserved  first  honors  was 
Commodore  Preble.  Where  others  failed  with  large  squad 
rons,  he  succeeded  with  the  smallest.  He  introduced 
iron  discipline  into  the  service  at  a  time  when  it  was  most 
needed,  and  yet  became  the  idol  of  his  officers  and  men, 
because  he  was  as  jealous  of  their  success  and  reputation 
as  of  his  own.  The  difficulties  that  had  proved  insur 
mountable  to  others  he  overcame.  And  he  inspired  his 
subordinates  with  ideals  of  obedience,  courage,  and  effi 
ciency  that  have  ever  since  been  the  standards  of  the 
American  Navy. 


VI 

THE  WAR  OF  1812— CAUSES  AND  EARLY 
EVENTS 

IMPRESSMENT  AND  RESTRICTIONS  ON  COMMERCE 

THE  causes  of  the  War  of  1812  were  mainly  the  im 
pressment  of  American  sailors  and  the  restrictions  on  our 
trade  caused  by  the  British  orders  in  council  and  Napo 
leon's  Decrees  of  Berlin,  Milan,  and  Rambouillet.  The 
outrages  connected  with  impressment  such  as  the  forcible 
seizure  of  our  citizens  from  merchantmen,  and  especially 
from  the  deck  of  the  frigate  Chesapeake  in  1807,  rankled 
most  in  the  hearts  of  our  countrymen. 

Great  Britain  at  the  close  of  the  eighteenth  century 
entered  upon  a  struggle  with  Napoleon  for  her  very  exist 
ence,  and  in  this  struggle  both  England  and  France  com 
mitted  many  depredations  upon  neutral  commerce.  Each 
of  the  two  parties  was  in  dire  need  of  our  food  products, 
and  England  wanted  men  for  her  gigantic  navy.  In  these 
inroads  upon  our  rights,  France  was  the  greater  offender, 
but  the  American  people,  with  the  memory  of  the  Revolu 
tion  still  fresh,  were  blinded  by  hatred  of  England  to 
the  more  selfish  motives  of  Napoleon.  Then,  too,  a  short 
sighted  policy  on  the  part  of  some  of  Great  Britain's 
leading  statesmen  promoted  this  ill  feeling  in  America 
by  attempting  to  keep  us  in  a  condition  of  colonial 
dependency.  Thus,  although  Jay's  treaty  (1794)  had 
wrested  from  England  the  right  for  our  merchantmen  to 
share  in  the  coveted  British  West  India  trade,  a  leading 
English  jurist  decided  in  1805,  in  the  test  case  of  the 
Essex,  that  merchandise  carried  from  the  West  Indies  to 
the  United  States  and  thence  to  France  was  belligerent 
and  hence  open  to  seizure.  This  ruling  acted  practically 

93 


94  The  United  States  Navy 

as  a  renewal  of  the  causes  of  the  Revolution ;  England,  in 
thus  making  laws  governing  our  commerce  with  other 
nations,  was  assuming  the  privilege  of  sovereignty.  As 
a  result  of  the  Essex  case,  "about  120  vessels  were  seized, 
several  condemned,  all  taken  from  their  course,  detained, 
or  otherwise  subjected  to  heavy  losses  and  damages."1 
American  shippers,  however,  managed  to  evade  the  rule 
by  unloading  merchandise  in  a  home  port  and  then  reship- 
ping,  thus  constituting  the  goods  American;  and  by  a 
system  of  rebates  our  merchants  could  land  these  products 
in  Europe  cheaper  than  could  British  competitors. 

Great  Britain,  as  a  next  step,  now  ordered  a  general 
blockade  against  France  from  the  Elbe  to  Brest,  and  a 
close  blockade  from  the  Seine  to  Ostend.  (Order  in 
Council  of  May  16,  1806.)  This  order  led  to  the  various 
decrees  of  Napoleon,  and  to  the  British  Orders  in  Council 
of  1807  and  1809,  as  well  as  to  such  retaliatory  acts  on 
our  part  as  the  Non-Importation  Act,  the  Embargoes,  and 
the  Non-Intercourse  Act.  Thus  as  Britain,  by  her  first 
order  had  begun  the  policy  of  restraining  neutral  trade, 
Napoleon  was  able  to  lay  at  her  doors  the  whole  blame 
for  our  commercial  restrictions.  His  famous  Berlin 
Decree,  dated  November  21,  1806,  promulgated  his  edict 
"that  the  British  Islands  were  thenceforward  in  a  state  of 
blockade ;  that  all  correspondence  and  commerce  with 
them  was  prohibited;  that  trade  in  English  merchandise 
was  prohibited;  and  that  all  merchandise  belonging  to 
England  or  (even  if  neutral  property)  proceeding  from 
its  manufactories  or  colonies,  is  lawful  prize."2  Thus  as 
the  United  States  was  forbidden  to  trade  with  both  Great 
Britain  and  the  Continent,  American  commerce  was 
ground  between  the  upper  and  lower  mill-stones. 

1  Monroe  to  Fox,  Amer.  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  iii, 
114. 

'Mahan,  War  of  1812,  i,  142. 


Chesapeake-Leopard  Affair  95 

By  the  strict  enforcement  of  the  blockade  under  the 
Order  of  May  16,  the  West  India  trade  difficulty  fell  into 
abeyance,  but  the  graver  question  of  impressment  "re 
mained  an  unhealed  sore  to  the  end. ' ' 3  Great  Britain 
claimed  the  right  to  search  our  vessels  for  British-born 
subjects.  "Once  a  subject,  always  a  subject  "  expressed 
the  English  view.  The  American  view — diametrically 
opposed  to  this — was  that  a  foreign  subject  might  by 
naturalization  give  up  his  allegiance  to  his  former  country 
and  cease  to  be  a  subject  of  that  country.  But  British 
captains  did  not  stop  at  deserters  or  at  those  who  claimed 
to  be  naturalized;  they  often  seized  native  Americans. 

THE  CHESAPEAKE-LEOPARD  INCIDENT 

The  wrongs  committed  by  the  "press  gangs"  were 
brought  to  a  climax  by  the  Chesapeake-Leopard  affair  in 
1807.  The  British  had  been  blockading  some  of  our  ports 
to  enforce  their  orders,  and  several  of  the  vessels  on  this 
duty  had  been  very  bold  in  impressing  sailors  even  within 
a  league  of  our  shores.  One  of  these  blockaders  in  Chesa 
peake  Bay  had  even  chased  an  American  revenue  cutter 
with  the  Vice-President  of  the  United  States  on  board. 
On  the  other  hand,  from  the  Melampus,  a  British  block- 
ader  in  the  Chesapeake,  one  night  in  February,  1807, 
five  of  the  crew  deserted,  and  three  of  them  later  enlisted 
on  the  United  States  frigate  Chesapeake.  A  demand  was 
made  for  their  return  by  the  British  minister  at  Wash 
ington,  and  while  the  correspondence  was  going  on,  five 
more  men  deserted  from  the  Halifax,  and  also  took  service 
on  the  Chesapeake.  The  authorities  at  Washington  made 
an  investigation,  but  having  been  convinced  that  the 
deserters  were  Americans,  refused  to  give  theln  up.  This 
refusal  was  reported  to  Vice-Admiral  Berkeley  at  Halifax, 
who  at  once  sent  an  order  to  the  commanders  of  all  British 

3Mahan,  War  of  1812,  i,  114. 


96  The  United  States  Navy 

vessels  on  the  North  Atlantic  station,  requiring  them  to 
watch  for  the  Chesapeake  at  sea,  and  search  her  for 
deserters. 

On  June  22,  1807,  as  the  Chesapeake  set  sail  from 
Hampton  Boads  to  relieve  the  Constitution  in  the  Medi 
terranean,  His  Majesty's  ship  Leopard,  which  had  been 
lying  at  Lynnhaven,  followed  her,  and  when  well  outside 
of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States,  the  British  vessel 
spoke  the  American.  Captain  James  Barron  of  the  Chesa 
peake,  supposing  the  message  to  be  of  a  peaceful  char 
acter,  hove  to,  and  received  an  officer  from  the  Leopard 
who  came  aboard  with  Admiral  Berkeley's  order.  Barron 
refused  to  give  up  the  men,  whereupon  the  British  frigate 
at  once  opened  fire.  The  American  vessel  had  just  under 
gone  repairs ;  her  powder  horns  were  empty,  rammers 
could  not  be  found,  matches  had  been  mislaid,  and  but  few 
of  her  guns  were  mounted.  After  a  number  of  broadsides 
had  been  fired  at  close  range  by  the  Leopard,  First  Lieu 
tenant  Allen  managed  to  discharge  one  gun  in  return  by 
means  of  a  live  coal  from  the  galley.  Meanwhile,  twenty- 
one  shot  had  struck  the  Chesapeake' 's  hull,  her  foremast 
and  mainmast  had  been  carried  away,  the  rigging  had  been 
badly  cut,  and  three  men  had  been  killed  and  eighteen 
wounded.  Barron  thereupon  hauled  down  his  flag.  The 
British  boarding  party  found  only  one  man  of  the 
Halifax's  crew,  for  the  rest  had  deserted  before  the 
Chesapeake  sailed,  but  they  took  off  three  other  men,  all 
Americans.  Barron  attempted  to  throw  his  ship  on  the 
British  captain  as  a  prize,  but  the  latter  refusing  to 
accept  it,  left  the  American  vessel  to  find  her  way  back 
to  port  as  best  she  might.* 


4  Captain  Barron  was  court-martialed  and  found  guilty  of 
neglecting,  on  the  probability  of  an  engagement,  to  clear  his 
ship  for  action.  He  was  suspended  for  five  years  without  pay. 


Restrictions  on  American  Trade  97 

The  Chesapeake  affair  angered  the  nation  far  more 
than  had  any  outrage  on  our  merchantmen;  it  was  an 
insult  to  the  navy,  to  the  very  sovereignty  of  this  country. 
Yet  the  wavering  policy  of  Jefferson  and  of  Madison 
preferred  a  war  of  words  to  redress  by  the  sword.  It 
was  not  until  1811  that  Britain  made  a  formal  disavowal 
of  this  act  by  restoring  to  the  United  States  three  of  the 
four  men  who  had  been  seized — one  had  been  hanged  at 
the  yard-arm  as  a  deserter. 

BRITISH  ORDERS  IN  COUNCIL  AND  NAPOLEON'S  DECREES 

Immediately  after  the  Chesapeake  affair,  Jefferson 
ordered,  by  proclamation,  all  British  ships-of-war  to  leave 
American  ports.  Hereupon,  Great  Britain,  by  her  Order 
in  Council  of  November,  1807,  declared  that  "all  ports 
from  which  the  British  flag  is  excluded  shall  from  hence 
forth  be  subject  to  the  same  restrictions,  in  point  of  trade 
and  navigation,  as  if  the  same  were  actually  blockaded 
in  the  most  strict  and  rigorous  manner  by  His  Majesty's 
naval  forces."  Napoleon,  in  retaliation,  now  declared 
by  his  Milan  Decree  that  any  foreign  vessel  allowing  the 
British  to  board  her  and  examine  her  papers  became, 
ipso  facto,  liable  to  seizure.  Congress  at  once  passed  an 
Embargo  Act  prohibiting  our  vessels  from  leaving  our 
ports. 

This  and  the  Non-Importation  Act  had  a  disastrous 
effect  on  trade.  Such  legislation  entailed  all  the  miseries 
of  war  without  its  compensations.  It  rendered  our  com 
merce  stagnant,  and  by  forcing  business  interests  to  evade 
the  law  corrupted  the  moral  sense.  Merchandise  was 
carried  abroad  by  way  of  the  West  Indies  and  Canada, 
and  American  sailors  were  thrown  out  of  employment  by 
thousands.  Embargo-breakers  were  left  unmolested  by 
British  cruisers,  or  frequently  even  sailed  under  British 
7 


98  The  United  States  Navy 

convoy.  Napoleon,  by  his  Bayonne  Decree,  April,  1808, 
made  this  class  of  vessels  also  liable  to  seizure. 

In  retaliation  Congress,  by  the  Non-Intercourse  Act, 
March  1,  1809,  declared  all  vessels  of  both  England  and 
France,  entering  our  ports  lawful  prize.  Thereupon  Great 
Britain,  by  her  Order  in  Council  of  April,  1809,  enun 
ciated  the  new  rule,  "no  trade  at  all"  (instead  of  "no 
trade  save  through  England"),  this  rule  to  apply  to  those 
coasts  over  which  Napoleon  still  had  control.  Then  Napo 
leon,  in  pretended  retaliation  for  our  Non-Intercourse 
Act,  but  in  reality  to  fill,  by  any  means,  his  empty  coffers, 
signed,  in  March,  1810,  his  Kambouillet  Decree,  giving 
the  right  to  seize  and  sell  all  American  vessels  that  had 
entered  French  ports  since  May,  1809.  Between  March 
and  May,  1810,  cargoes  to  the  value  of  $10,000,000  were 
seized  under  this  decree. 

The  people  of  the  United  States  were  getting  very 
restive  under  this  temporizing  policy  and  commercial  war 
fare.  Yet,  although  Napoleon  was  the  greater  offender, 
so  far  as  our  commerce  was  concerned,  the  American 
feeling  of  hostility  to  England  was  stronger,  especially 
on  account  of  impressment.  After  March  4,  1809,  when 
Madison  became  President,  we  hear  the  first  words  in 
Congress  of  war.  "I  will  never  let  go  the  embargo,"  said 
Josiah  Quincy,  "unless  on  the  very  same  day  on  which 
we  let  it  go,  we  draw  the  sword. ' '  Early  in  1810,  Pinkney, 
our  minister  to  England,  was  instructed  to  brook  no  more 
delays  in  the  negotiations.  After  receiving  many  evasive 
replies,  he  at  length,  in  January,  1811,  informed  the 
British  Government  that  the  United  States  could  no  longer 
be  represented,  and  immediately  took  his  departure. 

Some  British  statesmen,  nevertheless,  tried  hard  to 
avert  war.  The  lack  of  bread  in  England,  the  dire  dis 
tress  of  her  manufacturing  towns,  and  her  already  great 
burden  in  the  European  war,  made  many  Englishmen  hesi- 


The  President-Little  Belt  Affair  99 

tate  before  entering  on  another  war.  The  Prince  Regent, 
therefore,  in  answer  to  popular  clamor  now  did  his  utmost 
to  avert  hostilities,  and  the  British  orders  against  Amer 
ican  commerce  were  accordingly  revoked,  early  in  1812. 
But  American  patience  had  been  exhausted,  and  the  good 
intentions  of  the  Prince  Regent  were  too  late. 


THE  PRESIDENT  AND  THE  LITTLE  BELT 

Meanwhile  events  had  been  occurring  at  sea  which 
helped  to  spur  our  Government  to  severer  measures.  On 
May  1,  1811,  the  British  frigate  Guerriere,  off  New  York 
harbor,  had  boarded  the  American  brig  Spitfire  and  im 
pressed  a  passenger,  a  native  of  the  United  States.  Imme 
diately,  Captain  John  Rodgers  in  the  President  was 
ordered  to  seek  the  Guerriere.  Rodgers  had  already  been 
put  in  command  of  a  squadron  of  frigates  and  sloops, 
with  orders  to  defend  on  the  open  sea  all  vessels  of  the 
United  States  from  molestation  by  foreign  armed  ships. 

While  searching  for  the  Guerriere,  on  May  16,  1811, 
fifty  miles  off  Cape  Henry,  he  sighted  a  strange  vessel. 
At  eight  o'clock  that  evening,  though  within  hailing  dis 
tance,  he  could  not  make  out  in  the  darkness  the  stranger's 
identity.  The  latter,  after  two  hails  from  the  President, 
replied  with  a  shot,  which  struck  the  American  vessel's 
mainmast.  Captain  Rodgers  at  once  returned  the  com 
pliment.  After  a  battle  that  lasted  fifteen  minutes,  the 
foreign  corvette,  which  turned  out  to  be  the  sloop  of  war 
Little  Belt,  gave  up  the  unequal  contest.  She  had  been 
badly  cut  up,  had  lost  nine  killed  and  had  twenty- three 
wounded.  Captain  Rodgers  stood  by  during  the  night, 
and  next  day  offered  assistance;  but  the  English  captain 
refused  the  proffered  aid,  and  continued  his  voyage.  This 
incident  embittered  the  feelings  between  the  two  coun 
tries  still  more. 


100  The  United  States  Navy 

THE  DECLARATION  OF  WAR 

President  Madison  had  called  the  Congress  together 
on  November  4,  1811,  and  this  body  had  at  once  voted 
an  army  of  35,000  regulars  and  50,000  volunteers.  To 
the  navy,  the  President  had  devoted  in  his  message  only 
three  lines.  Congress  appointed  a  committee  to  consider 
the  feasibility  of  building  war  vessels,  and  this  committee 
suggested  that  twelve  ships-of-the-line  and  twenty  frigates 
should  be  built  to  protect  our  coasts.  But  Congress,  still 
dominated  by  a  Jeffersonian  opposition  to  naval  arma 
ments  as  expensive  and  subversive  of  political  freedom, 
rejected  the  report  by  a  vote  of  sixty-two  to  fifty-nine. 
Politicians  could  not  see  that  privateers  and  the  loss  of 
trade  were  far  more  expensive  than  ships-of-war,  nor  did 
they  yet  realize  that  a  well-managed  navy  would  promote 
patriotism  and  bring  back  national  self-respect.  Congress 
contented  itself  in  making  an  appropriation  of  $600,000 
for  timber  for  future  warships  and  Avliile  in  secret 
session  it  passed  another  embargo,  April,  1812,  intended 
to  prevent  the  sapping  of  our  seamen  and  supplies  to  aid 
England  in  her  Peninsular  War.  Like  the  other  embar 
goes,  the  Non-Intercourse  Act,  and  similar  legislation, 
this  law  also  failed  in  its  object.  On  June  1,  1812,  the 
President  sent  a  message  to  Congress  urging  that  war  be 
declared  against  Great  Britain,  for  the  reasons  that  the 
latter  country  had  ruined  America's  trade  by  her  Orders 
in  Council,  had  practically  blockaded  American  ports, 
and  had  impressed  American  seamen  into  the  service  of 
her  navy.  Congress  passed  the  necessary  act,  and  on  June 
19,  1812,  war  was  declared. 

We  thus  see  that  the  causes  that  led  to  war  were:  (1) 
the  hostile  feeling  in  the  United  States  towards  Great 
Britain;  (2)  a  series  of  British  Orders  in  Council  (Orders 


Comparison  of  Naval '  Strength  101 

of  1806,  1807,  1809),  the  Decrees  of  Napoleon  (Berlin, 
Milan,  Bayonne,  and  Rambouillet  Decrees),  and  the 
retaliatory  acts  of  our  government  (Embargo,  Non-Inter 
course,  and  Non-Importation  Acts)  ;  (3)  and  last  and 
most  important  of  all,  impressment. 

THE  NAVIES  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  GREAT  BRITAIN 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  war  there  were  sixteen  service 
able  war  vessels  in  our  navy ;  among  them  there  was  not 
a  single  ship-of-the-line,  but  they  included  the  three 
splendid  44-gun  frigates,  United  States,  Constitution,  and 
President,  which  were  superior  to  any  frigate  in  the 
British  Navy.  The  personnel  of  the  navy  also  was  at  a 
high  pitch  of  efficiency,  for  nearly  all  the  officers  and 
many  of  the  seamen  had  seen  active  service  in  the  French 
War  and  in  the  war  with  Tripoli. 

Besides  these  sixteen  men-of-war,  there  were  257  gun 
boats  which  had  been  built  in  the  years  immediately  pre 
ceding  the  war;  for  Jefferson,  who  strongly  opposed  a 
navy,  placed  great  faith  in  these  gunboats,  which  were 
intended  for  coast  defence.  These,  however,  proved  to 
be  utterly  worthless,  and  need  not  be  considered  as  any 
part  of  our  naval  force. 

On  the  other  hand,  Britain's  navy  in  1812  "stood  at 
a  height  never  reached  before  or  since  by  that  of  any 
other  nation."5  According  to  the  London  Times  of  that 
year,  England  "had  from  Halifax  to  the  West  Indies 
seven  times  the  armament  of  the  whole  American  Navy. ' ' 
Two  years  later,  by  the  abdication  of  Napoleon,  she  had 
her  entire  navy  free  to  use  against  the  United  States,  a 
huge  fleet  of  219  ships-of-the-line  and  296  frigates,  besides 
a  larger  number  of  corvettes. 


Roosevelt,  Naval  War  of  1812,  p.  22. 


The  United  States  Navy 


THE  CHASE  OF  THE  BELVIDERA 

Shortly  after  the  declaration  of  war,  Commodore 
Rodgers,  with  his  squadron  (the  only  vessels  ready  for 
immediate  service)  consisting  of  his  flagship,  the  Presi 
dent,  44;  the  United  States,  44,  Captain  Decatur;  the 
Congress,  38,  Captain  Smith;  the  Hornet,  18,  Captain 
Lawrence;  and  the  Argus,  16,  Lieutenant  Sinclair,  left 
New  York  on  June  21,  with  the  intention  of  capturing 
the  homeward-bound  plate  fleet  from  Jamaica.  On  June 
23,  Eodgers'  squadron  sighted  the  British  frigate  Belvi 
dera,  36,  Captain  Byron.  The  President  was  overhauling 
the  enemy,  and  when  she  came  within  gunshot,  the  Amer 
ican  vessel,  by  means  of  her  bow  guns,  killed  and  wounded 
nine  men.  At  this  juncture  a  main-deck  gun  on  the 
President  burst,  and  in  the  ensuing  confusion,  Captain 
Byron  escaped.  The  President  had  lost  much  ground  by 
yawing  and  firing  harmless  broadsides.  By  this  chase, 
Commodore  Rodgers  was  taken  far  out  of  the  course  of  the 
plate  fleet.  He  now  proceeded  to  Newfoundland  and 
thence  across  the  Atlantic  and  back  to  Boston,  where  he 
arrived  on  August  31,  with  seven  prizes,  all  merchantmen. 

HULL'S  ESCAPE  FROM  BROKE  's  SQUADRON 

The  Belvidera,  after  her  escape,  carried  the  news  of 
war  to  Halifax,  and  acting  on  this  information  Vice- 
Admiral  Sawyer,  on  July  5,  1812,  sent  a  squadron  under 
Captain  Philip  Bowes  Vere  Broke  to  cruise  against  the 
United  States.  This  squadron  consisted  of  the  flagship 
Shannon,  38;  the  Belvidera,  36,  Captain  Byron;  the 
Africa,  64,  Captain  Bastard;  the  Aeolus,  32,  Captain 
Townsend;  and  the  Guerriere,  38,  Captain  Dacres.  On 
the  16th,  the  British  vessels  captured  the  United  States 
brig  Nautilus,  of  14  guns.  On  the  same  afternoon,  off 


Chase  of  the  Constitution  103 

Barnegat,  they  made  out  a  strange  sail  standing  to  the 
northeast.  This  was  the  Constitution,  Captain  Hull. 
When  on  the  following  morning  they  discovered  that  she 
was  an  American  frigate,  they  began  a  chase,  remarkable 
for  its  duration,  and  for  the  skill  with  which  the  Constitu 
tion  was  handled. 

Commodore  Charles  Morris,  at  this  time  first  lieu 
tenant  on  the  Constitution,  gives  in  his  autobiography  an 
interesting  account  of  this  chase : 

"The  ship  [the  Constitution}  had  been  ordered  to 
New  York  to  meet  and  join  other  vessels  under  the  com 
mand  of  Commodore  Rodgers,  and  our  course  was  directed 
accordingly.  We  had  proceeded  beyond  the  Delaware, 
but  out  of  sight  of  land,  when,  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
16th  [July,  1812],  we  discovered  four  vessels  at  a  great 
distance  to  the  northwest,  and  a  single  ship  to  the  north 
east,  from  which  quarter  a  light  wind  was  then  blowing. 
The  wind  changed  to  the  southward  about  sunset  which 
brought  us  to  windward,  and  we  stood  for  the  ship,  the 
wind  being  very  light.  The  chase  was  evidently  a  frigate, 
and  the  first  impression  was  that  she  might  be  a  part  of 
Commodore  Rodgers'  squadron.  By  eleven  P.M.  we  were 
within  signal  distance,  and  it  was  soon  apparent  that  she 
was  not  an  American  man-of-war.  There  being  no  appre 
hension  that  a  British  frigate  would  make  any  attempt 
to  avoid  an  engagement,  Captain  Hull  felt  justified  in 
delaying  any  nearer  approach  till  daylight  of  the  17th, 
when  our  newly-collected  and  imperfectly  disciplined 
men  would  be  less  likely  to  be  thrown  into  confusion. 
The  ship  was  accordingly  brought  to  the  wind  with  her 
head  to  the  southward  and  westward,  under  easy  sail, 
with  a  light  wind  from  the  northwest.  The  other  ship  did 
the  same  at  about  two  miles'  distance.  The  watch  not 
on  duty  were  allowed  to  sleep  at  their  quarters,  and  the 
officers  slept  in  the  same  manner. 


104  The  United  States  Navy 

"As  the  following  morning  opened  upon  us,  it  dis 
closed  our  companion  of  the  night  to  be  a  large  frigate, 
just  within  gunshot,  on  the  lee  quarter,  and  a  ship-of-the- 
line  and  three  other  frigates,  a  brig,  and  a  schooner,  about 
two  miles  nearly  astern,  with  all  sails  set,  standing  for 
us,  with  English  colors  flying.  All  our  sails  were  soon 
set,  and  the  nearest  frigate,  fortunately  for  us,  but  with 
out  any  apparent  reason,  tacked  and  immediately  wore 
round  again  in  chase,  a  maneuver  that  occupied  some 
ten  minutes,  and  allowed  us  to  gain  a  distance,  which, 
though  short,  proved  of  utmost  importance  to  our  safety. 
By  sunrise  our  ship  was  entirely  becalmed  and  unman 
ageable,  while  the  ships  astern  retained  a  light  breeze  till 
it  brought  three  of  the  frigates  so  near,  that  their  shot 
passed  beyond  us.  The  distance,  however,  was  too  great 
for  accuracy,  and  their  shot  did  not  strike  our  ship. 

' '  Our  boats  were  soon  hoisted  out,  and  the  ship 's  head 
kept  from  the  enemy,  and  exertions  were  made  to  increase 
our  distance  from  them  by  towing.  This,  and  occasional 
catspaws,  or  slight  puffs  of  wind,  enabled  us  to  prevent 
their  closing,  but  as  their  means  were  equal  to  ours,  we 
could  gain  nothing.  A  few  guns  were  fired  from  our 
sternports,  but  so  much  rake  6  had  been  given  to  the  stern, 
that  the  guns  could  not  be  used  with  safety  and  their 
further  use  was  relinquished.  All  means  were  adopted 
that  seemed  to  promise  any  increase  of  speed.  The  ham 
mocks  were  removed  from  the  nettings,  and  the  cloths 
rolled  up  to  prevent  their  unfavorable  action ;  several 
thousand  gallons  of  water  were  started  and  pumped  over 
board,  and  all  the  sails  kept  thoroughly  wet  to  close  the 
texture  of  the  canvas. 

"While  making  all  these  exertions,  our  chances  for 
escape  were  considered  hopeless.  For  many  years  the 
ship  had  proved  a  very  dull  sailer,  especially  during  the 

6  Slant  or   inclination. 


Chase  of  the  Constitution  105 

late  cruise,  and  it  was  supposed  that  the  first  steady 
breeze  would  bring  up  such  a  force  as  would  render 
resistance  of  no  avail,  and  our  situation  seemed  hopeless. 
At  about  eight  A.M.,  one  of  the  frigates  called  all  the 
boats  of  the  squadron  to  her,  and,  having  arranged  them 
for  towing,  furled  all  sails.  This  brought  her  toward  us 
steadily,  and  seemed  to  decide  our  fate.  Fortunately  for 
us,  a  light  breeze  filled  our  sails  and  sent  us  forward  a 
few  hundred  yards,  before  her  sails  could  be  set  to  profit 
by  it. 

"With  our  minds  excited  to  the  utmost  to  devise 
means  for  escape,  I  happened  to  recollect  that,  when 
obliged  by  the  timidity  of  my  old  commander,  Cox,  to 
warp  the  President  in  and  out  of  harbors  where  others 
depended  on  sails,  our  practice  had  enabled  us  to  give  her 
a  speed  of  nearly  three  miles  an  hour.  We  had  been  on 
soundings  the  day  before,  and,  on  trying,  we  found 
twenty-six  fathoms.  This  depth  was  unfavorably  great, 
but  it  gave  me  confidence  to  suggest  to  Captain  Hull  the 
expediency  of  attempting  to  warp  the  ship  ahead.  He 
acceded  at  once,  and  in  a  short  time  (about  seven  A.M.) 
the  launch  and  the  first  cutter  were  sent  ahead  with  the 
kedge  and  all  the  hawsers  and  rigging,  from  five  inches 
and  upward,  that  could  be  found,  making  nearly  a  mile 
of  length.  When  the  kedge  was  thrown,  the  men  hauled 
on  the  connecting  hawser,  slowly  and  carefully  at  first, 
till  the  ship  was  in  motion,  and  gradually  increasing  until 
a  sufficient  velocity  was  given  to  continue  till  the  anchor 
could  be  taken  ahead  again,  when  the  same  process  was 
repeated.  In  this  way  the  ship  was  soon  placed  out  of 
the  range  of  the  enemy's  guns  and  by  continued  exertions 
when  the  wind  failed,  and  giving  every  possible  advantage 
to  the  sails  when  we  had  air  enough  to  fill  them,  we  pre 
vented  them  from  again  closing  very  near  us. 

1 '  The  ship  which  we  had  first  chased  gained  a  position 
abeam  of  us  about  nine  A.M.,  and  fired  several  broadsides, 


106  The  United  States  Navy 

but  the  shot  fell  just  short  of  us,  and  only  served  to 
enliven  our  men  and  excite  their  jocular  comments.  The 
exertions  of  neither  party  were  relaxed  during  this  day 
or  the  following  night.  There  was  frequent  alternation 
of  calms  and  very  light  winds  from  the  southeast,  which 
we  received  with  our  head  to  the  southwestward.  When 
the  wind  would  give  us  more  speed  than  with  warping  and 
towing,  the  boats  were  run  up  to  their  places,  or  sus 
pended  to  the  spars  in  the  chains  by  temporary  tackles, 
with  their  crews  in  them,  ready  to  act  again  at  a  moment 's 
notice. 

"At  daylight  of  the  second  day,  on  the  18th,  it  was 
found  that  one  frigate  had  gained  a  position  on  our  lee 
bow,  two  nearly  abeam,  one  on  the  lee  quarter  about  two 
miles  from  us,  and  the  ship-of-the-line,  brig,  and  schooner, 
three  miles  from  us  in  the  same  direction.  The  wind  had 
now  become  tolerably  steady,  though  still  light.  The 
frigate  on  the  lee  bow  tacked  about  four  A.M.,  and  would 
evidently  reach  within  gunshot  if  we  continued  our  course. 
This  we  were  anxious  to  avoid,  as  a  single  shot  might 
cripple  some  spar,  and  impede  our  progress.  If  we  tacked, 
we  might  be  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the  other  frigate  on 
the  lee  quarter;  but  as  she  was  a  smaller  vessel,  the  risk 
appeared  to  be  less,  and  we  also  tacked  soon. 

"In  passing  the  lee  frigate  at  five,  we  expected  a 
broadside  or  more,  as  we  should  evidently  pass  within 
gunshot;  but,  from  some  unexplained  cause,  Lord  James 
Townsend,  in  the  Aeolus,  of  32  guns,  suffered  us  to  pass 
quietly,  and  tacked  in  our  wake,  while,  the  others  soon 
took  the  same  direction.  We  had  now  all  our  pursuers 
astern  and  on  the  lee  quarter,  and  as  the  wind  was  grad 
ually  increasing,  our  escape  must  depend  on  our  superi 
ority  of  sailing,  which  we  had  no  reason  to  hope  or  expect. 
Exertions,  however,  were  not  relaxed.  The  launch  and 
first  cutter,  which  we  dared  not  lose,  were  hoisted  on 
board  at  six  A.M.,  under  the  directions  of  Captain  Hull, 


Chase  of  the  Constitution  107 

with  so  little  loss  of  time  or  change  of  sails,  that  our 
watching  enemies  could  not  conceive  what  disposition  was 
made  of  them.  This  we  afterward  learned  from  Lieu 
tenant  Crane,  who  was  a  prisoner  in  their  squadron.  The 
sails  were  kept  saturated  with  water,  a  set  of  skysails 
was  made  and  set,  and  all  other  sails  set  and  trimmed  to 
the  greatest  advantage,  close  by  the  wind.  The  ship 
directly  astern  gained  slowly,  but  gradually,  till  noon; 
though,  as  the  wind  increased,  our  good  ship  was  going  at 
that  time  at  the  unexpected  rate  of  ten  knots  an  hour. 
At  noon  we  had  the  wind  abeam,  and  as  it  gradually 
freshened,  we  began  to  leave  our  fleet  pursuer.  Our  ship 
had  reached  a  speed  of  twelve  and  a  half  knots  by 
two  P.M.  Our  hopes  began  to  overcome  apprehension,  and 
cheerfulness  was  more  apparent  among  us. 

"Though  encouraged,  we  were  by  no  means  assured, 
as  all  the  ships  were  still  near  and  ready  to  avail  them 
selves  of  any  advantage  that  might  offer.  About  six  P.M., 
a  squall  of  wind  and  rain  passed  over  us,  which  induced 
us  to  take  in  our  light  sails  before  the  rain  covered  us 
from  the  view  of  the  enemy ;  but  most  of  them  were  soon 
replaced  as  the  wind  moderated.7  When  the  rain  had 
passed,  we  had  evidently  gained  a  mile  or  more  during  its 

7  This  was  a  skilful  ruse  on  the  part  of  Hull  to  deceive  the 
enemy.  "  He  immediately  let  everything  go  by  the  run,  apparently 
in  the  utmost  confusion,  as  if  unable  to  show  a  yard  of  canvas — 
his  sails  were  hauled  up  by  the  brails  and  clewlines.  The  enemy, 
perceiving  this,  hastened  to  get  everything  snug,  before  the  gust 
should  reach  them;  but  no  sooner  had  they  got  their  sails  furled, 
than  Captain  Hull  had  his  courses  and  topsails  set,  and  the 
Constitution  darted  forward  with  great  rapidity.  So  coolly, 
however,  did  he  proceed,  that  he,  .  .  .  though  pressed  by  a 
pursuing  enemy,  attended  personally  to  hoisting  his  launch  and 
other  boats,  while  the  ship  was  going  at  ten  knots  through  the 
water.  .  .  .  The  British  squadron  cut  adrift  all  their  boats,  and, 
after  they  abandoned  the  chase,  spent  two  or  three  whole  days  in 
cruising  to  pick  them  up."  Naval  Monument,  pp.  8-9. 


108  The  United  States  Navy 

continuance.  Still  the  pursuit  was  continued,  and  our 
own  ship  pressed  forward  to  her  utmost  speed.  The 
officers  and  men  again  passed  the  night  at  quarters.  At 
daylight,  on  the  morning  of  the  19th,  our  enemies  had 
been  left  so  far  astern  that  danger  from  them  was  consid 
ered  at  an  end,  and  at  eight  A.M.  they  at  last  relinquished 
the  chase  and  hauled  their  wind.8  Our  officers  and  crew 
could  now  indulge  in  some  rest,  of  which  the  former  had 
taken  little  for  more  than  sixty  hours. 

' i  Captain  Hull  deservedly  gained  much  reputation  for 
this  difficult  retreat  from  a  greatly  superior  force,  when 
superior  numbers  and  other  circumstances  gave  the  enemy 
great  advantages.  ...  If  they  had  concentrated  their 
efforts  at  an  earlier  period  to  bringing  up  some  one  of 
their  ships  within  fair  range,  or  had  adopted  our  plan  of 
warping  at  any  time  during  the  early  part  of  the  chase, 
they  could  hardly  have  failed  to  inflict  such  damage  as 
would  have  prevented  our  escape,  after  our  dependence 
was  reduced  to  our  sails.  The  result  may  be  remembered 
as  an  evidence  of  the  advantages  to  be  expected  from 
perseverance  under  the  most  discouraging  circumstances, 
so  long  as  any  chance  of  success  may  remain."  9 

Captain  Isaac  Hull,  by  reason  of  his  coolness,  great 
perseverance,  good  seamanship,  and  readiness  to  take 
suggestions  of  his  subordinates,  had  completely  out- 
maneuvered  five  British  captains.  This  feat  in  eluding 
Broke 's  squadron,  and  his  fight  shortly  afterwards  with 
the  Guerriere,  according  to  Roosevelt,  "place  him  above 
any  single-ship  captain  of  the  war." 

8  That  is,  came  up  into  the  wind. 

9  The  Autobiography   of   Commodore  Morris,   pp.   51-55. 


VII 

THE  CAPTURES  OF  THE  GUERRIERE  AND 
THE  MACEDONIAN 

THE  CONSTITUTION  AND  THE  GUERRIERE 

THE  Constitution,  having  been  prevented  by  Broke 's 
squadron  from  entering  New  York,  proceeded  to  Boston, 
where  she  arrived  July  27,  1812.  Captain  Hull  at  once 
dispatched  letters  to  New  York  and  Washington,  renewed 
supplies,  and  prepared  for  active  service.  When  he  had 
delayed  just  long  enough  to  learn  that  there  were  no 
orders  from  Commodore  Rodgers  awaiting  him  in  New 
York,  Hull  put  to  sea  on  August  2.  His  haste,  Morris 
says,  was  due  to  his  "apprehension  of  being  blockaded 
by  the  enemy's  squadron";  but  probably  he  was  also 
influenced  by  his  eagerness  to  try  issues  with  the  British, 
and  by  the  likelihood  that  his  ship  would  soon  be  given  to 
a  captain  higher  on  the  list.  As  it  turned  out,  he  had  a 
narrow  escape  in  getting  to  sea;  for,  on  the  day  following 
his  departure,  orders  came  from  Washington  which  would 
have  held  him  in  port  for  weeks  and  perhaps  months.  It 
was  well  for  Hull,  thus  sailing  without  orders,  that  he 
could  giye  a  good  account  of  himself  upon  his  return. 

After  an  uneventful  cruise  to  Halifax,  he  took'  his 
station  off  Cape  Race,  where  he  might  intercept  ships 
bound  to  or  from  Quebec  or  Halifax.  Here  he  seized  two 
British  brigs,  saved  an  American  prize  from  being  recapt 
ured,  and  retook  an  American  brig  that  had  been  seized 
by  the  British.  At  this  point  he  heard  that  Broke 's 
squadron  was  on  the  western  edge  of  the  Grand  Banks. 
He  therefore  took  a  course  southward,  intending  to  pass 
near  the  Bermudas.  On  the  evening  of  August  18,  he 

109 


110  The  United  States  Navy 

saw  a  sail,  and  giving  chase  overhauled  it  in  two  hours. 
It  proved  to  be  an  American  privateer,  the  Decatur, 
Avhich,  in  attempting  to  escape  its  supposed  foe,  had 
thrown  twelve  of  its  fourteen  guns  overboard.  From  the 
Decatur  Hull  learned  that  a  British  ship  of  war  had 
been  seen  the  day  previous  standing  to  the  southward. 
He  immediately  resolved  to  give  chase. 

At  one  P.M.,  August  19,  when  the  Constitution  was  in 
latitude  41°  42'  N.,  longitude  55°  48'  W.1  (about  750 
miles  east  of  Boston),  the  lookout  at  the  masthead  made 
out  a  sail  somewhat  south  of  east.  Two  hours  later  the 
sail  could  be  seen  to  be  a  large  ship  on  the  starboard  tack 
under  easy  canvas,  close  hauled  to  the  wind,  which  was 
blowing  fresh  from  the  northwest.  Hull  was  eager  to 
engage  a  British  frigate,  and,  being  to  windward,  he  came 
rapidly  down  until  he  was  within  three  miles,  when  he 
ordered  the  light  sails  taken  in,  the  courses  hauled  up,  and 
the  ship  cleared  for  action.  The  stranger,  which  proved 
to  be  the  Guerriere,  had,  in  the  meantime,  shown  her 
willingness  to  engage  by  backing  her  main  topsail  and 
waiting  for  her  enemy  to  approach.  The  American 
responded  smartly,  intending  to  come  to  close  quarters  at 
once. 

If  the  Constitution  held  to  her  course,  Captain  Dacres 
of  the  Guerriere  saw  that  his  enemy  might  pass  under 
his  stern  and  rake.  To  prevent  this,  Dacres  fired  a  broad 
side  when  his  antagonist  was  barely  within  range  and 
then  wore,  firing  the  other  broadside  as  he  came  about. 
The  Constitution,  which  had  displayed  an  ensign  and  a 
jack  at  each  masthead,  also  fired  occasionally,  and  yawed 
to  prevent  being  raked.  Thus  the  frigates  maneuvered  for 
three-quarters  of  an  hour,  each  giving  the  other  no  advan- 


1  Letter  of  Captain  Hull,  August  30,  1812,  to  the  Secretary  of 
the  Navy. 


The  Constitution  and  the  Guerriere        111 

tage,  but  inflicting  no  injury.     The  Guerriere  then  gave 
the  Constitution  an  opportunity  to  come  into  close  action 


\  p 

IND\        f 


WIND 
N.W. 


—^  s.* 


S.55PM. 


C  CONSTITUTION 
G  GUERRTERE  tehadeJ) 
a.&.et  etc.  synchronous 


The. 


AUGUST  19,  1812 


PLAN  OF  THE  BATTLE  BETWEEN  THE  CONSTITUTION  AND  THE  GUERRIERE 
AUGUST  19,  1812 

by  bearing  up  and  sailing  slowly  under  topsails  and  jib 
with  the  wind  on  her  quarter.  Hull,  seeing  Dacres'  will 
ingness,  ordered  the  man  at  the  wheel  to  steer  directly 


The  United  States  Navy 

for  the  British  ship,  and  had  the  main  topgallant  sail  set 
that  he  might  close  at  once;  further,  he  instructed  his 
gunners  to  cease  firing. 

As  the  Constitution  approached,  the  Guerriere  opened 
vigorously  with  her  stern  chasers,  to  which  the  Constitu 
tion  could  give  no  effective  reply  without  yawing,  a 
maneuver  which  would  prevent  the  American  from  coming 
at  once  into  close  action.  In  obedience  to  Hull's  orders, 
his  gunners  endured  this  fire  in  silence,  but  made  every 
preparation  to  strike  a  telling  blow  when  the  word  should 
be  given,  and  double-shotted  their  guns  with  round  and 
grape. 

It  was  at  5.55,  according  to  Captain  Hull's  report, 
that  he  came  alongside  the  Guerriere  within  half  pistol 
shot.  At  the  signal  a  heavy  fire  burst  from  his  starboard 
battery  as  each  gun  bore  on  the  Guerriere.  Hull  had 
struck  his  first  blow,  and  the  enemy  fairly  staggered 
from  the  shock.  Just  before  the  battle,  as  the  American 
ensign  was  unfurled,  the  crew  of  the  Constitution  had 
given  three  cheers,  "requesting  to  be  laid  close  alongside 
the  enemy."  And  now  when  their  desire  was  promptly 
granted,  they  responded  nobly  to  the  supreme  test  and 
maintained  a  cool  and  well-directed  fire  in  the  face  of  a 
furious  cannonade  from  the  Guerriere.  It  was  only  six 
to  eight  weeks  since  Hull  had  shipped  his  crew,  many  of 
whom  were  raw  hands.  But  the  weeks  had  been  filled  with 
constant  practice,  and  early  in  this  battle  the  practice 
began  to  tell.  The  main  yard  of  the  Guerriere  was  shot 
away  in  the  slings,  and  fifteen  minutes  after  she  had  been 
engaged  at  close  quarters  her  mizzenmast  was  struck  by 
a  24-pound  shot,  and  went  by  the  board,  knocking  a  hole 
in  her  starboard  counter.  On  seeing  this,  Hull  is  said  to 
have  exclaimed,  *  *  Huzza,  my  boys !  We  have  made  a  brig 
of  her!" 

The    mast,    falling    on    the    starboard    side,     acted 


The  Constitution  and  the  Guerriere        113 

as  a  drag,  and,  though  the  helm  was  put  hard  over, 
brought  the  ship's  head  up.  As  the  Constitution 
then  drew  ahead,  Hull  luffed  short  round  the  Guerriere 's 
bows.  The  loss  of  braces,  with  spanker  and  mizzen  top 
sails  disabled,  prevented  his  coming  to  as  quickly  as  he 
desired,2  but  he  poured  in  two  raking  broadsides,  swept 
her  decks  with  grape,  and  put  several  holes  in  her  hull 
between  wind  and  water.  He  then  attempted  to  wear  that 
he  might  retain  the  advantage  of  position  and  perhaps 
rake  again,  but  as  he  brought  the  ship  before  the  wind 
the  bowsprit  of  the  Guerriere  fouled  the  port  mizzen 
rigging  of  the  Constitution. 

Each  side  now  thought  of  boarding.  With  the  British 
it  was  indeed  a  last  desperate  chance  to  retrieve  the  day. 
But  as  they  were  assembling  on  the  forecastle  of  the 
Guerriere,  the  American  sailors  were  being  drawn  up  on 
the  quarter-deck  of  the  Constitution.  Captain  Dacres, 
seeing  what  preparation  had  been  made  to  receive  his 
men,  and  considering  how  slow  and  difficult  it  would  be 
to  cross  over  because  of  the  rough  sea,  gave  up  the 
attempt. 

So  near  were  the  two  forces  to  each  other,  that  an 
American  sailor  who  had  discharged  his  boarding  pistol, 
enraged  that  he  had  missed  his  man,  threw  the  pistol  and 
struck  him  in  the  chest.  Marksmen  in  the  tops,  mean 
while,  inflicted  severe  losses  on  each  side;  in  fact,  nearly 
all  the  losses  that  the  Constitution  suffered  during  the 
engagement  occurred  at  this  time.  Lieutenant  Bush  of 
the  American  marines,  who  in  organizing  the  boarding- 
party  had  exposed  himself  on  the  Constitution's  quarter 
deck,  was  killed;  Lieutenant  Morris,  while  attempting  to 
pass  some  turns  of  the  mainbrace  over  the  Guerriere' s 
bowsprit  to  hold  the  two  ships  together,  was  severely 

2  Autobiography  of  Commodore  Morris,  p.  56. 
8 


114  The  United  States  Navy 

wounded ;  Mr.  Alwyn,  the  master,  also  sustained  a  slight 
injury ;  and  Captain  Hull  escaped  only  because  a  devoted 
sailor  who  saw  him  mounting  an  arm-chest  forcibly  drew 
him  back  and  begged  he  would  not  get  up  there  unless 
he  took  oft'  "those  swabs,"  pointing  to  his  epaulets.  Nor 
did  the  British  suffer  less;  among  the  wounded  were 
Captain  Dacres  (shot  through  the  back),  Mr.  Scott,  the 
master,  and  Mr.  Kent,  the  master's  mate. 

The  ships  soon  drew  apart,  but  the  bowsprit  of  the 
Guerriere,  striking  the  taffrail  of  the  Constitution,  slacked 
the  British  ship 's  f orestay ;  and  as  the  f oreshrouds  on  the 
port  side  had  been  mostly  shot  away,  the  foremast  fell 
over  on  the  starboard  side,  crossing  the  mainstay.  The 
jerk  suddenly  given  to  the  mainmast — not  very  sound- 
caused  that  to  fall ;  and  thirty  minutes  after  fighting  at 
close  quarters  had  begun,  according  to  Hull's  statement, 
the  Guerriere  was  left  without  a  spar  except  the  bowsprit. 
The  Constitution  sailed  ahead  of  the  Guerriere  and  again 
took  a  position  to  rake,  but  the  British,  seeing  the  useless- 
ness  of  further  fighting,  fired  a  gun  to  leeward  as  signal 
of  submission. 

The  Constitution  then  set  fore  and  mainsails,  and 
hauled  a  short  distance  to  the  east  to  repair  damages. 
All  her  braces  and  much  of  her  standing  and  running 
rigging  had  been  injured,  and  some  spars  had  been  shot 
away.  A  slight  fire,  caught  in  the  cabin  from  the  wadding 
of  the  enemy 's  guns,  had  to  be  extinguished.  A  half  hour 
sufficed  for  reeving  new  braces  and  making  temporary 
repairs,  whereupon  the  Constitution  wore  and  returned 
to  the  Guerriere. 

The  British  had  during  the  interim  employed  all  hands 
in  clearing  away  the  wreckage.  They  had  rigged  up  a 
spritsail,  but  when  the  Constitution  again  bore  down,  the 
spritsail  yard  carried  away,  and  the  ship  fell  into  the 
trough  of  the  sea,  with  her  main-deck  guns  rolling  under. 


The  Constitution  and  the  Guerriere        115 

It  was  hard  for  the  British  to  acknowledge  defeat  on 
their  own  element,  the  sea,  but  there  was  no  alternative. 
The  small  boat  sent  by  the  Constitution  returned  with 
Captain  Dacres,  and  the  formal  surrender  took  place. 

A  few  more  broadsides  would  have  sent  the  Guerriere 
to  the  bottom.  As  it  was,  the  lieutenant  placed  in  charge 
of  the  prize  hailed  next  morning  at  daylight  to  say  that 
there  was  four  feet  of  water  in  the  hold.  The  possibility 
of  taking  her  into  port  was  so  slight  that  Hull  decided 
on  her  destruction ;  and  having  removed  the  prisoners,  he 
set  fire  to  her  and  blew  her  up  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
20th.  As  he  had  completed  the  repairs  of  the  Constitution 
about  the  same  time,  he  set  sail  for  Boston. 

The  New  England  States  had  been  opposed  to  the  war 
at  the  outset,  and  more  than  once  during  the  dreary  con 
flict  their  discontented  citizens  threatened  secession.  How 
ever,  on  Hull's  arrival  there  was  no  lack  of  enthusiasm. 
A  splendid  entertainment  was  given  by  the  citizens  of  all 
parties  in  Boston  to  the  victorious  captain  and  his  officers ; 
other  cities  and  the  officers'  respective  States  honored 
them  with  similar  spirit,  and  Congress,  besides  giving  a 
vote  of  thanks,  appropriated  $50,000  as  prize  money. 
The  encouragement  gained  from  capturing  a  British 
frigate  was  certainly  needed  after  the  disgraceful  sur 
render  of  Detroit,  which  occurred  within  the  same  week. 

The  victory  also  had  an  important  influence  on  the 
naval  policy  of  the  nation.  In  the  years  following  the 
war  with  Tripoli  many  prominent  statesmen  were  strongly 
in  favor  of  doing  entirely  away  with  the  navy  as  had 
been  done  after  the  Revolution.  And  on  the  outbreak  of 
the  second  war  with  England,  the  administration,  having 
no  confidence  in  its  ships  when  opposed  to  the  over 
whelming  forces  of  England,  was  inclining  to  the  course 
of  preventing  their  capture  by  holding  them  locked  in 
the  fortified  harbors.  The  victory  of  the  Constitution 


116  The  United  States  Navy 

made  permanent  the  establishment  of  the  navy,  and 
induced  the  Government  to  give  the  ships  their  share  in 
the  fighting. 

Exultation  in  America  and  depression  in  England 
were  both  marked  with  extravagance.  Strangely  enough, 
when  the  British  officers  had  seen  the  Constitution  in  the 
West  Indies  and  the  Mediterranean,  they  had  spoken 
slightingly  of  her,  as  of  the  other  "Yankee"  frigates.3 
The  low  estimation  put  on  their  power  is  indicated  by 
Dacres'  entry  on  the  register  of  the  American  brig  John 
Adams,  as  he  fell  in  with  her  two  or  three  days  before 
meeting  the  Constitution:  "Captain  Dacres,  commander 
of  His  Britannic  Majesty's  frigate  Guerriere,  of  44  guns, 
presents  his  compliments  to  Commodore  Rodgers,  of  the 
United  States  frigate  President,  and  will  be  very  happy 
to  meet  him,  or  any  other  American  frigate  of  equal  force 
to  the  President,  off  Sandy  Hook,  for  the  purpose  of 
having  a  few  minutes'  tete-a-tete."  Thus,  in  meeting  a 
sister  ship  of  the  President,  Dacres  got  precisely  what  he 
sought. 

The  opinions  of  the  British  on  the  inferior  qualities 
of  the  American  frigates  were  now  quickly  reversed.  Cap 
tain  Dacres,  before  the  court-martial  which  tried  him  for 
the  loss  of  his  ship,  testified  to  the  American's  "superior 
sailing"  which  "enabled  him  to  choose  his  distance." 
And  an  officer  of  the  Guerriere  wrote  home  shortly  after 
the  fight:  "No  one  that  has  not  seen  the  Constitution 
would  believe  there  could  be  such  a  ship  for  a  frigate; 

3  The  English  people  as  a  whole  underrated  the  power  of  their 
enemy.  The  Morning  Post,  the  organ  of  the  Government,  had 
observed  shortly  before  the  loss  of  the  Guerriere :  "  A  war  of  a 
very  few  months,  without  creating  to  England  the  expense  of  a 
single  additional  ship,  would  be  sufficient  to  convince  America  of 
her  folly  by  a  necessary  chastisement  of  her  insolence  and 
audacity."  Quoted  by  Coutts,  Famous  Duels  of  the  Fleet,  p.  244. 


The  United  States  and  the  Macedonian     117 

the  nearest  ship  in  the  British  Navy,  as  to  her  dimensions 
and  tonnage,  is  the  Orion,  of  74  guns." 

A  comparison  of  the  two  forces  will  show  at  a  glance 
that,  courage  and  skill  being  at  all  equal,  there  really 
could  be  no  excuse  for  the  Americans '  not  winning : 

Guns     Broadside-  Crew  .    Killed  Wounded  Total 
weight 

Constitution     55           736 4  468             7  7            14 

Ouerriere    49           570  2G3            15  G3           78 

Yet  the  British  had  fought  with  the  French  and  Spanish 
against  odds  fully  as  great,  and  had  won.  They  had  come 
to  think  British  courage  and  discipline  much  more  than 
an  offset  for  a  few  additional  guns.  Now,  as  they  sud 
denly  apprehended,  they  were  dealing  with  quite  a  differ 
ent  foe.  They  had  also  to  face  the  fact  that  the  disparity 
in  force,  which,  according  to  Eoosevelt's  estimate,  was 
about  as  three  to  two,  was  very  much  less  than  the  dis 
parity  in  losses,  so  that  the  advantage  was  very  decidedly 
with  this  new  foe. 

THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  MACEDONIAN 

In  the  first  frigate  action  of  the  war  there  is  some 
weight  to  be  given  to  the  explanation  that  the  Guerriere 
was  not  an  English-built  ship  (she  had  been  captured 
from  the  French  six  years  before),  and  that  at  the  end 
of  a  long  cruise  she  was  very  much  in  need  of  overhauling. 
In  the  second  action  this  was  not  at  all  the  situation. 
The  British  frigate,  the  Macedonian,  38  guns,  just  out  of 
drydock,  and  built  only  two  years  before,  was  supposed 

4  American  shot  regularly  was  lighter  than  British  of  the 
same  size.  To  bring  the  two  to  a  like  standard,  subtract  from 
the  figures  given  for  American  guns  one-eighteenth,  following  the 
suggestion  of  James  (Naval  Occurrences,  p.  10)  ;  Roosevelt  would 
make  a  reduction  slightly  larger  than  James,  or  seven  per  cent. 


118  The  United  States  Navy 

to  be  one  of  the  finest  ships  of  her  class  in  the  Royal  Navy. 
Her  captain,  John  Surman  Garden,  gave  the  closest  atten 
tion  to  the  personnel  as  well  as  to  the  discipline  of  his 
crew.  To  such  men  as  he  found  below  the  standard  he 
gave  opportunity  to  desert ;  those  whom  he  found  efficient 
he  held  under  strictest  rule ;  and  with  his  able  lieutenant, 
David  Hope,  drilled  them  daily  in  seamanship  and 
gunnery. 

The  ship  that  was  to  engage  in  duel  with  the  Mace 
donian  was  the  United  States,  44  guns,  commanded  by 
Captain  Stephen  Decatur.  She  had  left  Boston,  October 
8,  1812,  in  Commodore  Rodgers'  squadron.  The  other 
ships  of  the  squadron,  the  President,  Congress,  and  Argus, 
returned  after  a  three  months'  cruise,  having  accom 
plished  little.  Decatur  had  parted  company  after  three 
days  out,  and  it  was  on  October  25,  1812,  off  the  Canary 
Islands  (lat.  29°  N.,  long.  29°  30'  W.)  that  he  encountered 
the  Macedonian.5 

Garden,  who  was  less  than  a  month  out  from  Ports 
mouth,  had  heard  at  Madeira  that  the  American  frigate 
Essex  was  in  the  vicinity,  and  as  the  lookout  at  the  mast 
head  early  on  the  morning  of  the  25th  reported  a  sail 
twelve  miles  distant  on  the  lee  beam,  Garden  made  haste 
and  stood  over  in  its  direction.  Instead  of  the  Essex, 
inferior  to  his  ship  in  power,  he  was  about  to  meet  the 
United  States,  which  was  decidedly  superior.  Yet  had  he 
known  who  the  stranger  was,  it  is  probable  he  would  have 
been  scarcely  less  eager  for  an  engagement.  The  utmost 
confidence  prevailed  on  board  the  Macedonian,  and  neither 
Garden  nor  his  lieutenant,  Hope,  was  the  kind  of  English 
man  that  is  careful  in  considering  the  odds  against  him. 
Garden  had  not  yet  learned  of  the  fate  of  the  Gnerriere. 

5  Letter  of  Captain  Decatur,  October  30,  1812,  to  the  Secretary 
of  the  Xavy. 


STEPHEN  DECATUR,  JR.",    •»  e'»',  i  ,  ,  '    ' 


The  United  States  and  the  Macedonian     119 

In  the  crew  of  the  Macedonian  were  seven  Americans 
impressed  into  the  British  Navy.  They  had  heard  only 
rumors  of  the  existence  of  war  between  the  two  countries ; 
but  when  they  saw  the  preparations  for  battle  and  an 
American  frigate  approaching,  one  of  their  number,  Jack 
Cand,  known  among  his  shipmates  for  his  bravery, 
addressed  the  captain,  requesting  that  they  might  be 
regarded  as  prisoners  of  war  and  be  excused  from  fighting 
against  their  own  flag.  Captain  Dacres,  although  short 
of  men,  had  in  precisely  the  same  situation  allowed  the 
Americans  to  go  below.  Captain  Garden,  never  too  gentle 
with  his  crew,  roughly  ordered  the  man  to  his  quarters, 
threatening  to  shoot  him  if  he  made  the  request  again. 
It  was  a  hard  fate  for  Cand,  whichever  course  he  took,  and 
he  was  killed  during  the  battle  by  a  24-pound  shot. 

The  Macedonian,  on  first  sighting  the  United  States, 
was  sailing  northwest  by  west,  and  in  closing  had  the 
advantage  of  the  weather-gage.6  The  wind  was  blowing 
fresh  from  the  south-southeast. 

Decatur,  wishing  to  secure  a  better  position,  just  before 
coming  into  range  wore  round  on  the  port  tack  and 
hauled  short  up.  The  Macedonian,  by  continuing  on  the 
course  she  was  then  sailing,  would  have  crossed  the 
United  States '  bow  at  short  range  and  would  have  entered 
at  once  into  close  action.7  This  was  what  Lieutenant 
Hope  advised.  But  in  so  doing  the  Macedonian  must  have 
relinquished  the  weather-gage.  Eather  than  do  this 
Garden  hauled  close  to  the  wind,  still  keeping  his  distance. 
Had  he  been  fighting  the  Essex,  as  he  still  supposed, 

6  Weather-gage :   the  term  applied  to  the  position  of  a  ship  to 
windward   of    another;    in   the    days   of   sailing   vessels    this   was 
regarded  as  a  decided  advantage,  for  it  gave  the  ship  possessing 
it  in  battle,   everything   else  being  equal,   the   greater    speed   and 
facility  in  maneuvering. 

7  Court-martial  of  Captain  Garden. 


120 


The  United  States  Navy 


V  UNITED  STATES 

M  MACEDONIAN  (Shaded) 

a.  b.  c.  eic.t  synchronous 
positions 


PLAN  of  the  ENGAGEMENT  between 
The  UNITED  STATES  and 
The  MACEDONIAN,  Oct.  25, 1812 


From  Mahan's  IVar  of  1812,  by  permission 

PLAN  OP  THE  ENGAGEMENT  BETWEEN  THE  UNITED  STATES  AND 
THE  MACEDONIAN.  OCT.  25,  1812 


The  United  States  and  the  Macedonian 

Garden's  decision  would  have  been  wise,  for  that  ship, 
though  well  equipped  with  carronades,  was  weak  in  long 
guns.  As  it  was,  he  gave  his  enemy  a  decided  advantage, 
for  the  United  States  excelled  in  long  guns  of  unusual 
weight. 

When  the  ships  passed  on  opposite  tacks,  the  United 
States  fired,  but  the  distance  was  too  great  to  inflict 
injury.  The  Macedonian,  which  had  already  shown  her 
self  much  the  faster  sailer,  then  wore  in  pursuit  and 
caught  up  with  her  enemy,  reaching  a  position,  at  long 
range,  off  the  American's  port  quarter.  An  exchange  of 
broadsides  cost  the  United  States  her  mizzen  topgallant 
mast,  and  the  Macedonian  her  gaff-halyards  and  mizzen 
topmast,  the  latter  falling  into  her  maintop.  This  loss 
deprived,  the  Macedonian  of  her  superiority  in  sailing.  As 
long  as  the  two  ships  sailed  on  parallel  courses  or  yawed 
to  fire  a  full  broadside,  the  advantage  was  not  of  position 
but  of  long  guns,  and  the  latter  was  decidedly  with  the 
United  States.  To  overcome  this  superiority,  and  to  bring 
his  ship  near  enough  to  use  her  carronades,  Garden 
changed  from  a  parallel  to  a  converging  course.  Decatur 
yawed  and  fired  a  broadside;  and  then,  running  ahead  a 
little  to  prevent  the  Macedonian  from  closing,  he  repeated 
the  maneuver.  On  came  the  Macedonian,  exposing  her 
starboard  bow  to  the  United  States;  whereupon  the  latter, 
by  a  severe  diagonal  fire,  dismounted  all  the  carronades 
on  the  starboard  side  of  the  Macedonian's  quarter-deck 
and  forecastle  and  at  the  same  time  damaged  her  hull  and 
disabled  many  of  the  crew. 

If  in  time  of  peace  there  had  been  considerable  sullen- 
ness  among  the  crew  of  the  Macedonian  because  of  the 
stern  rigidity  of  the  discipline  and  the  cruel  use  of  the 
lash,  as  is  reported,  the  men  certainly  showed  admirable 
spirit  in  fighting.  ''Our  men  kept  cheering  with  all  their 


The  United  States  Navy 

might,"  wrote  Samuel  Leech,8  a  boy  serving  one  of  the 
guns.  "I  cheered  with  them,  though  I  confess  I  scarcely 
knew  for  what.  Certainly  there  was  nothing  very  inspirit 
ing  in  the  aspect  of  things  where  I  was  stationed.  So 
terrible  had  been  the  work  of  destruction  round  us,  it 
was  termed  the  slaughter-house."  After  many  gruesome 
details  he  continues,  "Our  men  fought  like  tigers.  Some 
of  them  pulled  off  their  jackets,  others,  their  jackets  and 
vests;  while  some,  still  more  determined,  had  taken  off 
their  shirts,  and,  with  nothing  but  a  handkerchief  tied 
around  the  waistband  of  their  trousers,  fought  like 
heroes. ' '  Mr.  Hope,  the  first  lieutenant,  was  wounded  by 
an  iron  ring  torn  from  a  hammock  by  a  shot.  ' '  He  went 
below,  shouting  to  the  men  to  fight  on.  Having  had  his 
wound  dressed,  he  came  up  again,  shouting  to  us  at  the 
top  of  his  voice,  and  bidding  us  fight  with  all  our  might." 
This  lieutenant  had  been  brutal  in  enforcing  discipline 
and  in  administering  extreme  penalties  for  slight  offenses ; 
and  the  gunner's  boy  pauses  in  his  narrative  to  observe 
that  there  was  not  a  man  in  the  ship  who  would  not  have 
rejoiced  if  something  much  larger  had  struck  the  petty 
tyrant. 

At  10.15,  when  the  United  States  had  been  pouring  in 
an  effective  fire  for  half  or  three-quarters  of  an  hour, 
Decatur  laid  his  maintopsail  to  the  mast  and  allowed  the 
Macedonian  to  come  into  close  action.  But  it  was  too 
late  to  be  of  any  benefit  to  the  Englishman,  who  had  only 
his  main-deck  guns  remaining,  and  the  maneuver  but 
increased  the  disparity  of  forces.  A  few  minutes  after 
eleven  the  Macedonian  had  her  mizzenmast  shot  away; 
her  fore  and  maintopmasts  were  also  shot  away  at  the 
caps,  her  lower  masts  were  wounded,  and  she  had  received 
more  than  100  shot  in  her  hull.  No  longer  steadied  by 
her  sail,  she  was  rolling  her  main-deck  guns  under,  while 

8  In  his  Thirty  Years  from  Home,  p.  132,  ff. 


The  United  States  and  the  Macedonian    123 

the  United  States,  having  no  sail  she  could  not  set  but 
her  mizzen  topgallant,  was  perfectly  steady. 

There  was  just  one  wild,  desperate  chance  remaining 
for  the  British,  and  putting  their  helm  hard  aport  they 
prepared  to  board  the  American  frigate.  Lieutenant 
Hope  wrote  afterwards,  ' l  At  that  moment  every  man  was 
on  deck,  several  who  had  lost  an  arm,  and  the  universal 
cheer  was,  '  Let  us  conquer  or  die. '  '  Just  then,  however, 
the  forebrace  was  shot  away,  and  the  yard,  swinging 
round,  threw  the  ship  up  into  the  wind.  The  United 
States,  seeing  her  opponent's  helpless  state,  then  with 
drew  a  short  distance  for  repairs ;  at  which  the  irre 
pressible  "Macedonians,"  deluded  into  thinking  that 
their  enemy  had  spied  an  English  man-of-war  coming  to 
the  rescue,  gave  a  final  cheer. 

Returning  at  noon,  the  United  States  took  a  position 
off  her  opponent's  stern.  There  had  already  been  a 
council  of  war  on  the  quarter-deck  of  the  Macedonian. 
Lieutenant  Hope,  though  wounded  again,  this  time  some 
what  seriously  in  the  head,  had  still  much  fight  in  him, 
and  advised  "not  to  strike  but  to  sink  alongside."  The 
counsel  of  those  who  put  a  higher  valuation  on  life,  how 
ever,  prevailed. 

It  must  have  been  a  surprise  for  Garden  when  he 
learned  on  surrender,  that  he  was  to  meet  his  old  acquaint 
ance,  Decatur.  As  he  offered  his  sword,  Decatur  gener 
ously  declined  it,  saying,  "Sir,  I  cannot  receive  the  sword 
of  a  man  who  has  so  bravely  defended  his  ship."  With 
a  like  chivalry  and  kindness  Decatur  gave  orders  that  all 
the  personal  effects  of  the  English  officers  should  be 
respected  as  still  theirs,  even  including  a  large  stock  of 
wine  which  they  had  laid  in  at  Madeira,  giving  them  as 
equivalent  $800.  Further,  everything  was  done  by  the 
Americans  to  give  their  late  enemies,  while  on  the  United 
States,  the  comforts  and  cheer  due  to  honored  guests. 


124  The  United  States  Navy 

Decatur's  good  fortune  did  not  end  with  the  capture. 
Having  determined  to  take  his  prize  in,  he  spent  two 
weeks  after  the  fight  in  making  repairs.  With  the  many 
squadrons  that  the  English  had  scattered  about  the 
Atlantic  and  along  the  American  coast,  the  long  voyage 
home  involved  great  risk  of  recapture.  However,  without 
having  so  much  as  sighted  a  British  sail,  the  two  ships 
arrived  at  New  London  and  then  proceeded  to  New  York. 
The  Macedonian  was  repaired  and  fitted  out  anew,  and 
had  a  long  and  honorable  career  in  the  American  Navy. 

The  following  shows  the  comparative  force  of  the  two 
ships : 

Guns    Broadside        Crew          Killed     Wounded    Total 

United  States    55  786  478  5  7  12 

Macedonian     49  547  292  36  68  104 

In  speed  the  Macedonian  had  the  decided  advantage 
(the  nickname  of  the  United  States,  "Old  Wagoner," 
suggests  her  lumbering  gait,  which  seems  later  to  have 
been  somewhat  remedied) .  In  every  other  particular  the 
advantage  was  with  the  American  frigate.  She  was  the 
larger  ship,  had  thicker  scantlings,  was  higher  out  of  the 
water  (of  importance  in  the  rough  sea),  had  heavier  guns 
and  more  of  them,  and  finally  was  superior  in  her  crew. 
Further,  Decatur  showed  better  seamanship  than  Garden. 
An  instructive  comparison  is  to  be  gained  by  considering 
the  coming  into  close  action  by  Captain  Garden  on  the 
Macedonian  and  by  Captain  Hull  on  the  Constitution. 
Each  at  the  beginning  of  the  engagement  had  the  advan 
tage  of  the  weather-gage ;  Hull  yawed  when  his  opponent 
wore,  giving  him  no  opportunity  to  rake;  Hull  pursued 
a  zig-zag  course,  and  coming  up  in  the  British  ship's 
wake,  was  within  pistol  shot  before  the  enemy  could  do 
any  harm.  Garden  obstinately  held  to  the  weather-gage ; 
and  when  he  closed  he  did  so  without  maneuvering,  and 
exposed  his  ship  to  such  a  disastrous  diagonal  fire  that 


The  United  States  and  the  Macedonian    125 

he  was  virtually  defeated  before  lie  had  reached  close 
quarters. 

Strangely  enough,  the  comparative  effectiveness  of 
24-  and  18-pounders,  as  well  as  the  superiority  of  their 
respective  ships,  had  been  the  subject  of  a  friendly  argu 
ment  between  Garden  and  Decatur  a  few  months  previous 
to  the  war,  when,  as  the  two  ships  were  together  in  Chesa 
peake  Bay,  the  commanders  were  discussing  the  merits  of 
each. 

The  inequality  in  force  was  approximately  the  same 
as  that  between  the  Constitution  and  the  Guerriere,  three 
to  two,  but  the  disparity  in  losses  was  almost  nine  to  one. 
Yet  David  Hope  wrote  some  years  later  to  his  old  com 
mander,  "In  no  ship  in  the  British  service  could  there 
have  been  more  attention  paid  to  the  practical  part  of 
gunnery  than  was  done  by  you  to  the  crew  of  the  Mace 
donian."  If  this  is  true,  the  results  of  the  action  are 
evidence  of  the  very  superior  quality  of  the  crew  under 
Decatur.  Perhaps,  also,  they  illustrate  the  principle 
uttered  by  Farragut  at  Port  Hudson,  "The  best  protec 
tion  against  the  enemy's  fire  is  a  well-directed  fire  from 
our  own  guns."  It  is  plain,  on  reading  the  extravagant 
speeches  and  newspaper  articles  that  dealt  with  the  capt 
ure,  that  our  country  was  young  and  unaccustomed  to 
victory.  Yet  without  magnifying  the  size  and  armament 
of  the  Macedonian  or  reducing  that  of  the  United  States, 
this  victory,  like  that  of  the  Constitution,  was  a  notable 
achievement  in  the  history  of  the  navy  and  of  the  nation. 
The  leading  naval  power  of  the  world  had  lost  a  frigate  of 
which  an  officer  of  the  United  States,  while  admitting  the 
Macedonian's  inferiority  in  force,  goes  on  to  observe,  "But 
she  is  just  such  a  ship  as  the  English  have  achieved  all 
their  single-ship  victories  in ;  ...  she  is,  in  tonnage, 
men,  and  guns,  such  a  ship  as  the  English  prefer  to  all 
others,  and  have,  till  the  Guerriere 's  loss,  always  thought 
a  match  for  any  single-decked  ship  afloat." 


VIII 
A  VICTORY  AND  A  DEFEAT 

THE  CONSTITUTION  AND  THE  JAVA 

THE  third  squadron  sent  to  cruise  against  British 
commerce  during  the  War  of  1812  was  placed  under  the 
command  of  Captain  William  Bainbridge,  and  consisted 
of  three  ships,  the  Constitution,  44  guns,  flagship;  the 
Essex,  32  guns,  Captain  David  Porter;  and  the  sloop 
Hornet,  18  guns,  Master-Commandant  James  Lawrence. 
The  Hornet  and  the  Constitution  left  Boston  together  on 
October  26,  1812,  but  the  Essex,  which  was  fitting  in  the 
Delaware,  was  unable  to  get  to  sea  till  the  28th. 

The  orders  for  this  little  squadron  were,  to  sail  first 
for  the  Cape  Verde  Islands,  where  fresh  water  could 
be  procured;  thence,  by  November  27,  to  Fernando 
Noronha,  an  island  about  200  miles  off  the  coast  of  Brazil ; 
and  thence  along  the  coast  to  Eio  de  Janeiro.  From  this 
port  the  course  was  to  be  laid  directly  across  the  South 
Atlantic  for  the  neighborhood  of  St.  Helena,  where  the 
home-coming  English  East  Indiamen  frequently  touched. 
These  plans  were  never  carried  out. 

In  the  first  place,  the  Essex,  which  Porter  charac 
terized  as  the  "worst  frigate  in  the  service,"  was  unable 
to  catch  up  with  the  other  two ;  and  when  Porter  arrived 
at  Fernando  he  found  that  the  Constitution  and  the 
Hornet  had  already  gone  to  Bahia,  but  that  Bainbridge 
had  left  orders  for  him  to  proceed  to  Rio.  There,  finding 
no  sign  of  his  commodore,  Porter  struck  out  on  his  own 
authority  and  began  his  famous  roving  cruise  in  the 
Pacific.  Meanwhile  the  actions  between  the  Constitution 
126 


The  Constitution  and  the  Java  127 

and  the  Java,  and  between  the  Hornet  and  the  Peacock, 
compelled  the  Constitution  and  the  Hornet  to  give  up  the 
intended  cruise,  and  repair  to  the  United  States. 

On  the  13th  of  December,  the  Constitution  and  the 
Hornet  arrived  at  Bahia,  where  they  found  a  British 
sloop,  the  Bonne  Citoyenne,  with  a  large  amount  of  specie 
aboard.  The  American  vessels  kept  her  blockaded  for 
some  time,  during  which  Lawrence  challenged  the  British 
commander  to  come  out  to  single  combat,  Bainbridge 
pledging  his  honor  not  to  interfere.  The  Englishman, 
however,  declined,  excusing  himself  on  the  ground  that 
he  did  not  believe  the  American  commodore  would  keep 
his  hands  off.  Finally  on  the  26th  of  the  month,  Bain- 
bridge  made  sail  for  open  sea,  hoping  thereby  to  tempt 
the  Bonne  Citoyenne  to  come  out  and  meet  the  Hornet. 

At  nine  o'clock,  on  the  morning  of  the  29th,  Bain- 
bridge  discovered  two  sails  to  the  northeast,  which  proved 
to  be  a  British  frigate,  the  Java,1  and  an  American  prize. 
On  sighting  the  American  frigate,  the  Englishman  directed 
his  prize  to  make  for  Bahia,  while  he  himself  made  all 
sail  to  come  up  with  the  Constitution.  Captain  Bain- 
bridge  responded  by  tacking  and  heading  southeast,  in 
order  to  draw  the  other  to  a  safe  distance  beyond  neutral 
waters.  The  Java  came  on  at  a  ten-knot  gait,  and  rapidly 
overhauled  the  Constitution  till  about  1.30,  when  Bain- 
bridge  put  his  ship  about,  shortened  sail,  and  headed  for 
the  enemy.  The  Java  now  held  off,  trying  for  an  oppor 
tunity  to  rake,  which  the  Constitution  prevented  by 
wearing  and  resuming  her  course  to  the  southeast.  A 
half  hour  later,  with  the  Java  in  a  windward  position 
and  a  half  mile  distant,  Bainbridge  fired  ahead  of  the 
enemy  to  make  her  display  her  colors.  The  response  was 

1  Like  the  Guerriere,  the  Java  was  a  French  prize,  originally 
named  the  Renommee,  and  captured  only  the  year  before. 


128  The  United  States  Navy 

an  instant  hoisting  of  the  ensign  to  the  gaff,  followed  by 
a  broadside,  and  the  contest  was  on. 

The  earlier  part  of  the  battle  consisted  of  maneuvering 
on  the  part  of  the  Java  to  get  a  raking  position,  and  the 
simultaneous  wearing  of  the  Constitution  to  avoid  it, 


December  29,  1812 


CONSTITUTION -JAVA 

\ 
> 
\  ,/ 


PLAN  OF  ENGAGEMENT  BETWEEN  CONSTITUTION  AND  JAVA 

accompanied  by  heavy  firing  on  both  sides.  The  Java  was 
a  better  sailer  than  the  Constitution,  and  Bainbridge  had 
his  hands  full  to  match  her  movements,  particularly  as 
at  2.30  a  round  shot  from  the  Java  smashed  the  Constitu 
tion's  wheel,  and  the  ship  had  to  be  steered  thereafter  by 
relieving  tackles,  handled  two  decks  below.  Earlier  in 
the  action,  Commodore  Bainbridge  had  received  a  musket 
ball  in  his  hip,  and  the  shot  that  smashed  the  wheel  also 


The  Constitution  and  the  Java  129 

drove  a  copper  bolt  deep  into  his  thigh.    In  spite  of  these 
painful  wounds,  he  kept  the  deck  throughout  the  battle. 

Shortly  after  the  disaster  to  his  wheel,  he  determined 
to  close  with  his  adversary  even  at  the  risk  of  being  raked, 
and  luffed  up.  For  some  reason,  however,  the  Java 
missed  the  opportunity  to  rake  as  she  passed  under  the 
Constitution's  stern  (see  diagram,  1),  for  she  fired  only 
one  9-pounder.  She  then  luffed  up  and  crossed  the  wake 
of  the  Constitution  again,  delivering  a  semi-raking  fire 
which  was  not  effective  on  account  of  the  distance  (2). 
Bainbridge  then  set  the  courses  and  luffed  up  again 
in  order  to  close  with  his  nimble  adversary.  At  this  point 
the  Java  had  the  end  of  her  bowsprit  with  the  jib  and 
jib-boom  shot  away,  and  with  this  sudden  loss  of  her  head 
sails  she  pointed  up  into  the  wind,  where  she  lay  for  a 
few  moments  helpless  (3).  The  Constitution  instantly 
wore  and,  passing  under  the  Java's  stern,  raked  with 
great  effect.  The  American  wore  again,  and  the  English 
ship  attempted  to  save  the  day  by  laying  alongside  and 
boarding;  but  she  lost  her  foremast  at  the  outset  of  the 
maneuver  and  succeeded  only  in  running  the  stump  of  her 
bowsprit  into  the  mizzen  shrouds  of  the  Constitution  (4). 

From  this  moment  on,  though  the  Java  maintained  a 
heroic  defense,  she  was  a  beaten  ship.  The  Constitution 
sailed  round  her,  pouring  in  an  accurate  fire  at  close 
quarters  that  shot  away  every  spar  but  the  mainmast,  and 
that  went  by  the  board  a  few  minutes  before  the  surrender. 

Meanwhile,  the  American  gunners  had  been  also 
sweeping  the  Java's  decks  with  a  diagonal  fire,  seconded 
by  a  deadly  sharp-shooting  of  the  marines  in  the  tops. 
It  was  a  musket  bullet  from  the  maintop  that  gave  Cap 
tain  Lambert  his  mortal  wound,  shortly  after  the  two 
vessels  came  in  contact.  The  command  then  devolved 
upon  his  first  lieutenant,  Chads,  who  continued  the  hope 
less  fight  with  great  spirit. 
9 


130  The  United  States  Navy 

At  five  minutes  after  four,2  the  fire  from  the  Java  had 
been  completely  silenced,  and  she  rolled  on  the  seas  a 
dismasted  hulk,  her  decks  lumbered  with  the  fallen  spars, 
sails,  and  rigging.  As  she  displayed  no  colors,  Captain 
Bainbridge  took  it  for  granted  that  she  had  struck;  and, 
hauling  down  his  courses,  he  shot  ahead  to  repair  his 
badly  cut  rigging.  On  his  return,  at  about  5.30,  he  found 
that  the  enemy  had  his  colors  flying  again ;  but,  as  the 
Constitution  drew  across  the  Java's  bow,  ready  to  rake, 
they  were  instantly  struck. 

The  Constitution  had  about  the  same  superiority  in 
metal  over  the  Java  as  she  had  had  over  the  Guerriere; 
but,  as  in  the  action  with  the  latter  frigate,  the  relative 
damage  inflicted  was  wholly  disproportionate  to  the 
respective  armaments.  It  must  be  remembered  also  that 
the  Java  had  one  considerable  advantage  in  her  superior 
speed.  The  British  frigate3  was  so  thoroughly  shot  to 
pieces  that  Bainbridge  had  no  alternative  but  to  blow  her 
up,  while  the  Constitution  was  in  condition  to  make  a 
long  voyage  back  to  the  United  States  without  refitting. 
The  American  loss  in  this  engagement  amounted  to  nine 
killed  and  twenty-five  wounded,  three  mortally.  Chads 's 
official  report  of  the  British  casualties  gave  twenty-two 
killed  and  102  wounded.4 

In  1804  Captain  Lambert  distinguished  himself,  in  a 

2  According    to    the   British   account,    4.35.      There    is    such    a 
wide  discrepancy   in  the  matter  of  time  between  the  two  reports 
that  an  English  writer  suggests  that  "  perhaps  someone's  watch  or 
clock  was  adrift."      (Famous  Duels  of  the  Fleet,  p.  261.) 

3  A  relic  of  the  Java  that  for  a  long  time  remained   on  the 
Constitution's  quarter-deck  was  her  wheel,  which  replaced  the  one 
shot  away  early  in  the  action. 

4  Captain    Bainbridge,    inclosing   as    evidence    a    letter   written 
by  one  of  the  British  officers  and  accidentally  left  on  board  the 
Constitution,    gives    the    figures    of    that    officer,    which    are   sixty 
killed  and  170  wounded. 


The  Constitution  and  the  Java  131 

heavy  action  at  close  quarters,  by  beating  off  a  French 
ship  with  a  broadside  of  240  pounds  opposed  to  his  own 
total  of  99  pounds.  But  the  crew  he  then  commanded 
had  just  been  under  a  captain  known  as  a  "crank"  in 
gunnery,  and  Lambert  got  the  benefit  of  his  predecessor's 
work.  During  the  six  weeks  he  was  in  command  of  the 
Java,  he  had  held  gun  drill  only  once,  and  then  with 
blank  cartridges.  In  seamanship  he  was  probably  unsur 
passed,  for  the  Java  was  expertly  handled;  but,  like  so 
many  of  his  brother-officers,  he  had  small  interest  in 
gunnery.  The  Java's  firing  grew  wilder  as  the  battle 
progressed,  while  that  of  the  Constitution  steadily 
improved. 

Among  the  American  wounded  was  Lieutenant  Alwyn, 
who  had  been  shot  through  the  shoulder  in  the  engage 
ment  with  the  Guerriere.  When  the  Java's  bowsprit 
fouled  the  mizzen  rigging  of  the  Constitution,  and  board 
ers  were  called  away,  he  leaped  upon  the  hammock  net 
tings  to  lead  the  party,  and  was  shot  through  the  very 
shoulder  that  had  been  wounded  before.  Despite  the 
painful  character  of  the  wound,  he  kept  at  his  station 
till  the  enemy  had  struck,  but  died  on  the  voyage  home. 

While  at  Bahia,  where  the  Constitution  put  in  after 
the  battle,  Commodore  Bainbridge,  himself  suffering 
severely,  was  brought  before  the  dying  Lambert;  and, 
with  the  stately  courtesy  of  the  time,  returned  to  him  his 
sword  with  the  expression  of  an  earnest  hope  for  his 
recovery.  There  are  also  letters  from  General  Hyslop, 
a  passenger  on  the  Java,  to  Commodore  Bainbridge, 
which  bear  grateful  testimony  to  the  chivalrous  bearing 
of  the  victorious  commander.  Later,  General  Hyslop 
presented  Bainbridge  with  a  gold-mounted  sword  in  token 
of  appreciation. 

Of  the  engagement  with  the  Java,  Admiral  Mahan 
says :  ' '  This  battle  was  not  merely  an  artillery  duel,  like 


132  The  United  States  Navy 

those  of  the  Constitution  and  the  Guerriere,  the  Wasp 
and  the  Frolic,  nor  yet  one  in  which  a  principal  maneuver, 
by  its  decisive  effect  upon  the  use  of  artillery,  played  the 
determining  part,  as  was  the  case  with  the  United  States 
and  the  Macedonian.  Here  it  was  a  combination  of  the 
two  factors,  a  succession  of  evolutions  resembling  the 
changes  of  position,  the  retreats  and  advances,  of  a  fencing 
or  a  boxing  match,  in  which  the  opponents  work  round 
the  ring;  accompanied  by  a  continual  play  of  the  guns, 
answering  to  the  thrusts  and  blows  of  individual  en 
counter.  ' ' 

This  victory  can  hardly  be  passed  without  some  men 
tion  of  its  personal  significance  to  Commodore  Bainbridge. 
Up  to  this  time,  though  he  was  admittedly  an  excellent 
officer,  his  professional  career  had  been  marked  by  the  most 
trying  misfortunes  that  can  befall  a  commander.  In  the 
French  War  he  had  been  taken  by  a  superior  force  and 
imprisoned,  with  the  mortifying  knowledge  that  his  was 
the  only  American  man-of-war  to  strike  to  the  tricolor. 
Scarcely  was  he  again  on  the  quarter-deck,  when  he  was 
forced  by  the  Dey  of  Algiers  to  submit  to  the  worst 
humiliation  ever  suffered  by  an  American  naval  officer. 
During  the  war  with  Tripoli,  the  greatest  disaster  to  the 
American  cause  was  the  loss  of  his  ship,  the  Philadelphia, 
and,  while  his  brother  officers  were  winning  distinction 
and  applause,  he  was  compelled  to  remain  a  prisoner.  He 
had  been  sharply  criticised  on  more  than  one  occasion, 
and,  even  his  own  crew,  the  men  who  under  Hull  had 
worked  the  ship  free  from  Broke  *s  squadron  and  recently 
beaten  the  Guerriere,  apparently  felt  little  confidence  in 
their  new  commander,  as  is  shown  by  the  long  list  of 
punishments  for  infractions  of  discipline.  To  all  this 
criticism  and  distrust,  Bainbridge 's  conduct  in  the  battle 
with  the  Java  was  a  sufficient  answer. 


The  Chesapeake  and  the  Shannon         133 

THE  CHESAPEAKE  AND  THE  SHANNON 

In  spite  of  the  fact  that  Commodore  Bainbridge  left 
the  Hornet  alone  to  blockade  the  Bonne  Citoyenne,  Cap 
tain  Greene  of  the  British  sloop  still  refused  Lawrence's 
challenge.  This  was  taken  by  Lawrence  as  cowardice, 
and  he  did  not  avoid  saying  what  he  thought.  His  crit 
icism  of  Greene  on  this  occasion  put  him  on  his  mettle, 
when,  six  months  later,  the  situation  was  exactly  reversed 
and  Captain  Broke,  with  the  Shannon,  blockaded  alone  the 
young  American  commander  in  the  ill-fated  Chesapeake. 

Lawrence's  relations  with  the  Bonne  Citoyenne  were 
suddenly  cut  short  by  the  arrival  of  a  ship-of-the-line 
that  chased  him  into  port.  By  immediately  standing 
out  to  sea,  under  cover  of  the  night,  he  escaped  the  new 
enemy,  and  headed  north.  During  this  cruise  he  made 
his  famous  capture  of  the  sloop  Peacock.  On  the  24th  of 
March,  1813,  he  reached  New  York  and  discharged  his 
prisoners,'  after  a  cruise  of  145  days,  during  which  he 
had  captured  one  ship,  two  brigs,  one  schooner,  and  one 
man-of-war,  a  record  that  none  of  his  brother  officers 
could  equal. 

Lawrence,  already  the  most  popular  officer  in  the 
service,  became  at  once  the  toast  of  the  nation.  By  this 
time,  his  rank  5  would  not  permit  his  retaining  command 
of  the  sloop  Hornet,  though  he  requested  to  be  allowed  to 
do  so ;  and  the  Department  appointed  him  to  command  a 
frigate,  the  Chesapeake,  then  refitting  at  the  Boston  Navy 
Yard.  Lawrence  would  have  preferred  the  Constitution, 
but,  as  his  orders  were  not  changed,  he  took  command  of 
the  Chesapeake  on  May  20,  1813. 

Lawrence  was  under  orders  to  put  to  sea  at  the  earliest 


8  Lawrence   had   been    promoted   in   March   from   Master-Com 
mandant  to  Captain. 


134  The  United  States  Navy 

opportunity,  and  to  head  north  to  strike  at  the  British 
fisheries  on  the  Banks.  On  this  cruise  he  was  to  meet,  at 
Cape  Breton,  Master- Commandant  Biddle,  commanding 
the  Hornet,  and  the  two  vessels  were  to  act  together  in  a 
commerce-destroying  cruise.  Although  in  the  early 
months  of  the  war  the  Admiralty  had  left  the  coast  of 
New  England  alone,  in  order  to  encourage  the  hostile 
attitude  of  that  section  toward  the  war,  by  the  spring  of 
1813  it  had  abandoned  this  policy  and  instituted  a  block 
ade  from  New  York  to  Nova  Scotia.  Early  in  April  the 
Shannon  and  the  Tenedos  appeared  off  Boston  Light  and 
maintained  as  close  a  blockade  as  the  weather  conditions 
would  permit.  Shortly  before  Lawrence  arrived,  the 
frigates  President  and  Congress  ran  the  blockade  in  a 
fog,  leaving  the  Constitution,  which  was  undergoing 
repairs,  and  the  Chesapeake,  which  was  nearly  ready  for 
sea. 

On  taking  command,  Lawrence  notified  the  Depart 
ment  that  he  found  the  Chesapeake  "ready  for  sea," 
lacking  only  a  small  number  of  men  and  a  few  supplies. 
On  May  30,  ten  days  later,  he  cast  loose  from  Long 
"Wharf  and  dropped  down  to  the  Roads,  "with  the  inten 
tion  of  lying  there  a  few  days  and  shaking  down  before 
going  to  sea."6  The  following  afternoon,  while  dining 
with  a  friend  in  Boston,  he  received  news  that  only  one 
English  frigate  was  in  sight  off  the  port,  and  he  imme 
diately  returned  to  his  ship  to  prepare  for  action.  Between 
eight  and  nine  o'clock  the  next  morning,  June  1,  1813, 
the  British  frigate  was  again  sighted,  and  Lawrence  made 
instant  preparations  for  going  out  to  meet  her.  The 

0  Gleaves,  Life  of  James  Lawrence,  p.   172. 

7  Although  the  Chesapeake  was  rated  as  a  "  36,"  she  carried 
two  more  carronades  than  the  "  38-gun  "  Shannon,  and  fifty  more 
men  in  her  crew. 


The  Chesapeake  and  the  Shannon         135 

stranger  was  the  38-gun  7  frigate  Shannon;  and  it  hap 
pened  that  while  Lawrence  was  making  ready  to  slip  his 
moorings,  her  commander,  Captain  Philip  B.  V.  Broke, 
was  writing  a  lengthy  but  courteous  challenge  to  Law 
rence,  inviting  him  to  single-ship  combat,  "wherever  it 
is  most  convenient  to  you."  This  challenge  was  sent 
ashore  by  a  discharged  prisoner,  but  by  the  time  it  reached 
Boston,  the  beaten  Chesapeake  was  already  on  her  way 
to  Halifax. 

The  American  commander  was  under  orders  to  strike 
a  blow  at  a  definite  area  of  the  enemy's  commerce,  but, 
with  the  memory  of  the  Bonne  Citoyenne  fresh  in  his 
mind,  Lawrence  was  not  the  man  to  hesitate  an  hour  in 
the  face  of  an  opportunity  for  single-ship  combat.  That 
one  ship  should  attempt  to  maintain  the  blockade  was 
enough  to  call  him  out  as  soon  as  he  could  trip  his  anchor 
and  swing  his  yards.  The  Chesapeake  was  not,  however, 
in  the  best  condition  to  meet  a  seasoned  enemy.  Her 
first  lieutenant,  Octavius  Page,  was  lying  ill  with  pneu 
monia  in  the  hospital  ashore,  where  he  died  a  few  days 
after  the  battle.  Two  other  officers  were  on  leave,  so 
that  Lieutenant  Ludlow,  then  only  twenty-one,  became 
first  lieutenant,  and  two  midshipmen,  Cox  and  Ballard, 
were  promoted  to  the  position  of  acting  lieutenants. 
These  officers  were  new  to  their  duties  and  to  the  men,  and 
the  crew,  for  their  part,  were  as  yet  unorganized"  and 
undisciplined. 

On  the  other  hand,  their  antagonist,  the  Shannon, 
was  manned  by  a  veteran  crew,  some  of  them  men  who 
had  fought  under  Rodney  and  Nelson,  and  who  had  been 
drilled  together  aboard  the  same  ship,  and  under  the  same 
captain,  for  about  seven  years.  Her  commander,  though 
only  five  years  older  than  Lawrence,  had  seen  active 
service  since  his  midshipman  days.  He  had  been  a  lieu- 


136  The  United  States  Navy 

tenant  in  the  great  victory  off  St.  Vincent,  and  had 
become  post  captain  8  at  the  age  of  twenty-five. 

In  1806  he  was  given  the  Shannon,  and  it  wras  not  long 
before  he  made  her  famous  as  a  "crack"  ship.  At  a 
time  when  most  of  the  British  officers  echoed  Nelson's 
contemptuous  remark  on  gun-sights,  Broke  fitted  out  at 
his  own  expense  dispart  sights  and  quadrants  for  every 
gun  on  his  ship.  Behind  each  gun  he  cut  out  arcs  of 
circles  on  the  deck,  with  degrees  notched  in,  and  filled 
with  putty,  so  that  all  the  fire  of  a  broadside  could  be  con 
centrated  accurately  upon  a  target.  Nor  were  the  devices 
idle.  Twice  a  day,  except  Saturdays  and  Sundays,  the 
watch  below  were  exercised  at  the  guns,  not  merely  in 
practice  with  the  side-tackles,  but  in  actual  firing  at  a 
barrel  floating  three  or  four  hundred  yards  away. 

When  hostilities  broke  out,  Broke  was  the  senior 
British  officer  on  the  American  station.  Early  in  the 
war,  he  had  endured  the  chagrin  of  seeing  the  Constitution 
slip  away  from  his  squadron  when  he  was  so  sure  of 
her  that  he  had  told  off  a  prize  crew  from  his  Shannon 
to  bring  her  into  Halifax.  Then  followed  the  mortifying 
captures  of  the  Guerriere,  the  Macedonian,  the  Frolic,  the 
Java,  and  the  Peacock,  without  a  single  British  naval 
success  to  offset  them.  Confident  of  his  own  ship  and 
her  crew,  he  dismissed  the  Tenedos  from  the  blockade  of 
Boston  in  order  that  he  might  meet  the  Chesapeake  alone, 
and  restore  the  prestige  of  the  British  Navy  by  a  victory. 

His  opponent,  James  Lawrence,  was  now  in  his  thirty- 

8  Post  captain :  "  A  designation  formerly  applied  ...  to 
a  naval  officer  holding  a  commission  as  captain,  to  distinguish  him 
from  an  officer  of  inferior  rank,  to  whom  the  courtesy  title  of 
captain  was  often  given,  either  as  being  an  acting  captain,  or  as 
being  master  and  commander  of  a  vessel  not  rated  to  be  commanded 
by  a  full-grade  captain,  and  so  not  said  to  '  give  post.' "  New 
English  Dictionary. 


The  Chesapeake  and  the  Shannon         137 

second  year.  Like  most  of  the  naval  heroes  of  the  War 
of  1812,  he  had  entered  the  navy  as  a  midshipman  in 
1798,  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  with  France,  and  he 
had  received  his  early  training  under  Captain  Tingey 
on  the  Ganges.  He  had  won  distinction  in  the  war  with 
Tripoli,  notably  as  Decatur's  lieutenant  in  the  burning  of 
the  Philadelphia,  and  had  reached  the  height  of  his  fame 
by  his  recent  brilliant  capture  of  the  Peacock.  Hand 
some,  impetuous,  and  winning,  he  was  perhaps,  next  to 
Decatur,  the  most  romantic  figure  in  the  navy. 

Before  unmooring  ship  to  meet  the  Shannon,  Law 
rence  mustered  his  crew  aft,  and  made  the  customary 
patriotic  speech  before  an  action.  At  the  end  two  mem 
bers  stepped  forward,  requesting  the  prize  money  which 
had  long  been  due  them.  Lawrence  sent  them  below  to 
the  purser  to  get  checks  for  the  amount  due,  and  then 
retired  to  his  cabin  to  write  last  letters  to  his  wife  and 
the  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

By  noon,  the  Chesapeake  was  heading  for  the  Shannon, 
and  Broke,  seeing  that  Lawrence  intended  to  fight,  led 
the  way  some  distance  to  sea,  and  then  hove  to,  awaiting 
his  approach.  The  Englishman  made  no  effort  to 
maneuver,  allowing  Lawrence  to  choose  his  own  method 
of  attack.  For  his  part,  the  American  commander 
refused  the  opportunity  of  securing  a  raking  position 
under  the  Shannon's  quarter,  but  rounded-to  to  run 
alongside  and  fight  "yard-arm  to  yard-arm." 

At  5.50,  as  the  Chesapeake* 's  bows  doubled  on  the 
Shannon's  starboard  quarter,  the  British  gunners  struck 
the  first  blow.  As  soon  as  each  gun  of  the  Shannon  bore 
on  the  Chesapeake,  it  was  fired,  rapidly  reloaded,  and 
fired  again.  The  effect  was  terrible  at  such  close  quarters, 
but  the  American  gunners  responded  smartly,  and  for 
five  or  six  minutes  the  two  frigates  sailed  on  parallel 
courses,  pounding  each  other  at  a  range  of  about  fifty 
yards. 


138 


The  United  States  Navy 


Lawrence,  however,  had  made  the  mistake  of  coming 
up  with  too  much  headway,  and  he  saw  that  his  ship 
would  soon  forge  too  far  ahead.  Accordingly,  he  tried  to 
luff  her,  but  as  her  sails  blanketed  those  of  her  enemy, 
her  headway  carried  her  still  farther  till  she  lay  on 
the  Shannon's  weather  bow.  At  this  critical  point  the 
two  upon  whom  the  safety  of  the  vessel  most  depended 


CHESAPEAKO 
SHANNON         > 


THE  CHESAPEAKE  AND  THE  SHANNON 

were  disabled,  Lawrence  was  wounded,  and  his  sailing- 
master  killed.  Disasters  then  crowded  each  other  in  rapid 
succession.  The  cutting  of  the  fore-topsail  tye  by  the 
enemy's  fire  let  fall  the  yard,  so  that  the  foresail  became 
useless;  at  the  same  time  the  wheel  was  disabled  and  the 
brails  of  the  spanker  and  the  jib-sheet  were  shot  away. 
The  combined  result  was  that,  as  the  ship  had  no  head 
sails  left,  and  her  wheel  was  useless,  she  pointed  up  into 
the  wind,  and  lay  helpless  in  the  most  desperate  position 
imaginable ;  that  is,  with  her  quarters  exposed  to  her 


The  Chesapeake  and  the  Shannon         139 

enemy's  broadside  only  about  seventy  yards  distant. 
The  Shannon  took  instant  advantage  of  the  opportunity 
by  a  terrible  diagonal  fire  that  swept  the  Chesapeake.  To 
add  to  the  confusion,  about  this  time  a  grenade  tossed 
from  the  Shannon's  mainyard  exploded  an  arms  chest  on 
her  enemy's  deck. 

Seeing  that  the  Chesapeake  was  now  gaining  stern- 
board,  and  would  soon  foul  the  Shannon,  Lawrence  called 
the  boarders  away.  But  the  negro  bugler,  whose  duty  it 
was  to  sound  the  call,  had  hidden  himself  in  terror,  and 
the  word  was  passed  with  difficulty  by  word  of  mouth. 
Just  before  the  two  ships  touched,  Lawrence  received  his 
second  and  mortal  wound,  and  was  carried  below.  Like 
Lambert  of  the  Java,  he  had  been  picked  off  by  one  of 
his  enemy's  marines. 

As  the  Chesapeake' s  stern  fouled  the  main  chains  of 
the  Shannon,  the  two  ships  were  lashed  together  by  the 
British,  who  made  instant  preparation  to  carry  the  Amer 
ican  frigate  by  boarding.  Meanwhile,  at  Lawrence's  call 
for  boarders,  the  Chesapeake' 's  men  had  responded 
promptly,  but  they  found  no  leaders.  Lawrence  was  being 
carried  below;  and,  of  the  officers  on  the  spar  deck,  first 
lieutenant,  sailing-master,  captain  of  marines,  and  boat 
swain  had  already  received  their  death  wounds,  leaving 
none  but  a  few  midshipmen. 

The  second  lieutenant  was  at  the  forward  end  of  the 
gun  deck  with  no  idea  of  what  was  happening  on  the 
quarter-deck;  the  fourth  lieutenant  had  been  mortally 
wounded  at  the  first  fire;  and  the  third  lieutenant,  on 
hearing  the  call  for  boarders,  led  his  men  on  deck,  but 
stopped  to  help  his  beloved  commander  down  to  the 
steerage  ladder;  and  when  he  attempted  to  get  back  again, 
found  the  hatch  battened  down  by  the  enemy 's  boarders. 

Left  wholly  without  officers,  the  crew,  already  demor 
alized  by  a  raking  fire  at  close  quarters,  made  an  ineffect- 


140  The  United  States  Navy 

ual  attempt  to  resist  the  British  boarding  party,  and 
then  a  large  number  actually  broke  and  ran  below  into 
the  hold.  The  marines,  however,  under  their  sergeant, 
made  a  gallant  defense ;  out  of  a  total  of  forty-four  they 
lost  twelve  killed  and  twenty  wounded. 

Shortly  after  Captain  Broke  and  his  men  boarded  the 
quarter-deck  of  the  Chesapeake,  the  American  frigate  fell 
off  sufficiently  to  catch  the  wind.  The  lashings  parted 
and  the  Chesapeake  broke  away  with  the  enemy 's  boarders 
on  her  deck.  Here  was  a  chance  for  the  Americans  to 
save  the  day,  but  there  were  no  officers  to  rally  the  panic- 
stricken  crew.  Second  Lieutenant  Budd,  who  had  gained 
the  forecastle  and  begun  a  desperate  resistance,  was  twice 
severely  wounded,  and  thrown  to  the  deck  below.  In  a 
few  minutes  the  last  effort  at  defense  was  abandoned. 

In  this  hand-to-hand  struggle  on  the  forecastle,  Cap 
tain  Broke  himself  received  a  sabre  cut  on  the  head  that 
very  nearly  proved  mortal,  and  incapacitated  him  for 
the  rest  of  his  life.  Meanwhile,  his  first  lieutenant, 
Watts,  lost  his  life  by  a  blunder;  soon  after  boarding 
the  Chesapeake  he  had  lowered  the  colors,  and  bent  on  an 
English  ensign,  but  in  his  excitement  he  stopped  the 
English  colors  under,  instead  of  over,  the  American.  At 
this,  the  "  Shannons,"  thinking  that  the  Americans  must 
have  regained  the  quarter-deck,  fired  one  of  the  main 
deck  guns,  killing  Watts  and  four  or  five  of  his  men. 

It  was  only  fifteen  minutes  from  the  first  shot  of  the 
battle  to  the  final  rout  of  the  American  crew,  just  the 
time  it  took  Lawrence  to  destroy  the  Peacock  a  few 
months  before.  Unfortunately,  the  brutality  of  the  young 
English  lieutenants  and  their  men  on  taking  possession 
bears  no  such  parallel  with  the  magnanimity  of  Lawrence 
on  a  similar  occasion,  and  it  is  the  most  discreditable 
feature  of  the  Shannon's  victory.  No  blame,  however, 
can  be  attached  to  the  gallant  Broke,  whose  wound  had 
already  rendered  him  unconscious. 


The  Chesapeake  and  the  Shannon         141 

For  four  days,  Lawrence  lingered  in  great  agony, 
repeating  in  his  delirium,  the  words  that  have  since  become 
the  motto  of  the  navy,  * '  Don 't  give  up  the  ship  ! ' '  His 
kindness  to  the  men  of  the  Peacock  had  won  him  friendly 
regard  among  all  Englishmen,  and  no  honor  was  spared 
him  in  the  subsequent  funeral  ceremonies  at  Halifax. 

Naturally,  the  victory  of  the  Shannon  caused  the 
greatest  exultation  in  England,  and  corresponding  gloom 
in  the  United  States.  The  fact  that  the  Shannon  had 
captured  the  Chesapeake  in  fifteen  minutes  with  an 
unprecedented  slaughter  of  officers  and  men  was  morti 
fying,  and  it  was  not  long  before  a  "patriotic"  legend 
twined  around  the  ugly  fact.  This  legend  reports,  in 
brief,  that  the  Chesapeake' 's  crew  was  made  up  of  land 
lubbers  and  foreigners,  and  those  were  either  dead  drunk 
during  the  battle,  or  mutinous  and  cowardly.  The  muster 
roll,  however,  proves  that  there  was  not  one  "landsman" 
on  board,  and  gives  only  fifteen  foreign  names  out  of  a 
total  of  340.  Just  two  men  were  reported  drunk,  and 
the  idea  of  a  mutinous  spirit  is  based  wholly  on  the  request 
for  prize  money  made  just  before  going  out.  This  request 
was  reasonable  enough.  The  money  was  long  overdue, 
and  the  men  wanted  it  to  their  credit  on  the  eve  of  battle. 
The  purser  expressly  testified,  before  the  court  of  inquiry, 
that  there  was  nothing  disorderly  or  mutinous  in  the 
conduct  of  the  crew  as  they  came  to  him  for  the  prize 
checks.  Lawrence,  in  writing  to  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  after  this  incident,  says,  "My  crew  appear  to  be 
in  fine  spirits,  and  I  trust  will  do  their  duty." 

While  it  is  true  that  many  of  the  crew  became  panic- 
stricken  at  the  end  when  they  had  no  leaders,  yet  of  their 
own  accord  they  gave  three  hearty  cheers  when  the 
Chesapeake  swung  alongside  the  enemy;  and  they  stood 
splendidly  by  their  guns  in  that  terrible  first  broadside 
from  the  Shannon.  In  fact,  during  those  six  minutes, 


142  The  United  States  Navy 

when  the  two  vessels  were  running  on  parallel  courses, 
the  slaughter  on  board  the  Shannon  was  apparently  as 
bad  as  that  on  board  the  Chesapeake.  During  those  min 
utes,  the  Chesapeake  killed  and  wounded  more  on  the 
Shannon  than  the  Constitution — a  much  heavier  frigate — 
did  in  thirty  minutes'  pounding  of  the  Guerriere.  It  was 
when  the  Chesapeake  hung  in  irons,  unable  to  reply  to  a 
diagonal  fire,  that  the  American  loss  grew  to  such  a 
terrible  disproportion. 

In  his  official  report  of  the  action,  Lieutenant  Budd 
gave  a  loss  of  forty-eight  killed  and  ninety-seven 
wounded,  and  of  the  latter  fourteen  died  after  the  battle. 
The  British  loss  was  given  at  forty-three  killed  (including 
those  who  died  shortly  after  the  engagement)  and  twenty- 
nine  wounded.9  In  this  brief  action  the  victor  suffered 
more  than  the  vanquished  Guerriere  or  Macedonian. 
:'The  total  loss  of  both  ships  [Chesapeake  and  Shannon] 
was  only  forty-five  less  than  the  combined  losses  of  the 
French  and  English  fleets  at  Cape  St.  Vincent  where 
forty-two  ships  were  engaged."10 

The  defeat  was  partly  due  to  the  fact  that  "the  Chesa 
peake  was  a  ship  much  inferior  to  the  Shannon,  as  a  regi 
ment  newly  enlisted  is  to  one  that  has  seen  service,  and 
the  moment  things  went  wrong  seriously,  she  could  not 
retrieve  herself."11  But,  equally  it  can  be  attributed  to 
what  may  be  called  "the  fortune  of  war,"  in  the  unprece 
dented  slaughter  of  the  Chesapeake's  officers  at  the  outset 
of  the  battle,  with  a  simultaneous  destruction  of  her  wheel 
and  head  sails.  The  fact  may  be  accepted,  however,  that 
it  was  a  fair  fight  and  fairly  won. 

It  was  fortunate  for  Lawrence  that  he  died  a  hero, 
for  the  defeat  was  a  severe  blow  to  our  national  pride. 

9  Figures  from  Gleaves's  Life  of  James  Lawrence,  p.  209. 
in  Ibid.,  p.  210. 
"Mahan,  War  of  1812,  ii,   145. 


The  Chesapeake  and  the  Shannon         143 

As  it  was,  Midshipman  Cox — acting  third  lieutenant— 
who  made  the  mistake  of  assisting  his  commander  to  the 
deck  below,  was  expelled  from  the  service  with  the  burden 
of  the  defeat  laid  on  his  shoulders;  and  this,  despite 
the  fact  that  it  was  he  who  trained  and  discharged  the 
last  gun  fired  in  defense  of  the  flag. 

Much  has  been  written  concerning  Captain  Lawrence 's 
judgment  in  going  out  to  fight  the  Shannon,  and  the 
opinion  is  widely  accepted  that  he  acted  rashly  and  impul 
sively;  with  great  gallantry,  but  with  inexcusable  lack 
of  judgment.  And  yet,  it  is  hard  to  see  how  a  brave 
officer  could  have  done  otherwise.  For  months  the  harbor 
had  been  blockaded  by  two  frigates;  and,  as  far  as  Law 
rence  knew,  at  any  moment  the  blockade  of  two  or  even 
three  frigates,  would  be  renewed.  The  fact  that  the 
Shannon  alone  stood  on  blockade  meant  an  opportunity 
to  get  to  sea,  and  win  honor  besides.  It  is  clear,  from 
his  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Na,vy,  that  he  regarded 
his  ship  as  ready  for  sea,  and  he  knew  that  if  he  delayed 
a  week,  or  even  a  day  or  two,  simply  to  get  his  ship's 
organization  into  better  shape,  he  ran  the  risk  of  never 
having  another  chance  to  leave  port.  As  it  turned  out, 
the  Constitution,  which  was  then  undergoing  repairs 
after  her  battle  with  the  Java,  was  blockaded  until  late 
in  1814,  when  the  war  was  practically  over.  Had  the 
Chesapeake  also  remained,  she  would  have  shared  the 
same  fate.  It  must  be  added  to  Lawrence's  credit,  that 
when  he  did  offer  battle,  he  chose  the  style  of  fighting  that 
was  best  adapted  to  an  unpracticed  crew,  namely,  close 
quarters.  At  all  events,  he  did  not  strike  his  colors;  and 
the  harshest  critic  must  be  gentle  in  the  face  of  his  heroic 
death. 


IX 

THE  SLOOP  ACTIONS  OF  THE  WAR 

IN  the  single-ship  engagements  between  frigates  in  this 
war,  the  United  States  was  three  times  victorious  and  once 
defeated.  All  these  actions  occurred  during  the  first 
twelve  months  of  the  war,  for  after  the  several  reverses 
the  British  Admiralty  had  grown  wary  and  had  instructed 
their  captains  to  refuse  battle  when  English  18-pounders 
were  opposed  to  American  24  X  and  to  obtain  added 
security  for  their  frigates  by  cruising  in  couples.  The 
activity  of  American  frigates  was  further  checked,  as 
the  British,  on  increasing  their  naval  force  on  our  shores, 
extended  the  blockade  so  as  to  include  New  England. 
Whenever  it  was  known  that  an  American  frigate  was  in 
a  harbor,  an  English  squadron  would  hover  about,  making 
it  impossible  for  a  large  ship  to  get  to  sea.  Thus  the 
Congress  was  shut  up  in  Portsmouth  on  her  return  in 
1813 ;  the  Constellation,  which  was  undergoing  repairs 
in  the  Chesapeake  at  the  outbreak  of  hostilities,  was  pre 
vented  from  sailing  till  their  close ;  and  the  United  States, 
after  defeating  the  Macedonian,  was  permitted  to  sail 
with  her  former  prize  only  from  New  York  to  New 
London,  where  both  frigates  were  closely  held  till  the 
end  of  the  war. 

The  sloops  of  war,  drawing  less  water  and  being  much 
more  nimble  than  the  frigates,  easily  eluded  the  blockade, 
and  their  activity  continued  unabated  throughout  the 
war.  Besides  inflicting  great  damage  on  the  enemy's 
commerce,  they  engaged  in  battle  British  craft  of  their 
own  kind,  fighting  in  all  eight  single-ship  actions ;  in  just 
one,  the  third  encounter,  the  British  were  successful;  in 
the  other  seven,  our  sloops  were  victorious. 
144 


The  Frigate  and  the  Sloop  Actions        145 


80  60 


zo 


A.  Constitution-Guerriere  D.  Chesapeake-Shannon 

B.  United  States-Macedonian  E.  Essex-Phcebe  &  Cherub 

C.  Constitution-Java  F.  President- Endymion 

G.  Constitution-Cyane  &  Levant 

1.  Wasp-Frolic  5.  Peacock- Epervier 

2.  Hornet-Peacock  6.  Wasp-Reindeer 

3.  Argus-Pelican  7.  Wasp-Avon 

4.  Enterprise-Boxer  8.  Hornet-Penguin 


60 


60 


4-0 


20 


THE  FRIGATE  AND  THE  SLOOP  ACTIONS  OF  THE  WAR  OF  1812 


10 


146  The  United  States  Navy 

THE  WASP  AND  THE  FROLIC 

On  the  18th  of  October,  1812,  the  American  sloop  of 
war  Wasp,  18  guns,  Master-Commandant  Jacob  Jones, 
engaged  the  British  brig  Frolic,  22  guns,  Captain  Thomas 
Whinyates.  The  Wasp  had  sailed  from  the  Delaware  on 
October  13 ;  two  days  later  she  had  encountered  a  violent 
storm  that  carried  away  her  jib-boom  with  two  men.  On 
the  17th,  a  half  hour  before  midnight,  when  about  500 
miles  east  of  Chesapeake  Bay  (lat.  37°  N.,  long.  65°  W.) 
Jones  made  out  a  convoy;  but,  as  there  appeared  to  be 
at  least  two  large  ships,  he  cautiously  stood  off  till  day 
light  should  disclose  their  force.  The  convoy  consisted  of 
six  vessels  returning  from  Honduras  in  the  charge  of  the 
Frolic.  The  gale  which  had  so  severely  handled  the 
Wasp  had  been  no  kinder  to  the  English  brig,  for  the 
Frolic  had  lost  her  main  yard  as  well  as  her  topsails  and 
had  sprung  her  maintopmast. 

When,  as  day  broke,  Jones  had  determined  the  char 
acter  of  the  enemy,  he  bore  down  to  attack.1  Whinyates, 
seeing  his  intention,  ordered  the  convoy  to  run  before 
the  wind,  while  he  dropped  astern  and  hoisted  Spanish 
colors,  hoping  by  this  ruse  to  deceive  and  delay  his  enemy. 

The  action  did  not  begin  until  the  two  were  within 
fifty  yards  of  each  other,  and  as  they  sailed  along  parallel 
courses,  there  was  little  maneuvering.  In  very  few  naval 
battles  has  the  equality  of  force  been  so  marked.  For 
though  the  Wasp  had  an  advantage  in  the  number  of  men, 
135  to  her  opponent's  110,  the  Frolic,  to  offset  this,  had 
a  heavier  broadside,  274  pounds  to  the  American's  250; 
both  alike  had  suffered  from  the  gale. 

There  was  a  heavy  sea  running,  which  frequently 
threw  spray  over  the  decks  or  even  rolled  the  muzzles  of 

1  Jones's  official  report  may  be  found  in  Giles's  Register,  iii, 
217;  Whinyates',  in  the  Naval  Chronicle,  xxix,  76. 


The  Wasp  and  the  Frolic  147 

the  guns  under,  yet  the  gunnery  was  unusually  good. 
The  Wasp  suffered  many  wounds  in  her  spars  and  rig 
ging;  within  four  or  five  minutes  her  main  topmast  was 
shot  away,  and,  falling  with  the  maintopsail  yard  across 
the  port  fore  and  foretopsail  braces  rendered  the  head 
yards  unmanageable;  four  minutes  later,  the  gaff  and 
mizzen  topgallant  mast  fell;  and  after  twenty  minutes 
of  fighting  every  brace  and  most  of  the  rigging  had  been 
shot  away.  Meanwhile,  the  distance  between  the  two 
ships  had  gradually  lessened  and  the  Wasp,  drawing 
ahead  of  her  opponent,  secured  an  advantageous  position 
off  the  Frolic's  bow.  Captain  Whinyates  in  his  official 
report  of  the  battle  wrote: 

"The  superior  fire  of  our  guns  gave  every  reason  to 
expect  its  speedy  termination  in  our  favor;  but  the  gaff 
head-braces  being  shot  away,  and  there  being  no  sail  on 
the  mainmast,  the  brig  became  unmanageable,  and  the 
enemy  succeeded  in  taking  a  position  to  rake  her,  while 
she  was  unable  to  bring  a  gun  to  bear. ' ' 

The  Frolic  now  fouled  the  Wasp,  running  her  bow 
sprit  between  the  main  and  mizzen  rigging  of  the  Wasp. 
This  was  not  disadvantageous  for  Jones;  for,  with  his 
rigging  so  badly  cut  up,  he  was  apprehensive  that  his 
masts  might  fall,  and  he  had  already  decided  to  take  the 
enemy  by  boarding.  First,  however,  he  seized  the  oppor 
tunity  to  rake,  and  was  intending  further  to  hammer 
away,  when  the  eagerness  of  his  crew  for  still  closer  action 
could  scarcely  be  restrained.  Jack  Lang,  once  impressed 
into  the  British  service,  leaped  on  his  gun,  cutlass  in 
hand,  and  thence  to  the  Frolic.  Lieutenant  Biddle  was 
for  calling  him  back,  but,  seeing  the  enthusiasm  of  the 
crew,  quickly  changed  his  mind,  and  led  them  on.  His 
feet,  however,  got  tangled  in  the  rigging,  and,  as  a  mid 
shipman  caught  hold  of  his  coat  to  help  himself  up,  the 
lieutenant  fell  back  upon  the  deck  of  the  Wasp.  Quickly 


148  The  United  States  Navy 

jumping  up  again,  Biddle  passed  Lang  and  a  seaman 
who  had  gained  the  bowsprit  of  the  Frolic,  and  was  the 
first  to  go  aft.  There  to  his  astonishment,  he  found  only 
four  men  on  deck  alive,  Captain  Whinyates  with  two  other 
officers  and  a  seaman  who  held  to  his  station  at  the  wheel. 
On  Biddle 's  approach  the  officers,  all  wounded,  threw 
down  their  swords  in  token  of  submission,  and  as  there 
was  no  one  to  haul  down  the  colors  Biddle  himself 
climbed  the  rigging  and  did  so. 

A  few  minutes  after  the  Wasp  had  freed  herself  from 
the  Frolic,  both  masts  of  the  latter  fell,  the  mainmast 
close  to  the  deck,  the  foremast  twelve  or  fifteen  feet  above 
the  deck.  The  action  had  lasted  forty-three  minutes. 
The  most  surprising  feature  of  the  engagement  is  that 
with  the  unusual  equality  of  force  there  should  have  been 
such  a  great  difference  in  losses.  On  the  American  side 
there  were  five  killed  and  five  wounded,  a  total  of  ten ;  on 
the  British,  not  twenty  men  escaped  injury,  and  the  total 
loss  was  about  ninety.  In  explanation  of  this  it  was 
reported  that,  in  the  heavy  sea  running,  the  Frolic  fired 
when  rising  on  the  crest  of  the  waves,  so  that  nearly  all 
her  shot  which  struck  injured  the  spars  and  rigging  of 
her  enemy ;  and  that  the  Wasp  fired  while  going  down  so 
that  her  shot  swept  the  decks  or  pierced  the  hull  of  her 
opponent.  When  Whinyates  spoke  of  the  "superior  fire" 
of  the  British  guns,  he  probably  meant  the  more  rapid 
fire  (three  to  two,  according  to  Cooper)  for,  as  Vice- 
Admiral  Jurien  de  la  Graviere  of  the  French  Navy 
observes,  the  accuracy  of  the  American  fire,  in  spite  of 
the  unfavorable  conditions  prevailing,  was  indeed  aston 
ishing. 

The  determined  and  obstinate  resistance  of  the  Frolic 
illustrates  the  value  of  holding  out  to  the  last,  even 
when  things  are  going  wrong.  Whinyates  subjected 
his  ship  and  crew  to  awful  losses,  yet  not  with- 


The  Hornet  and  the  Peacock  149 

out  result;  for  soon  after  the  Frolic  had  surrendered, 
another  sail  appeared  on  the  horizon.  Jones  supposed  it 
to  be  one  of  the  convoy  of  the  Frolic,  several  of  which 
were  heavily  armed,  and  he  loaded  his  guns  an(i  cleared 
for  action.  But  the  stranger  proved  to  be  the  British 
74-gun  ship-of-the-line  Poictiers,  Captain  Beresford;  and 
as  the  Wasp  could  not  flee,  Beresford  took  the  Wasp  and 
recaptured  the  Frolic,  and  sailed  with  them  to  Bermuda. 

THE  HORNET  AND  THE  PEACOCK 

It  has  been  told  in  the  previous  chapter  how  James 
Lawrence,  when  captain  of  the  Hornet,  vainly  sought  an 
engagement  on  equal  terms  with  the  Bonne  Citoyenne  off 
the  coast  of  Brazil.  At  length,  compelled  by  the  British 
ship-of-the-line  Montague,  74  guns,  to  choose  a  new 
station,  he  followed  the  coast  to  British  Guiana,  a 
favorite  cruising  ground  of  American  privateers,  and  on 
his  way  captured  the  British  brig  Resolution,  10  guns, 
with  $23,000  in  specie  on  board. 

On  February  24,  1813,  when  off  the  mouth  of  the 
Demerara  River,  British  Guiana,  Lawrence  discovered 
on  his  weather  quarter,  a  brig  which  showed  a  willingness 
to  engage.  It  was  the  Peacock,  a  sister  ship  of  the  Frolic, 
and  thus  of  about  the  same  size  as  the  Hornet,  but  with 
only  two-thirds  as  heavy  a  broadside;  for  her  32-pound 
carronades,  because  of  her  light  scantling,  had  all  been 
replaced  by  24 's. 

As  the  ships  neared  each  other,  Lawrence  kept  close 
to  the  wind,  and  secured  the  weather-gage.  At  5.25  the 
ships,  passing  on  opposite  tacks,  exchanged  broadsides  at 
half  pistol-shot  range.  Then  Lawrence,  seeing  that  the 
Peacock  was  about  to  wear,  bore  up  and,  receiving  her 
starboard  broadside,  ran  close  on  her  starboard  quarter, 
where,  by  a.  heavy  and  well-directed  fire,  he  cut  the  brig 


150  The  United  States  Navy 

to  pieces.  By  this  fire  the  British  commander,  Captain 
William  Peake,  was  killed,  and  soon  the  Peacock  was  in 
a  desperate  condition.  Less  than  fifteen  minutes  after 
the  action  had  begun,  the  Peacock  surrendered,  hoisting 
an  ensign,  union  down,  as  a  signal  of  distress.  The  ship 
was  sinking  fast,  already  having  six  feet  of  water  in  her 
hold. 

Lieutenant  Conner,  who,  with  a  small  force  of  Amer 
ican  seamen,  had  been  sent  aboard,  made  every  effort  to 
keep  the  Peacock  afloat  until  the  prisoners  could  be  re 
moved;  they  threw  guns  overboard,  plugged  some  of  the 
holes,  and  resorted  to  pumping  and  baling.  But  she 
continued  to  settle,  and  went  to  the  bottom  so  suddenly 
as  to  carry  down  nine  of  her  crew  and  three  Americans. 

The  loss  on  the  Peacock  was  five  killed,  including  her 
commander,  and  thirty-three  wounded;  on  the  Hornet, 
one  killed  and  four  wounded  (two  by  the  bursting  of  a 
cartridge)2;  the  rigging  of  the  Hornet  was  cut,  but  the 
hull  had  received  no  damage.  While  it  must  be  admitted 
that  the  advantage  favored  the  Americans  in  number  of 
crew  and  weight  of  gun  metal,  still  this  does  not  explain 
the  astonishing  difference  in  the  effects  of  the  fire  of  the 
two  ships.  As  some  writer  has  observed,  "Had  the  guns 
of  the  Peacock  been  of  the  largest  size  they  could  not 
have  changed  the  result,  as  the  weight  of  shot  that  do  not 
hit  is  of  no  great  moment. ' ' 

Another  British  brig,  the  Espiegle,  of  approximately 
the  same  strength  as  the  Peacock,  lay  at  anchor  six  miles 
distant  throughout  the  engagement.  At  its  termination, 
Lawrence  quickly  patched  his  rigging  and  prepared  for 
a  second  fight  which  he  supposed  would  be  soon  forced 
upon  him.  But  as  the  Espiegle  remained  unconcernedly 
at  her  anchorage  in  the  harbor,  he  sailed  away. 

2  Official  report  of  Captain  Lawrence,  March  19,   1813. 


The  Argus  and  the  Pelican  151 

THE  ARGUS  AND  THE  PELICAN 

On  June  18,  1813,  the  American  brig-of-war  Argus, 
Master-Commandant  William  H.  Allen,  sailed  for 
L 'Orient,  with  Mr.  Crawford,  the  newly  appointed  min 
ister  to  France.  On  the  voyage  over  of  twenty-three  days, 
Allen  made  just  one  prize,  but,  later,  in  thirty-one  days 
of  cruising  in  the  chops  of  the  English  Channel,  he  cap 
tured  and  destroyed  nineteen  British  merchantmen.  The 
explanation  of  the  difference  is  that  on  the  regular  thor 
oughfares  ships  were  not  allowed  to  sail  except  in  convoy, 
while  nearer  home,  in  the  vicinity  of  England  and  Ireland, 
ships  followed  a  hundred  courses,  as  in  time  of  peace, 
and  there  were  no  ships-of-war  stationed  near  to  protect 
them.  The  career  of  the  Argus  was  soon  to  be  cut  short, 
but  she  had  shown  the  advantage  of  preying  on  unpro 
tected  parts  of  the  enemy's  coast. 

Early  in  the  morning,  August  14,  1813,  the  Argus, 
after  capturing  a  prize  between  Wales  and  southern 
Ireland  and  setting  fire  to  her,  fell  in  with  the  British 
brig-of-war  Pelican,  Captain  Maples,  which  had  been 
sent  out  from  Cork,  expressly  to  meet  her.  The  wind  was 
from  the  south  and  the  Pelican  had  the  weather-gage. 
Allen  attempted  to  pass  to  windward,  but  finding  he  could 
not,  he  shortened  sail  and  allowed  the  Pelican  to  close. 
The  action  began  at  six  A.M.,  when  the  Argus  wore  round 
and  fired  her  port  broadside  within  grape  distance,  the 
Pelican  promptly  responding  with  her  starboard  battery. 
Although  early  in  the  action,  Allen  was  severely  wounded 
in  the  leg  by  a  round  shot,  he  held  to  his  post,  until  he 
fainted  from  loss  of  blood — bravery  that  cost  him  his 
life.  A  few  minutes  later,  the  first  lieutenant,  W.  H. 
Watson,  was  struck  in  the  head  and  stunned  by  a  grape 
shot,  whereupon  the  command  devolved  on  the  second 
lieutenant,  W.  H.  Allen,  Jr. 


152  The  United  States  Navy 

A  large  part  of  the  rigging  of  the  Argus  had  now 
been  disabled,  yet  as  the  enemy  edged  off  to  pass  under 
her  stern,  Second  Lieutenant  Allen  skilfully  prevented 
this  by  luffing  with  the  maintopsail  aback,  at  the  same 
time  firing  a  raking  broadside.  The  wheel  ropes  of  the 
Argus,  as  well  as  the  running  rigging,  were  soon  shot 
away  and  she  became  unmanageable.  Her  enemy,  only 
slightly  damaged,  could  then  choose  his  position  at  will. 

When,  at  6.30,  Lieutenant  Watson,  on  recovering  con 
sciousness,  again  came  up  on  deck,  he  found  the  enemy 
raking  from  under  the  stern  of  the  Argus.  The  Amer 
icans  were  plainly  beaten,  unless  they  could  bring  their 
ship  up  and  board;  and  this  maneuver,  since  all  their 
braces  were  cut,  proved  impossible.  The  action  continued 
a  few  minutes  longer,  the  Argus  exposed  to  a  cross  or 
raking  fire  to  which  she  was  able  to  respond  with  little 
more  than  musketry.  Finally,  at  6.47,  when  the  action 
had  been  in  progress  about  three-quarters  of  an  hour, 
the  Argus  surrendered. 

The  American  loss  was  six  killed  and  seventeen 
wounded,  five  so  severely  that  they  died  within  a  few 
days.  The  British  had  two  killed  and  five  wounded. 
The  British  brig  was  twenty  per  cent  larger,  and  her 
broadside  seventeen  per  cent  heavier.  Yet  this  does  not 
explain  why  the  American  fire  at  short  range  caused  so 
little  injury.  Even  when  the  Argus  had  a  raking  position 
she  could  not  use  it  to  advantage.  Her  gunnery  was 
decidedly  poor.  Lieutenant  Watson  observes  in  his 
official  report  that  the  crew  had  been  under  a  long  strain 
because  of  the  "very  rapid  succession  of  captures." 

THE  ENTERPRISE  AND  THE  BOXER 

On  September  5,  1813,  the  American  brig  Enterprise, 
of  14  guns,  commanded  by  Lieutenant  William  Burrows, 
while  near  Monhegan  Island,  Maine,  fell  in  with  the 


The  Peacock  and  the  Epervier  153 

British  brig  Boxer,  of  14  guns,  Captain  Samuel  Blyth, 
and  decisively  defeated  her  in  an  action  lasting  forty 
minutes. 

Both  vessels  were  dull  sailers.  The  Enterprise  had  a 
slight  superiority  in  guns,  and  also  a  larger  complement; 
but  while  the  Enterprise  had  just  got  to  sea,  the  Boxer 
had  been  cruising  for  six  months,  certainly  an  enviable 
opportunity  for  drilling. 

The  loss  of  the  Americans  was  fourteen  killed  and 
wounded;  that  of  the  British  was  not  reported,  but  was 
evidently  larger.  The  Enterprise  had  inflicted  consid 
erable  damage  in  the  hull  of  her  enemy,  while  receiving 
little  in  return;  both  had  suffered  in  spars  and  rigging. 
The  Enterprise  seems  to  have  been  more  skilfully  maneu 
vered,  and,  to  quote  the  findings  of  the  British  court- 
martial,  she  had  '  *  a  greater  degree  of  skill  in  the  direction 
of  her  fire."  Almost  at  the  first  broadside,  Captain 
Blyth  of  the  Boxer  was  killed,  and,  at  about  the  same 
time,  Lieutenant  Burrows  of  the  Enterprise  was  struck 
down  by  a  musket  ball.  Lieutenant  Edward  R.  McCall, 
who  then  assumed  command  of  the  Enterprise,  and  carried 
the  fight  to  a  successful  conclusion,  had  never  so  much  as 
seen  a  battle  before. 

THE  PEACOCK  AND  THE  EPERVIER 

The  Government,  though  so  slow  in  building  new 
frigates  that  none  took  part  in  the  war,  had  in  the  latter 
part  of  1813  three  new  sloops  approaching  completion, 
the  Peacock,  the  Frolic,  and  the  Wasp,  names  given  in 
honor  of  Lawrence's  and  Jones's  splendid  victories.  On 
April  29,  1814,  the  Peacock,  18  guns,  Master-Commandant 
Lewis  Warrington,  while  off  the  southeast  coast  of  Flor 
ida,  engaged  the  British  brig  Epervier,  18  guns,  Captain 
Wales.  The  American  ship,  nominally  equal  in  strength 
to  her  antagonist,  was  slightly  superior  in  every  partic- 


154  The  United  States  Navy 

ular.  Still  when  the  Epervier  surrendered,  after  an  action 
lasting  forty-five  minutes,  the  difference  in  losses  showed, 
even  more  decidedly  than  in  previous  engagements,  that 
it  was  something  more  than  heavier  guns  which  brought 
victory. 

The  Peacock  had  not  a  man  killed,  and  but  two  slightly 
wounded;  the  Epervier,  eight  killed  and  fifteen  wounded. 
Not  a  round  shot  had  touched  the  hull  of  the  Peacock, 
and  her  masts  and  spars  were  as  sound  as  ever,  while  her 
enemy  had  masts  badly  cut  up  and  forty-five  shots  in  the 
hull  which  had  admitted  five  feet  of  water  in  the  hold. 

After  making  some  repairs,  Warrington  decided  to 
take  his  prize  into  Savannah.  The  sloops  were  chased  by 
two  British  frigates,  but  escaped  by  clever  maneuvering, 
and  succeeded  in  reaching  port  in  safety. 

THE  WASP  AND  THE  REINDEER 

An  important  share  in  the  credit  for  the  Enterprise's 
splendid  victory  over  the  Boxer  was  due  to  Master- 
Commandant  Johnston  Blakely.  It  was  he  who  had  fitted 
out  the  brig  and  drilled  the  raw  crew,  and  thus  made  it 
possible  for  the  young  and  inexperienced  Lieutenants 
Burrows  and  McCall,  immediately  on  getting  to  sea,  to 
give  such  good  account  of  the  Enterprise.  He  himself 
did  not  sail,  for  he  had  just  received  a  better  command, 
the  new  sloop  of  war  Wasp,  now  nearly  ready  for  sea. 
The  story  of  this,  the  second  Wasp,  is  that  of  a  swift  and 
daring  cruiser  which  met  with  signal  success. 

Leaving  Portsmouth,  New  Hampshire,  on  May  1,  1814, 
Blakely  slipped  through  the  blockading  line,  arid,  accord 
ing  to  his  instructions,  took  up  a  station  in  the  approaches 
to  the  English  Channel,  almost  exactly  where  Allen,  in 
the  Argus,  had,  a  year  before,  captured  so  many  mer 
chantmen.  Blakely  had  a  sloop  that  probably  was  not 
surpassed  in  all  European  waters;  his  crew  of  173  was 


The  Wasp  and  the  Reindeer  155 

made  up  almost  entirely  of  New  Englanders,  and,  though 
they  averaged  only  twenty-three  years  in  age,  many  with 
out  previous  sea  training,  they  were  spirited  and  ambi 
tious,  the  kind  that  an  efficient  commander  like  Blakely 
could  quickly  mould  into  the  best  of  crews. 

Not  until  he  had  been  thirty-two  days  at  sea  did  he 
make  a  capture;  he  was  then  probably  near  his  station 
in  the  Channel,  for,  in  the  next  thirty-five  days  he  took 
seven  more  prizes.  Not  every  sail  he  saw  was  legitimate 
prey;  as  he  observes  in  a  letter  of  July  8,  1814,  "After 
arriving  on  soundings,  the  number  of  neutrals  which  were 
passing  kept  us  almost  constantly  in  pursuit."  It  was  a 
daring  game  he  was  playing,  for  he  adds,  "I  found  it 
impossible  to  maintain  anything  like  a  station,  and  was 
led  in  chase  farther  up  the  Channel  than  was  intended." 

Early  on  the  morning  of  June  28,  1814,  Blakely, 
having  discovered  two  sails  on  his  lee  beam,  started  in 
chase;  but  as  soon  afterwards  he  made  out  a  single  sail 
on  his  weather  beam,  he  altered  his  course,  and  stood  for 
this.  The  stranger,  which  was  the  brig  Reindeer,  Captain 
William  Manners,  might  easily  have  escaped,  and  as  the 
superior  character  of  American  sloops  was  now  pretty 
well  known,  Manners  must  have  been  aware  that  he  was 
about  to  engage  a  stronger  antagonist;  but  William 
Manners  had  a  crew  said  to  be  the  pride  of  Plymouth, 
and  was  himself  a  commander  that,  for  courage  and 
ability,  had  scarcely  a  superior.  Instead  of  avoiding 
battle,  Manners  came  about  with  the  wind  nearly  aft,  and 
stood  for  his  opponent. 

The  breezes  were  so  light  that  the  ships  moved  on 
almost  an  even  keel ;  and  it  was  quarter  after  one  before 
Blakely  had  the  drummer  call  the  men  to  their  quarters. 
Two  hours  more  elapsed  before  the  fight  began,  Blakely 
having  tacked  and  attempted  to  pass  to  windward  of  his 
enemy ;  Manners,  much  too  clever  to  surrender  any  advan- 


156  The  United  States  Navy 

tage  needlessly,  had  tacked  at  the  same  time,  and  standing 
from  the  American,  had  foiled  him.  Blakely,  seeing  that 
his  enemy  would  weather  him,  changed  to  the  other  tack, 
and,  furling  most  of  his  sail,  allowed  the  Reindeer  to 
approach. 

The  English  brig  came  up  on  the  weather  quarter  of 
the  Wasp,  about  sixty  yards  distant,  and  opened  with  a 
12-pound  carronade  loaded  with  round  and  grape  shot,  a 
fire  that  must  have  severely  tested  the  discipline  of  the 
crew  of  the  Wasp,  for,  as  the  Reindeer  did  not  draw 
abeam,  the  guns  of  the  Wasp  would  not  bear.  Blakely 
got  out  of  this  awkward  position,  however,  by  suddenly 
putting  his  helm  alee;  and  beginning  with  the  after 
carronade  he  fired,  in  succession,  all  the  guns  of  his 
broadside  as  they  bore. 

The  Reindeer,  somewhat  disabled  by  this  fire,  now 
ran  aboard  of  the  Wasp,  her  port  bow  against  the  Wasp's 
quarter,  in  which  position  the  Wasp  raked  with  telling 
effect.  Meanwhile  the  American  marines  and  riflemen, 
with  the  skill  for  which  they  were  famed,  picked  off  many 
of  the  exposed  officers  and  crew  of  the  brig.  Captain 
Manners,  though  wounded,  kept  the  deck  and  urged  on 
the  fight.  A  second  wound  caused  by  a  shot  that  went 
through  both  thighs,  brought  him  to  his  knees ;  but  he  was 
up  again  quickly,  and  would  give  no  heed  to  his  wounds, 
which  were  bleeding  profusely.  Finally,  perceiving  the 
execution  of  the  musketry  from  the  tops  of  the  Wasp,  he 
called  out,  "Follow  me,  my  boys,  we  must  board."  With 
the  words,  he  climbed  the  rigging  to  lead  them  on,  but 
two  balls  from  the  Wasp's  maintop,  passing  through  his 
skull,  killed  him  instantly. 

The  Americans,  in  turn,  now  prepared  to  board.  The 
English,  badly  crippled  by  the  death  or  disability  of  nearly 
all  their  officers,  as  well  as  of  half  their  men,  could  make 
but  little  resistance,  and  soon  surrendered. 


The  Wasp  and  the  Avon  157 

The  action  occupied  nineteen  minutes.3  The  Wasp 
received  six  round  shot  in  her  hull,  and  a  24-pound  shot 
that  passed  through  the  centre  of  her  foremast,  and  had 
her  sails  and  rigging  injured.  The  Reindeer,  wrote 
Blakely,  "was  literally  cut  to  pieces  in  a  line  with  her 
ports."  The  Wasp  had  five  killed  and  twenty-one 
wounded,  the  Reindeer,  twenty-five  killed  and  forty-two 
wounded.  Almost  equal  honor  was  due  the  two  forces  for 
the  brave  fight.  When,  as  in  this  case,  it  is  a  picked 
American  crew  against  a  picked  English  crew,  both  splen 
didly  disciplined,  and  directed  by  the  finest  of  captains, 
victory  depends  on  something  else  than  determination  and 
courage ;  and  here  it  is  fair  to  conclude  that  it  was  due 
to  superiority  in  power.  The  Wasp  had  twenty  32- 
pounder  carronades  and  two  long  guns  against  the  Rein 
deer's  sixteen  24-pounders  and  two  long  guns,  and  as 
the  complement  of  the  Wasp  was  in  a  like  degree  larger, 
she  surpassed  the  English  brig  in  at  least  the  ratio  of 
three  to  two. 

THE  WASP  AND  THE  AVON 

That  he  might  secure  the  best  care  for  his  wounded 
and  as  well  make  needed  repairs  on  the  Wasp,  Blakely 
sailed  for  L 'Orient,  where  he  remained  till  the  27th  of 
August.  Then  putting  to  sea,  in  less  than  a  month,  he 
made  six  more  valuable  captures.  How  free  and  fearless 
were  his  movements  may  be  seen  from  the  capture  of  the 
British  brig  Mary,  loaded  with  cannon  and  other  mili 
tary  stores,  and  convoyed  with  nine  other  ships  by  a  bomb- 
ship,  and  the  ship-of-the-line  Armada,  74  guns.  The  Wasp 
not  only  succeeded  in  cutting  out  the  Mary,  but  having 
burned  it  within  sight  of  the  convoy  attempted  to  make 
another  capture;  she  was  prevented,  however,  by  the 
Armada,  which  chased  her  away. 

3  For  Blakely's  report,  see  Niles's  Register,  vii,  114. 


158  The  United  States  Navy 

On  the  evening  of  the  same  day,  September  1,  1814, 
the  lookout  sighted  four  sails,  two  on  the  starboard  and 
two  on  the  port  bow.  Blakely  immediately  set  sail  in 
chase  of  the  ship  on  the  starboard  bow  farthest  to  wind 
ward.  The  chase  was  the  brig  Avon,  Captain  James 
Arbuthnot.  After  an  engagement  of  three-quarters  of  an 
hour  she  surrendered,  with  a  loss  of  nine  killed  and 
thirty-three  wounded.  The  Wasp  had  two  killed  and  one 
wounded,  about  an  eighth  or  ninth  of  her  loss  in  the  fight 
with  the  Reindeer;  since  the  Avon  was  superior  to  the 
Reindeer  by  having  32-pounders  where  the  Reindeer  had 
24 X  this  shows  something  of  the  quality  of  Manners 
and  his  crew. 

When  Blakely  was  about  to  take  possession  of  the 
prize,  he  discovered  a  second  brig,  the  Castilian,  of  18 
guns,  standing  towards  him  and  he  received  a  broadside 
from  her  as  she  ran  up  under  his  stern.  Since  two  other 
sails  were  also  approaching,  Blakely  left  his  prize  and 
standing  off  to  reeve  new  braces,  attempted  to  decoy  the 
second  brig  from  her  supports.  But  the  Avon  was  firing 
guns  of  distress,  and  the  Castilian  went  to  her  rescue; 
scarcely  had  the  last  man  been  removed  from  the  Avon 
before  she  went  down. 

Sailing  now  to  the  south,  Blakely  captured  off  the 
Madeiras  the  brig  Atlanta,  which,  being  of  exceptional 
value,  he  sent  with  official  despatches  to  Savannah.  Three 
weeks  later,  the  Wasp  was  spoken  900  miles  farther  south 
and  this  is  the  last  ever  heard  of  the  brilliant  captain 
and  his  gallant  crew.  Their  end  is  entirely  shrouded  in 
mystery. 

THE  HORNET  AND  THE  PENGUIN 

On  January  20,  1815,  the  Hornet,  Master-Comman 
dant  James  Biddle,  slipped  through  the  British  blockading 
squadron  off  New  York  and  set  sail  for  the  South  Atlantic, 


The  Hornet  and  the  Penguin  159 

where,  with  several  other  ships  that  were  to  rendezvous 
at  the  lonely  island  of  Tristan  da  Cunha,  1500  miles  west 
of  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  it  was  planned  she  should 
cruise  against  British  commerce. 

On  her  arrival,  March  23,  1815,  as  she -was  about  to 
anchor,  the  lookout  sighted  a  sail  to  the  southeast,  passing 
behind  the  island.  The  Hornet  immediately  got  under 
way,  and  after  a  little  maneuvering,  at  1.40  that  after 
noon,  entered  into  an  artillery  duel  with  the  British  sloop 
of  war  Penguin,  Captain  Dickinson.  The  two  were  run 
ning  on  parallel  courses,  the  Hornet  to  leeward.  In 
armament,  the  Penguin  had  sixteen  32-pounder  carron- 
ades,  two  long  12  's,  and  one  12-pounder  carronade ; 
opposed  to  this,  the  Hornet  had  eighteen  32-pounder 
carronades  and  two  long  12 's.  Thus  it  will  be  seen  that 
the  Hornet  had  only  very  little  superiority  in  gun  metal. 

The  story  of  the  fight  is  like  that  of  many  other  actions. 
The  Penguin  kept  drifting  nearer,  and  as  she  was  being 
decidedly  worsted  in  the  artillery  duel,  Dickinson  sud 
denly  put  his  helm  hard  up  and  fouled  the  Hornet  with 
the  intention  of  boarding.  But  the  American  crew  was 
ready  and  kept  the  British  oft'  while  the  small-arms 
men  poured  in  a  murderous  fire.  The  Penguin  wrenched 
loose  with  the  loss  of  her  bowsprit  and  foremast,  and  then 
surrendered.  The  action  lasted  twenty-two  minutes.  The 
British  guns  were  active,  yet  the  fact  that  the  Hornet 
did  not  receive  a  single  round  shot  in  her  hull  or  any 
material  injury  in  her  spars  shows  the  inaccuracy  of  their 
fire.  Her  loss  was  one  killed  and  eleven  wounded,  to  be 
contrasted  with  fourteen  killed  on  the  Penguin,  including 
the  captain,  and  twenty-eight  wounded.  This  was  the 
last  naval  action  of  the  war;  in  fact,  it  occurred  several 
weeks  after  the  terms  of  peace  had  been  approved  by  the 
President  and  ratified  by  the  Senate. 


160  The  United  States  Navy 

THE  IMPORTANCE  OF  THE  SLOOP  ACTIONS 

Although  the  loss  of  seven  sloops  from  such  a  navy 
as  Great  Britain's  could  have  little  direct  effect  upon 
the  war,  yet  the  service  of  our  small  cruisers  was  far- 
reaching  in  its  influence.  The  daring  enterprise  of  our 
sloops,  their  ability  to  move  almost  at  will  in  the  face  of 
a  heavy  blockade,  the  skill  with  which  they  were  handled, 
in  short,  their  almost  uninterrupted  success  in  coping 
with  the  first  navy  of  the  world,  fostered  in  our  country 
the  much  needed  spirit  of  self-respect,  earlier  stimulated 
by  the  frigate  actions,  and  awoke  in  Europe  a  general 
feeling  of  admiration. 

Of  no  trifling  importance,  further,  was  the  service  of 
our  sloops  in  their  attack  upon  England's  commerce.  In 
this,  none  of  the  frigates,  save  the  Essex,  are  to  be  classed 
with  them;  the  Argus,  Peacock  (2d),  and  Wasp  (2d) 
were  extremely  daring,  and  the  number  of  prizes  they 
took  can  be  compared  favorably  with  the  work  of  even 
the  most  celebrated  of  the  privateers.  Such  communica 
tions  as  the  following,  sent  to  the  British  Admiralty  by 
the  Royal  Exchange  and  London  Assurance  Corporations 
in  August,  1814,  were  weighty  arguments  for  concluding 
hostilities : 

"  Should  the  depredations  on  our  commerce  continue, 
the  merchants  and  traders  will  not  be  able  to  get  any 
insurance  effected,  except  at  enormous  premiums  on 
vessels  trading  between  Ireland  and  England,  either  by 
the  chartered  companies  or  individual  underwriters;  and 
as  a  proof  of  this  assertion,  for  the  risks  which  are  usually 
written  fifteen  shillings  nine  pence  per  cent  the  sum 
of  five  guineas  is  now  demanded. ' ' 4 

*Niles's  Register,  vii,  174. 


X 

THE  BATTLE  OF  LAKE  ERIE 

STRATEGIC  IMPORTANCE  OF  THE  GREAT  LAKES 

ALTHOUGH  the  United  States  did  not  rouse  itself  to 
maintain  a  navy  on  the  Great  Lakes  until  after  hostilities 
had  begun,  long  before  the  beginning  of  the  war  Great 
Britain  had  appreciated  their  strategic  importance. 
Indeed  the  British  had,  ever  since  the  days  of  the  French 
occupation  in  Canada,  realized  the  advantage  of  these 
inland  oceans  on  the  borderland  as  rapid  means  of  con 
veying  troops,  supplies,  and  communications.  The  nation 
in  power  on  these  waterways  had  also  the  lucrative  fur 
trade,  and  with  it  the  Indian  interests  in  that  section. 
The  woods  on  both  the  Canadian  and  American  sides 
were  all  but  impassable.  Since  Britain's  salt  water  navy 
could  reach  with  its  mighty  arm  as  far  as  Montreal, 
control  of  the  lakes  would  easily  give  her  the  upper  hand 
in  all  the  territory  bordering  on  these  waterways  as  far 
as  Mackinac.  Kingston,  Detroit,  and  Mackinac  were  the 
important  links  in  the  chain  of  communication  from  the 
Atlantic  to  the  Northwest.  Besides,  the  fact  that  two  of 
these  places,  Detroit  and  Mackinac,  were  on  narrow  bodies 
of  water,  furnished  an  additional  element  of  defense. 

It  should  have  been  the  policy  of  our  Government  to 
take  the  offensive  on  the  northern  border,  while  it  sought 
to  maintain  a  defensive  attitude  on  the  seaboard.  Prepa 
rations  for  a  control  of  the  lakes  should  have  been  made 
ten  years  previous  to  the  war,  but  a  parsimonious  govern 
ment,  naturally  opposed  to  navies,  did  not  foresee  the 
need  of  warships  at  sea,  much  less  on  the  lakes.  It  was 
a  similar  shortsighted  policy  that  prompted  Hull  and 
11  161 


162 


The  United  States  Navy 


\\ 


Chauncey  and  Elliott  163 

Dearborn  to  concentrate  their  efforts  in  the  Northwest, 
rather  than  at  Lake  Champlain  and  against  Montreal,  the 
true  objective  in  an  offensive  war  for  control  of  the 
Northwest.  Hull's  disastrous  campaign  in  Michigan,  and 
the  fall  of  Detroit  and  Mackinac  in  the  summer  of  1812, 
spurred  our  people  to  efforts  which  culminated  in  a  par 
tial  control  of  Lake  Ontario,  and  in  Perry's  victory  on 
Lake  Erie.  Detroit  and  Mackinac  would  never  have  fallen 
if  we  had  had  control  of  the  Great  Lakes.  Indeed,  shortly 
after  Perry's  capture  of  the  British  flotilla  on  Lake 
Erie,  Detroit  and  the  territory  of  Michigan  came  back 
into  our  possession. 

CHAUNCEY  AND  ELLIOTT  SENT  TO  THE  LAKES 

On  September  3,  1812,  Captain  Isaac  Chauncey  was 
ordered  by  the  Navy  Department  to  take  command  of 
Lakes  Erie  and  Ontario  with  the  purpose  of  building 
fleets  on  these  waters  and  wresting  the  naval  supremacy 
on  them  from  the  British.  Chauncey  took  charge  of  the 
work  on  Ontario  himself,  and  on  September  7  he  dis 
patched  Lieutenant  Jesse  D.  Elliott  to  Lake  Erie  to  estab 
lish  a  naval  base.  The  latter  arrived  at  Buffalo  on  Sep 
tember  14,  and  was  busily  engaged  in  equipping  at  Black 
Rock,  his  temporary  navy  yard,  some  schooners  which  he 
had  recently  bought,  when,  on  October  8,  he  was  informed 
that  two  British  armed  brigs  had  come  to  anchor  off  Fort 
Erie.  These  were  the  Detroit,  formerly  the  U.  S.  S. 
Adams,  and  the  Caledonia. 

With  the  aid  of  ninety  seamen,  who  had  arrived  that 
very  day  from  New  York,  and  with  about  fifty  soldiers, 
Elliott  determined  to  cut  out  these  brigs.  He  succeeded 
in  bringing  the  Caledonia  to  Black  Rock,  but  the  Detroit 
ran  aground  off  Squaw  Island,  and,  under  the  fire  of  both 
the  British  and  American  forts,  had  to  be  burned.  The 


164  The  United  States  Navy 

Caledonia  had  a  cargo  of  furs  valued  at  $200,000,  and  the 
Detroit  had  a  quantity  of  ordnance;  four  of  the  latter 's 
12-pounders  and  a  quantity  of  shot  were  later  recovered 
at  night  by  a  party  of  American  seamen. 

Lieutenant  Elliott  had  quickly  seen  his  opportunity 
and  grasped  it ;  he  had  realized  that  with  these  two  vessels 
added  to  his  squadron  he  might  wrest  the  control  of  the 
Upper  Lakes  (i.e.,  the  lakes  west  of  Lake  Erie)  from 
Great  Britain.  But  as  the  Detroit  had  to  be  destroyed, 
the  British  still  possessed  a  naval  force  too  great  for 
Elliott  to  encounter.  General  Brock,  commanding  the 
British  forces,  however,  felt  the  loss  of  these  brigs  very 
much.  In  a  letter  to  the  Governor-General  of  Canada,  he 
wrote :  ' '  This  event  is  particularly  unfortunate  and  may 
reduce  us  to  incalculable  distress.  The  enemy  is  making 
every  exertion  to  gain  a  naval  superiority  on  both  lakes; 
which  if  they  accomplish,  I  do  not  see  how  we  can  retain 
the  country.  More  vessels  are  fitting  for  war  on  the  other 
side  of  Squaw  Island,  which  I  should  have  attempted  to 
destroy  but  for  your  Excellency's  repeated  instructions 
to  forbear.  Now  such  a  force  is  collected  for  their  pro 
tection  as  will  render  every  operation  against  them  very 
hazardous."  1  Elliott  kept  hard  at  work  until  the  winter 
closed  the  lake  to  navigation,  and  his  labors  laid  the 
foundations  for  Perry's  success  the  following  year. 


PERRY  IN  COMMAND  ON  LAKE  ERIE 

On  March  27,  1813,  Master-Commandant  Oliver 
Hazard  Perry  took  charge  of  the  work  on  Lake  Erie, 
and  removed  the  flotilla  from  Black  Rock  to  Presqu'isle 
(Erie),  where  he  established  his  base.  A  race  in  ship 
building  now  took  place  between  Perry  on  the  American 


Quoted  in  Mahan's  War  of  1812,  i,  356. 


OLIVKR  H.  PERKY         '     ' 


Perry  and  Barclay  on  Lake  Erie          165 

side  and  the  British  naval  commander,  Barclay,  on  the 
Canadian  side.  Both  were  young  and  full  of  energy. 
Both  had  to  work  under  great  difficulties.  The  Canadians 
gave  Barclay  little  help;  the  severer  winter  and  less 
developed  country  on  the  north  shores  made  his  task 
harder.  Although  the  salt  water  navy  of  Great  Britain 
could  reach  as  far  as  Montreal  to  bring  men  and  arms, 
still  the  Government  was  in  great  straits  for  sailors  for 
the  European  war.  Captain  Sir  James  Lucas  Yeo,  the 
able  young  British  officer  on  Lake  Ontario,  could  spare  his 
subordinate  on  Erie  but  few  men,  as  he  needed  them  too 
much  himself  in  his  struggle  for  supremacy  against 
Chauncey.  On  the  other  hand,  Perry  had  in  New  York 
a  better  developed  country  to  operate  in.  But  he  likewise 
found  it  difficult  to  persuade  his  superior,  Chauncey,  to 
spare  him  men  and  supplies;  and  he  had  to  bring  his 
mechanics  and  seamen  for  the  most  part  from  New  York 
City,  a  distance  of  500  miles.  The  American  commander 
had  to  depend  largely  on  militia  and  negroes  to  defend 
his  shipbuilding  operations,  as  his  British  rival  depended 
on  Canadians  and  Indians.  As  many  of  the  Canadians 
had  originally  come  from  New  England  and  New  York, 
they  had  been  from  the  beginning  as  much  opposed  to 
'the  war  as  the  people  in  our  northern  States,  and  were 
not  to  be  relied  upon.  Roosevelt  is  of  the  opinion  that 
the  Canadians,  being  naturally  lake  sailors,  fought  better 
at  the  battle  of  Lake  Erie  than  British  tars  did  a  year 
later  at  the  battle  of  Lake  Champlain.  Barclay,  however, 
lamented  greatly  his  lack  of  British  officers  and  seamen. 

Taking  advantage  of  a  temporary  naval  control  on 
Lake  Ontario,  Chauncey,  in  conjunction  with  General 
Dearborn,  captured  York,  now  Toronto,  in  April,  1813. 
A  month  later  Chauncey  assisted  in  the  capture  of  Fort 
George,  on  the  Niagara  River,  an  event  which  compelled 
the  British  to  abandon  their  hold  on  this  river.  This 


166  The  United  States  Navy 

made  it  possible  for  Perry  to  tow  up  the  river  to  Presqu  '- 
isle  the  brig  Caledonia,  the  purchased  schooners  Somers, 
Tigress,  and  Ohio,  and  the  sloop  Trippe.  The  warping 
of  these  vessels  up  against  the  powerful  current  was  an 
arduous  task.  The  rest  of  Perry's  squadron,  the  two 
20-gun  brigs  Lawrence  and  Niagara,  and  three  more 
schooners,  the  Ariel,  Scorpion,  and  Porcupine,  were  being 
hastily  constructed  at  the  navy  yard  at  Presqu 'isle. 

Barclay,  too,  was  very  busy  in  building  and  equipping 
his  flotilla,  which  consisted  of  the  ships  Detroit  (a  new 
vessel  named  after  the  former  Detroit)  and  Queen  Char 
lotte,  the  brig  Hunter,  the  schooners  Lady  Prevost  and 
Chippewa,  and  the  sloop  Little  Belt.  As  soon  as  most  of 
his  vessels  were  ready,  Barclay'  put  to  sea  and  at  once 
blockaded  Perry  at  Presqu 'isle.  The  American  com 
mander  was  now  in  difficult  straits,  because  he  could  not 
get  his  brigs,  with  their  guns  mounted,  across  the  bar 
at  the  mouth  of  Erie  harbor ;  and  to  try  to  get  them  over 
with  guns  unmounted,  while  Barclay's  flotilla  was  hover 
ing  about,  would  be  foolhardy.  The  British  commander 
maintained  a  close  blockade  until  August  2,  when,  for  no 
apparent  reason,  he  disappeared  to  the  westward.  Perry 
now  hurried  matters,  and  on  the  4th  he  towed  the  Law 
rence  to  the  deepest  part  of  the  bar,  hastily  took  out  her 
guns,  and  that  night  got  the  brig  across  the  bar.  The 
method  used  by  Perry  in  getting  the  Lawrence  over  is 
thus  described  by  Cooper:  "Two  large  scows,  prepared 
for  the  purpose,  were  hauled  alongside,  and  the  work  of 
lifting  the  brig  proceeded  as  fast  as  possible.  Pieces  of 
massive  timber  had  been  run  through  the  forward  and 
after  ports,  and  when  the  scows  were  sunk  to  the  water's 
edge,  the  ends  of  the  timbers  were  blocked  up,  supported 
by  these  floating  foundations.  The  plugs  were  now  put  in 
the  scows,  and  the  water  was  pumped  out  of  them.  By 
this  process  the  brig  was  lifted  quite  two  feet,  though 


Perry  and  Barclay  on  Lake  Erie          167 

when  she  was  got  on  the  bar  it  was  found  that  she  still 
drew  too  much  water.  It  became  necessary,  in  conse 
quence,  to  cover  up  everything,  sink  the  scows  anew, 
and  block  up  the  timbers  afresh.  This  duty  occupied  the 
whole  night."2 

At  eight  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  5th,  just  as 
the  Lawrence  had  been  safely  got  across,  Barclay  reap 
peared.  But  he  was  too  late,  and  after  the  exchange  of  a 
few  shots  with  the  American  schooners,  Barclay  went  back 
to  his  base  at  Maiden  (Amherstburg)  to  await  the  com 
pletion  of  his  most  powerful  ship,  the  Detroit.  Shortly 
after,  Perry  brought  the  Niagara  across  the  bar  without 
trouble.  After  sailing  westward  towards  Maiden,  Perry 
returned  to  Erie  to  lay  in  provisions,  and  on  August  10 
took  on  102  seamen  whom  Lieutenant  Elliott  had  just 
brought  as  a  much-needed  reinforcement.  Elliott,  as 
second  in  command,  took  charge  of  the  Niagara.  Perry 
could  now  range  the  lake  at  will.  He  made  his  head 
quarters  at  Put-in-Bay,  a  good  harbor  thirty  miles  south 
west  of  Maiden,  where  he  could  watch  the  movements  of 
Barclay  and  prevent  him  from  getting  to  the  British 
source  of  supplies  at  Long  Point.  As  the  roads  were 
impassable,  and  as  blockade-running  was  impracticable, 
Captain  Barclay  was  soon  forced  to  come  out  for  supplies. 
In  his  report  to  Sir  James  Yeo  after  the  battle,  he  wrote : 
"So  perfectly  destitute  of  provisions  was  the  port 
[Maiden],  that  there  was  not  a  day's  flour  in  store,  and 
the  crews  of  the  squadron  under  my  command  were  on 
half  allowance  of  many  things,  and  when  that  was  done 
there  was  no  more."  The  Indians  had  been  wantonly 
killing  cattle  in  this  region,  and  these  warriors  and  their 
families,  in  all  14,000,  whom  the  British  had  to  provide 
for,  were  becoming  restive  because  of  the  lack  of  food. 

2J.  Fenimore  Cooper,  The  History  of  the  Navy  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  ii,  389. 


168  The  United  States  Navy 

THE  BATTLE  OF  LAKE  ERIE 

At  sunrise  on  September  10,  1813,  the  lookout  at  the 
masthead  of  the  Lawrence  saw  the  British  flotilla  coming 
out  from  Maiden.  The  wind  was  at  first  southwest,  which 
gave  Barclay  the  weather-gage.  But  after  Perry  had 
got  under  way,  the  wind  shifted  to  the  southeast  and  thus 
was  in  his  favor.  Barclay,  in  his  report  of  the  battle, 
says:  "The  weather-gage  gave  the  enemy  a  prodigious 
advantage,  as  it  enabled  them  not  only  to  choose  their 
position,  but  their  distance  also,  which  they  did  in  such  a 
manner,  as  to  prevent  the  carronades  of  the  Queen  Char 
lotte  and  Lady  Prevost  from  having  much  effect;  while 
their  long  guns  did  great  execution,  particularly  against 
the  Queen  Charlotte." 

Both  commanders  formed  their  vessels  in  columns, 
with  the  most  powerful  ships  in  the  centre — a  formation 
which  gave  the  whole  line  a  strong  cohesive  force.  Perry 
had  intended  to  have  each  of  his  stronger  vessels  keep  its 
position  parallel  to  a  correspondingly  powerful  opponent. 
This  is  proved  by  the  fact  that  after  he  noticed  the  forma 
tion  of  Barclay's  centre  to  be  constituted  in  the  following 
order:  Detroit,  Hunter,  and  Queen  Charlotte,  he  rear 
ranged  his  own  centre  thus:  Lawrence,  Caledonia,  and 
Niagara.  His  first  plan  had  been  to  have  the  Niagara 
ahead  of  the  Lawrence,  thinking  that  the  British  centre 
would  be  led  by  the  Queen  Charlotte.  This  change  in 
formation  should  be  noted  carefully,  as  it  has  an  impor 
tant  bearing  on  the  Perry-Elliott  controversy  which  arose 
after  the  battle,  and  which  caused  our  people  to  take  sides 
with  the  two  American  commanders. 

The  battle  began  at  11.45  and  continued  until  three 
o'clock.  Shortly  after  the  British  opened  fire,  Perry 
determined  to  abandon  his  first  formation  parallel  to  the 
enemy's  column.  lie  found  that  the  Lawrence  with  her 


The  Battle  of  Lake  Erie 


169 


carronades  was  not  within  effective  range.  Accordingly, 
with  the  schooners  Ariel  and  Scorpion,  and  the  flagship 
Lawrence  in  the  van,  he  tried  to  reform  his  flotilla  in 
column  ahead  obliquely,  that  is,  in  echelon,  or  bow  and 
quarter  line.  At  the  same  time  he  sent  word  to  the  rear 
ships,  which  by  reason  of  the  lightness  of  the  wind  were 
straggling  behind,  to  close  up.  For  some  reason  Elliott 
did  not  follow  his  commander's  lead;  instead,  he  kept  his 
position  behind  the  slow-sailing  Caledonia,  and  as  four- 


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THE  BATTLE  OP  LAKE  ERIE 

fifths  of  the  Niagara's  guns  were  carronades,  Elliott's 
vessel  fell  behind,  -out  of  range.  Meanwhile,  her  intended 
antagonist,  the  Queen  Charlotte,  finding  that  the  long 
guns  of  the  Caledonia  were  doing  great  damage,  sailed 
ahead  to  take  part  in  the  terrific  fire  that  was  already 
being  concentrated  on  the  Lawrence.  By  reason  of 
Elliott's  misunderstanding  of  orders,  or  his  poor  judg 
ment,  there  was  now  a  considerable  gap  between  the 
Caledonia  and  the  vessels  in  the  van. 

The  Lawrence  was  thus  compelled  to  bear  the  brunt 
of  the  battle  from  twelve  o'clock  until  half-past  two.    Both 


170  The  United  States  Navy 

the  British  and  the  American  larger  ships  in  the  van 
were  suffering  terribly.  At  the  end  of  the  first  stage  of 
the  battle,  at  two-thirty,  the  Lawrence  was  a  wreck.  Four- 
fifths  of  her  crew  were  either  dead  or  wounded.  Finally, 
Perry  had  to  call  on  the  surgeons  and  even  on  the  wounded 
to  lend  a  hand,  and  he  himself,  assisted  by  the  purser 
and  chaplain,  fired  the  last  effective  gun.  But  the  Detroit 
was  also  '  *  a  perfect  wreck, ' '  according  to  Barclay 's  report. 
The  Queen  Charlotte  had  lost  her  able  captain,  Finnis, 
early  in  the  action,  and  was  now  being  badly  handled  by 
an  inexperienced  Canadian  officer. 

It  was  at  this  crucial  moment,  that  Perry,  while  his 
ship  was  drifting  helplessly  astern  out  of  action,  made  his 
famous  passage  in  a  boat  from  the  flagship  to  the  Niagara, 
which  was  still  perfectly  fresh.  He  at  once  sent  Elliott 
to  hurry  up  the  American  vessels  astern,  and  he  himself 
in  the  Niagara  stood  down  for  the  badly  shattered  British 
flagship.  On  passing,  Perry  fired  his  port  guns  into  the 
smaller  vessels  of  the  enemy,  and  his  starboard  into  the 
Detroit,  the  Queen  Charlotte,  and  the  Hunter.  The 
Detroit  and  the  Queen  Charlotte  were  at  this  moment 
trying  to  wear,  to  bring  fresh  broadsides  into  action ;  but 
as  every  brace  and  almost  every  bowline  on  both  had  been 
shot  away,  the  two  vessels  fouled  each  other,  and  thus 
gave  the  Niagara  an  excellent  opportunity  to  rake  within 
half  pistol-shot,  The  terrific  fire  of  the  Niagara,  sup 
ported  by  the  Caledonia  and  the  schooners  now  coming 
up,  quickly  brought  the  battle  to  a  close. 

Perry  then  transferred  his  broad  pennant  back  to  the 
Lawrence,  so  that  he  might  receive  the  surrender  of  the 
British  commanders  on  the  deck  of  his  old  flagship.  In 
the  smoke  and  confusion,  the  Chippeiva  and  the  Little 
Belt  had  crowded  on  all  sail  to  escape,  but  they  were  soon 
overhauled  by  the  Trippe  and  the  Scorpion,  and  were 
forced  to  send  their  officers  to  the  Lawrence  to  give  up 


The  Battle  of  Lake  Erie  171 

their  swords.  Immediately  after  the  formalities  of  sur 
render,  Perry  sent  to  General  William  Henry  Harrison, 
who  had  succeeded  Hull  in  the  command  of  the  American 
Army  in  the  Northwest,  his  famous  message,  "We  have 
met  the  enemy  and  they  are  ours — two  ships,  two  brigs, 
one  schooner,  and  one  sloop." 

The  forces  opposed  in  the  battle  were  very  unequal. 
The  Americans  had  nine  vessels3  with  a  total  broadside 
of  896  pounds  against  Barclay's  six  vessels  and  total 
broadside  of  459  pounds.  Perry 's  superiority  in  long  gun 
metal  was  as  three  is  to  two,  and  in  carronade  metal  as 
two  is  to  one.  Barclay's  gunnery  was  excellent  in  spite 
of  the  fact  that,  having  no  locks,  he  had  to  fire  his  guns 
by  flashing  pistols  at  the  touch-holes.  The  total  American 
crew  numbered  532,  of  whom  only  416  were  fit  for  duty; 
the  British  crew  amounted  to  440.  In  all  this  comparison, 
however,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  Americans 
were  not  able  to  take  advantage  of  their  superiority  in 
ships  and  equipment  until  nearly  the  end  of  the  action, 
when  Elliott  finally  brought  up  the  Niagara. 

Elliott's  conduct  in  the  battle  is  difficult  to  explain. 
He  seems  to  have  misunderstood  his  commanding  officer's 
orders.  Perry  had  sent  back  word  by  trumpet  early  in 
the  engagement  to  close  up  the  line.  Whether  Elliott  ever 
received  this  order  we  cannot  now  determine,  as  the 
charges  and  counter-charges  were  never  carefully  sifted. 
Lieutenant  Elliott  had  rendered  excellent  service  in  his 
earlier  work  on  Lake  Erie,  but  in  this  battle  he  seems  to 
have  displayed  bad  judgment  and  lack  of  initiative  in  not 
following  Perry's  lead  in  getting  into  close  action,  and 
in  not  engaging  the  Quean  Charlotte  according  to  the 
original  plan.  Elliott's  pleas  were  that  he  understood  he 

3 The  Ohio  was  not  present  at  the  battle;  she  had  some  time 
previously  been  sent  down  the  lake. 


172  The  United  States  Navy 

was  to  maintain  his  position  in  the  line  behind  the  Cale 
donia,  and  that  the  wind  was  too  light  to  keep  up  with 
the  faster  sailing  Queen  Charlotte. 

Hitherto  American  naval  officers  had  had  little  or  no 
practice  in  fleet  operations,  for  the  sea  fights  of  the  early 
days  had  been  all  single-ship  actions.  The  traditions  of 
the  middle  of  the  18th  century  required  that  the  line 
must  be  maintained  at  all  hazards,  with  the  opposing  fleets 
sailing  in  parallel  courses.  In  the  famous  Battle  of  the 
Saints,  fought  with  De  Grasse  in  the  West  Indies,  April 
12,  1782,  Rodney,  at  the  suggestion  of  his  fleet  captain 
Hood,  introduced  a  new  maneuver,  that  of  breaking 
through  the  enemy's  line.  By  this  means  he  concentrated 
the  flre  of  many  of  his  ships  upon  an  inferior  number  of 
the  enemy's,  quickly  put  them  out  of  the  fight,  and  over 
whelmed  the  rest  of  the  French  ships  as  they  came  to  the 
rescue.  These  also  were  Nelson's  tactics  at  Trafalgar. 
In  other  words,  it  was  the  policy  of  annihilating  the 
enemy  in  detail.  That  principle,  although  carried  out  in 
a  different  way,  holds  as  good  now  as  in  the  time  of 
Rodney  and  Nelson. 

Perry's  method  of  attack  seems  at  first  to  have  fol 
lowed  the  older  tradition  of  ships  sailing  in  column 
abreast  the  enemy,  and  Elliott's  reluctance  to  leave  his 
station  astern  of  the  Caledonia  indicates  that  this  was 
the  style  of  battle  which  he,  at  least,  expected.  This 
unwillingness  of  his  to  leave  his  position  in  column,  and 
the  maneuver  of  the  Queen  Charlotte  in  sailing  ahead  to 
join  in  the  attack  on  the  Lawrence,  the  Ariel,  and  the 
Scorpion,  very  nearly  enabled  Barclay  to  accomplish  the 
feat  of  destroying  in  detail  a  superior  enemy.  From  the 
moment  Perry  boarded  the  Niagara,  however,  he  aban 
doned  all  line  formation,  and,  by  breaking  through  his 
enemy's  flotilla,  turned  defeat  into  victory. 

Captain  Barclay,  who  was  thirty-two  years  of  age,  had 


The  Battle  of  Lake  Erie  173 

an  excellent  record,  and  had  been  in  the  battle  of  Trafal 
gar  under  Nelson.  In  the  action  on  Lake  Erie  he  was 
twice  wounded.  lie  refused  to  leave  the  deck  the 
iirst  time  he  was  hurt,  but  the  second  time  he  was  wounded 
so  terribly  that  his  condition  later  brought  tears  to  the 
eyes  of  the  officers  who  sat  on  his  court-martial.  Barclay 
behaved  with  splendid  courage  during  the  battle ;  his 
great  mistake  was  in  giving  up  the  blockade  of  Presqu'- 
isle  and  thus  letting  Perry  get  to  sea.  In  his  report, 
the  British  commander  states  the  number  of  killed  as 
forty-one,  and  wounded  ninety-four;  Perry  gives  his 
losses  as  twenty-seven  killed  and  ninety-six  wounded. 

Although  the  forces  were  unequal,  this  very  inequality 
redounds  to  the  glory  of  Perry,  whose  energy  created  so 
quickly  a  superior  flotilla.  Koosevelt  remarks  that  Perry's 
victory  over  an  inferior  force  does  not  deserve  the  high 
place  above  such  men  as  Hull  and  Macdonough  generally 
accorded  him  in  American  histories.  But  he  goes  on  to 
say:  "It  was  greatly  to  our  credit  that  we  had  been 
enterprising  enough  to  fit  out  such  an  effective  little  flotilla 
on  Lake  Erie,  and  for  this  Perry  deserves  the  highest 
praise."4  Then,  too,  if  we  contrast  the  short  and  quick 
work  on  Lake  Erie  with  the  lack  of  results  on  Lake 
Ontario,  we  must  admit  that  Perry  accomplished  wonders. 
His  intense  energy  got  together  a  fleet  which  within  a  few 
months  gave  the  United  States  control  of  Lake  Erie,  the 
Upper  Lakes,  and  the  adjacent  territory.  On  the  other 
hand,  on  Lake  Ontario,  the  shipbuilding  race  between 
Yeo  and  Chauncey  kept  on  without  result,  and  ended  only 
with  the  war.  The  extravagant  praise  of  Perry  in  Amer 
ican  histories,  criticised  by  Roosevelt,  is  due  to  the  melo 
dramatic  features  of  the  battle,  which  appealed  to  the 
popular  imagination:  the  heroic  resistance  of  the  Law- 

4  Roosevelt,  Naval  War  of  1812,  p.  278. 


174  The  United  States  Navy 

rence,  the  passage  of  Perry  in  an  open  boat  to  the 
Niagara,  and  the  sudden  turning  of  the  tide  of  victory. 
His  fame  should  rest,  rather,  upon  the  hopeless  days  when 
the  timbers  of  his  future  ships  were  still  growing  in  the 
forest.  In  a  word,  Perry's  work  on  Lake  Erie  attests 
the  fact  that  what  counts  in  an  officer's  career  is  not  the 
spectacular  event  which  appeals  to  the  public,  but  the 
quiet,  yet  tireless  energy,  the  sound  judgment,  and  the 
farsightedness  that  always  precede,  and  sometimes  follow, 
a  successful  battle. 

RESULTS 

The  results  of  the  battle  of  Lake  Erie  were  important 
and  far-reaching.  Detroit  and  Michigan  fell  back  into 
our  possession;  Tecumseh,  the  great  Indian  leader,  was 
slain  in  the  disastrous  battle  of  the  Thames,  a  direct  result 
of  Perry's  victory,  and  thus  the  Indians  left  the  British 
and  ceased  to  be  a  terror  to  the  American  towns  in  the 
Northwest.  Moreover,  the  British  had  had  a  design  of 
creating  an  independent  Indian  state  on  United  States 
territory  in  this  section — a  state  under  the  protection  of 
Great  Britain  and  thus  a  buffer  against  the  United  States. 
This  scheme  was  nipped  in  the  bud  by  the  victory  of 
Lake  Erie. 


XI 

THE  CRUISE  OF  THE  ESSEX 

IN  Chapter  VIII  it  was  said  that  the  32-gun  frigate 
Essex,  after  missing  the  Constitution  and  the  Hornet,  set 
sail  on  a  roving  cruise  in  southern  waters.  There  were 
several  reasons  for  this  independent  action  on  the  part 
of  Captain  Porter.  In  the  first  place,  after  waiting  in 
vain  two  weeks  off  Cape  Frio  (near  Rio  de  Janeiro)  to 
meet  Bainbridge,  Porter  found  his  ship  running  short  of 
supplies.  He,  therefore,  hurried  on  to  the  next  rendezvous 
agreed  upon,  the  Island  of  St.  Catharine's,  which  was 
also  on  the  Brazilian  coast.  There  he  failed  to  find  either 
the  Constitution  or  the  Hornet,  but  heard  of  the  capture 
of  the  Java,  with  rumors  to  the  effect  that  the  Hornet  had 
been  taken  by  the  ship-of-the-line  Montague,  and  learned 
that  several  heavy  British  ships  were  soon  expected  in 
those  waters.  Fearing  that  he  should  be  blockaded,  or 
attacked  in  port  by  an  overwhelming  force,  Captain  Porter 
immediately  put  to  sea. 

"It  was  then  necessary,"1  he  wrote  in  his  journal, 
"to  decide  promptly  on  my  proceedings,  as  our  pro 
visions  were  getting  short.  I  called  on  the  purser  for  a 
report  and  found  that  we  had  about  three  months'  bread 
at  half  allowance.  There  was  no  port  on  this  coast  where 
we  could  procure  a  supply,  without  a  certainty  of  capture, 
or  blockade  (which  I  considered  as  bad)  ;  to  attempt  to 
return  to  the  United  States  at  a  season  of  the  year  when 
our  coast  would  be  swarming  with  the  enemy's  cruisers, 
would  be  running  too  much  risk,  and  would  be  going 

1  Porter's  Journal,  i,  56,  ff. 

175 


176  The  United  States  Navy 

diametrically  opposite  to  my  instructions.  I  was  per 
fectly  at  loss  now  where  to  find  the  commodore,  as,  in 
remaining1  before  Bahia,  he  had  departed  from  his  original 
intentions,  and  had  already  disappointed  me  at  three 
rendezvous.  The  state  of  my  provisions  would  not  admit 
of  going  off  St.  Helena's  to  intercept  the  returning  India- 
men,  nor  would  my  force  justify  the  proceeding.  .  .  . 
I,  therefore,  determined  to  pursue  that  course  which 
seemed  to  be  best  calculated  to  injure  the  enemy  and 
would  enable  me  to  prolong  my  cruise.  This  could  only 
be  done  by  going  into  a  friendly  port,  where  I  could 
increase  my  supplies  without  the  danger  of  blockade,  and 
the  first  place  that  presented  itself  to  my  mind  was  the 
port  of  Concepcion  on  the  coast  of  Chile.  The  season  was, 
to  be  sure,  far  advanced  for  doubling  Cape  Horn;  our 
stock  of  provisions  was  short,  and  the  ship  in  other 
respects  not  well  supplied  with  stores  for  so  long  a  cruise ; 
but  there  appeared  no  other  choice  left  to  me  except 
capture,  starvation  or  blockade.'' 

Accordingly  he  put  all  hands  on  half  rations  and 
steered  for  the  Cape.  After  a  rough  three  weeks  spent 
in  beating  against  the  storms  for  which  Cape  Horn  is 
famous,  the  Essex  turned  northward  again,  the  first 
American  man-of-war  to  weather  the  Horn  or  to  enter  the 
Pacific.  It  happened  by  an  odd  coincidence  that  this 
little  vessel  had  been  also  the  first  American  man-of-war 
to  round  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope. 2 

On  March  13,  1813,  Captain  Porter  dropped  his  anchor 
in  the  harbor  of  Valparaiso,3  and  proceeded  at  once  to 
replenish  his  exhausted  stores.  The  Chilean  Government 
treated  him  with  courtesy,  for,  being  at  that  time  already 


2  In  1800,  under  Captain  Edward  Preble. 

3  Porter  was  prevented  from  carrying  out  his  original  intention 
of  entering  Concepcion  by  a  gale  that  drove  him  so  far  north  of 
that  port  that  he  made  for  Valparaiso  instead. 


DAVID  PORTER 


The  Cruise  of  the  Essex  111 

in  revolt  against  Spain,  it  did  not  profess  an  alliance 
with  England,  as  did  the  still  loyal  colonies  of  Spain  and 
Portugal.  Peru,  for  example,  was  so  zealous  in  England 's 
cause  that  she  had  already  commissioned  several  privateers 
to  prey  on  the  returning  American  whalers. 

While  lying  at  Valparaiso,  Captain  Porter  learned 
from  an  American  whaler  that  there  were  likely  to  be  many 
English  whalers  in  the  vicinity  of  Galapagos  Islands,  a 
noted  whaling  rendezvous  about  five  hundred  miles  west 
of  Ecuador,  and  that  the  presence  of  the  Essex  in  that 
neighborhood  would  serve  also  to  give  warning  and  pro 
tection  to  home-bound  American  vessels,  whose  masters 
were  still  ignorant  of  the  fact  that  war  had  broken  out. 
Acting  on  this  information,  as  soon  as  he  had  finished 
storing  ship  (March  20),  Captain  Porter  left  Valparaiso 
for  the  Galapagos,  skirting,  en  route,  the  coast  line  of 
Chile  and  Peru,  looking  for  a  Peruvian  privateer  which 
he  heard  had  captured  two  American  whalers.  In  a  few 
days  he  succeeded  in  finding  and  capturing  the  privateer, 
whose  captain,  on  demand,  furnished  a  list  and  descrip 
tion  of  all  the  British  whalers  he  knew  in  those  waters. 
Two  days  later,  he  recaptured  the  Barclay,  one  of  the 
two  American  ships  taken  by  the  privateer.  After  this, 
he  sailed  direct  for  the  Galapagos  Islands,  arriving  there 
on  the  17th  of  April. 

While  cruising  in  this  neighborhood,  the  Essex  capt 
ured  six  ships,  carrying  in  all  eighty  guns  and  340  men. 
Finding  himself  burdened  with  prisoners  and  prizes,  which 
were  too  far  from  any  American  port  to  send  home,  Porter 
took  his  squadron  to  the  coast  to  land  his  prisoners  and 
dispose  of  some  of  his  prizes.  He  touched  first  at  Tumbez, 
a  town  at  the  mouth  of  the  Tumbez  River,  in  the  Gulf  of 
Guayaquil,  Ecuador.  There  he  put  the  largest  of  the 
prizes,  the  Atlantic,  mounting  twenty  light  guns,  under  the 
command  of  the  first  lieutenant,  Master-Commandant 

12 


178  The  United  States  Navy 

Dowries,  and  renamed  her  the  .Essex  Junior.  To  another 
prize,  the  Greenwich,  he  transferred  all  the  supplies  he 
had  taken  from  his  captures  and  made  her  thereafter  the 
store  ship  of  his  squadron. 

Having  completed  these  arrangements,  Porter  returned 
to  the  Galapagos  in  the  Essex,  accompanied  by  the  Green 
wich,  and  a  prize  ship  of  16  guns,  the  Georgiana.  The 
remaining  prizes  he  sent  to  Valparaiso  under  the  escort 
of  the  Essex  Junior.  By  this  time  he  had  captured  so 
many  vessels  that  he  was  compelled  to  draw  on  the  mid 
shipmen  for  prize  masters,  and  in  the  trip  from  Tumbez 
to  Valparaiso,  he  put  the  ship  Barclay,  with  her  ex-captain 
retained  on  board  to  help  navigate  her,  under  the  com 
mand  of  Midshipman  Farragut,  then  not  quite  twelve 
years  old.  At  the  very  outset,  the  lad  was  compelled  to 
settle  the  question  of  command  with  the  big  whaler,  who 
swore  that  he  would  take  the  Barclay  to  New  Zealand 
instead  of  Valparaiso,  and  went  below  to  get  his  pistols. 
The  other  vessels  of  the  squadron  wTere  by  this  time  too 
far  away  to  communicate  with,  but  Farragut,  after  telling 
his  right-hand  man  of  the  prize  crew  what  the  situation 
was,  shouted  down  the  cabin  ladder  that  if  the  whaler 
came  up  writh  his  pistols  he  did  so  at  the  risk  of  going 
overboard.  Finding  that  the  crew  were  ready  to  stand 
by  their  young  commander,  the  ex-captain  had  to  give  in. 
From  that  moment  Farragut  was  master  of  the  situa 
tion,  and  navigated  the  Barclay  without  mishap  to 
Valparaiso. 

Captain  Porter  continued  to  make  valuable  captures  in 
the  neighborhood  of  the  Galapagos,  and  by  the  end  of 
September,  when  he  was  rejoined  by  the  Essex  Junior, 
he  had  captured  nearly  every  English  ship  on  the  southern 
coast.  Master- Commandant  Downes,  on  his  arrival, 
brought  the  news  from  Valparaiso  that  the  36-gun  frigate 
Phoebe  and  the  sloops  Cherub  and  Raccoon  were  on  their 


The  Cruise  of  the  Essex  179 

way  round  the  Horn.  Porter  looked  forward  to  an  oppor 
tunity  of  trying  the  Essex  against  the  Phcebe,  but  his  ship 
was  in  great  need  of  overhauling.  Accordingly,  he  set 
sail  with  his  squadron  for  the  Marquesas  Islands,  where 
he  could  dismantle  his  ship  without  fear  of  being  dis 
turbed  by  a  British  man-of-war. 

While  the  squadron  lay  at  Nukahiva,  one  of  the 
Marquesas  Islands,  the  work  of  refitting  was  interrupted 
by  a  lively  campaign  on  shore  in  defense  of  the  coast 
tribe,  which  had  received  them  with  hospitality,  against 
hostile  tribes  of  the  interior.  On  the  12th  of  December, 
1813,  the  overhauling  of  the  Essex  was  completed.  Cap 
tain  Porter  left  Lieutenant  Gamble  4  of  the  marines  with 
three  midshipmen  and  twenty-six  men  in  charge  of  a 
small  battery,  under  which  the  four  prizes  were  moored; 
and  made  sail  for  Valparaiso,  accompanied  by  the  Essex 
Junior.  He  hoped  now  to  meet  an  English  man-of-war 
of  equal  force,  and  conclude  his  commerce-destroying 
cruise  with  the  capture  of  a  frigate. 

The  results  of  this  famous  cruise,  Captain  Porter 
summarized  in  his  report  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy, 
as  follows : 5 

"  I  had  completely  broken  up  the  British  navigation 
in  the  Pacific;  the  vessels  which  had  not  been  captured 
by  me  were  laid  up  and  dared  not  venture  out.  I  had 
afforded  the  most  ample  protection  to  our  own  vessels, 
which  were,  on  my  arrival,  very  numerous  and  unpro 
tected.  The  valuable  whale  fishery  there  [of  the  British] 
is  entirely  destroyed,  and  the  actual  injury  we  have  done 

4  A  mutiny  broke  out  shortly  afterwards.  Lieutenant  Gamble 
escaped  with  his  life  and  eventually  made  his  way  to  one  of  the 
Sandwich  Islands,  and  was  captured  afterwards  by  the  Cherub. 
The  mutineers  were  British  deserters  in  the  crew  of  the  Essex 
aided  by  six  prisoners. 

8  Porter's  Journal,  ii,  161. 


180  The  United  States  Navy 

them  may  be  estimated  at  two  and  a  half  million  dollars, 
independent  of  the  expenses  of  vessels  sent  in  search  of 
me.  They  have  supplied  me  amply  with  sails,  cordage, 
cables,  anchors,  provisions,  medicines,  and  stores  of  every 
description— and  the  slops  on  board  them  have  furnished 
clothing  for  the  seamen.  We  have,  in  fact,  lived  on  the 
enemy  since  I  have  been  in  that  sea;  every  prize  having 
proved  a  well-found  store  ship  for  me.  I  have  not  yet 
been  under  the  necessity  of  drawing  bills  on  the  Depart 
ment  for  any  object,  and  have  been  enabled  to  make  con 
siderable  advances  to  my  officers  and  crew  on  account  of 
pay.  For  the  unexampled  time  we  have  kept  at  sea,  my 
crew  have  continued  remarkably  healthy." 

On  the  way  to  the  mainland,  Captain  Porter  kept  his 
men  exercised  daily  at  gun  and  sword  drills  in  anticipa 
tion  of  meeting  the  Phoebe.  On  February  3,  1814,  the 
Essex  and  the  Essex  Junior  reached  Valparaiso.  Five 
days  later,  the  Phoebe  and  the  Cherub  came  in  together. 
The  Raccoon  had  previously  parted  company  from  her 
consorts  and  headed  north.  What  happened  between  the 
two  forces  is  graphically  told  by  Farragut  in  his  journal.6 

"In  January,  1814,  we  arrived  off  the  coast  of  Chile. 
After  looking  into  Concepcion,  we  ran  down  to  Valparaiso, 
where  we  lay  until  the  arrival  of  the  British  frigate 
Phcvbe  and  sloop  of  war  Cherub.  This  occurred  early  in 
February.  The  frigate  mounted  thirty  long  18-pounders, 
sixteen  32-pounder  carronades,  one  howitzer,  and  six 
3-pounders  in  the  tops,  with  a  crew  of  320  men.  The 
Cherub  had  eighteen  32-pounder  carronades,  eight  24- 
pounders,  two  long  nines,  and  a  crew  of  180  men. 

"  When  they  made  their  appearance  off  the  port,  our 
wrhole  watch,  being  a  third  of  our  crew,  wrere  on  shore  on 
liberty.  The  mate  of  an  English  merchantman,  which 

6  Loyal  1  Farragut,  Life  of  David  Glasgow  Farragut,  p.  32,  fT. 


The  Arrival  of  the  British  Ships          181 


was  lying  in  port  at  the  time,  went  immediately  on  board 
the  Phoebe,  and  stated  to  Captain  Hilly ar  that  one-half  of 
our  men  were  on  shore  and  that  the  Essex  would  fall  an 
easy  prey.  The  two  ships  then  hauled  into  the  harbor 
on  a  wind.  The  Phoebe  made  our  larboard  quarter,  but 
the  Cherub  fell  to  leeward  about  half  a  mile.  On  gaining 


The  CRUISE  of  the  ESSEX 

••C.HOK*  OCT.  28.  J812-MAR.Z8. 1814 


THE  CRUISE  OF  THE  ESSEX,  OCT.  28,  1812— MAR.  28,  1814 

our  quarter,  the  Phoebe  put  her  helm  down,  and  luffed  up 
on  our  starboard  bow,  coming  within  ten  or  fifteen  feet  of 
the  Essex. 

' '  I  should  say  here,  that  as  soon  as  the  enemy  hove  in 
sight,  we  fired  a  gun  and  hoisted  a  cornet  for  all  boats  and 
men  to  return,  and  in  fifteen  minutes  every  man  was  at 
his  quarters,  and  but  one  was  under  the  influence  of  liquor, 
he  a  mere  boy.  When  the  Phoebe,  as  before  mentioned, 
was  close  alongside,  and  all  hands  were  at  quarters,  the 


182  The  United  States  Navy 

powder-boys  stationed  with  slow  matches  ready  to  dis 
charge  the  guns,  the  boarders,  cutlass  in  hand,  standing 
by  to  board  in  the  smoke,  as  was  our  custom  at  close 
quarters,  the  intoxicated  youth  saw,  or  imagined  that  he 
saw,  through  the  port,  some  one  on  the  Phoebe  grinning  at 
him.  'My  fine  fellow,  I'll  stop  your  making  faces/  he 
exclaimed,  and  was  just  about  to  fire  his  gun,  when  Lieu 
tenant  McKnight  saw  the  movement  and  with  a  blow 
sprawled  him  on  the  deck.  Had  that  gun  been  fired,  I 
am  convinced  that  the  Phoebe  would  have  been  ours.  But 
it  was  destined  to  be  otherwise.  We  were  all  at  quarters 
and  cleared  for  action,  waiting  with  breathless  anxiety  for 
the  command  from  Captain  Porter  to  board,  when  the 
English  captain  (Hillyar)  appeared,  standing  on  the  after 
gun  in  a  pea-jacket,  and  in  plain  hearing  said : 

"  'Captain  Hillyar 's  compliments  to  Captain  Porter, 
and  hopes  he  is  well.' 

"Porter  replied,  'Very  well,  I  thank  you;  but  I  hope 
you  will  not  come  too  near,  for  fear  some  accident  might 
take  place  which  would  be  disagreeable  to  you, '  and  with 
a  wave  of  his  trumpet  the  kedge  anchors  went  up  to  our 
yard-arms,  ready  to  grapple  the  enemy. 

1 '  Captain  Hillyar  braced  back  his  yards  and  remarked 
to  Porter  that  if  he  did  fall  aboard  him,  he  begged  to 
assure  the  captain  that  it  would  be  entirely  accidental. 

"  'Well,'  said  Porter,  'you  have  no  business  where 
you  are.  //  you  touch  a  rope-yarn  of  this  ship,  I  shall 
board  instantly.'  He  then  hailed  the  Essex  Junior,  and 
told  Captain  Dowries  to  be  prepared  to  repel  the  enemy. 

' '  But  our  desire  for  a  fight  was  not  yet  to  be  gratified. 
The  Phoebe  backed  down,  her  yards  passed  over  ours,  not 
touching  a  rope,  and  she  anchored  about  half  a  mile  astern. 
We  thus  lost  an  opportunity  of  taking  her,  though  we  had 
observed  the  strict  neutrality  of  the  port  under  very 
aggravating  circumstances. 


The  Arrival  of  the  British  Ships          183 

"We  remained  together  in  the  harbor  for  some  days, 
when  the  British  vessels,  having  completed  their  pro 
visioning  and  watering,  went  to  sea  and  commenced  a 
regular  blockade  of  our  ships.  One  night  we  manned  all 
our  boats  for  the  purpose  of  boarding  the  enemy  outside. 
The  captain  in  his  boat,  with  muffled  oars,  pulled  so  close 
up  to  the  Phoebe  that  he  could  hear  the  conversation  of 
the  men  on  her  forecastle,  and  thereby  learned  that  they 
were  lying  at  their  quarters  prepared  for  us;  so  the 
attempt  was  given  up,  and  we  returned  on  board. 

' '  It  was  understood  in  our  ship,  one  day,  that  Captain 
Porter  had  sent  word  to  Captain  Hillyar  that,  if  he  would 
send  the  Cherub  to  the  leeward  point  of  the  harbor,  he 
would  go  out  and  fight  him.  We  all  believed  the  terms 
would  be  accepted,  and  everything  was  kept  in  readiness 
to  get  under  way.  Soon  after,  the  Phoebe  was  seen  stand 
ing  in  with  her  motto  flag  flying,  on  which  was  God  and 
our  Country!  British  Sailors'  Best  Rights!  This  was  in 
answer  to  Porter's  flag,  Free  Trade  and  Sailors'  Eights! 
She  fired  a  gun  to  windward,  and  the  Cherub  was  seen 
running  to  leeward.  In  five  minutes  our  anchor  was  up, 
and  under  topsails  and  jib  we  cleared  for  action — in  fact, 
we  were  always  ready  for  that.  When  within  two  miles 
of  our  position,  the  Phoebe  bore  up  and  set  her  studding- 
sails.  This  I  considered  a  second  breach  of  faith  on  the 
part  of  Hillyar;  for,  by  his  maneuvers  in  both  instances, 
it  was  evident  that  he  was  either  wanting  in  courage  or 
lacked  the  good  faith  of  a  high-toned  chivalrous  spirit  to 
carry  out  his  original  intention.  However,  as  Captain 
Hillyar  subsequently  proved  himself  a  brave  man,  in 
more  than  one  instance,  I  shall  not  deny  him  that  common 
characteristic  of  a  naval  officer,  and  have  attributed  his 
action  on  these  two  occasions  to  a  want  of  good  faith.  He 
was  dealing  with  a  far  inferior  force  and  it  was  ignoble 


184  The  United  States  Navy 

in  the  extreme,  on  his  part,  not  to  meet  his  foe,  when  he 
had  the  ghost  of  an  excuse  for  doing  so,  ship  to  ship. 

* '  On  the  28th  of  March,  1814,  it  came  on  to  blow  from 
the  south,  and  we  parted  our  larboard  cable,  dragging  the 
starboard  anchor  leeward ;  we  immediately  got  under  way 
and  made  sail  on  the  ship.  The  enemy's  vessels  were  close 
in  with  the  weathermost  point  of  the  bay;  but  Captain 
Porter  thought  we  could  weather  them,  so  we  hauled  up 
for  that  purpose,  and  took  in  our  topgallant  sails,  which 
had  been  set  over  close  reefed  topsails.  But  scarcely  had 
the  topgallant  sails  been  clewed  down,  when  a  squall  struck 
the  ship  and,  though  the  topsail  halyards  were  let  go,  the 
yards  jammed,  and  would  not  come  down.  When  the  ship 
was  nearly  gunwale  under,  the  maintopmast  went  by  the 
board,  carrying  the  men  who  were  on  the  maintopgallant 
yard  into  the  sea,  and  they  were  drowned.  We  imme 
diately  wore  ship  and  attempted  to  regain  the  harbor; 
but,  owing  to  the  disaster,  were  unable  to  do  so ;  therefore 
we  anchored  in  a  small  bay,  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile 
off  shore  and  three-quarters  of  a  mile  from  the  small 
battery. 

"But  it  was  evident,  from  the  preparations  being 
made  by  the  enemy,  that  he  intended  to  attack  us ;  so  we 
made  arrangements  to  receive  him  as  well  as  we  possibly 
could.  Springs  7  were  got  on  our  cables,  and  the  ship  was 
perfectly  prepared  for  action. 

"I  well  remember  the  feelings  of  awe  produced  in  me 
by  the  approach  of  the  hostile  ships ;  even  to  my  young 
mind  it  was  perceptible  in  the  faces  of  those  around  me, 

7  A  spring  is  a  rope  taken  from  the  stern  of  a  ship  to  an 
anchor  off  the  bow.  By  hauling  on  it  the  crew  can  turn  or  '•'  wind  " 
the  ship  in  the  desired  direction  without  having  to  depend  on  sail 
power.  In  this  action  the  springs  were  bent  to  the  anchor  cable 
instead  of  to  the  ring  of  the  anchor  itself,  an  unfortunate  arrange 
ment  which  exposed  them  to  the  enemy's  fire. 


The  Action  with  the  Phoebe  and  Cherub    185 

as  clearly  as  possible,  that  our  case  was  hopeless.  It  was 
equally  apparent  that  all  were  ready  to  die  at  their  guns 
rather  than  surrender;  and  such  I  believe  to  have  been 
the  determination  of  the  crew  almost  to  a  man.  There 
had  been  so  much  bantering  of  each  other  among  the  men 
of  the  ships,  through  the  medium  of  letters  and  songs, 
with  an  invariable  fight  between  the  boats'  crews  when 
they  met  on  shore,  that  a  very  hostile  sentiment  was 
engendered.  Our  flags  wrere  flying  from  every  mast,  and 
the  enemy's  vessels  displayed  their  ensigns,  jacks,  and 
motto  flags,  as  they  bore  down  grandly  to  the  attack. 

"At  3.54  P.M.  they  commenced  firing;  the  Phoebe 
under  our  stern,  and  the  Cherub  on  our  starboard  bow. 
But  the  latter,  finding  out  pretty  soon  that  we  had  too 
many  guns  bearing  on  her,  likewise  ran  under  our  stern. 
We  succeeded  in  getting  three  long  guns  out  of  the  stern 
ports,  and  kept  up  as  well  directed  a  fire  as  possible  in 
such  an  unequal  contest. 

"In  half  an  hour  they  were  both  compelled  to  haul 
off  to  repair  damages.  During  this  period  of  the  fight, 
we  had  succeeded  three  times  in  getting  springs  on  our 
cables,  but  in  each  instance  they  were  shot  away  as  soon 
as  they  were  hauled  taut,  Notwithstanding  the  incessant 
firing  from  both  of  the  enemy's  ships,  we  had,  so  far, 
suffered  less  than  might  have  been  expected,  considering 
that  we  could  bring  but  three  guns  to  oppose  two  broad 
sides.  We  had  many  men  killed  in  the  first  five  or  ten 
minutes  of  their  fire,  before  we  could  bring  our  stern  guns 
to  bear. 

"The  enemy  soon  repaired  damages,  and  renewed  the 
attack,  both  ships  taking  position  on  our  larboard  quarter, 
out  of  reach  of  our  carronades,  and  where  the  stern  guns 
could  not  be  brought  to  bear.  They  then  kept  up  a  most 
galling  fire,  which  we  were  powerless  to  return.  At  this 
juncture  the  captain  ordered  the  cable  to  be  cut,  and, 


186  The  United  States  Navy 

after  ineffectual  attempts,  we  succeeded  in  getting  sail 
on  the  ship,  having  found  that  the  flying  jib-halyards 
were  in  a  condition  to  hoist  that  sail.  It  was  the  only 
serviceable  rope  that  had  not  been  shot  away.  By  this 
means  we  were  able  to  close  with  the  enemy,  and  the 
firing  now  became  fearful  on  both  sides.  The  Cherub  was 
compelled  to  haul  out,  and  never  came  into  close  action 
again,  though  she  lay  off  and  used  her  long  guns  greatly 
to  our  discomfort,  making  a  perfect  target  of  us.  The 
Phoebe  also,  was  enabled,  by  the  better  condition  of  her 
sails,  to  choose  her  own  distance,  suitable  for  her  long 
guns,  and  kept  up  a  most  destructive  fire  on  our  helpless 
ship. 

'  Finding, '  as  Captain  Porter  says,  '  the  impossibility 
of  closing  with  the  Phoebe/  he  determined  to  run  his  ship 
ashore  and  destroy  her.  We  accordingly  stood  for  the 
land,  but  when  we  were  within  half  a  mile  of  the  bluffs 
the  wind  suddenly  shifted,  took  us  flat  aback,  and  paid 
our  head  off  shore.  We  were  thus  again  exposed  to  a 
galling  fire  from  the  Phoebe.  At  this  moment  Captain 
Downes  of  the  Essex  Junior  came  on  board  to  receive  his 
orders,  being  under  the  impression  that  our  ship  would 
soon  be  captured,  as  the  enemy  at  that  time  were  raking 
us,  while  we  could  not  bring  a  gun  to  bear,  and  his  vessel 
was  in  no  condition  to  be  of  service  to  us. 

*  *  Captain  Porter  now  ordered  a  hawser  to  be  bent  on 
to  the  sheet  anchor  and  let  go.  This  brought  our  ship's 
head  around,  and  we  were  in  hopes  that  the  Phoebe  would 
drift  out  of  gun  shot,  as  the  sea  was  nearly  calm ;  but  the 
hawser  broke,  and  we  were  again  at  the  mercy  of  the 
enemy.  The  ship  was  now  reported  to  be  on  fire,  and  the 
men  came  rushing  up  from  below,  many  with  their  clothes 
burning,  which  were  torn  from  them  as  quickly  as  pos 
sible,  and  those  from  whom  this  could  not  be  done  were 
told  to  jump  overboard  and  quench  the  flames.  Many  of 


The  Action  with  the  Phccle  and  Cherub    187 

the  crew,  and  even  some  of  the  officers,  hearing  the  order 
to  jump  overboard,  took  it  for  granted  that  the  fire  had 
reached  the  magazine,  and  that  the  ship  was  about  to  blow 
up ;  so  they  leaped  into  the  water  and  attempted  to  reach 
the  shore,  about  three-quarters  of  a  mile  distant,  in  which 
effort  a  number  were  drowned. 

"The  captain  sent  for  the  commissioned  officers,  to 
consult  with  them  the  propriety  of  further  resistance ;  but 
first  went  below  to  ascertain  the  quantity  of  powder  in 
the  magazine.  On  his  return  to  the  deck,  he  met  Lieu 
tenant  McKnight,8  the  only  commissioned  officer  left  on 
duty,  all  the  others  having  been  killed  or  wounded.  As  it 
was  pretty  evident  that  the  ship  was  in  a  sinking  condi 
tion,  it  was  determined  to  surrender,  in  order  to  save  the 
wounded,  and  at  6.30  P.M.  the  painful  order  was  given  to 
haul  down  the  colors.'* 

In  this  action,  the  Essex  lost  fifty-eight  killed,  sixty- 
six  wounded,  and  thirty-one  missing.  Most  of  the  last 
were  probably  drowned  in  the  attempt  to  swim  ashore. 
If  the  number  of  the  missing  is  included,  this  is  the 
heaviest  loss  sustained  by  any  American  vessel  during  the 
war.  The  British  reported  four  killed  and  seven  wounded 
on  the  Phoebe;  and  one  killed  and  three  wounded  on  the 
Cherub.  Among  the  killed  on  the  Phoebe  was  Captain 
Hillyar's  first  lieutenant,  Ingram,  who,  it  is  said,  begged 
his  captain  to  close  with  the  Essex,  saying  that  it  was 

8  The  loss  of  the  Essex  is  linked  with  the  tragedy  of  the 
Wasp.  After  the  battle  in  Valparaiso,  Lieutenant  Stephen  Decatur 
McKnight  and  Midshipman  James  Lyman  were  exchanged  against 
a  number  of  Englishmen  in  one  of  the  Essex's  prizes  that  remained 
in  port,  and  these  officers  consented  to  go  in  the  Phoebe  to  Rio  to 
testify  before  the  prize  court  in  behalf  of  the  Phoebe's  prize  claims. 
Afterwards  they  embarked  in  a  Swedish  brig  sailing  for  England. 
On  October  9,  1814,  the  brig  fell  in  with  the  Wasp,  in  mid  ocean. 
The  two  officers  were  transferred  to  her,  and  she  was  never  heard 
from  again. 


188  The  United  States  Navy 

deliberate  murder  to  lie  off  at  long-  range  and  fire  into 
the  Americans  like  a  target,  when  they  were  unable  to 
return  the  fire.  Hillyar,  however,  naturally  preferred  to 
make  the  capture  at  least  cost  to  himself. 

The  result  was  conclusive  as  to  the  folly  of  arming  a 
frigate 's  main  deck  with  carronades.  Porter  himself  had 
protested,  on  taking  command,  and  begged  to  be  allowed 
to  substitute  long  guns,  but  the  Department  refused.  It 
may  fairly  be  said  that  the  country  owes  the"  loss  of  the 
Essex  to  this  refusal.9 

Though  the  British  captain  showed  Captain  Porter 
and  the  survivors  of  the  American  crew  every  considera 
tion,  as  Porter  freely  admits,  the  latter  could  not  but  feel 
a  bitter  resentment  over  Hillyar 's  attacking  him  in  neutral 
waters.  This  was  particularly  hard  to  endure  after 
Porter's  forbearance  when  the  Plicebe  came  into  the 
harbor  with  the  evident  intention  of  taking  the  Essex  by 
surprise.  Captain  Hillyar 's  conduct,  however,  was  in 
keeping  with  the  policy  of  those  days,  common  to  Napoleon 
and  to  the  British  Government  alike,  which  recognized 
neutral  rights  only  when  it  was  convenient. 

Like  another  famous  commerce-destroyer,  the  Con 
federate  cruiser  Alabama,  the  Essex  was  not  taken  till 
after  she  had  struck  her  blow.  By  destroying  British 
commerce  in  the  Pacific  she  did  far  more  to  hurt  the 
enemy  than  she  could  have  done  by  the  capture  of  a 
frigate;  for  in  1814  England  had  frigates  to  spare,  but 
her  merchantmen  were  her  very  means  of  existence. 


9  The  armament  of  the  Essex  in   her  action  with   the  British 
ships  consisted  of  forty  32-lb.  carronades  and  six  long  12's. 


XII 

BATTLE  OF  LAKE  CHAMPLAIN  AND  THE 
CONCLUSION  OF  THE  WAR 

OPERATIONS  ON  LAKE  ONTARIO 

ON  Lake  Ontario  the  shipbuilding  contest  between 
Sir  James  Lucas  Yeo  and  Captain  Isaac  Chauncey,  re 
ferred  to  in  a  previous  chapter,  continued.  At  the  begin 
ning  of  the  summer  of  1814,  each  had  four  ships  and 
four  brigs.  This  contest  in  building  went  on  with  the 
nicety  of  a  mathematical  problem.  When  one  commander 
had  a  slight  superiority,  the  second  hid  in  port  until  he 
could  build  enough  to  outstrip  the  other.  Then  the  second 
sallied  forth,  and  the  first  took  his  turn  in  port.  Both 
were  overcautious. 

During  the  previous  spring,  Yeo  had  managed  to  get 
to  sea  some  time  before  Chauncey,  and  at  once  made  a 
successful  attack  (May  5)  on  Oswego,  destroying  the 
barracks  and  sailing  away  with  the  Growler,  together  with 
heavy  ordnance  and  supplies.  The  British,  however,  did 
not  pursue  their  advantage,  but,  instead,  now  blockaded 
the  American  commodore  at  Sackett's  Harbor,  where  he 
was  doing  his  best  in  hurrying  forward  the  heavy  guns 
for  his  new  ships.  On  June  5,  Yeo  raised  the  blockade ; 
and  Chauncey,  on  July  31,  took  the  lake,  only  to  find 
that  the.  British  commander  had  shut  himself  up  at 
Kingston  to  await  the  completion  of  a  ship-of-the-line 
then  building. 

When  Major- General  Brown  asked  the  co-operation  of 
Chauncey  in  the  offensive  campaign  against  Canada,  the 
latter,  who  had  rendered  valuable  assistance  the  year 

189 


190  The  United  States  Navy 

before  in  the  attacks  on  Forts  George  and  York,  objected 
on  the  plea  that  he  had  his  hands  full  in  attempting  the 
"capture  and  destruction  of  the  enemy's  fleet."  This 
was,  of  course,  his  immediate  duty ;  and  if  he  had  accom 
plished  it,  General  Brown 's  mission  on  the  Niagara  penin 
sula  would  have  received  the  kind  of  co-operation  it  most 
needed.  But  Chauncey's  cautious  and  dilatory  tactics 
gained  nothing  for  himself,  or  for  the  American  cause 
anywhere.  It  was  the  opinion  of  Winfield  Scott  that  if 
the  British  had  not  had  free  access  to  the  lake,  Lundy's 
Lane,  instead  of  being  a  drawn  battle,  might  have  been 
a  victory  so  decisive  as  to  have  turned  the  scales  of  war. 
The  Americans  soon  found  themselves,  instead  of  taking 
the  offensive  against  Canada,  forced  to  prepare  for  a 
threatened  invasion  through  Lake  Champlain.1 

BATTLE  OF  LAKE  CHAMPLAIN 

Although  the  condition  of  affairs  on  the  Great  Lakes 
remained  unchanged  during  the  year  1814,  events  of  the 
greatest  importance  were  taking  place  on  Lake  Champlain. 
This  lake  had  not  hitherto  played  a  part  in  the  war  at  all 
commensurate  with  its  important  position.  With  Lake 
George  and  the  Hudson  River  it  formed  a  series  of  water 
connections  from  the  source  of  American  supplies  at  New 
York  to  what  should  have  been  the  true  objective  of  an 
offensive  war  on  the  Canadian  border,  Montreal.  The 
British,  naturally  on  the  defensive  in  Canada,  had  paid 
no  heed  to  this  waterway  during  the  early  years  of  the 
war,  and  the  Americans,  in  their  efforts,  under  Hull  and 
Dearborn,  to  concentrate  their  attention  on  the  Northwest, 
had  neglected  their  opportunity.  Hence  we  find  little  or 
no  mention  of  Lake  Champlain  until  June,  1813.  As 
three  of  the  armed  sloops  here  were  American,  against  one 

1Mahan,  War  of  1812,  ii,  306-311. 


THOMAS  MACDONOT;.;H 


Rivalry  for  Control  191 

British,  the  former  could  sail  where  they  pleased,  while 
the  British  remained  at  their  base  in  the  lower  narrows,  at 
Isle  aux  Noix.  On  June  2,  1813,  two  of  the  American 
sloops,  the  Eagle  and  the  Growler,  while  approaching 
too  near  the  British  garrison  at  the  narrows,  were  raked 
from  the  shore  and  captured.  The  British  now  followed 
up  their  advantage.  Captain  Everard,  of  the  British 
sloop  Wasp,  lying  at  Quebec,  volunteered  with  some  of 
his  men  to  make  a  raid  on  the  lake.  He  destroyed  the 
public  building  at  Plattsburg  and  the  barracks  at  Saranac, 
and  captured  some  small  vessels,  while  Macdonough,  the 
American  commander  on  the  lake,  taken  utterly  by  sur 
prise,  and  helpless  because  of  the  loss  of  his  two  vessels, 
had  to  sit  by  and  look  on.  Everard  hurried  back,  and 
with  Captain  Pring  stirred  up  the  authorities  to  building 
ships  at  once  on  Lake  Champlain. 

Now  began  a  contest  in  shipbuilding  like  the  rivalry 
on  the  Great  Lakes,  and  it  continued  until  the  fall  of 
1814.  Macdonough  had  already  established  his  base  at 
Plattsburg,  and  had  all  his  vessels,  except  the  Eagle, 
ready  by  the  latter  part  of  May.  He  could  then  range 
the  lake  at  will  and  bring  stores  from  Burlington,  while 
the  British  were  awaiting  the  completion  of  their  most 
powerful  ship,  the  Confiance,  which  was  not  launched 
until  August  25.  Captain  Downie  took  command  of 
the  British  flotilla  on  September  2,  and  in  response  to  the 
goading  of  the  Governor-General  of  Canada,  hurried  the 
equipment  of  his  vessels  to  the  utmost  in  order  to 
co-operate  with  Prevost's  invading  army.  By  this  time, 
the  American  flotilla  consisted  of  the  ship  Saratoga,  26 ; 
the  brig  Eagle,  20;  the  schooner  Ticonderoga,  17;  the 
sloop  Preble,  7;  and  about  ten  row-galleys  or  gunboats: 
in  all  fourteen  vessels,  with  882  men,  eighty-six  guns, 
and  total  broadside  of  1194  pounds,  714  from  short  and 
480  from  long  guns. 


192  The  United  States  Navy 

On  the  other  hand,  the  British  had  the  Confiance 
(rated  after  her  capture  in  our  navy  as  a  frigate),  mount 
ing  twenty-seven  long  24-pounders,  of  which  one  was  a 
pivot  gun  and  thus  available  for  both  broadsides,  and 
ten  carronades ;  they  had,  besides,  the  brig  Linnet,  16 ; 
the  Chub,  11 ;  the  Finch,  11 ;  and  about  twelve  gunboats : 
in  all,  sixteen  vessels,  with  937  men,  ninety-two  guns,  and 
total  broadside  of  1192  pounds,  532  from  short  and  660 
from  long  guns.  Thus  the  superiority  was  on  the  British 
side.  The  Confiance  had  an  approximate  tonnage  of  1200, 
as  against  the  Saratoga's  734  tons.  "The  two  largest 
British  vessels,  Confiance  and  Linnet,  were  slightly 
inferior  to  the  American  Saratoga  and  Eagle  in  aggregate 
weight  of  broadside ;  but,  like  the  General  Pike  on  Ontario 
in  1813,  the  superiority  of  the  Confiance  in  long  guns,  and 
under  one  captain,  would  on  the  open  lake  have  made  her 
practically  equal  to  cope  with  the  whole  American  squad 
ron,  and  still  more  with  the  Saratoga  alone,  assuming  that 
the  Linnet  gave  the  Eagle  some  occupation."2 

A  British  army  of  11,000  men,  part  of  four  brigades 
recently  sent  from  Wellington's  Peninsular  veterans  to 
Canada,  was  slowly  marching,  under  the  command  of 
Sir  George  Prevost,  Governor-General  of  Canada,  up  the 
western  side  of  Lake  Champlain.  The  American  general, 
Izard,  had  been  ordered  to  proceed  with  most  of  the 
troops  at  Plattsburg  to  Sackett's  Harbor,  leaving  General 
Macomb  with  scarcely  2000  men  to  meet  the  invaders. 
Prevost  kept  urging  Downie  to  set  sail,  so  as  to  co-operate 
with  him  in  the  attack  on  Plattsburg.  The  Governor- 
General  drove  Macomb  across  the  Saranac,  which  divides 
Plattsburg,  and  then  he  sat  down  and  waited  for  Downie. 
The  latter  thus  had  to  offer  battle  prematurely  to  Mac- 
donough;  but  although  the  British  flotilla  was  somewhat 


aMahan,  War  of  1812,  ii,  371. 


Rivalry  for  Control  193 

handicapped  by  this  haste,  the  American  vessels  were 
likewise  not  yet  fully  prepared.  The  crews  of  both 
flotillas  had  had  little  time  for  that  training  necessary  to 
organized  effort.  The  locks  of  some  of  the  guns  of  the 
Confiance  were  useless,  and  similar  difficulties  presented 
themselves  on  the  American  vessels.  But  in  these  disad 
vantages,  the  opposing  fleets  were  equally  handicapped. 

Macdonough,  though  only  twenty-eight  years  old,  had 
made  preparations  for  battle  worthy  of  a  much  older  head. 
The  mouth  of  Plattsburg  Bay,  where  the  engagement  took 
place,  extends  from  Cumberland  Head  southwestward  to 
the  shoals  of  Crab  Island.  AYhen  Downie's  fleet,  early  on 
the  morning  of  September  11,  was  known  to  have  set  sail 
under  a  northeast  wind,  Macdonough  anchored  his  ships 
in  a  line  across  the  entrance  of  Plattsburg  Bay,  the  larger 
vessels  off  Cumberland  Head,  in  the  following  order: 
Eagle,  Saratoga,  Ticonderoga,  and  Preble;  the  gunboats 
he  drew  up  in  a  line  forty  yards  behind.  Thus  the  heavier 
vessels  at  Cumberland  Head,  and  the  shoals  at  Crab 
Island,  would  check  any  attempt  at  turning  Macdonough 's 
flanks.  The  enemy,  in  a  channel  too  narrow  to  beat,  would 
have  to  approach  bows  on,  close  to  the  wind,  while  the 
Americans  had  the  weather-gage  for  easy  maneuvering. 
Besides,  in  case  of  failure  of  wind,  or  for  presenting  a 
new  broadside  quickly  at  the  same  berth,  Macdonough  had 
provided  his  vessels  with  springs. 

The  British  naval  commander,  who  could  plainly  see 
across  the  narrow  Cumberland  Head  Macdonough 's  for 
mation,  planned  his  own  line  accordingly.  The  Confiance 
was  to  round  the  point,  fire  a  broadside  at  the  Eagle  at 
the  upper  end  of  the  line,  and  then  come  to  anchor  across 
the  bows  of  the  Saratoga.  The  Chub  and  the  Linnet  were 
then  to  anchor  off  the  Eagle's  bow  and  stern,  and  the 
Finch,  assisted  by  the  British  gunboats,  was  to  oppose 
the  Ticonderoga  and  the  Preble. 
13 


194 


The  United  States  Navy 


As  Downie  rounded  Cumberland  Head,  he  was  sur 
prised  to  find  no  co-operation  from  Prevost,  but  he  never 
theless  bravely  adhered  to  his  part  of  the  attack.  The 
Con  fiance  laboriously  made  for  the  upper  end  of  the 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LAKE  CHAMPLAIN 

3EPT.1U314 


PLATTSBURG  , 


C  CHUB 
F  FINCH 
L  LINNET 


E  EAGLE 
P  PREBLE 
T  TICONDEROGA 


THE  BATTLE  OF  LAKE  CHAMPLAIN,  SEPT.  11,  1814 

American  line,  but  under  the  concentrated  fire  from 
Macdonough's  vessels  and  the  shifting  winds,  she  was 
compelled  to  abandon  her  first  plan  of  going  to  the  head 
of  the  line,  and  she  came  to  anchor  some  500  yards  to  the 
east  of  the  Saratoga.  Both  port  bow-anchors  of  the 


Battle  of  Lake  Cham-plain  195 

British  flagship  had  meanwhile  been  shot  away,  and  a 
ball  from  one  of  the  Saratoga's  long  24-pounders,  fired 
by  Macdonough  himself,  struck  the  Con  fiance  near  the 
hawse-hole,  killing  and  wounding  several  men. in  its  course 
along  the  length  of  the  deck.  Downie,  who  coolly  made 
fast  his  ship  before  he  fired  a  gun,  now,  at  about  nine 
o'clock,  fired  a  deadly  broadside  which  is  said  to  have 
killed  or  wounded  one-fifth  of  the  Saratoga's  crew. 

Meanwhile  the  Linnet  and  the  Chub  had  engaged  the 
Eagle.  The  Chub,  before  she  could  anchor,  received  con 
siderable  damage  to  her  sails  and  rigging;  and,  with  her 
commander  wounded,  she  drifted  helplessly  through  Mac 
donough 's  line,  where  an  American  midshipman  took 
charge  of  her.  The  Linnet,  having  anchored  to  windward 
of  the  Eagle,  kept  pouring  a  diagonal  fire  into  the  Amer 
ican  vessel.  After  standing  the  broadsides  of  the  Linnet 
and  part  of  the  fire  of  the  Con  fiance,  the  Eagle  at  10.30 
cut  her  cables  and  slipped  down  to  a  position  between  the 
Saratoga  and  the  Ticonderoga.  In  this  way  she  brought 
her  fresh  broadside  into  play  against  the  Confiance  with 
out  exposure  to  shots  from  either  the  Confiance  or  the 
Linnet.  The  Eagle's  change  of  berth  gave  the  Linnet  an 
opportunity,  after  some  slight  skirmishing  with  the  Amer 
ican  gunboats,  to  shift  her  anchorage  to  a  raking  position 
off  the  Saratoga's  bows. 

At  the  southern  end  of  the  American  line,  the 
Finch  and  some  of  the  British  gunboats  were  attack 
ing  the  Ticonderoga  and  the  Preble.  As  the  Finch 
did  not  keep  near  enough  to  the  wind,  she  failed  to 
reach  the  position  assigned  to  her  abreast  the  Ticon 
deroga,  nor  could  she  gain  it  later  when  the  wind  died 
down.  Silenced  by  a  few  broadsides  from  the  Amer 
ican  schooner,  she  drifted  on  the  shoals  at  Crab  Island, 
where  a  6-pounder  mounted  on  shore  forced  her  finally 
to  surrender.  Although  some  of  the  British  gunboats  kept 


196  The  United  States  Navy 

at  a  safe  distance  from  their  enemy's  long  guns  and  later 
ingloriously  fled,  four  pressed  forward  to  attack  with  des 
perate  courage.  The  little  Preble  was  obliged  to  cut  her 
cable  and  take  refuge  under  the  American  shore  batteries 
at  Plattsburg.  As  the  American  gunboats  were  too  light 
to  be  of  much  assistance,  the  Ticonderoga  was  left  prac 
tically  unsupported,  but  her  commander,  Lieutenant 
Cassin,  handled  his  schooner  with  marked  ability.  Heed 
less  of  the  great  danger  from  musketry  and  grape,  he 
directed  the  fight  from  the  taffrail,  and  gave  the  close- 
approaching  gunboats  loads  of  canister  that  finally  drove 
them  off,  though  not  till  some  of  them  had  got  within  a 
boat's  length  of  their  foe. 

At  the  head  of  the  line,  where  the  main  fighting  took 
place,  the  contest  dwindled  down  to  one  between  the 
Saratoga  and  Eagle  on  the  American  side,  and  the  Con- 
fiance  and  Linnet  on  the  British.  The  vessels  were  firing 
at  stationary  targets,  at  point-blank  range,  and  in  smooth 
water,  and  under  such  conditions  even  inexperienced 
crews  could  inflict  terrible  damage.  Downie  was  killed 
early  in  the  action,  and  his  death  was  a  great  loss  to  the 
British  side.  Gradually,  owing  to  the  inexperience  and 
lack  of  longer  training  of  the  crews,  confusion  became 
apparent  in  both  flotillas.  The  American  sailors,  when 
their  officers  were  killed  or  wounded,  overloaded  the  car- 
ronades,  and  thus  destroyed  the  effectiveness  of  these 
guns.  On  the  Con  fiance  the  quoins  were  gradually 
loosened  by  the  heavy  firing,  and  as  this  error  was  not 
rectified,  her  guns  kept  shooting  higher  and  higher.  Such 
confusion  reigned  at  times  on  the  British  flagship,  that 
the  gunners  rammed  home  shot  without  any  powder,  or 
cartridges  without  any  shot.  The  first  broadside  of  the 
Confiance,  before  Captain  Downie  was  killed,  had  been 
directed  with  deadly  precision,  but  the  later  confusion 


Battle  of  Lake  Champlain  197 

showed  the  need  of  that  organization  and  co-operation 
which  are  necessary  to  make  crew  and  officers  a  unit  in 
action. 

The  damage  aboard  the  Saratoga  was  also  great, 
nearly  her  whole  starboard  battery  having  been  rendered 
useless ;  but  it  was  at  this  crisis  that  Macdonough  's  fore 
sight  and  preparation  were  able  to  bring  into  play  the 
unused  guns  of  his  vessel.  By  means  of  the  springs  pre 
viously  prepared  for  just  such  a  contingency,  he  now 
winded  his  ship,  and  thus  brought  to  bear  her  fresh  broad 
side.  The  British  tried  to  do  the  same,  and  as  the  Con- 
fiance's  stern  anchor  had  been  shot  away,  Lieutenant 
Robertson  tried  to  wind  her  by  a  spring  from  the 
bow.  The  attempt  was  not  successful,  and  the  flagship 
hung  with  her  bow  to  the  wind,  affording  the  Saratoga 
an  excellent  opportunity  to  rake.  With  the  British  vessel 's 
hold  partly  full  of  water,  and  a  crew  that  refused  to  work 
the  guns  any  longer,  Robertson,  in  his  exposed  position, 
was  compelled  to  strike  his  colors.  This  was  at  about 
eleven  o'clock.  Macdonough  at  once,  by  means  of  his 
springs,  again  turned  his  ship  so  that  her  broadside  would 
bear  on  the  Linnet,  and  after  fifteen  minutes  forced  Cap 
tain  Pring  also  to  strike.  At  just  this  time  the  Ticon- 
deroga  was  ending  her  fight  with  the  gunboats. 

The  battle  had  been  fought  with  the  greatest  obstinacy 
on  both  sides.  The  Saratoga  had  been  hulled  by  round 
shot  fifty-five  times,  and  the  Confiance  105  times.  The 
Eagle  and  the  Linnet  also  were  badly  shattered.  The 
number  of  killed  and  wounded  on  the  American  side  was 
approximately  200 ;  that  of  the  British,  300.  The  greatest 
praise  is  due  to  Macdonough  for  this  signal  victory;  in 
the  careful  choice  of  his  position  and  in  the  thorough 
preparations  for  battle,  he  had  shown  unusual  skill  and 
judgment.  In  addition  to  these  qualities,  Macdonough 


198  The  United  States  Navy 

possessed  indomitable  courage.  ' '  Down  to  the  time  of  the 
Civil  War  he  is  the  greatest  figure  in  our  naval  history. ' ' 3 
The  results  of  the  battle  of  Lake  Champlain  were  of 
the  highest  importance.  Prevost's  army  at  once  fled  in 
confusion  back  to  Canada,  thus  abandoning  the  policy  of 
the  British  Government  for  an  offensive  war.  It  had  also 
a  decisive  effect  on  the  pending  peace  negotiations  in 
forcing  England  to  relinquish  her  claim  to  American 
territory. 

CONCLUDING  EVENTS  OF  THE  WAR 

The  battle  of  Lake  Champlain  practically  ended  the 
war.  The  Treaty  of  Ghent  was  signed  on  December  24, 
1814,  but,  owing  to  the  slowness  of  means  of  communica 
tion  in  those  days,  it  was  not  ratified  by  our  Government 
until  February  17,  1815.  Since  it  had  been  expressly  stip 
ulated  that  hostilities  were  not  to  cease  until  ratification, 
and  since  it  was  difficult  to  get  news  of  peace  to  vessels 
cruising  in  distant  waters,  several  important  battles  took 
place  after  the  signing  and  even  after  the  ratification  of 
the  treaty.  These  included  one  land  battle,  New  Orleans ; 
and  several  naval  engagements,  the  capture  of  the  Presi 
dent  by  the  British  blockading  squadron  off  New  York, 
the  battle  between  the  Constitution  and  the  Cijane  and 
Levant,  and  the  sloop  action  between  the  Hornet  and  the 
Penguin. 

The  part  of  the  navy  in  the  battle  of  New  Orleans 
was  small;  yet  the  aid  of  the  Carolina  in  attacking  the 
invaders  on  December  23,  1814,  and  the  assistance  ren 
dered  by  the  crew  of  the  Louisiana,  with  its  naval  battery 
mounted  ashore  so  as  to  enfilade  the  troops  of  the  enemy, 
on  January  1,  1815,  showed  of  what  excellent  use  even  a 
trifling  naval  force  can  be. 

3  Roosevelt,  Xaval  War  of  1812,  p.  399. 


Capture  of  the  President  199 

Loss  OF  THE  PRESIDENT 

The  frigate  President,  lying  in  New  York  harbor, 
had,  in  May,  1814,  been  transferred  to  Captain  Stephen 
Decatur,  who  had  brought  with  him  the  crew  from  his 
former  command,  the  United  States,  then  hopelessly 
blockaded  at  New  London.  As  a  formidable  force  under 
Admiral  Cochrane  and  General  Ross  was  now  threatening 
our  coast,  the  citizens  of  New  York  and  Philadelphia  were 
anxious  that  Decatur  should  remain  in  the  vicinity. 

This,  and  the  fact  that  a  vigilant  blockading  fleet  was 
outside,  kept  the  President  shut  up  in  New  York  until 
the  night  of  January  14,  1815,  when,  in  a  bad  northwester, 
she  slipped  out  of  the  harbor,  but  unfortunately  went 
aground  in  the  channel.  After  considerable  effort,  the 
President  cleared  the  bar,  damaged  so  badly  that  her 
former  speediness  was  gone.  To  add  to  her  misfortune, 
she  ran  at  five  o'clock  next  morning  into  the  blockading 
fleet,  under  Captain  Hayes,  consisting  of  the  razee  Majes 
tic,  56,  and  the  38-gun  frigates  Endymion,  Pomone,  and 
Tenedos.  In  the  fierce  gale,  the  British  vessels  were 
scattered,  and  Captain  Hayes  had  not  yet  succeeded  in 
getting  his  ships  together. 

While  Captain  Hayes  was  directing  his  attention  to 
a  suspicious  sail  to  the  south,  which  turned  out  to  be  his 
own  frigate,  the  Tenedos,  the  Endymion  started  a  chase 
of  the  President  which  lasted  until  nearly  midnight  of  the 
fifteenth.  Decatur  steered  his  course  eastward,  parallel 
to  the  shore  of  Long  Island.  The  Endymion,  by  con 
stantly  yawing,  was  able  to  bring  her  broadsides  to  bear 
without  losing  distance.  Decatur  endured  this  fire  for 
a  half  hour,  and  then  suddenly  putting  his  helm  to  port 
headed  south,  with  intent  to  cross  the  Endymion 's  bows. 
But  the  latter  imitated  the  maneuver,  and  the  two  ships, 
on  parallel  courses,  exchanged  broadsides  until  Decatur 


200  The  United  States  Navy 

had  accomplished  his  purpose,  which  was  to  strip  his 
pursuer's  sails  from  the  spars  and  thus  prevent  further 
pursuit.  The  President  now,  with  even  studding-sails 
set,  continued  her  course,  but  although  the  JEndymion 
was  badly  crippled,  Decatur's  maneuver  had  given  the 
Pomone  and  the  Tenedos  a  chance  to  overtake  him.  At 
eleven  P.M.,  the  American  commander  surrendered  with 
out  firing  another  broadside. 


CAPTURE  OF  THE  CYANE  AND  LEVANT 

The  Constitution,  Captain  Stewart,  after  a  long  block 
ade  in  Boston  harbor,  managed,  in  December,  1814,  to 
get  to  sea.  Some  200  miles  northeast  of  Madeira,  on 
February  20,  1815,  she  sighted  two  vessels,  which  later 
were  found  to  be  the  frigate  Cyane,  32,  and  the  sloop  of 
war  Levant,  of  20  guns.  When  first  seen,  the  British 
ships  were  ten  miles  apart,  but  in  spite  of  the  light  easterly 
wind,  they  gradually  joined  each  other,  and  were  only 
100  yards  apart  when  they  attacked  the  Constitution. 
At  6.05  P.M.  the  American  vessel,  being  to  windward,  at 
300  yards '  distance,  opened  with  her  guns.  The  wind  was 
so  light  that  in  the  enveloping  smoke  the  antagonists  had 
to  cease  firing  at  times  to  see  where  they  were.  Stewart, 
with  remarkable  nimbleness,  not  only  avoided  being  raked 
himself,  but  managed  to  wear  the  Constitution  so  adroitly 
that  he  raked  both  British  vessels  several  times.  The 
Cyane  struck  at  6.50.  Stewart  now  set  out  in  pursuit 
of  the  Levant,  which  had  withdrawn  while  a  prize  crew 
was  taking  possession  of  the  Cyane;  but  at  8.50  P.M.  the 
plucky  little  Levant  wore,  and  on  opposite  tacks  the  vessels 
exchanged  broadsides.  Stewart,  by  another  quick  turn, 
raked  the  Levant  from  the  stern.  The  British  vessel  now 
sought  safety  in  flight,  but  at  ten  P.M.  the  Constitution 
overtook  and  captured  her.  The  divided  force  of  the 


Results  of  the  War  201 

enemy  in  this  engagement  was  in  the  Constitution's  favor, 
but  it  was  especially  the  quick  and  skilful  maneuvering 
of  Captain  Stewart  that  won  the  battle.  The  Constitution 
and  the  Cyane  later  escaped  from  a  British  squadron  and 
safely  reached  the  United  States,  but  the  Levant  was 
recaptured. 

PRIVATEERING 

At  least  a  passing  consideration  should  be  given  to 
the  very  important  service  of  the  American  privateers, 
although,  strictly  speaking,  they  had  no  place  in  our  navy. 
Privateering,  especially  towards  the  end  of  the  war,  was 
a  favorite  way  of  harrying  British  trade.  By  diverting 
large  numbers  of  seamen,  it  weakened  the  regular  navy; 
and  as  the  results  were  far  less  than  might  have  been 
secured  by  men-of-war,  it  seems  from  our  point  of  view 
to  have  been  of  doubtful  advantage.  Yet  our  country, 
when  it  awoke  to  the  fact  that  it  had  entered  upon  hos 
tilities  wretchedly  prepared,  welcomed  assistance  from 
private  enterprise.  Privateering  was  profitable  business 
to  those  who  succeeded,  and  it  must  be  admitted  com 
mercial  instinct  quite  as  often  as  patriotism  was  the 
impelling  motive.  There  were  about  500  of  these  vessels, 
and  they  captured  or  destroyed  1350  British  ships. 

RESULTS  OF  THE  WAR 

The  treaty  signed  at  Ghent  on  December  24,  1814,  was 
silent  regarding  the  two  great  issues  of  the  war,  impress 
ment  and  illegal  seizures  under  the  Orders  in  Council. 
The  orders  had  been  repealed  before  war  was  declared 
by  the  United  States,  and  though  Great  Britain  stoutly 
maintained  her  prescriptive  right  to  impressment,  she  did 
not  later  continue  her  practice  in  this  regard.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  British  made  concessions  in  the  treaty  that 


202  The  United  States  Navij 

were  hard  for  them  to  yield.  On  the  strength  of  their 
possession,  in  1814,  of  Forts  Mackinac  and  Niagara,  and 
of  the  country  east  of  the  Penobscot,  England  had  at 
first  laid  claim  to  the  surrender  of  some  of  our  territory. 
The  British  also  had  sought  to  make  military  barriers  of 
the  Great  Lakes,  which  thenceforth  should  be  controlled 
by  Great  Britain  and  used  by  Americans  only  for  com 
mercial  purposes.  Further,  they  had  laid  claim  to  some 
of  our  territory  in  the  Northwest  for  an  independent 
Indian  state.  In  the  face  of  a  possible  European  war, 
however,  and  more  particularly  by  reason  of  Prevost's 
precipitous  retreat  to  Canada,  the  British  gave  up  these 
territorial  demands,  and  the  American  position,  no  grant 
of  territory  whatever,  was  incorporated  in  the  treaty. 
Moreover,  to  avoid  future  complications,  the  treaty  pro 
vided  for  the  adjustment  of  the  boundary  as  far  as  the 
Lake  of  the  Woods  in  Minnesota.  Both  parties  also 
pledged  themselves  to  use  every  effort  to  stamp  out  the 
slave  trade. 

The  war  had  an  excellent  effect  in  firing  anew  the 
spirit  of  patriotism  in  the  young  nation,  and  in  promoting 
respect  abroad.  The  narrow  selfishness  of  many  of  the 
merchant  classes  and  the  hostile  attitude  of  New  England 
to  the  war,  had  given  way  to  a  stronger  national  unity 
and  a  broader  patriotism.  The  navy  had  contributed  in 
no  small  degree  to  bringing  about  this  result.  While 
battles  were  being  lost  on  land,  the  brilliant  feats  of  the 
navy  kept  up  the  courage  of  our  people.  Although  Great 
Britain  with  her  thousand  vessels  might  little  miss  the 
loss  of  a  few  frigates,  still  the  ship-duels  of  this  war 
brought  the  navj^,  and  consequently  the  country,  a  world 
wide  respect. 


XIII 

MINOR  OPERATIONS 

THE  WAR  WITH  ALGIERS 

THE  war  with  Tripoli  had  put  an  end  to  all  paying 
of  tribute  by  the  United  States  to  that  principality,  but 
ever  since  the  treaty  of  1795  we  had  been  sending  annual 
tribute  to  the  Dey  of  Algiers.  The  return  of  the  Hornet 
to  the  United  States,  in  1807,  left  the  Mediterranean 
without  a  single  American  man-of-war;  and  after  the 
Leopard  incident  in  1807  the  American  Navy  was  con 
fined  so  closely  to  home  waters,  on  account  of  impending 
war  with  Great  Britain,  that  one  year  succeeded  another 
without  the  appearance  of  an  American  cruiser  before 
Algiers.  Encouraged  by  this  situation,  the  Dey  seized 
three  American  merchantmen,  late  in  1807,  on  the  excuse 
that  his  tribute  of  naval  stores  was  overdue.  The  crew  of 
one  of  these  ships,  the  Mary  Ann,  managed  to  kill  their 
Algerian  prize  crew  and  retake  their  vessel,  but  the  other 
two  were  brought  into  port.  Scarcely  had  the  matter 
been  settled  by  cash  payment  for  arrears,  when  the  Dey 
demanded  $18,000  for  the  nine  Algerians  who  had  been 
the  prize  crew  of  the  Mary  Ann.  Consul  Lear  had  to  pay 
this,  also,  in  order  to  avoid  instant  declaration  of  war. 

In  1808,  this  Dey  was  assassinated,  as  was  his  succes 
sor  the  year  following.  Early  in  1812,  the  reigning  Dey 
received  a  special  envoy  from  the  British  Government, 
presenting  a  friendly  letter  from  the  Prince  Regent  him 
self.  Feeling  now  that  he  had  the  support  of  Great 
Britain,  the  Dey  decided  that  he  could  safely  assume  a 
hostile  attitude  towards  the  United  States.  When  the 
Alleghany  arrived  in  July  with  the  tribute  of  naval  stores, 

203 


204  The  United  States  Navy 

he  instantly  found  fault  with  them.  There  was  some 
tribute  money — less  than  $16,000 — still  in  arrears,  but 
he  demanded  $27,000,  on  the  ground  that,  by  the  Mahom- 
medan  way  of  reckoning  (354  days  to  a  year)  seventeen 
years  and  a  half  had  elapsed  since  the  treaty  of  1795, 
instead  of  seventeen.  He  gave  Consul  Lear  five  days  in 
which  to  make  the  payment,  with  the  alternative  of  going 
into  slavery,  together  with  all  other  American  residents 
and  the  crew  of  the  Allegheny.  The  consul  finally  bor 
rowed  the  money  at  twenty-five  per  cent  interest  from  a 
Jew  in  Algiers,  and,  with  three  other  American  residents, 
left  the  country  on  the  Alleghany. 

Fortunately  the  expectation  of  war  with  England  had 
kept  American  merchantmen  out  of  the  Mediterranean, 
so  that  when  the  Dey  sent  out  his  cruisers  they  took  only 
one  brig,  the  Edwin.  Her  crew  of  ten  were  sold  into 
slavery.  During  the  war  with  England,  efforts  were 
made  to  ransom  them,  but  without  success. 

The  conclusion  of  peace  with  Great  Britain  left  the 
United  States  free  to  deal  with  Algiers,  and  Congress 
acted  promptly.  On  March  2,  1815,  war  was  declared 
against  Algiers  and  two  squadrons  were  ordered  to  the 
Mediterranean.  One,  which  was  to  assemble  at  Boston, 
was  placed  under  the  command  of  Commodore  Bain- 
bridge,  and  the  other,  at  New  York,  under  Commodore 
Decatur.  The  latter  squadron  got  to  sea  first,  on  May  20. 
It  consisted  of  the  frigates  Guerriere,1  44,  flagship ;  Con 
stellation,  36 ;  Macedonian,  38 ;  the  sloops  Epervier,  18, 
and  Ontario,  16 ;  and  the  brigs  Firefly,  Spark,  and  Flam 
beau,  each  14  guns.  Of  these  the  Firefly  was  so  badly 
damaged  by  a  gale  that  she  had  to  put  back  to  New  York. 

Before  entering  the  Mediterranean,  Decatur  made 
inquiries  of  the  American  consuls  at  Cadiz  and  Tangiers 

1 A  new  frigate  named  after  the  one  destroyed  by  the  Consti 
tution. 


Operations  under  Decatur  205 

as  to  the  whereabouts  of  Algerian  cruisers,  and  learned 
that  a  squadron  had  just  entered  the  straits  under  the 
command  of  the  Algerian  admiral,  Rais  Hammida. 
Decatur  touched  at  Gibraltar  only  long  enough  to  com 
municate  with  the  American  consul,  and  then  set  off  in 
pursuit,  hoping  to  take  the  Algerians  by  surprise. 

On  June  17,  the  Constellation  sighted  a  large  frigate 
off  Cape  de  Gat  and  signaled  an  enemy.  Decatur  imme 
diately  ordered  English  colors  hoisted  to  deceive  the 
Algerian,  but  the  mistake  of  a  quartermaster  on  the  Con 
stellation  in  sending  up  American  colors  gave  the  corsair 
warning  and  she  made  all  sail  to  escape.  The  Constellation 
then  opened  fire,  and  the  Algerian,  apparently  giving  up 
the  idea  of  making  the  port  of  Algiers,  suddenly  wore 
ship  to  reach  the  neutral  waters  of  Spain.  This  maneuver 
brought  her  close  to  the  Guerriere,  and  Decatur,  laying 
aboard,  delivered  two  broadsides.  This  fire  did  such  exe 
cution  that  it  drove  below  decks  all  the  survivors  of  the 
crew  but  the  musketeers  in  the  tops,  and  killed  Rais 
Hammida  himself.  Seeing  that  the  Algerian  frigate 
was  making  no  resistance,  Decatur  ceased  firing  and  drew 
a  short  distance  away.  The  little  Epervier,  however, 
under  Captain  John  Downes,  came  up  on  the  starboard 
quarter  of  the  enemy,  who  was  trying  to  escape,  and,  by 
skilful  maneuvering,  held  this  position,  delivering  nine 
broadsides.  This  forced  the  frigate  to  come  up  into  the 
wind  and  surrender.  She  proved  to  the  Mashuda,  44 
guns,  the  flagship  of  the  Algerian  fleet. 

Two  days  later  the  squadron  drove  an  Algerian  brig 
ashore,  and  on  the  28th  arrived  at  Algiers.  Decatur 
immediately  sent  to  the  Dey  the  terms  of  a  treaty  which 
he  insisted  should  be  ratified  at  once,  threatening,  in  case 
of  delay,  to  capture  every  Algerian  ship  that  tried  to  enter 
the  port.  The  loss  of  the  Mashuda,  together  with  the 
death  of  Hammida,  had  its  effect  on  the  Dey.  On  the 


206  The  United  States  Navy 

appearance  of  an  Algerian  cruiser,  whose  capture  by 
Decatur  was  only  a  matter  of  minutes,  he  sent  out  a  boat 
in  great  haste  to  give  word  of  his  assent. 

Thus,  by  Decatur 's  dashing  methods,  peace  was  con 
cluded  with  Algiers  in  less  than  six  weeks  from  the  time 
the  squadron  left  New  York.  The  treaty  provided  for  no 
tribute  in  the  future,  the  instant  release  of  American 
captives,  the  restoration  of  American  property  seized  by 
the  Dey,  the  payment  of  $10,000  for  the  brig  Edwin,  the 
emancipation  of  every  Christian  slave  who  should  escape 
to  an  American  man-of-war,  and  the  treatment  of  cap 
tives,  in  case  of  a  future  war,  not  as  slaves,  but  as  pris 
oners  of  war,  exempt  from  labor. 

After  settling  with  Algiers  in  this  masterful  style, 
Decatur  proceeded  to  Tunis  and  Tripoli,  having  learned 
meanwhile  that  these  states  had  permitted  British  men- 
of-war  to  recapture  American  prizes  in  their  waters. 
From  Tunis  he  exacted  $46,000 — the  estimated  value  of 
the  prizes  taken  there — and  from  Tripoli  $25,000  with  the 
added  condition  that  ten  Christian  slaves  should  be  lib 
erated.  Two  of  these  were  Danes,  selected  by  Decatur  out 
of  gratitude  to  the  Danish  consul,  Nissen,  who  had  shown 
so  much  kindness  to  the  captives  from  the  Philadelphia. 

Meanwhile,  Commodore  Bainbridge  had  sailed  with  his 
squadron  from  Boston,  July  3.  With  characteristic  bad 
luck,  he  arrived  at  Gibraltar  only  in  time  to  discover  that 
his  junior,  Decatur,  had  done  all  that  needed  to  be  done, 
and  had  carried  off  all  the  glory.  Nevertheless,  he  took 
his  squadron  to  the  Barbary  ports  to  reinforce  the  impres 
sions  left  by  Decatur.  As  it  was  no  longer  of  any  advan 
tage  to  Great  Britain  to  subsidize  Algiers,  she  dispatched, 
the  following  year,  a  large  fleet  under  Lord  Exmouth  to 
bombard  the  city.  That  blow  ended  the  pretensions 
of  the  Barbary  states  to  special  privileges  in  piracy  and 
Christian  slavery. 


Piracy  in  the  West  Indies  207 

SUPPRESSION  OF  PIRACY  IN  THE  WEST  INDIES 

We  have  already  seen  the  extent  to  which  French 
privateers,  in  the  closing  years  of  the  18th  century,  preyed 
on  American  ships  in  the  West  Indies  and  even  in  our 
own  waters,  eventually  bringing  on  our  war  with  France. 
These  privateers  were,  to  all  purposes,  pirate  craft,  which 
used  the  French  colony  of  Guadeloupe  as  their  base  of 
operations.  During  the  West  Indian  campaigns  against 
France,  the  pirates  were  checked  by  British  and  American 
men-of-war,  but  by  no  means  exterminated.  The  capture 
of  Guadeloupe  by  the  British  in  1810  drove  them  from 
their  refuge;  but  they  found  other  rendezvous  in  the 
Gulf  coast,  where  some  resorted  to  smuggling  and  others 
continued  their  piracy. 

The  bayous  of  Louisiana  were  especially  adapted  to 
their  profession,  and  here  the  celebrated  brothers  Lafitte 
made  their  headquarters  for  preying  on  the  commerce  of 
the  coast.  The  war  with  Great  Britain  saved  them  from 
interruption  by  American  authorities  till  September, 
1814,  when  Master-Commandant  Patterson,  with  six  gun 
boats  and  a  schooner  towing  several  barges  of  troops, 
attacked  and  destroyed  ten  of  the  pirate  vessels.  The 
Lafittes,  with  some  of  their  followers,  escaped  to  New 
Orleans,  where,  oddly  enough,  they  offered  their  services 
to  General  Jackson  and  fought  under  him  in  the  famous 
defense  of  that  city  in  January,  1815.  One  of  the  brothers 
went  afterwards  to  Texas,  where  he  resumed  his  profes 
sion.  As  late  as  1822,  his  name  was  the  terror  of  every 
skipper  on  the  Gulf. 

The  Lafittes  were  not  the  only  pirates  in  this  region 
in  the  decade  after  the  war.  There  were  French  and 
Spanish  privateersmen,  and — it  must  be  admitted — some 
American  as  well,  to  whom  the  business  of  robbing  mer 
chantmen  was  too  agreeable  to  give  over  on  conclusion  of 


208  The  United  States  Navy 

peace.  Nearly  all  of  these  obtained  letters  of  marque 
from  some  Spanish  colony  in  revolt,  as  Venezuela,  for 
example,  and  used  them  for  protection  against  capture  by 
a  man-of-war.  This  abuse  grew  to  such  proportions  that 
scarcely  a  ship  passed  through  the  Gulf  or  the  Caribbean 
without  at  least  one  desperate  adventure  with  these 
so-called  privateers. 

In  1819,  the  United  States  took  action  by  sending  a 
squadron  to  the  Gulf  under  the  command  of  Commodore 
Oliver  H.  Perry,  the  hero  of  Lake  Erie.  He  went  directly 
to  Angostura,  Venezuela,  to  open  negotiations  concerning 
the  matter  of  Venezuelan  letters  of  marque.  But  there  he 
was  suddenly  taken  ill  with  yellow  fever,  and  died  on  the 
way  to  Trinidad.  His  death  ended  the  expedition  without 
result. 

Further  efforts  in  the  year  1821—22,  by  a  squadron 
under  Commodore  James  Biddle,  made  a  good  beginning. 
One  small  gunboat,  the  Shark,  distinguished  herself  by 
capturing  five  pirate  craft  and  aiding  in  the  capture  of 
a  sixth.  Her  commander  was  Matthew  C.  Perry,  a 
younger  brother  of  Oliver  Hazard  Perry,  and  famous 
later  for  his  mission  to  Japan.  To  continue  the  work, 
the  Government  dispatched  another  squadron  the  follow 
ing  year,  February,  1823,  commanded  by  Commodore 
David  Porter.  Pie  was  accompanied,  as  in  the  Essex 
days,  by  his  adopted  son,  David  G.  Farragut. 

This  service  in  the  West  Indies  was  beset  with  difficul 
ties.  In  order  to  destroy  the  pirates  it  was  necessary  to 
make  land  attacks  upon  their  strongholds.  Frequently 
the  ground  was  almost  impassable,  and  the  Americans 
advanced  in  constant  danger  of  ambush.  Further,  the 
yellow  fever,  which  had  recently  been  brought  to  the 
West  Indies  by  the  slaves,  proved  a  far  more  dangerous 
enemy  than  the  pirates  themselves.  In  the  midst  of  his 
campaign,  Commodore  Porter  was  forced  for  a  time  to 


The  Fajardo  Affair  209 

withdraw  his  entire  squadron  to  Key  West  on  account 
of  the  epidemic.  It  cost  him  one  of  his  best  officers,  Lieu 
tenant  Watson;  indeed,  he  himself  lay  for  some  days  at 
the  point  of  death.  Perhaps  the  greatest  obstacle,  how 
ever,  was  the  fact  that  many,  if  not  most,  of  the  Spanish 
officials  were  secretly  hand  in  glove  with  the  pirates,  as 
they  were  then  and  later  with  the  slavers. 

An  instance  of  this  duplicity  was  the  famous  " Fajardo 
case."  In  October,  1823,  Lieutenant  Platt,  commanding 
the  schooner  Beagle,  was  informed  that  $5000  worth  of 
goods  had  been  stolen  from  the  American  consul  at  St. 
Thomas.  As  the  robbers  were  reported  to  have  taken  a 
boat  for  Fajardo,  Porto  Rico,  Lieutenant  Platt  sailed  for 
that  place.  On  going  ashore  to  explain  his  errand,  he  was 
insulted  by  the  officials  of  Fajardo  and  thrown  into 
prison.2  After  a  long  deliberation,  enabling  the  stolen 
goods  to  be  put  safely  out  of  the  way,  the  ''alcalde" 
allowed  Lieutenant  Platt  to  return  to  his  ship.  As  soon 
as  the  commodore  heard  of  the  affair,  he  proceeded  to 
Fajardo  with  a  large  force.  The  Spaniards,  who  had 
prepared  a  defense,  deserted  their  guns  and  ran  at  the 
approach  of  the  American  seamen  and  marines.  Porter 
spiked  the  battery  that  had  been  thrown  across  the  road, 
and  proceeded  to  the  outskirts  of  the  town.  Under  a  flag 
of  truce,  he  sent  a  demand  for  the  officials  of  the  town 
to  appear  and  make  instant  and  public  apology  to  Lieu 
tenant  Platt.  This  they  hastened  to  do,  with  the  humblest 
promise  of  good  behavior  in  the  future  toward  all  Amer 
ican  officers.  Thereupon  Porter  retired  to  his  ship,  having 
settled  the  whole  affair  in  less  than  three  hours. 

Although  Spain  had  made  no  protest  whatever,  this 

2  They  pretended  to  believe  that  Platt  was  not  an  American 
officer  because  he  had  come  ashore  in  civilian  clothes,  and  when  he 
showed  his  commission  they  declared  that  it  was  a  forgery. 
14 


210  The  United  States  Navy 

impulsive  conduct  offended  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy, 
as  being  an  offense  against  neutral  rights,  and  Captain 
Porter  was  ordered  home  in  December,  1824,  to  explain 
his  action.  By  this  time,  however,  he  had  so  thoroughly 
done  the  difficult  work  intrusted  to  him  that  the  year 
1824  may  be  said  to  be  the  last  in  which  the  black  flag 
was  seen  in  the  West  Indies. 

On  reaching  the  United  States,  Porter  found  that  he 
had  to  face  a  court-martial  on  account  of  his  conduct 
at  Fajardo.  Unfortunately,  there  were  some  members  of 
the  court  who  were  reputed  to  be  personally  hostile  to 
the  commodore,  notably  the  president,  James  Barron.  At 
least,  Porter  believed  that  the  latter  bore  a  grudge  against 
him  because  he  had  been  a  member  of  the  court  that  sus 
pended  Barron  for  the  affair  of  the  Chesapeake  and  the 
Leopard.  At  all  events,  the  court  found  Commodore 
Porter  guilty  of  "disobedience  of  orders  and  conduct 
unbecoming  an  officer,"  and  suspended  him  from  the 
service  for  six  months.  The  court  added,  however,  that 
the  "censurable  conduct"  of  the  accused  was  due  to  an 
"anxious  disposition  on  his  part  to  advance  the  interest 
of  the  nation  and  the  service. ' ' 

Strictly  speaking,  there  is  no  question  but  that  the 
landing  of  an  armed  force  on  Spanish  soil,  except  in 
pursuit  of  actual  pirates,  was  an  act  of  hostility  and 
unauthorized  by  the  United  States  Government;  but  to 
many  who  were  acquainted  with  the  ways  of  West  Indian 
officials  the  circumstances  were  an  ample  justification. 
Porter  naturally  felt  that  the  sentence  was  unjust,  and 
resigned.  Shortly  after,  he  accepted  the  command  of  the 
naval  forces  of  Mexico,  but  after  three  years  of  this 
service  he  left  in  disgust  and  returned  to  the  United 
States.  President  Jackson  then  appointed  him  consul- 
general  to  Algiers  and  later  minister-resident  to  Turkey, 
in  which  office  he  died  in  1843. 


The  Slave  Trade 


Commodore  Porter's  name  is  associated  chiefly  with 
his  celebrated  cruise  in  the  Essex,  but  it  should  be  remem 
bered  that  by  abolishing  in  one  year  the  long-established 
piracy  of  the  Gulf  and  Caribbean,  he  performed  a  task 
far  more  difficult  and  hazardous. 

THE  SLAVE  TRADE 

Although  the  Constitution  forbade  the  prohibition  of 
the  slave  trade  to  the  United  States  prior  to  the  year 
1808,  Congress,  as  early  as  1794,  passed  an  act  prohibiting 
the  export  trade  and  providing  for  the  humane  treatment, 
during  their  passage,  of  slaves  imported  into  the  United 
States.  In  1800  it  was  made  a  crime,  punishable  by  two 
years'  imprisonment  and  a  fine  of  $2000,  for  any  Amer 
ican  citizen  to  engage  in  the  slave  trade.  In  1808,  the 
trade  was  prohibited  entirely,  and  in  1820  it  was  declared 
piracy  and  punishable  by  death.  Our  men-of-war  were 
ordered  to  take  slavers  wherever  found.  A  bounty  of 
twenty-five  dollars  a  head  was  offered  to  the  captor  for 
every  slave  on  board. 

In  spite  of  these  severe  measures,  the  slave  trade 
increased  enormously  for  two  principal  reasons  ;  first,  the 
great  profits  in  the  business,  and  second,  the  carelessness 
of  United  States  authorities.  As  an  example  of  the  first, 
in  1835  the  Baltimore  schooner  Napoleon,  of  ninety  tons, 
delivered  in  one  voyage  350  slaves.  These  cost  $16  a 
head  on  the  African  coast  and  sold  at  $360  each  in  Cuba. 
As  for  the  second,  although  the  slave  trade  was  declared 
piracy,  scarcely  a  week  passed  in  the  decade  before  the 
Civil  War  when  a  slaver  did  not  leave  New  York  harbor  ; 
and  the  first  American  slave  trader  hanged  as  a  pirate 
went  to  his  death  in  November,  1861,  after  the  Civil  War 
had  begun. 

The  efforts  of  our  navy  to  suppress  the  traffic  were 


The  United  States  Navy 

weakened  by  several  conditions.  For  a  number  of  years 
the  courts  in  England  and  America  would  convict  a  slaver 
only  when  the  negroes  were  actually  on  board.  The  result 
of  this  ruling  is  exemplified  in  the  case  of  the  slaver 
Brilliant e.  On  one  of  her  trips,  in  1831,  her  captain  found 
himself  becalmed  and  surrounded  by  four  British  cruisers. 
Anticipating  being  boarded  if  the  wind  did  not  rise,  he 
stretched  on  deck  his  entire  chain  cable,  suspended  it 
clear  of  everything,  and  shackled  it  to  his  anchor,  which 
hung  on  the  bow  ready  to  drop.  To  this  chain  he  lashed 
his  600  slaves.  He  waited  for  a  breeze  till  he  heard  the 
oars  of  the  British  boats  close  at  hand,  wrhen  he  cut  away 
the  anchor.  As  it  fell,  it  dragged  overboard  the  entire 
cable  with  its  human  freight;  and,  though  the  British 
heard  the  screams  of  the  victims  and  found  their  manacles 
still  lying  on  the  deck,  because  there  were  no  slaves  left  on 
board,  the  officers  had  to  leave  the  vessel  amid  the  jeers 
of  her  captain  and  crew.1 

It  was  not  long  after  this  incident  when  the  prepos 
terous  ruling  was  set  aside  in  favor  of  common  sense.  A 
more  serious  obstacle  to  the  suppression  of  the  trade  arose 
from  the  unwillingness  of  the  United  States  to  co-operate 
heartily  with  Great  Britain.  In  1824  the  English  Parlia 
ment  declared  the  slave  trade  piracy,  though  the  founda 
tions  of  Liverpool's  commercial  greatness  had  been  only 
recently  laid  by  the  profits  of  her  slavers.  England  soon 
went  still  further  by  asking  and  gaining  the  co-operation 
of  several  of  the  European  powers  in  suppressing  the 
slave  traffic  to  their  colonies.  But  when  she  made  an 
appeal  for  a  mutual  right  of  search  to  be  exercised  by 
United  States  and  British  cruisers  upon  the  merchantmen 
of  England  and  America  in  the  ''Middle  Passage"  she 
met  with  an  indignant  refusal.  Those  who  were  financially 

1  Spears,  The  American  Slave  Trade,  p.  145. 


The  Slave  Trade  213 

interested  in  the  trade  raised  the  cry  of  ' '  sailors '  rights, ' ' 
and  appealed  to  the  principles  of  the  War  of  1812. 

This  patriotic  clap-trap  succeeded;  and  as  the  Ameri 
can  ships  were  the  only  ones  safe  from  British  search, 
almost  the  entire  slave  trade  passed  under  the  protection 
of  the  American  flag.  Although  in  1842  the  United 
States,  in  a  treaty  with  England,  agreed  to  maintain  a 
squadron  of  not  less  than  eighty  guns  off  the  African  coast, 
the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  in  his  instructions  to  the  com 
modore  laid  more  emphasis  on  the  necessity  of  preventing 
any  attempted  search  of  American  ships  by  English 
cruisers  than  on  capturing  slavers.  Accordingly,  the 
commander  of  this  squadron,  Commodore  Matthew  C. 
Perry,  cruised  about  without  finding  a  single  slaver. 
Meanwhile,  every  English  officer  who  boarded  a  slaver  was 
obliged  to  leave  with  an  apology  if  the  captain  could  show 
American  papers,  real  or  forged. 

Early  in  the  fifties  Lieutenant-Commander  Andrew  H. 
Foote  captured  two  slavers  off  the  coast  of  Africa.  On 
his  return  he  wrote  a  book,  Africa  and  the  American 
Flag;  and  this  book,  by  describing  the  hideous  condi 
tions  of  the  traffic  and  the  protection  it  received  from 
the  American  ensign,  did  more  to  stop  the  abuse  than  all 
the  American  squadrons  put  together.  It  opened  the 
eyes  of  the  Americans  to  the  fact  that  their  flag  had 
become  the  symbol  of  the  slave  trade. 

During  President  Buchanan's  administration  the  Gov 
ernment  was  secretly  anxious  to  bring  about  the  annexa 
tion  of  Cuba.  In  order  to  create  a  sentiment  of  some 
sort  on  which  to  base  an  appeal  to  the  nation,  especially 
to  the  anti-slavery  sections,  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy 
ordered  American  naval  vessels  to  cruise  in  Cuban  waters 
and  capture  slavers  there.  In  spite  of  Spain's  formal 
renouncement  of  the  slave  trade,  made  under  pressure 
from  England,  it  was  common  knowledge  that  Cuba  was 


£14  The  United  States  Navy 

the  most  profitable  slave  market  in  the  world,  for  the 
black-mailing  charges  of  the  Cuban  officials  were  so  low 
as  not  to  interfere  seriously  with  the  great  profits  of  the 
business.  In  the  year  1860  alone,  twelve  Cuban  slavers 
were  captured  by  our  men-of-war,  although  that  was 
insignificant  compared  with  the  actual  number  of  slavers 
that  were  landing  negroes  at  various  points  along  the 
coast.  One  great  difficulty  was  the  fact  that  the  slavers, 
usually  American-built  "clipper"  ships,  or  sometimes 
converted  yachts,  could  easily  outsail  a  man-of-war.  At 
all  events  the  trade  was  never  so  nourishing  as  in  the  five 
years  preceding  the  Civil  War. 

During  that  time  the  pro-slavery  men  were  making 
active  efforts  to  repeal  all  existing  legislation  against  the 
slave  trade,  most  of  which  was  admittedly  dead-letter. 
But  the  change  of  administration  and  the  outbreak  of 
war  altered  the  situation.  The  limited  right  of  search 
asked  by  England  was  readily  granted  in  1862.  enlarged 
in  1863,  and  in  1870  extended  still  further.  From  the 
moment  the  United  States  showed  a  sincere  desire  to  allow 
her  navy  to  co-operate  with  the  British,  the  slave  trade 
was  doomed. 

THE  MUTINY  ON  THE  SOMERS 

In  the  fall  of  1842,  the  brig  Somcrs,  10  guns,  was 
ordered  to  the  African  coast  with  dispatches  for  Com 
modore  Perry's  squadron.  On  her  return  trip  to  New 
York,  November  26,  the  purser's  steward  got  word  to 
the  captain,  Commander  Alexander  Slidell  MacKenzie, 
that  Acting-Midshipman  Philip  Spencer  had  tried  to 
induce  him  to  join  a  conspiracy  to  seize  the  ship,  murder 
all  the  officers,  together  with  such  of  the  crew  as  would 
not  be  wanted,  and  turn  pirate. 

At  first,  Commander  MacKenzie  laughed  at  the  story 


The  Mutiny  on  the  Somers  215 

as  a  boy 's  joke,  but  since  the  bearing  of  the  crew  had  been 
insubordinate  from  the  time  they  left  Madeira,  the  other 
officers  were  inclined  to  regard  the  matter  as  serious. 
Accordingly,  Spencer  was  put  in  irons  and  his  effects 
were  searched,  with  the  result  that  a  paper  with  Greek 
characters  was  discovered.  It  happened  that  there  was  one 
person  on  board  besides  Spencer  who  understood  the  Greek 
alphabet — Midshipman  Rogers.  He  interpreted  the  words 
as  a  list  of  the  crew,  marked  "certain,"  or  "doubtful," 
with  a  few  observations  as  to  the  policy  to  be  pursued 
with  the  rest  of  the  crew. 

From  the  time  of  Spencer's  arrest  the  conduct  of  the 
crew  became  more  and  more  sullen  and  insubordinate. 
That  afternoon  there  was  a  sudden  and  mysterious  falling 
of  the  maintopmast  and  unnecessary  confusion  in  clearing 
it  away.  The  men  gathered  in  whispering  groups,  and 
Spencer  was  observed  making  signals  to  them  from  the 
quarter-deck  where  he  sat  in  irons. 

From  the  evidence  of  the  purser's  steward,  a  boat 
swain's  mate  named  Cromwell,  and  a  seaman  named 
Small  also  were  arrested  as  ring-leaders  and  put  in  irons. 
As  it  was  evident  from  the  temper  of  the  crew  that  the 
situation  was  extremely  grave,  Commander  MacKenzie 
convened  all  his  officers  in  a  court  of  inquiry,  while  he, 
with  a  midshipman,  took  charge  of  the  vessel.  After 
deliberating  about  a  day  and  a  half,  the  officers  returned 
a  report  that  the  prisoners  were  guilty  of  a  "determined 
intention  to  commit  a  mutiny  on  board  this  vessel  of  a 
most  atrocious  nature,"  and  in  view  of  the  "uncertainty 
as  to  what  extent  they  are  leagued  with  others  still  at 
large,  the  impossibility  of  guarding  against  the  contingen 
cies  which  a  day  or  an  hour  may  bring  forth,  we  are  con 
vinced  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  carry  them  to  the 
United  States,  and  that  the  safety  of  the  public  property, 
the  lives  of  ourselves,  and  of  those  committed  to  our 


216  The  United  States  Navy 

charge,  require  that  .  .  .  they  should  be  put  to 
death."2 

Commander  MacKenzie  concurred  in  this  opinion,  and 
on  December  1,  he  caused  the  three  conspirators  to  be 
hanged  from  the  yard-arm.  Upon  receiving  sentence, 
Spencer  and  Small  admitted  their  guilt;  Cromwell  pro 
tested  his  innocence  to  the  end.  The  execution  had  a 
salutary  effect  on  the  crew,  who  immediately  returned  to 
their  duties  with  an  alacrity  that  was  in  striking  contrast 
with  their  previous  conduct. 

On  the  arrival  of  the  Somers  at  New  York,  the  report 
of  this  execution  aroused  the  greatest  excitement,  par 
ticularly  as  Spencer  was  the  son  of  the  Secretary  of  War. 
MacKenzie  immediately  called  for  a  court  of  inquiry ;  but 
before  its  findings  were  reported,  he  was  hurried  to  a 
court-martial.  Though  both  courts  rendered  an  hon 
orable  acquittal,  for  a  long  time  thereafter  the  father  of 
Spencer  made  unsuccessful  efforts  to  have  MacKenzie 
indicted  in  the  civil  courts  for  murder.  The  newspapers 
naturally  made  a  great  deal  of  the  matter,  to  the  dis 
paragement  of  the  navy  as  well  as  of  MacKenzie,  and  even 
so  distinguished  a  writer  as  Fenimore  Cooper  published  a 
pamphlet  reviewing  the  evidence  of  the  court-martial 
with  a  severe  criticism  of  Commander  MacKenzie 's  con 
duct.  Indeed,  the  feeling  was  so  strong  that  it  became 
a  point  of  etiquette  among  naval  officers  never  to  discuss 
the  mutiny  on  the  Somers. 

Theoretically,  the  death  sentence,  then  as  now,  could 
not  be  inflicted  without  the  approval  of  the  President. 
But  a  commander's  first  duty  is  to  save  his  ship,  and 
the  lives  of  the  officers  and  men  under  him.  To  appre 
ciate  the  circumstances,  one  must  realize  that  the  Somers 


2  Proceedings  of  the  Naval  Court-Martial  in  the  Case  of  Alex 
ander  Slidell  MacKenzie,  p.  35. 


The  Mutiny  on  the  Somers  217 

was  about  the  size  of  a  pleasure  yacht  of  to-day.  There 
were  only  small  scuttles  leading  from  the  officers '  quarters 
to  the  deck,  and  it  would  have  been  a  simple  matter  for  the 
mutineers  to  seize  the  deck  and  kill  the  officers  one  by  one 
as  they  came  up.  In  fact,  if  there  had  been  a  leader  ready, 
after  the  three  were  put  in  irons,  a  single  concerted  rush 
by  the  crew  would  have  overpowered  the  officers  instantly. 
Further,  on  account  of  the  cramped  quarters,  the  pris 
oners  had  to  be  kept  in  irons  on  the  quarter-deck  where 
they  were  in  sight  of  the  crew  and  offering  a  constant 
temptation  to  rescue,  if  the  men  were  so  disposed.  As 
the  Somers  was  at  this  time  more  than  500  miles  from 
St.  Thomas,  there  was  no  knowing  when  she  would  be 
able  to  reach  New  York;  and  the  mutiny  might  have 
broken  out  at  any  moment.  Finally  the  dying  confession 
of  Spencer  showed  that  a  plot  for  a  mutiny  of  the  most 
diabolical  type  was  actually  afoot,  so  that  the  apprehen 
sions  of  Commander  MacKenzie  and  his  officers  were  not 
due  to  sudden  panic.  At  the  time  this  affair  occurred, 
Commander  MacKenzie  had  as  fine  a  professional  reputa 
tion  as  any  other  officer  in  the  service,  and  though  he  had 
a  difficult  decision  to  make,  it  is  safe  to  concur  with  the 
opinion  of  his  brother  officers  that  he  followed  the  only 
proper  course. 

This  incident  had  a  wider  significance  than  was  realized 
at  the  time.  It  suddenly  focused  the  attention  of  the 
naval  officers  and  the  public  upon  the  evils  of  a  practice 
that  had  become  prevalent,  that  of  throwing  upon  the 
navy  such  young  scapegraces  as  proved  on  shore  hard 
to  keep  out  of  jail.  Philip  Spencer  was  probably  the 
worst  example  of  this  type,  and  his  case,  like  most  of  the 
others,  was  aggravated  by  the  fact  that  he  was  backed 
by  strong  political  influence.  He  came  to  the  receiving 
ship  North  Carolina  with  a  bad  college  record,  and  made 
mischief  at  once.  When  the  first  lieutenant,  Craney, 


218  The  United  States  Navy 

tried  to  have  him  punished,  the  father  set  in  motion  all 
his  political  influence  to  persecute  the  unfortunate  officer, 
who  finally  escaped  only  by  resigning  his  commission. 
After  Spencer  had  made  a  brief  cruise  on  the  Brazilian 
station  in  the  John  Adams,  he  was  forced  to  resign  on 
account  of  his  ' '  disgraceful  and  scandalous  conduct ' ' ; 
but,  apparently  he  was  reappointed  to  the  Somers,  through 
his  father's  influence.  In  fact,  Spencer  admitted  to  Com 
mander  MacKenzie  just  before  the  execution  that  he  had 
cherished  the  plan  of  mutiny  and  piracy  ever  since  he 
entered  the  navy. 

THE  FOUNDING  OF  THE  NAVAL  ACADEMY 

Hitherto  the  idea  of  a  naval  school  corresponding  to 
the  Military  Academy  had  often  been  urged,  but  without 
success.  Congress  did  not  wish  to  spend  any  more  money 
on  the  navy,  and  the  officers,  especially  the  older  men, 
laughed  at  the  idea  of  "teaching  sailors  on  shore."  The 
Spencer  incident,  however,  showed  clearly  enough  the 
demoralizing  influence  of  taking  undisciplined  young 
rascals  into  the  service  without  any  training  or  qualifica 
tions  whatever.  Furthermore,  the  use  of  steam  for  men- 
of-war  had  by  this  time  passed  the  experimental  stage 
and  become  recognized  as  necessary.  It  began  to  be  evi 
dent  that  steam  engineering  could  not  be  picked  up,  like 
seamanship,  simply  by  going  to  sea.  Accordingly,  when 
the  historian,  George  Bancroft,  accepted  the  post  of 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  in  March,  1845,  he  did  so  with 
the  determination  of  founding  a  Naval  Academy.  Know 
ing  the  obstacles  he  had  to  overcome,  he  went  about  the 
work  with  consummate  tact.  He  managed  it  so  that  the 
suggestion  for  a  school  appeared  to  come  directly  from 
the  officers  themselves.  lie  first  asked  an  examining  board, 
consisting  of  older  officers,  to  make  a  report  on  the  best 


GEORGE  BANCitbiiW1  i  -J  ->  •>  ?  i      "i1    !  \  > 


The  Founding  of  the  Naval  Academy     £19 

location  for  the  school,  and  by  submitting  the  same  ques 
tion  to  another  board,  composed  of  the  younger  element, 
won  their  approval  as  well.  The  recommendation  of  the 
first  board  that  Fort  Severn,  Annapolis,  was  a  suitable 
place  was  formally  seconded  by  the  second  board,  and 
thus  the  entire  navy  was  committed  to  the  idea. 

Bancroft  then  overcame  the  unwillingness  of  Congress 
to  make  an  appropriation ;  first,  by  getting  a  transfer 
of  Fort  Severn  from  the  War  to  the  Navy  Department; 
and  secondly,  by  putting  all  but  a  selected  few  of  the 
navy  * l  schoolmasters ' '  on  the  waiting  list,  using  the  money 
appropriated  to  their  salaries  for  the  necessary  expenses 
of  the  new  academy. 

By  these  means,  he  managed  in  a  few  months  from 
the  time  he  accepted  his  post,  to  have  the  Naval  Academy 
in  actual  operation.  From  the  point  of  view  of  its  effect 
on  the  personnel  of  the  navy,  the  founding  of  this  school 
may  be  regarded  as  the  most  important  event  between 
the  War  of  1812  and  the  Civil  War. 


XIV 

THE  MEXICAN  WAR 
PERRY'S  EXPEDITION  TO  JAPAN 

THE  MEXICAN  WAR 

WHILE  President  Polk,  early  in  his  administration 
(1845-1849),  was  framing  a  treaty  with  Great  Britain 
that  should  establish  our  claim  to  Oregon — the  name 
applied  to  the  vast  territory  in  the  extreme  northwest — 
he  was  also  attempting  to  secure  the  Pacific  slope  to  the 
south ;  for  he  had  already  recognized  the  immense  future 
value  of  California  with  its  harbor  of  San  Francisco. 
This  territory,  owned  by  Mexico  and  as  yet  undeveloped, 
President  Polk  wished  to  purchase  at  a  fair  price;  but 
Mexico,  ill  disposed  because  of  the  annexation  of  Texas 
to  the  United  States  and  torn  by  civil  dissension,  would 
not  consent.  Her  refusal,  however,  did  not  discourage 
the  determined  President. 

On  the  13th  of  May,  1846,  when  troubles  relating  to 
Texas  had  become  acute,  Congress  by  a  joint  resolution 
recognized  a  state  of  war  as  existing  between  Mexico  and 
the  United  States.  Nearly  a  year  previous,  Commodore 
Sloat  in  command  of  the  American  squadron  on  the  Pacific 
coast  had  been  given  confidential  instructions  as  to  his 
course  of  action  should  Mexico  show  herself  "resolutely 
bent  on  hostilities. ' '  *  When  he  heard  that  war  had  begun, 
Commodore  Sloat  sailed  north,  and,  on  July  7,  1846,  took 
possession  of  Monterey.  Two  days  later,  by  his  orders, 
Captain  Montgomery  took  possession  of  San  Francisco, 
and  when  Commodore  Stockton,  who  had  relieved  Sloat, 

1  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  184C,  p.  378. 
220 


The  War  with  Mexico 

entered  Los  Angeles  the  month  following,  our  flag  was 
flying  over  every  commanding  position  in  California. 

A  campaign  in  the  extreme  west  had  also  been  planned 
by  the  army.  Brigadier-General  Kearny  had  begun  a 
march  to  the  Pacific  early  in  July,  stopping  long  enough 
before  Santa  Fe  to  scatter  an  army  of  Mexicans,  three 
times  his  force,  and  to  occupy  the  city.  When  he  arrived 
at  the  eastern  border  of  California  and  heard  that  the  navy 
had  largely  anticipated  him,  he  sent  most  of  his  troops 
back.  But  just  about  this  time  the  Mexicans  recaptured 
Los  Angeles.  Kearny  had  now  only  110  dragoons  and 
mounted  riflemen;  but,  co-operating  with  Stockton,  who 
furnished  a  large  force  of  sailors  and  marines,  he  marched 
from  San  Diego  to  Los  Angeles  and  after  a  two  days' 
battle  made  permanent  the  authority  of  the  United  States 
in  California.2  The  rest  of  the  war  was  on  the  east,  or 
Gulf,  side  of  Mexico. 

The  general  situation  at  the  beginning  of  the  war 
corresponded  in  many  respects  with  the  situation  a  half 
century  later,  when  the  United  States  was  fighting,  not 
Mexico,  but  Mexico's  mother  country,  Spain.  Commo 
dores  Sloat  and  Stockton  in  the  far  west,  like  Admiral 
Dewey  in  the  far  east,  acted  with  decision,  and,  falling 
upon  a  detached  portion  of  the  enemy  that  were  ill  pre 
pared,  at  once  took  possession  of  a  vast  territory.  In 
consequence,  the  plans  of  the  Navy  Department  in  both 
wars  were  chiefly  concerned  with  the  slower  and  more 
extensive  operations  nearer  home. 

The  chief  work  for  the  navy  was,  therefore,  to  block 
ade  and  seize  the  Mexican  ports  on  the  Gulf;  these  were 
from  north  to  south,  Tampico,  Tuxpan,  Vera  Cruz,  Alva- 
rado,  and  Frontera.  Later,  the  co-operation  of  the  navy 
was  required  for  the  army,  when  the  plan  of  military 

3  Bancroft,  H.  EL,  History  of  California,  vol.  v. 


222  The  United  States  Navy 

campaign  changed  a  long  march  from  the  Rio  Grande 
through  the  interior  by  General  Taylor,  to  a  short  advance 
from  Vera  Cruz  to  the  City  of  Mexico  by  General  Scott. 
The  navy  was  to  assist  in  the  transportation  of  troops  to 
Vera  Cruz  and  in  the  attack  on  that  city. 

The  "Home  Squadron,"  upon  which  this  duty  fell, 
was  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  under  the  command  of 
Commodore  David  Conner.  Its  early  work  wras  lacking  in 
results  because  of  two  reasons :  First,  it  was  handicapped 
by  having  no  gunboats  of  shallow  draft  to  cross  the  bars 
at  the  mouths  of  rivers.  Second,  the  commander  of  the 
squadron,  though  possessing  many  excellent  qualities,  was 
ill  adapted  to  the  service  required.  Captain  AY.  II.  Parker 
says  of  him:  "I  knew  Commodore  Conner  well;  I  was 
his  aid  for  some  time.  He  had  served  with  distinction  in 
the  War  of  1812,  and  was  in  the  Hornet  when  she  captured 
the  Penguin,  where  he  was  badly  wounded.  lie  was  an 
educated  man  and  a  brave  officer;  but  during  the  \var 
he  always  seemed  to  be  too  much  afraid  of  risking  his 
men;  he  lacked  moral  courage,  and  would  not  take  the 
responsibility  his  position  imposed  upon  him.  Conse 
quently  he  failed. ' ' 3 

The  naval  operations  before  Vera  Cruz  were  naturally 
of  much  greater  magnitude  than  at  any  other  point. 
Here  the  ships  covered  the  landing  of  the  army,  and  by  a 
very  nice  piece  of  organization  disembarked  10,000  in  one 
day.  Later,  a  naval  battery  with  guns  and  men  from  the 
ships  did  excellent  service  in  the  attack  upon  Vera  Cruz. 

Among  the  officers  who  had  a  minor  part  in  the  opera 
tions  on  the  Gulf  were  Farragut  and  Porter,  who  were 
later  to  win  renown,  but  were  as  yet  unknown.  At  the 
outbreak  of  hostilities  both  had  applied  to  the  Depart 
ment  for  active  duty;  but  although  they  possessed  unusual 

8  Parker,  Recollections  of  a  Naval  Officer,  p.  53. 


Operations  at  Vera  Cruz  223 

qualifications  for  service  about  Vera  Cruz,  they  were  kept 
waiting  for  several  months. 

Farragut  knew  Vera  Cruz,  for  he  had  served  five 
years  in  the  Gulf,  and  had  been  present  on  the  U.  S.  S. 
Erie  when,  nearly  twenty  years  earlier,  the  French  had 
taken  the  Castle  of  San  Juan  de  Ulloa,  the  chief  defense 
of  the  city.  And  it  was  because  he  was  confident  in  his 
knowledge  that  he  wrote  to  the  Department,  urging  that 
the  fleet  early  in  the  war  should  bombard  the  castle  or 
attack  by  escalade  4  at  night.  Knowing  the  character  of 
the  Mexicans,  he  believed  either  method  of  attack  would 
be  successful,  and  he  wanted  to  win  honors  for  the  navy. 
In  referring  to  what  he  had  learned  from  the  operations 
of  the  French,  he  later  remarked,  "I  .  .  .  had  taken 
great  pains  to  inform  myself  as  to  the  local  advantages  in 
attacking  the  place,  measured  the  depth  of  water  all 
around  the  fort,  and  marked  the  penetration  of  every 
shell  from  the  French  ships ;  ...  in  so  doing  I  had  not 
at  the  time  looked  forward  to  a  war  with  Mexico,  but  / 
had  made  it  a  rule  of  my  life  to  note  these  things  ivith  a 
view  to  the  possible  future."  5  It  was  just  this  thorough 
ness  of  Farragut  that  eventually  was  to  enable  him  to 
fly  the  admiral 's  flag,  but  in  the  Mexican  War  the  oppor 
tunity  for  making  it  tell  was  denied  him.  When  at  length 
he  was  given  a  ship,  he  was  ordered  to  blockade  Tuxpan. 
There  for  five  months  and  a  half,  where  nothing  ever 
happened,  he  remained ;  and  the  only  enemy  he  had  to  deal 
with  was  yellow  fever,  which  very  nearly  proved  fatal. 

Porter  also  knew  Vera  Cruz,  for  when  he  was  a  boy 
of  fourteen  his  father  was  commander-in-chief  of  the 
Mexican  Navy,  and  with  his  father  he  lived  for  a  while 

4  Escalade:   surmounting  the  walls  or  ramparts  of  a  fortifica 
tion  by  means  of  ladders  or  scaling. 

5  Loyall  Farragut,  The  Life  of  David  Glasgow  Farragut,  p.  157. 


224  The  United  States  Navy 

in  this  very  Castle  of  San  Juan.  It  was,  however,  not 
until  nearly  ten  months  after  the  beginning  of  hostilities 
that  his  request  for  active  service  was  granted.  He  had, 
in  the  meantime,  submitted  to  the  Department  a  plan  in 
many  respects  resembling  Farragut's.  It  provided  for  the 
exploding  of  several  cases  of  gunpowder  placed  under  the 
bastions  of  the  castle  by  Captain  Taylor,  the  submarine 
engineer.  Porter  had  volunteered  to  rush  in  through  the 
breach  made  by  the  explosion  with  fifty  picked  men,  and 
seize  the  top  of  the  castle.6  The  scheme  was  novel  and 
suggested  many  difficulties  in  its  operation,  but  Porter  had 
nerve  and  knew  how  effective  were  surprise  and  deeds  of 
daring  in  fighting  Mexicans.  Porter's  plan,  like  Farra 
gut's,  failed  to  gain  serious  consideration. 

To  Porter's  great  satisfaction,  however,  he  was  sent 
to  Yera  Cruz  in  time  to  take  part  in  the  attack.  His 
duty  was  that  of  first  lieutenant  on  the  Spitfire,  Captain 
Josiah  Tattnall,  of  the  "Mosquito  Fleet."  When  the 
army  had  been  landed,  Commodore  M.  C.  Perry,  who 
had  relieved  Conner,  wished  to  learn  the  position  of  the 
enemy's  guns,  and  directed  the  Mosquito  Fleet  to  draw 
their  fire.  The  night  previous  Porter  spent  in  a  row  boat, 
moving  daringly  about  under  the  enemy's  guns  in  order 
to  take  soundings.  In  the  morning  he  acted  as  a  pilot 
and  guided  in  the  Spitfire  and  the  Vixen,  each  with  two 
gunboats  in  tow.  They  advanced  to  a  position  between 
the  Castles  of  San  Juan  and  Santiago  and  opened  fire  on 
the  fortifications.  In  reply,  the  heavy  guns  of  the  forts 
began  a  furious  cannonade,  which  if  it  had  been  well 
directed  would  have  quickly  sunk  the  little  vessels.  Shot 
and  shell  splashed  around  them,  but,  incredible  as  it  may 
seem,  did  practically  no  harm.  The  army  and  the  navy 
looked  on  breathless  and  amazed.  Commodore  Perry 

6  Soley,  Admiral  Porter,  p.  59. 


Perry's  Expedition  to  Japan  225 

anxiously  signalled  a  retreat;  but  Tattnall,  following  the 
famous  example  of  Nelson  at  Copenhagen,  told  his  quar 
termaster  not  to  look  at  the  flagship  and  continued  the 
bombardment.  At  length,  Perry  sent  his  fleet  captain, 
Mayo,  to  the  Spitfire  with  peremptory  orders  to  retire, 
and  was  reluctantly  obeyed. 

The  war  ended  on  February  2,  1848,  when  according  to 
the  treaty  the  United  States  came  into  possession  of  an  im 
mense  area  which  included,  not  only  Texas,  but  the  present 
States  of  California,  New  Mexico,  Nevada,  Arizona,  Utah, 
and  parts  of  Wyoming  and  Colorado.  In  return  Mexico 
was  given  $15,000,000  and  released  from  the  payment  of 
claims,  amounting  to  $3,000,000,  held  against  her  by 
American  citizens.7 

Although  our  naval  officers  and  seamen  for  several 
months  continued  to  exhibit  courage,  resource,  and  daring, 
yet  the  Mexican  War  cannot  be  regarded  as  of  great 
importance  in  the  history  of  the  navy.  As  the  enemy  had 
no  force  to  meet  our  ships  on  their  element,  the  army 
bore  a  far  more  conspicuous  part.  At  the  same  time  the 
navy,  through  its  spirited  co-operation,  made  possible 
several  victories  of  the  army,  the  most  important  of  which 
was  Vera  Cruz ;  and  for  this  service  gained  recognition. 


PERRY'S  EXPEDITION  TO  JAPAN 

The  acquisition  of  California  opened  the  way  for  trade 
with  the  Orient.  American  merchants  had  already  made 
a  beginning,  and  for  some  years  our  whalers  had  been 
carrying  on  extensive  operations  in  the  Japanese  Sea. 
The  United  States  earnestly  desired  friendly  relations 
with  Japan  for  three  reasons :  1.  To  protect  our  shipping ; 
in  stress  of  weather  foreign  vessels  could  not  take  refuge 

7  Cambridge  Modern  History,   vii,   397. 
15 


226  The  United  States  Navy 

in  Japanese  ports,  and  when  wrecked  on  the  Japanese 
coast  the  crews  were  thrown  into  prison.  2.  To  facilitate 
trade  with  Asia;  Japan  had  rich  industries,  she  lay  on 
the  route  to  China,  and  she  had  deposits  of  coal  of  the 
greatest  value  to  steamers  making  the  long  voyages. 
3.  To  succeed  where  England,  France,  Portugal,  and 
Russia  had  failed,  for  they  had  long  been  seeking  trade 
relations  in  vain. 

In  the  middle  of  the  sixteenth  century,  Japan  had, 
with  great  friendliness,  received  missionaries  as  well  as 
traders  from  Holland,  Portugal,  and  other  countries.  For 
the  next  half  century  the  Christianization  of  Japan 
advanced  with  marked  rapidity.  But  at  the  end  of  that 
period  there  occurred  several  miserable  quarrels  between 
the  Europeans  of  different  monastic  orders,  as  well  as 
between  the  Dutch  and  Portuguese  (their  home  countries 
being  then  at  war  with  each  other).  Whereupon  the 
Japanese  decidedly  changed  in  their  attitude,  and  when 
native  Christians  later  were  found  to  be  plotting  with 
the  Portuguese  against  the  throne,  the  government  resorted 
to  severest  measures.  It  not  only  stamped  out  the  Chris 
tian  religion,  but  expelled  all  foreigners;  a  slight  excep 
tion  was  made  in  favor  of  the  Dutch,  who,  limited  by  the 
strictest  regulations,  were  allowed  to  retain  residence 
and  a  few  commercial  privileges  in  Nagasaki.  Japan 
thus  entered  upon  a  policy  of  seclusion  that  lasted  for 
two  centuries.  It  was  from  this  that  the  United  States 
succeeded  in  wresting  her. 

There  were  several  steps  that  led  up  to  this  notable 
achievement.  In  1846  Commodore  Biddle  with  the  Colum 
bus  and  the  Vincennes  entered  Yedo  Bay.  Nine  years 
earlier  the  Morrison,  an  unarmed  ship  that  attempted  to 
land  shipwrecked  Japanese  sailors,  had  been  fired  upon 
by  the  forts.  Biddle  Avas  treated  with  more  respect. 
The  Japanese,  with  a  show  of  great  generosity,  brought 


Perry's  Expedition  to  Japan 

him  supplies,  but  they  would  allow  no  one  to  land;  and 
to  the  offer  of  friendly  intercourse,  they  replied,  "Go 
away  and  do  not  come  back  any  more."  In  1849  Com 
mander  Glynn  with  the  Preble  visited  Nagasaki  and  com 
pelled  the  release  of  some  American  sailors  who  had  been 
shipwrecked  the  year  before  and  imprisoned.  During 
this  transaction  he  discovered  that  the  Japanese  knew  all 
about  our  recent  victory  over  Mexico  and  had  been  con 
siderably  impressed.  Returning  home  he  reported  that 
the  time  was  unusually  favorable  for  the  United  States  to 
try  the  moral  effect  of  an  armed  demonstration.  A  large 
expedition  was  accordingly  authorized,  and  to  Commodore 
Matthew  Calbraith  Perry,  on  March  24,  1852,  was  given 
the  command. 

In  organizing  his  squadron  Perry  encountered  many 
vexatious  delays.  Had  he  waited  for  the  twelve  ships 
assured  him,  he  might  never  have  seen  Japan.  However, 
the  months  of  waiting  were  not  given  entirely  to  idleness. 
Charts  of  Japanese  waters  were  secured  from  Holland 
at  a  cost  of  $30,000.  And,  through  book  collectors  in  New 
York  and  London,  Perry  gathered  all  the  important  litera 
ture  relating  to  the  Japanese.  By  these  and  other  means 
he  carefully  acquainted  himself  with  Japanese  history, 
customs,  and  manners. 

Commodore  Perry  sailed  from  Norfolk,  November  24, 
1852.  On  arriving  in  China,  he  continued  his  study  and 
preparation.  Finally,  when  all  was  ready,  he  directed  his 
course  toward  the  very  heart  of  Japan.  On  July  8,  1853, 
with  the  steam  frigates  Susquehanna  and  Mississippi, 
towing  the  sloops  of  war  Saratoga  and  Plymouth,  he 
moved  slowly  up  the  bay  of  Yedo  and  dropped  anchor  off 
Uraga,  a  city  twenty-seven  miles  from  the  capital,  Yedo 
(Tokio).  This  was  the  first  appearance  of  a  steamer  in 
Yedo  Bay ;  and  great  was  the  astonishment  of  the  natives 
to  see  the  huge  ships  approaching  directly  against  the 


228 


The  United  States  Navy 


wind.  A  cordon  of  small  boats  soon  surrounded  the 
vessels,  and  the  curious  natives  caught  at  the  chains  and 
attempted  to  clamber  on  board.  This  and  many  other 
liberties  had  been  permitted  by  foreign  ships  in  the  past, 
but  now  the  Japanese  were  forcibly  given  to  understand 


JAPAN 


JAPAN 

that  they  must  keep  off.  Perry,  in  coming  to  the  exclusive 
nation,  had  decided  fairly  to  outdo  them  in  exclusiveness, 
and  had  given  orders  forbidding  communication  with  the 
natives  except  from  the  flagship.  Even  when  the  Vice- 
Governor  of  Uraga  appeared  in  a  small  boat  and  an  inter 
preter  declared  his  rank,  he  was  kept  waiting  until  he 
had  explained  why  he,  and  not  the  Governor,  had  come. 


Perry's  Expedition  to  Japan  229 

And  when  the  gangway  was  lowered  and  the  dignitary 
came  on  board,  he  was  by  no  means  permitted  to  see  Com 
modore  Perry.  Perry,  because  of  his  rank  as  the  great 
ambassador  of  the  President,  would  meet  no  one  less  than 
a  "counsellor  of  the  Empire"  (cabinet  minister).  How 
ever,  Lieutenant  Contee,  acting  as  Perry's  representative, 
informed  the  Vice-Governor  of  the  friendly  mission  on 
which  the  Americans  had  come,  and  of  the  letter  written 
by  the  President  to  the  Emperor,  which  Commodore  Perry 
would  deliver  with  appropriate  formalities.  The  Vice- 
Governor's  immediate  answer  was  that  "Nagasaki  was 
the  only  place,  according  to  the  laws  of  Japan,  for  nego 
tiating  foreign  business,  and  it  would  be  necessary  for 
the  squadron  to  go  there."  To  this  "he  was  told  that 
the  commodore  had  come  purposely  to  Uraga  because  it 
was  near  to  Yedo,  and  that  he  should  not  go  to  Nagasaki; 
that  he  expected  the  letter  to  be  duly  and  properly 
received  where  he  then  was ;  that  his  intentions  were  per 
fectly  friendly,  but  that  he  would  allow  of  no  indignity. ' '  8 

Perry  had  resolved  to  use  force  only  as  a  last  resort; 
yet  that  he  might  be  prepared  for  emergency  he  had 
already  cleared  the  decks  and  begun  drilling  the  crews  as 
in  war.  It  was  indeed  a  time  of  uncertainty.  Though  on 
the  ships  all  was  very  quiet  that  evening,  on  the  shores  the 
blazing  of  beacon  fires  from  every  hill  top  and  the  tolling 
of  a  great  alarm  bell  gave  indication  of  the  tremendous 
excitement  that  was  rapidly  spreading  among  the  people. 

At  seven  o'clock  the  next  morning  two  large  boats  that 
came  alongside  the  Susquehanna  brought  the  Governor 
of  Uraga.  Again  the  exclusive  commodore  would  not 
deign  to  treat  with  an  official  beneath  his  rank,  but  dele- 

8  This  and  the  following  quotations  relating  to  the  opening  of 
Japan  are  from  Hawks's  Narrative  of  the  Expedition  to  Japan. 
This  is  the  official  account,  compiled  from  Perry's  notes  under  his 
immediate  supervision. 


230  The  United  States  Navy 

gated  Captains  Buchanan  and  Adams  to  confer  with  him. 
The  first  suggestion  from  the  new  conferee  was  ''Naga 
saki";  and  again  this  met  with  an  emphatic  refusal.  The 
captains  said  that  the  commodore  "would  persist  in  deliv 
ering  the  letter  where  he  was;  and,  moreover,  that  if  the 
Japanese  Government  did  not  see  fit  to  appoint  a  suitable 
person  to  receive  the  documents  in  his  possession  addressed 
to  the  Emperor,  that  he,  the  commodore,  whose  duty  it 
was  to  deliver  them,  would  go  on  shore  with  a  sufficient 
force  and  deliver  them  in  person,  be  the  consequences  what 
they  might. ' '  The  Governor  now  requested  an  opportun 
ity  to  send  to  Yedo  for  further  instructions.  This  he  said 
would  require  four  days ;  he  was  informed  the  commodore 
would  wait  only  three.  Before  departing  the  Governor 
asked  what  the  ships'  boats,  busily  engaged  since  daylight 
in  surveying  the  bay  and  harbor,  were  doing.  And  when 
he  was  told,  he  strongly  protested,  urging  that  it  was 
against  the  Japanese  law  to  permit  such  examinations. 
The  quick  reply  was  "that  the  American  laws  command 
them,  and  that  Americans  were  as  much  bound  to  obey 
the  American  as  he  was  to  obey  the  Japanese  laws. ' ' 

Perry  was  well  aware  "that  the  more  exclusive  he 
should  make  himself,  and  the  more  unyielding  he  might 
be  in  adhering  to  his  declared  intentions,  the  more  respect 
these  people  of  forms  and  ceremonies  would  be  disposed 
to  award  him."  And  thus  it  happened  that  on  the  day 
following  the  Governor's  visit,  Sunday,  Perry, 'who  from 
his  boyhood  up  had  been  careful  in  Sabbath  observance, 
refused  to  admit  on  board  his  ship  several  mandarins 
who  had  come  to  make  an  unofficial  visit.  If  the  Japanese 
had  been  familiar  with  the  language  of  their  visitors  they 
would  have  been  further  edified  by  one  of  Isaac  Watts 's 
hymns  sung  in  the  morning  service:  "Before  Jehovah's 
awful  throne,  Ye  nations  bow  with  solemn  joy." 

As  can  be  easily  imagined,  the  communications  taken 


Perry's  Expedition  to  Japan  231 

to  Yedo  by  the  Governor  of  Uraga  had  the  effect  of  an 
earthquake.  For  even  if  the  Japanese  were  not  to  be 
shaken  out  of  their  prejudice  against  foreigners  by 
Perry's  friendly  purpose,  they  were  tremendously  dis 
turbed  by  his  individual  firmness  and  power.  They  were 
shrewd  enough  to  recognize  that  if  they  forcibly  resisted 
him,  he  might  land,  and  by  dwelling  in  it  defile  the  Holy 
Country.  They  especially  dreaded  this,  because  the  gov 
ernment  was  already  in  an  unstable  condition  and  the 
dynasty  in  power  was  threatened  with  rebellion. 

Of  this  internal  disorder  Perry  had  no  knowledge. 
But  he  was  rejoiced  by  the  Governor's  returning,  on  the 
day  appointed,  with  the  answer  that  the  President 's  letter 
would  be  received  by  an  official  of  superior  rank  with 
fitting  ceremonies.  Almost  immediately  the  Governor 
proceeded  to  arrange  with  Captains  Buchanan  and  Adams, 
the  time,  place,  and  even  the  minutest  details  for  the 
formal  delivery  and  acceptance  of  the  letter. 

Two  days  later  (July  14),  shortly  before  eight  o'clock, 
the  Susquehanna  and  the  Mississippi  moved  down  the 
bay,  and  inshore,  towards  a  large  and  highly  decorated 
reception  hall  which  the  Japanese  had  quickly  erected. 
At  a  signal  from  the  Susquehanna,  300  officers,  sailors, 
and  marines  filled  fifteen  launches  and  cutters,  and  with 
stately  procession  moved  toward  the  shore.  When  they 
had  gone  half  way,  a  salute  of  thirteen  guns  from  the 
Susquehanna  began  to  boom  and  re-echo  among  the  hills ; 
this  was  to  announce  that  the  great  commodore,  the 
august  ambassador  of  the  President,  upon  whom  no 
Japanese  eye  had  yet  been  privileged  to  gaze,  was  embark 
ing  in  his  barge. 

' '  On  the  arrival  of  the  commodore,  his  suite  of  officers 
formed  a  double  line  along  the  landing  place,  and  as  he 
passed  up  between,  they  fell  into  order  behind  him.  The 
procession  was  then  formed  and  took  up  its  march  toward 


232  The  United  States  Navy 

the  house  of  reception,  the  route  to  which  was  pointed  out 
by  Kayama  Yezaiman  [the  Governor  of  Uraga]  and  his 
interpreter,  who  preceded  the  party.  The  marines  led 
the  way,  and  the  sailors  following,  the  commodore  was 
duly  escorted  up  the  beach.  The  United  States  flag  and 
the  broad  pennant  were  borne  by  two  athletic  seamen, 
who  had  been  selected  from  the  crews  of  the  squadron  on 
account  of  their  stalwart  proportions.  Two  boys,  dressed 
for  the  ceremony,  preceded  the  commodore,  bearing  in  an 
envelope  of  scarlet  cloth  the  boxes  which  contained  his 
credentials  and  the  President's  letter.  These  documents, 
of  folio  size,  were  beautifully  written  on  vellum,  and  not 
folded,  but  bound  in  blue  silk  velvet.  Each  seal,  attached 
by  cord  of  interwoven  gold  and  silk  with  pendent  gold 
tassels,  was  encased  in  a  circular  box  six  inches  in  diam 
eter  and  three  in  depth,  wrought  of  pure  gold.  Each  of 
the  documents,  together  with  its  seal,  was  placed  in  a  box 
of  rosewood  about  a  foot  long,  with  lock,  hinges,  and 
mountings  all  of  gold.  On  either  side  of  the  commodore 
marched  a  tall,  well-formed  negro,  who,  armed  to  the 
teeth,  acted  as  his  personal  guard."  These  negroes,  the 
pick  of  the  squadron,  were  giants  in  stature  and  attracted 
great  attention  from  the  Japanese,  who  had  never  seen 
blacks  before.  This  pomp  and  parade,  carefully  planned 
for  effect,  seems  to  have  been  highly  successful. 

As  Perry  and  his  suite  entered  the  reception  hall, 
magnificent  in  its  hangings  of  violet-colored  silk  and  fine 
cotton,  two  princes,  who  were  seated  on  the  left,  rose, 
bowed,  and  then  resumed  their  seats.  They  had  been 
appointed  by  their  government  to  receive  the  documents, 
and  their  dignity  was  appalling ;  during  the  entire  inter 
view  they  sat  with  statuesque  formality  uttering  not  a 
word  nor  making  a  gesture. 

The  complete  ceremonies  occupied  not  more  than  a 
half  hour.  For  some  minutes  after  the  commodore  had 


Perry's  Expedition  to  Japan  233 

taken  his  seat  there  was  absolute  silence,  broken  finally  by 
the  Japanese  interpreter  asking  the  American  interpreter 
if  the  letters  were  ready  for  delivery  and  stating  that  the 
princes  were  ready  to  receive  them.  "The  commodore, 
upon  this  being  communicated  to  him,  beckoned  to  the 
boys  who  stood  in  the  lower  hall  to  advance,  when  they 
immediately  obeyed  his  summons  and  came  forward,  bear 
ing  the  handsome  boxes  which  contained  the  President's 
letter  and  other  documents.  The  two  stalwart  negroes 
followed  immediately  in  rear  of  the  boys,  and  marching 
up  to  the  scarlet  receptacle  [prepared  by  the  Japanese 
for  the  letters] ,  received  the  boxes  from  the  hands  of  the 
bearers,  opened  them,  took  out  the  letters,  and,  displaying 
the  writings  and  seals,  laid  them  upon  the  lid  of  the 
Japanese  box — all  in  perfect  silence." 

The  commodore  then  directed  his  interpreter  to  inform 
the  Japanese  that  he  should  leave  in  two  or  three  days, 
but  would  return  the  following  spring  for  an  answer. 
When  they  inquired  if  he  should  return  with  all  four 
vessels,  he  gave  the  prompt  assurance,  "All  of  them  and 
probably  more,  as  these  are  only  a  portion  of  the  squad 
ron.  ' '  After  a  further  impressive  silence,  and  a  repetition 
of  the  formal  bowing  with  which  the  conference  had 
begun,  Perry  took  his  departure. 

Before  leaving  the  bay  of  Yedo  the  Susquehanna  had 
another  visit  from  Yezaiman,  Governor  of  Uraga,  who, 
after  being  shown  over  the  ship,  was  urged  to  remain  and 
see  the  engine  in  motion.  The  interest  of  the  Japanese 
was  keenly  aroused  and  there  could  be  no  doubt  of  the 
favorable  impression  produced  by  this  striking  example 
of  American  inventive  genius.  Perry  advanced  farther 
up  the  western  shore  of  the  bay  within  ten  miles  of  Yedo, 
all  the  while  taking  soundings,  and  again  he  caused  the 
Japanese  evident  uneasiness.  Then  he  retraced  his  course 
and  sailed  for  China. 


234  The  United  States  Navy 

While  the  American  ships  were  wintering  in  Hong 
Kong,  Commodore  Perry  had  his  suspicions  aroused  by 
the  unusual  movements  of  some  French  and  Russian 
ships  in  the  vicinity,  and  he  feared  lest  they  were  secretly 
planning  a  visit  to  the  bay  of  Yedo,  with  the  purpose  of 
snatching  the  advantages  he  had  gained.  He  resolved  not 
to  be  anticipated ;  and  although  navigation  in  those  waters 
was  supposed  to  be  extremely  dangerous  in  winter,  he 
sailed  for  Japan  on  the  14th  of  January,  1854.  Entering 
Yedo  Bay  with  three  steam  frigates  and  four  sloops  of 
war  he  steamed  twelve  miles  beyond  Uraga,  and  on  Feb 
ruary  13  came  to  anchor  twenty  miles  from  Yedo. 

Shortly  after  Perry's  first  visit,  the  Japanese  Emperor 
had  died.  The  Japanese  officials  had  sent  the  Americans 
news  of  this  while  the  squadron  was  at  Hong  Kong,  and 
had  requested  that  they  defer  their  return  as  it  might 
create  confusion.  Perry  suspected  the  genuineness  of 
the  report ;  at  least  he  could  see  no  reason  why  he  should 
not  be  near  to  comfort  his  new  friends  in  their  bereave 
ment.  On  arrival  he  was  well  received,  but  the  Japanese 
dignitaries  who  conferred  with  his  captains — for  Perry 
was  still  playing  his  role  of  exclusiveness — at  once  re 
quested  that  the  ships  put  back  to  Uraga,  where  they  said 
preparations  had  been  made  to  treat  with  the  Americans 
and  to  give  an  answer  to  the  President's  letter.  Perry, 
feeling  that  it  would  be  dangerous  to  yield  in  a  single 
instance,  replied,  through  his  captains,  that  Uraga  was 
unsafe  and  inconvenient  for  the  ships,  and  further  that 
it  was  the  custom  of  civilized  nations  to  treat  at  the 
metropolis.  When  the  dignitaries  continued  to  insist  on 
Uraga  and  the  captains  to  refuse,  and  several  days  had 
been  spent  in  useless  conferences,  Perry  settled  the  diffi 
culty  in  a  characteristic  way.  Without  warning,  he  moved 
the  squadron  forward  until  within  sight  of  Yedo.  This 
induced  the  Japanese  promptly  to  adopt  a  conciliatory 


Framing  the  Treaty  235 

tone ;  they  then  proposed  for  the  treaty  ground  Yokohama, 
almost  opposite  where  the  ships  were  anchored,  and  this 
was  at  once  accepted. 

On  the  eighth  of  March,  the  day  that  had  been  set  for 
beginning  the  negotiations,  the  commodore  with  500  men 
and  three  bands  of  music,  went  ashore  to  the  "Treaty 
House,"  erected  for  this  especial  occasion.  At  an  early 
stage  in  the  negotiations,  the  Japanese  -expressed  a  willing 
ness  to  enter  into  friendly  intercourse  with  the  United 
States,  but  were  seemingly  determined  to  grant  nothing. 
Three  weeks  of  conference  followed,  and  as  the  commodore 
continued  to  show  the  firmness  and  dignity  that  had 
already  won  prestige  for  him  and  as  he  kept  his  men 
strictly  under  discipline,  the  Japanese  came  to  regard 
their  persistent  visitors  with  increasing  tolerance. 

In  the  middle  of  the  negotiations  Perry  delivered  to 
the  Japanese  the  presents  that  the  storeship  had  lately 
brought  from  America,  designed  especially  for  this  people, 
and  he  sent  ashore  officers  and  workmen  to  prepare  the 
gifts  for  exhibition.  Among  them  were  agricultural 
implements,  clocks,  two  telegraph  instruments,  three 
Francis  life-boats,  and  a  Lilliputian  railway.  The  last 
had  a  locomotive,  tender,  car,  and  rails,  but  was  so  small 
that  it  could  scarcely  carry  a  child  of  six.  ' '  The  Japanese, 
however,  were  not  to  be  cheated  out  of  a  ride,  and,  as 
they  were  unable  to  reduce  themselves  to  the  capacity  of 
the  inside  of  a  carriage,  they  betook  themselves  to  the 
roof.  It  was  a  spectacle  not  a  little  ludicrous  to  behold  a 
dignified  mandarin  whirling  around  the  circular  road  at 
the  rate  of  twenty  miles  an  hour,  with  his  loose  robes 
flying  in  the  wind,  .  .  .  [clinging]  with  a  desperate 
hold  to  the  edge  of  the  roof,  fand]  grinning  with  intense 
interest."  In  return  the  Japanese  brought  generous 
presents  of  lacquered  work,  pongee,  umbrellas,  dolls,  and 
various  other  things,  together  with  the  substantial  remem- 


236  The  United  States  Navy 

brances  of  200  sacks  of  rice  and  300  chickens.  Then, 
after  this  evidence  of  friendliness,  they  entertained  their 
guests  with  wrestling  matches  between  their  champions, 
enormously  fat  and  muscular.  Later  the  Americans 
received  seventy  of  the  Japanese  on  board  the  Powhatan 
and  the  cook  fairly  outdid  himself  in  setting  forth  a 
dinner  which,  as  the  Japanese  did  not  pay  much  attention 
to  order  in  eating  the  various  dishes  of  food  loading  the 
tables,  is  described  as  the  most  "confused  commingling 
of  fish,  flesh,  and  fowl,  soups  and  syrups,  fruits  and 
fricassees,  roast  and  boiled,  pickles  and  preserves " ;  all 
of  which  the  Japanese  consumed  in  large  quantities,  and 
became  fairly  "  uproarious  under  the  influence  of  over 
flowing  supplies  of  champagne,  Madeira,  and  punch,  which 
they  seemed  greatly  to  relish. ' ' 

On  Friday,  March  31,  1854,  Commodore  Perry  and 
four  Japanese  commissioners  signed  a  treaty  written  in 
the  English,  Dutch,  and  Chinese  languages.  This  guar 
anteed  succor  and  protection  to  shipwrecked  Americans; 
permission  for  a  ship  in  distress,  or  overtaken  by  storm, 
to  enter  any  Japanese  port;  the  opening  of  the  ports 
Simoda  and  Hakodadi,  where  Americans  could  secure 
water,  wood,  coal,  and  provisions,  and  enjoy,  with  some 
restrictions,  trade  relations.9 

Larger  privileges  were  later  granted  by  the  treaties  of 
1857  and  1858.  England,  quick  to  follow  the  advantage 
gained  by  the  United  States,  six  months  after  Perry 


8  An  interesting  souvenir  of  Perry's  expedition  is  preserved  at 
the  U.  S.  Naval  Academy.  It  is  an  ancient  bronze  bell,  said  to 
have  been  cast  in  1168,  which  was  presented  to  Perry  by  the 
Regent  of  Napha,  one  of  the  Lew  Chew  Islands,  a  dependency  of 
Japan.  Among  the  many  flowery  sentences  inscribed  on  the  outside, 
one  gave  the  assurance  that  if  the  people  would  bear  in  mind  to 
act  rightly  and  truly,  and  the  lords  and  ministers  would  do  justice 
in  a  body,  the  barbarians  would  never  invade  their  country. 


The  Treaty  with  Japan  237 

(September,  1854),  also  secured  commercial  rights,  and 
Russia  and  Holland  were  only  a  few  months  later.  Thus 
if  Perry's  expedition  had  been  planned  solely  for  our 
own  commercial  profit,  there  might  have  been  disappoint 
ment.  But  the  prestige  gained  by  the  American  commo 
dore,  who  had  shown  himself  such  an  able  diplomat,  and 
the  honor  that  came  to  our  nation  in  having  drawn  Japan 
from  her  isolation,  proved  an  ample  recompense. 


XV 

THE  CIVIL  WAR:  THE  FIRST  YEAR 

IN  the  great  struggle  with  Secession  certain  conditions 
that  had  existed  in  our  wars  with  England  were  reversed. 
The  odds  were  as  decidedly  in  favor  of  the  United  States 
Navy  as  earlier  they  had  been  against  it.  Yet  the  varied 
duty  that  fell  to  the  navy  was  full  of  hazard  and  difficulty, 
and  often  involved  extreme  tests  of  endurance. 

It  was  not  merely  that  the  South  showed  daring  and 
brilliancy  in  the  few  single-ship  actions,  and,  by  develop 
ing  the  idea  of  the  ironclad,  threatened  destruction  to 
whole  squadrons  of  wooden  vessels;  the  National  Navy 
had  also  to  reckon  among  its  foes  powerful  forts  guarding 
the  harbors  and  the  rivers;  it  had  to  blockade  a  coast 
over  3000  miles  in  length;  and  with  the  army  it  was 
assigned  the  task  of  opening  the  vast  system  of  water 
ways  comprised  in  the  Mississippi  and  its  tributaries. 

THE  NAVY  UNPREPARED 

Here  were  difficulties  for  any  navy,  and  they  were 
more  formidable  because  of  the  wretched  condition  of  the 
National  Navy  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war.  On  March  4, 
1861,  when  President  Lincoln  took  his  oath  of  office,  there 
were  in  commission,  including  supply  ships  and  tenders, 
forty- two  vessels,  of  which  there  were  only  twenty-three 
propelled  by  steam  that  might  be  called  efficient.  On 
that  day  but  four  of  the  twelve  ships  constituting  the 
home  squadron  were  in  Northern  ports,  available  for 
service  l  •  the  other  squadrons  were  in  the  Mediterranean, 

1  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  "Navy,   1801,  p.   10. 
238 


The  Navy  Unprepared  239 

Pacific,  and  off  Brazil,  the  East  Indies,  and  Africa.  With 
the  time  necessary  for  the  transmission  of  orders  and  for 
the  return  voyage,  it  was  several  months  before  these 
squadrons  could  be  utilized.  Threats  of  war  had  been 
heard  long  before  fighting  began ;  why  then,  when  the 
crisis  came,  was  the  navy  so  utterly  unprepared? 

First,  President  Buchanan  (1857-1861)  was  the  victim 
of  his  environment;  three  of  his  Cabinet  advisers  were, 
to  say  the  least,  lukewarm  in  their  allegiance  to  the 
Union;  and  a  fourth,  Mr.  Toucey,  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy,  although  from  Connecticut,  was  so  strong  in  his 
Southern  sympathies,  that  he  had  earlier  failed  of  re-elec 
tion  to  the  Senate.  Secondly,  Congress  had  by  its  indiffer 
ence  and  blindness  disorganized  the  navy  quite  as  much 
as  had  the  administration.  Because  of  the  wide-spread 
financial  disaster,  beginning  in  1857,  the  national  revenue 
had  fallen  off,  and  Congress,  in  attempting  to  economize, 
had  severely  crippled  the  navy. 

Opposition  to  building  or  even  repairing  ships  came 
from  Northern  as  well  as  Southern  sources.  Congress 
men  from  Ohio  and  Illinois  led  in  the  attack  on  the  navy 
and  the  naval  appropriation  bill.  Congress  as  a  whole 
was  apathetic.  Strange  as  it  may  seem  now,  even  a  few 
months  before  hostilities  began,  the  Northern  members  had 
no  real  apprehension  of  the  titanic  struggle  at  hand. 
Outside  of  Congress  such  a  clear-sighted  observer  as 
James  Russell  Lowell,  writing  on  the  eve  of  Lincoln's 
election,  made  light  of  the  threats  of  secession. 

When  Lincoln  was  elected  and  secession  had  been 
accomplished,  President  Buchanan  still  remained  inac 
tive;  thus  no  preparation  was  made  to  meet  the  great 
emergency.  Admiral  Chadwick  ably  remarks  on  the  state 
of  affairs  at  the  time :  ' '  The  whole  Government  was  in  a 
state  of  sad  flabbiness.  There  was  but  a  nucleus  of  an 
army :  the  navy  was  moribund ;  there  was  a  captain  afloat 


240  The  United  States  Navy 

in  command  nearly  seventy  years  of  age ;  the  commandant 
of  the  Norfolk  Navy  Yard  was  sixty-eight;  the  com 
mandant  at  Pensacola,  sixty-seven.  The  general-in-chief 
of  the  army  was  seventy-four.  There  was  no  settled  belief 
or  opinion.  The  New  York  Tribune,  which  held  the  posi 
tion  of  leadership  among  Republican  journals,  and  which 
was  a  power  throughout  the  North,  was  proclaiming  that 
'if  the  Cotton  States  shall  become  satisfied  that  they  can 
do  better  out  of  the  Union  than  in  it,  we  insist  on  letting 
them  go  in  peace';  and,  again,  that  'five  millions  of  people, 
more  than  half  of  them  of  the  dominant  race,  of  whom  at 
least  half  a  million  are  able  and  willing  to  shoulder 
muskets,  can  never  be  subdued  while  fighting  around  and 
over  their  own  hearthstones' — expressions  which  had  a 
powerful  effect  for  ill  throughout  the  South. ' ' 2  The 
opinion  that  the  South  could  never  be  subdued  was  freely 
uttered  in  the  North,  and  universally  believed  in  Europe. 


THE  EARLY  PLANS  FOR  OPERATIONS 

With  the  firing  on  Fort  Sumter,  April  12,  1861,  war 
began,  and  the  new  and  efficient  Secretary  of  the  Navy, 
Gideon  Welles,  took  vigorous  hold  of  affairs.  He  had 
an  invaluable  helper  in  the  Assistant  Secretary,  Gustavus 
V.  Fox.  Mr.  Fox  had  had  eighteen  years'  experience  in 
the  navy,  resigning  to  enter  business  in  1856,  the  year  he 
was  commissioned  lieutenant.  His  training  and  rare 
ability  made  him  just  the  man  for  the  position.  The 
assistant  secretaryship  was  a  new  office  felt  to  be  neces 
sary  in  order  to  introduce  harmony  in  the  various  bureaus 
of  the  Department.  Fox  was  the  professional  adviser,  and 
was  given  the  greatest  responsibility  in  planning  opera 
tions,  choosing  leaders,  and  removing  superannuated  and 


3  Causes  of  the  Civil  War,  p.  104. 


Early  Plans  for  Operations  241 

inefficient  officers.  The  last  was  the  weakest  point  of  the 
navy  at  the  beginning  of  the  war.  One  of  Lincoln's 
Cabinet  characterized  Fox  as  ' '  the  able  man  of  the  admin 
istration.  ' ' 

The  Department  early  made  plans  for  an  immense 
naval  armament.  The  annual  appropriation  made  by  the 
previous  Congress  for  the  navy  of  about  $13,000,000  was 
increased  to  $43,500,000.  As  Mr.  Welles  outlined  in  his 
^report  of  December,  1861,  three  lines  of  operation  had 
been  determined  on :  1.  The  naval  occupation  of  the 
Potomac,  and  the  blockade  of  all  Southern  ports.  2.  The 
organization  of  combined  naval  and  military  expeditions 
against  various  points  on  the  Southern  coast  and  along 
the  Mississippi.  3.  The  active  pursuit  of  Confederate 
cruisers  and  privateers. 

The  Northern  navy  yards,  in  which  work  had  been 
almost  entirely  suspended  during  the  years  preceding, 
became  scenes  of  great  animation.  Within  a  few  months 
after  the  firing  on  Sumter,  the  North  had  11,000  men 
engaged  in  fitting 'out  the  old  ships  that  had  been  dis 
mantled,  in  overhauling  those  returned  from  foreign 
waters,  and  in  building  new  ships  especially  adapted  to 
the  service  for  which  they  were  required.  At  the  same 
time  the  Navy  Department,  drawing  from  every  source, 
was  purchasing  and  making  over  ships  from  the  merchant 
service. 

The  added  ships  required  crews  to  man  them,  and 
before  the  year  was  ended  the  number  of  seamen  had 
grown  from  7600  to  22,000.  Meanwhile,  one-fifth  of  all 
the  officers  in  the  old  navy  (322,  if  all  grades  and  corps 
are  included)  had  joined  fortunes  with  the  seceded  States.3 
To  meet  the  emergency,  the  upper  classes  at  the  Naval 
Academy  were  given  active  duty;  and  promotion  was  so 

1  Soley,  The  Blockade  and  the  Cruisers,  p.  8. 
16 


242  The  United  States  Navy 

rapid  that  many  midshipmen  became  lieutenants  before 
they  had  reached  the  age  of  nineteen.  Volunteer  officers 
were  also  called  for,  and  7500  of  them  received  appoint 
ments  during  the  war. 

President  Lincoln,  by  official  proclamation  on  April 
19  and  21,  declared  his  intention  to  blockade  all  the 
Southern  coast.  But  according  to  international  law,  as 
formulated  in  the  Declaration  of  Paris,  1856,  "a  blockade 
in  order  to  be  binding  must  be  effectual,  that  is  to  say, 
maintained  by  a  force,  sufficient  in  reality  to  prevent 
access  to  the  coast  of  the  enemy."  For  the  Union  Navy 
at  once  to  blockade  the  coast  from  Alexandria,  Virginia, 
to  the  Rio  Grande,  3549  statute  miles,  with  189  harbor  or 
river  openings,  was  discovered  to  be  an  impossible  task. 
Tt  could  not  be  accomplished  in  a  month  nor  in  several 
months ;  but  the  beginning1  was  made  at  Hampton  Roads 
shortly  after  the  proclamation,  and  as  ship  after  ship, 
purchased  or  built,  was  fitted  our,  it  was  assigned  its  place 
in  the  long  line. 

THE  POTOMAC  FLOTILLA 

Washington,  both  because  of  its  being  the  national 
capital  and  because  of  its  proximity  to  the  Confederate 
lines,  became  an  important  centre  of  operations.  And 
when  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  the  loyalty  of  Maryland, 
the  nearest  State,  seemed  to  be  wavering,  it  caused  the 
greatest  concern.  The  people  of  Baltimore  attempted  to 
prevent  the  Northern  troops  from  passing  through  the  city, 
though  it  was  known  that  those  troops  were  indispensable 
to  the  protection  of  the  national  capital.  Thus,  for  various 
reasons,  it  was  highly  important  that  the  Union  forces 
should  control  the  Potomac  and  maintain  Washington's 
communications  by  water. 

For  this  service  Commander  J.  II.  Ward  organized  a 
small  flotilla  in  May,  1861.  Already  the  buoys  had  been 


The  Expedition  to  Hatteras  Inlet        243 

largely  removed  from  the  Potomac  by  the  Confederates, 
and  men  and  supplies  were  being  constantly  ferried  across 
from  Maryland  into  Virginia.  Then,  too,  the  Confederates 
had  begun  to  fortify  the  heights  near  Aquia  Creek.  Ward 
bombarded  them  without  much  result  on  May  31  and 
June  1.  This  was  the  first  naval  engagement  of  the  war. 
The  flotilla  was  active  and  efficient,  but  its  duties-,  as 
the  year  advanced,  became  increasingly  difficult.  Buoys 
that  had  been  replaced  were  again  removed;  light-house 
keepers  were  intimidated  into  extinguishing  their  lights; 
and  so  many  were  the  convenient  points  for  crossing  the 
river  that  it  was  impossible  to  stop  more  than  a  part  of 
the  men  and  supplies  entering  Virginia.  Finally,  the 
Confederates,  having  come  into  possession  of  large  guns 
by  the  capture  of  the  Norfolk  Navy  Yard,  made  fortifica 
tions  along  the  river  of  such  strength  that  they  were 
more  than  a  match  for  the  ill-protected  paddle-wheel 
steamers  of  the  flotilla.  On  October  15,  Commander  T.  T. 
Craven  had  to  report  that  in  spite  of  the  utmost  efforts 
of  the  flotilla  the  navigation  of  the  river  was  practically 
closed.  In  the  following  spring,  however,  the  operations 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  against  Richmond  compelled 
the  Confederates  to  contract  their  lines  and  abandon 
the  fortifications  on  the  Potomac. 


CAPTURE  OF  BATTERIES  AT  HATTERAS  INLET 

Naval  stations  and  harbors  convenient  for  refuge  from 
the  heavy  storms  common  to  the  South  Atlantic  coast 
were,  as  the  Department  saw,  indispensable  for  carrying 
on  hostilities  and  maintaining  a  blockade.  Accordingly, 
a  board  was  appointed,  consisting  of  Captain  Samuel  F. 
DuPont  and  Commander  Charles  H.  Davis  of  the  navy, 
and  Major  John  G.  Barnard  of  the  Coast  Survey,  to  make 
"  a  thorough  investigation  of  the  coast  and  harbors,  their 


244  The  United  States  Navy 

access  and  defenses, ' '  and  recommend  a  plan  of  immediate 
action.  As  a  result,  two  combined  naval  and  military 
expeditions  were  organized  in  the  late  summer  and  fall 
of  1861. 

The  first  was  directed  against  Halteras  Inlet.  This 
position  was  important  as  the  key  to  Pamlico  Sound,  and 
here  the  Confederates  had  erected  two  defenses,  Forts 
Clark  and  Hatter  as.  On  August  26,  an  expedition  of  four 
teen  vessels  under  Flag-Officer  Silas  H.  Stringham,  accom 
panied  by  Major-General  Benjamin  F.  Butler  with  860 
troops,  sailed  from  Hampton  Roads.  The  resistance  made 
by  the  forts  was  rather  weak,  and  after  a  two  days'  bom 
bardment  the  Confederates  surrendered;  the  captured 
numbered  615  officers  and  men,  including  Samuel  Barron, 
flag-officer  of  the  Confederate  Navy,  who  for  nearly  fifty 
years  previous  had  served  in  the  National  Navy.  Not  a 
man  in  the  Union  Navy  was  killed  during  the  engagement, 
an  immunity  due  in  part  to  Stringham 's  clever  maneuver 
ing  of  his  ships  when  near  the  forts;  he  passed  and 
repassed  the  forts,  varying  his  course  so  as  to  prevent 
their  securing  the  range. 

THE  CAPTURE  OP  PORT  ROYAL 

For  the  second  point  of  attack,  the  Department  decided 
on  Port  Royal,  S.  C.,  and  made  Captain  Samuel  F. 
DuPont,  lately  appointed  flag-officer  of  the  South  Atlantic 
blockading  squadron,  leader  of  the  expedition.  Port  Royal 
was  by  inland  routes  thirty  miles  from  Savannah  and 
fifty  from  Charleston.  Though  somewhat  neglected,  it 
was  the  finest  natural  harbor  on  the  Southern  coast. 

On  October  29,  the  fleet  of  fifty  vessels  (including 
army-transports  carrying  nearly  13,000  troops  under 
Brigadier-General  Thomas  W.  Sherman)  left  Hampton 
Roads.  Great  pains  had  been  taken  to  conceal  their 


The  Capture  of  Port  Royal  245 

destination,  but  without  success.  The  Confederates  heard 
of  the  plans  even  earlier  than  most  of  the  officers  of  the 
fleet.4 

The  weather,  which  had  promised  well  as  they  started, 
changed  to  a  gale  off  Hatteras,  and  for  a  while  its  violence 
approached  that  of  a  hurricane.  The  fleet  was  utterly 
dispersed  and  on  November  2  but  one  sail  was  to  be  seen 
from  the  deck  of  the  Wabasli.  Some  of  the  ships  that  had 
been  purchased  or  chartered  because  of  the  great  need 
were  quite  unfit  to  encounter  such  a  wind  and  sea.  Thus 
two  were  lost — the  men  being  saved  with  great  difficulty — 
and  a  third  had  to  throw  her  battery  overboard  to  keep 
from  foundering.  However,  as  the  severity  of  the  gale 
abated,  prospects  brightened  and  on  the  morning  of  the 
4th,  DuPont,  with  twenty-five  of  his  vessels,  anchored 
off  the  bar  of  Port  Royal,  while  others  were  appearing  on 
the  horizon. 

The  buoys  that  marked  the  channel  across  the  long 
bar  before  Port  Royal  had  been  removed.  But  they  were 
replaced  by  Commander  Davis,  the  fleet-captain,  and  Mr. 
Boutelle,  of  the  Coast  Survey,  so  that  the  gunboats  and 
lighter  transports  could  enter  the  roadstead  that  evening. 
DuPont  had  grave  fears  in  crossing  the  bar  with  his  flag 
ship,  the  Wabash,  for  with  her  deep  draft  there  would  be 
but  a  foot  or  two  to  spare.  But  on  making  the  attempt 
next  morning,  he  succeeded,  and  was  soon  followed  by  the 
frigate  Susquehanna  and  the  large  transports. 

The  entrance  to  Port  Royal  was  guarded  by  two 
strongly  built  fortifications,  two  and  five-eighths  miles 

4  Although  the  ships  were  sailing  under  sealed  orders,  the 
following  telegram  was  sent,  on  November  1,  from  Richmond,  to 
Governor  Pickens  and  Generals  Drayton  and  Ripley  of  South  Caro 
lina:  "  I  have  just  received  information,  which  I  consider  entirely 
reliable,  that  the  enemy's  expedition  is  intended  for  Port  Royal. 
J.  P.  Benjamin,  Acting  Secretary  of  War." 


246 


The  United  States  Navy 


apart,  Fort  Beauregard,  mounting  twenty  guns  on  Bay 
Point,  the  northern  side,  and  Fort  Walker,  mounting 
twenty-three  guns  on  Hilton  Head,  the  southern  side.  To 
reduce  these  forts  with  wooden  ships  was  what  Flag-Officer 


PORT  ROYAL  SOUND 


BATTLE  OF  PORT  ROYAL 

DuPont  had  decided  on.  The  13,000  troops  accompanying 
"the  expedition  had  no  part  in  the  attack  on  the  forts. 
This  change  in  plans  was  due  to  the  fact  that  the  greater 
part  of  the  means  for  disembarkation  had  been  lost  in  the 
storm,  and  that  the  only  convenient  place  for  the  troops 


The  Capture  of  Port  Royal  247 

to  land  was  five  or  six  miles  from  the  anchorage  of  the 
transports.  It  was  therefore  decided  to  reduce  the  forts 
by  the  naval  force  alone. 

Calling  his  captains  on  board  the  Wabash,  DuPont 
explained  the  strength  and  the  weakness  of  the  enemy's 
position,  and  then  carefully  outlined  his  plan  of  attack 
and  order  of  battle.  The  fleet  was  to  divide,  "a  main 
squadron  ranged  in  a  line  ahead,  and  a  flanking  squadron 
which  was  to  be  thrown  off  on  the  northern  section  of  the 
harbor  to  engage  the  enemy's  flotilla,  and  prevent  their 
raking  the  rear  ships  of  the  main  line  when  it  turned  to 
the  southward,  or  cutting  off  a  disabled  vessel. " 5  The 
main  squadron,  consisting  of  nine  of  the  heaviest  frigates, 
sloops,  and  gunboats,  was  led  by  DuPont 's  flagship,  the 
W abash;  and  the  flanking  squadron  of  five  gunboats  was 
led  by  the  Bienville. 

1  'The  plan  of  attack  was  to  pass  up  midway  between 
Forts  Walker  and  Beauregard,  receiving  and  returning 
the  fire  of  both,  to  a  certain  distance  about  two  and  a 
half  miles  north  of  the  latter.  At  that  point  the  line 
was  to  turn  to  the  south,  round  by  the  west,  and  close  in 
with  Fort  Walker,  encountering  it  on  its  weakest  flank, 
and  at  the  same  time  enfilading,  in  nearly  a  direct  line, 
its  two  water  faces.  .  .  .  When  abreast  of  the  fort  the 
engine  was  to  be  slowed  and  the  movement  reduced  to 
only  as  much  as  would  be  just  sufficient  to  overcome  the 
tide,  to  preserve  the  order  of  battle  by  passing  the  batteries 
in  slow  succession,  and  to  avoid  becoming  a  fixed  mark 
for  the  enemy 's  fire.  On  reaching  the  extremity  of  Hilton 
Head  .  .  .  the  line  was  to  turn  to  the  north  and  east, 
and,  passing  to  the  northward,  to  engage  Fort  Walker 
with  the  port  battery  nearer  than  when  first  on  the  same 
course.  These  evolutions  were  to  be  repeated." 

Captain  DuPont  had  worked  out  an  unsually  skilful 

6  Naval  War  Records,  xii,  262. 


248  The  United  States  Navy 

plan,  which  was  executed  with  faultless  precision.  At 
eight  A.M.,  November  7,  the  commander  made  signal  to 
get  under  way.  A  half  hour  later  the  two  columns  were 
headed  in  for  the  forts,  the  flanking  squadron  to  the 
right;  and  soon  the  ships,  decreasing  the  intervals,  came 
into  close  order.  At  9.26  there  was  a  flash  and  a  roar  from 
Fort  Walker,  and  another  immediately  followed  from  Fort 
Beauregard.  The  challenge  was  taken  up  by  the  Wabash, 
and  the  other  ships  followed  with  their  fire  as  their  guns 
bore.  At  ten  o'clock  the  head  of  the  main  squadron  had 
reached  the  point  two  and  a  half  miles  above  the  forts; 
then  as  the  ships  turned,  they  changed  the  course  so  that 
when  abreast  of  Fort  Walker  they  should  be  only  800 
yards  distant ;  and  in  this  closer  formation  they  steamed 
with  great  deliberation  southward. 

From  a  reconnoissance  DuPont  had  learned  of  the 
weakness  of  the  northern  flank  of  Fort  Walker,  and  on 
this  point  each  ship  opened  with  her  forward  pivot  as 
soon  as  she  came  in  range.  The  Confederates,  unprepared 
for  an  attack  on  this  quarter,  suffered  from  the  enfilading 
fire,  which  dismounted  a  few  of  the  guns  and  greatly 
annoyed  the  defenders.  And  their  confusion  increased 
when  in  addition  to  the  enfilading  fire,  still  kept  up  by 
the  rear  of  the  Union  line,  full  broadsides  swept  the 
parapets  from  the  leading  ships,  now  abreast  of  the  fort. 

Meanwhile,  a  small  Confederate  squadron  of  four  gun 
boats  under  Commodore  Tattnall  came  down  the  river  and 
endeavored  to  make  its  presence  known.  Tattnall  was  a 
cool  and  daring  officer  who  had  served  long  in  the  old 
navy,  and  when  the  Union  columns  had  first  moved  against 
the  forts  he  had  advanced  as  if  to  give  battle  to  the  entire 
fleet.  Taking  a  raking  position  he  fired  several  ineffectual 
broadsides  at  the  Wabasli.  But  as  that  ship  came  within 
range,  he  wisely  retreated  in  haste  up  Skull  Creek ;  there 
he  was  out  of  the  fight,  yet  still  showed  his  spirit  by 


The  Capture  of  Port  Royal  249 

dipping  his  blue  flag  three  times,  ' '  regretting  his  inability 
to  return  the  high-flown  compliments  of  Flag-Officer 
DuPont  in  a  more  satisfactory  manner. ' ' 6  The  flanking 
squadron,  by  remaining  at  the  northern  end  of  the  loop, 
prevented  Tattnall's  emerging  from  Skull  Creek,  and 
also  kept  up  the  enfilading  fire  on  Walker. 

The  main  squadron  reached  its  starting  place  at  11 
A.M.  and  then  proceeded  to  execute  another  ellipse;  but 
this  time  the  ships  as  they  turned  to  southward  moved 
still  nearer  to  Fort  Walker,  taking  a  course  less  than  600 
yards  distant. 

The  forts  were  considered  strong  and  well  equipped, 
yet  the  defense  crumbled  under  the  fire  of  the  fleet.  The 
commanding  officers  gave  various  explanations  in  their 
reports  to  Richmond:  only  a  part  of  the  guns  could  be 
used  against  the  ships,  many  of  the  shells  would  not  fit 
the  guns  and  were  useless,  ammunition  was  insufficient, 
and  gun  crews  became  exhausted — all  of  which  indicated 
lack  of  preparation  and  discipline.  Yet,  had  the  forts 
been  fully  manned  and  equipped,  the  slight  losses  sus 
tained  by  the  fleet  give  reason  for  believing  that  it  might 
still  have  been  successful.  More  troops  and  ammunition 
would  not  have  made  up  for  the  defects  in  the  construc 
tion  of  the  forts.  The  batteries  were  arranged  to  command 
the  sea-front ;  but  against  an  attack  from  inside  the  sound 
they  had  no  defense.  The  guns  were  nearly  all  mounted 
en  barbette,  that  is,  above  a  parapet,  thus  affording  the 
advantage  of  wide  range,  but  Avith  the  disadvantage  of 
little  protection  to  the  gunners.  Consequently,  although 
it  was  estimated  at  this  time  that  one  gun  on  shore  was 
equal  to  four  on  ship,  the  superiority  of  the  land  batteries 
was  lost  almost  the  moment  the  ships  took  the  enfilading 
position.  For  though  the  fire  of  the  fleet  did  not  do  great 

6  Savannah  Republican,  November  12,  1861,  quoted  in  the 
Naval  War  Records,  xii,  295. 


250  The  United  States  Navy 

damage  to  the  guns  themselves,  it  drove  the  gunners  to 
shelter. 

Major  Huger,  C.  S.  A.,  one  of  the  defenders  of  Fort 
Walker,  recognized  its  weakness,  as  in  his  official  report 
he  said:  "Three  of  them  [the  Union  ships]  took  position 
to  enfilade  our  batteries  from  our  northwest  flank,  while 
others  which  had  not  yet  got  into  action  assumed  direc 
tion  opposite  our  southeast  front,  and  their  largest  ship 
[the  Wabash]  .  .  .  returned  down  our  front,  delivering 
a  beautifully  accurate  fire  at  short  range,  supported  at 
rather  longer  range  by  the  fire  of  two  other  large  ships 
of  war.  So  soon  as  these  positions  had  become  established, 
the  fort  was  fought  simply  as  a  point  of  honor,  for,  from 
that  moment,  we  were  defeated,  except  perhaps  by  provi 
dential  interference. ' ' 7 

When  the  main  squadron  had  reached  the  northern 
end  of  the  ellipse  for  the  third  time  and  was  about  to 
begin  another  bombardment  on  the  southern  course,  the 
Ottawa  signaled  that  the  works  at  Hilton  Head  had  been 
abandoned.  Commander  John  Rodgers  was  sent  ashore 
with  a  flag  of  truce,  and,  finding  that  the  fort  was  indeed 
deserted,  at  2.20  P.M.  raised  the  flag  of  the  Union.  The 
transports  now  came  up,  and  before  night  troops  had 
landed  and  occupied  the  works.  At  sunset  it  was  dis 
covered  that  Fort  Beauregard  was  no  longer  flying  the 
Confederate  flag,  and  early  next  morning  that  defense 
also  was  occupied  by  Union  troops. 

The  victory  was  extremely  important.  It  created 
alarm  in  South  Carolina,  and  caused  troops  about  to  leave 
for  Virginia  to  be  retained  for  the  protection  of  their  own 
State.  It  gave  the  Union  an  excellent  harbor,  of  the  great 
est  advantage  for  fitting  out  expeditions  against  the  strong 
holds  along  the  coast,  and  for  protecting  the  blockade. 
Incidentally,  the  engagement  demonstrated  the  value  of 
steam  power,  and  showed  that  ships  could  be  used  even 

''Naval  War  Records,  xii,  308. 


The  Trent  Affair  251 

in  attacking  strongly  armed  forts.  Finally,  the  victory, 
coming  in  the  latter  part  of  1861,  when  a  gloom  was  over 
hanging  the  North  from  the  many  disasters  on  land, 
brought  cheer  and  encouragement.  A  stronghold  had 
been  seized  in  South  Carolina,  the  State  that  had  been 
first  to  secede. 

THE  TRENT  AFFAIR 

On  the  same  day  the  Union  flag  was  raised  over  Fort 
Beauregard  there  occurred  elsewhere  an  event  which  at 
first  was  hailed  as  a  great  achievement  on  the  part  of  the 
navy,  but  which  soon  proved  a  grave  menace,  for  it 
involved  the  United  States  almost  in  a  European  war. 
It  was  the  "Trent  affair." 

The  Confederacy  had  early  sought  recognition  from 
the  leading  European  states,  but  although  their  repre 
sentatives  were  given  a  friendly  reception  in  England 
and  elsewhere,  they  were  received  merely  as  private  citi 
zens.  President  Davis  then  resolved  to  send  commissioners 
of  the  highest  ability  to  England  and  France,  hoping 
that  they  might  succeed  where  the  others  had  failed;  he 
accordingly  selected  James  M.  Mason  of  Virginia  and 
John  Slidell  of  Louisiana,  with  J.  E.  Macfarland  and 
George  Eustis  as  their  secretaries;  both  Mr.  Mason  and 
Mr.  Slidell  were  United  States  senators  when  their  States 
seceded,  and  both  had  earlier  held  important  posts  in  the 
diplomatic  service.  Eluding  the  blockade,  they  sailed 
from  Charleston  to  Nassau  and  then  to  Cardenas,  Cuba; 
on  November  7  they  took  passage  on  the  British  mail- 
steamer  Trent,  Havana  to  St.  Thomas,  on  their  way  to 
England.  It  was  the  seizing  of  these  commissioners  on  the 
Trent  by  an  armed  United  States  ship  that  so  violently 
aroused  all  Europe  and  America. 

Captain  Charles  Wilkes,  commanding  the  San  Jacinto 
in  West  Indian  waters,  who  had  earlier  distinguished 


The  United  States  Navij 

himself  in  Antarctic  exploration,  resolved  to  intercept 
the  Confederate  commissioners.  As  they  made  no  effort 
to  maintain  secrecy  after  arriving  in  Cuba,  Captain 
Wilkes  learned  of  their  intended  departure  on  the  Trent, 
and  took  up  his  station  in  the  Old  Bahama  Channel.  At 
11.40  A.M.,  November  8,  the  smoke  of  a  steamer  was 
reported,  which  was  rightly  guessed  to  be  the  Trent. 
What  followed  Captain  Wilkes  states  in  his  official  report.8 

"We  were  all  prepared  for  her,  beat  to  quarters,  and 
orders  were  given  to  Lieutenant  D.  M.  Fairfax  to  have  two 
boats  manned  and  armed  to  board  her  and  make  Messrs. 
Slidell,  Mason,  Eustis,  and  Macfarland  prisoners,  and  send 
them  immediately  on  board.  .  .  . 

"The  steamer  approached  and  hoisted  English  colors. 
Our  ensign  was  hoisted,  and  a  shot  was  fired  across  her 
bow;  she  maintained  her  speed,  and  showed  no  disposi 
tion  to  heave  to;  then  a  shell  was  fired  across  her  bow, 
which  brought  her  to.  I  hailed  that  I  intended  to  send  a 
boat  on  board,  and  Lieutenant  Fairfax,  with  the  second 
cutter  of  this  ship,  was  dispatched.  He  met  with  some 
difficulty,  and  remaining  on  board  the  steamer  with  a 
part  of  the  boat 's  crew,  sent  the  boat  back  for  more  assist 
ance.  The  captain  of  the  steamer  having  declined  to 
show  his  papers  and  passenger  list,  a  force  became  neces 
sary  to  search  her.  Lieutenant  James  A.  Greer  was  at 
once  dispatched  in  the  third  cutter,  also  manned  and 
armed. 

"Messrs.  Slidell,  Mason,  Eustis,  and  Macfarland  were 
recognized  and  told  they  were  required  to  go  on  board 
this  ship ;  this  they  objected  to,  until  an  overpowering 
force  compelled  them.  Much  persuasion  was  used  and  a 
little  force,  and  at  about  two  o'clock  they  were  brought 
on  board  this  ship  and  received  by  me.  Two  other  boats 
were  then  sent  to  expedite  the  removal  of  their 

8  Xaval  War  Records,  i,  130. 


The  Trent  Affair  253 

and  some  stores,  when  the  steamer,  which  proved  to  be 
the  Trent,  was  suffered  to  proceed  on  her  route  to  the  east 
ward,  and  at  3.30  P.M.  we  bore  away  to  the  northward 
and  westward.  The  whole  time  employed  was  two  hours, 
thirteen  minutes. 

"  It  was  my  determination  to  take  possession  of 
the  Trent  and  send  her  to  Key  West  as  a  prize,  for  resist 
ing  search  and  carrying  these  passengers,  whose  character 
and  objects  were  well  known  to  the  captain,  but  the 
reduced  number  of  my  officers  and  crew,  and  the  large 
number  of  passengers  on  board  bound  to  Europe  who 
would  be  put  to  great  inconvenience,  decided  me  to  allow 
them  to  proceed." 

The  prisoners  were  taken  to  Boston  and  confined  in 
Fort  Warren.  Captain  Wilkes  became  at  once  a  popular 
hero.  He  was  given  a  grand  ovation  in  Boston  and  New 
York,  lauded  by  the  public  press,  and  thanked  by  a  joint 
resolution  of  Congress.  Even  the  Cabinet  with  one  excep 
tion,  the  Postmaster-General,  were  delighted  with  the 
capture.  But  while  the  country  was  being  thus  swept  by 
an  outburst  of  enthusiasm,  President  Lincoln,  with  his 
rare  discernment,  perceived  the  complications  that  were 
soon  to  follow.  He  remarked:  "I  fear  the  traitors  will 
prove  to  be  white  elephants.  We  must  stick  to  American 
principles  concerning  the  rights  of  neutrals.  We  fought 
Great  Britain  for  insisting,  by  theory  and  practice,  on  the 
right  to  do  exactly  what  Captain  Wilkes  has  done.  If 
Great  Britain  shall  now  protest  against  the  act,  and 
demand  their  release,  we  must  give  them  up,  apologize 
for  the  act  as  a  violation  of  our  doctrines,  and  thus 
forever  bind  her  over  to  keep  the  peace  in  relation  to 
neutrals,  and  so  acknowledge  that  she  has  been  wrong  for 
sixty  years."  9 

Great  Britain  did  protest,  and  Lord  Lyons,  the  British 
9  Lossing,  History  of  the  Civil  War,  ii,  156. 


254  The  United  States  Navy 

minister,  was  instructed,  unless  redress  including  the 
surrender  of  the  commissioners  was  forthcoming  within 
seven  days,  to  depart  with  ''the  archives  of  the  legation, 
and  .  .  .  repair  immediately  to  London."10  Mean 
while,  the  British  Government,  without  Availing  for  devel 
opments,  embarked  troops  for  Halifax,  conveyed  muskets 
from  London  Towrer  for  shipment,  and  made  ready  all 
kinds  of  warlike  munitions. 

Although  the  matter  primarily  concerned  only  Eng 
land,  the  Emperor  of  France,  the  King  of  Prussia,  and 
the  Emperor  of  Austria  had  within  a  month  of  the  receipt 
of  the  news  communicated  wdth  the  Foreign  Office,  London, 
and  their  own  diplomatic  representatives  in  Washington, 
expressing  their  approval  of  England's  attitude  in  the 
controversy.  In  short,  just  as  emphatically  as  the  United 
States  had  approved  of  Wilkes's  act,  Europe  disapproved. 

War  was  averted,  however,  by  the  United  States'  dis 
avowing  the  act  and  surrendering  the  prisoners  to  English 
custody,  January  1,  1862.  As  the  affair  involves  such  an 
important  point  in  international  law  much  has  since  been 
written  on  it.  The  best  authorities  of  recent  years  agree 
in  condemning  the  act  of  Captain  Wilkes.  While  he  had 
the  right  to  stop  the  Trent  and  search  her,  he  could  not 
possess  himself  of  any  persons  on  her  without  taking  the 
ship  into  port  as  a  prize.  Neither  the  commissioners  nor 
their  dispatches,  being  of  a  non-military  character,  could 
be  regarded  as  contraband  of  war,  and  therefore  the  ship 
was  not  liable  to  capture  except  on  the  ground  of  resist 
ance  to  search.  Since  obstacles  in  the  way  of  search  were 
interposed  by  the  captain  of  the  Trent,  Wilkes  would 
have  been  justified  in  taking  the  ship  into  port,  though 
whether  a  court  would  have  considered  the  resistance  as 
sufficient  to  condemn  her  is  a  matter  of  conjecture.11 


War  Records,  i,  101. 
11  Harris,  The  Trent  Affair,  p.  264. 


XVI 

THE  BATTLE  OF  HAMPTON  ROADS:  THE  DE 
STRUCTION  OF  THE  CUMBERLAND 
AND  THE  CONGRESS 

NORFOLK  NAVY  YARD  ABANDONED 

SOME  of  the  large  guns  the  Confederates  used  at 
Hatteras  and  Port  Royal,  as  well  as  later  about  New 
Orleans,  Port  Hudson,  and  Vicksburg,  were  secured  from 
the  Norfolk  Navy  Yard.  The  loss  of  this  yard  in  the  latter 
part  of  April,  1861,  was  the  greatest  disaster  sustained 
by  the  navy  during  the  war.  It  was  caused,  not  by  an 
overwhelming  force  of  hostile  arms,  but  by  the  prevalent 
policy  of  inaction,  and  by  panic.  The  administration, 
the  Navy  Department,  and  several  of  the  senior  officers 
of  the  army  and  the  navy,  all  shared  in  the  blame. 

The  situation  in  Virginia  previous  to  the  firing  on 
Sumter  had  been  extremely  delicate ;  as  the  State  wavered 
in  her  choice  of  sides,  friends  of  the  Confederacy  who 
were  closely  watching  the  Norfolk  Navy  Yard  found  it  easy 
to  dissuade  the  administration  from  taking  any  measures 
to  protect  the  government  property  there,  arguing  that 
this  would  indicate  distrust  and  thus  alienate  the  State. 

General  Scott,  the  head  of  the  army,  a  Virginian,  and 
conservative  by  reason  of  age  (he  was  nearly  seventy-five 
years  old),  did  not  favor  sending  troops  to  Norfolk.  And 
when  Commodore  C.  S.  McCauley,  commandant  of  the 
yard  (sixty-eight  years  old),  was  instructed  on  April  10 
that  ' '  great  vigilance  should  be  exercised  in  guarding  and 
protecting  the  public  interests  and  property,"  he  did 
nothing.  He  was  misled  by  Southern  advisers,  and  seemed 

255 


256  The  United  States  Navy 

to  lack  all  power  of  action ;  so  far  as  is  known,  he  made 
not  even  a  plan  in  defense  of  the  yard. 

A  week  before  Virginia  passed  the  ordinance  of  seces 
sion  (April  17),  the  Department  had  become  apprehensive 
and  had  sent  confidential  orders  for  the  removal  of  the 
Merrimac  and  other  ships  at  the  Norfolk  Yard.  On  April 
12  Engineer-in-Chief  Isherwood  was  sent  from  Washing 
ton  expressly  to  take  out  the  Merrimac.  He  found  her 
engines  in  bad  condition;  but  putting  a  large  force  of 
men  to  work  on  Monday  morning,  the  day  after  his  arrival, 
and  employing  shifts  so  as  to  push  the  work  day  and  night, 
he  reported  Wednesday  afternoon  that  everything  was  in 
readiness  for  firing.  On  Thursday  morning  he  had  steam 
up,  and  waited  only  for  the  commandant's  order  to  cast 
loose  and  take  the  Merrimac,  with  the  Germantown  in  tow, 
to  a  place  of  safety.  But  the  commandant  hesitated,  and 
hesitation  at  this  critical  moment  was  fatal.  Finally,  when 
Isherwood  reminded  him  of  the  peremptory  orders  given 
by  the  Department  for  sending  the  ship  out,  McCauley 
said  that  he  had  decided  to  retain  her,  and  directed  that 
the  fires  be  drawn. 

The  patriotism  of  Commodore  McCauley  was  never 
seriously  doubted.  But  he  was  quite  unequal  to  the 
emergency.  Distressed  and  anxious,  he  was  led  by  some 
of  his  officers  who  shortly  entered  the  Confederate  service 
to  believe  that  moving  the  Merrimac  would  incite  to  vio 
lence  the  mob  collecting  outside  the  yard.  Although  he 
had  a  force  which,  with  the  guns  of  the  ships,  could  have 
resisted  several  regiments  of  militia  without  artillery,  he 
was  persuaded  that  the  security  of  the  yard  depended 
on  avoiding  a  rupture.  He  was  also  induced  to  believe 
that  some  obstructions  the  Confederates  had  placed  in  the 
channel,  really  insignificant,  would  prevent  the  Merrimac' 's 
passing. 

When  Engineer-in-Chief  Isherwood  and  Commander 


Norfolk  Navy  Yard  Abandoned          257 

Alden  (who  was  to  have  been  captain  of  the  Merrimac) 
found  they  could  do  nothing,  they  departed  for  Washing 
ton  and  made  their  report.1  Immediately  Commodore 
Hiram  Paulding,  in  the  Pawnee,  and  a  detachment  of 
500  men  were  dispatched  to  relieve  McCauley  and  save  the 
ships.  But  it  was  too  late. 

The  greater  part  of  McC'auley's  officers  had  resigned 
or  deserted.  Mechanics  and  watchmen  had  joined  the 
secessionists  outside,  who  were  collecting  in  scattered 
groups.  The  unfortunate  commandant,  dejected  by  this, 
and  dismayed  by  the  reports  that  State  troops  were 
arriving  from  Richmond  and  Petersburg,  decided  to 
destroy  all  the  ships  in  the  yard  except  the  Cumberland. 
Accordingly,  on  Saturday,  April  20,  he  scuttled  the  Merri 
mac,  Germantown,  Plymouth,  and  Dolphin. 

At  the  very  hour  when  the  destruction  began,  Com 
modore  Paulding,  who  had  progressed  as  far  as  Fortress 
Monroe,  was  embarking  a  regiment  of  Massachusetts 
volunteers.  They  were  only  twelve  miles  away,  and  were 
coming  as  fast  as  the  Pawnee  could  bring  them  to  save 
the  ships. 

On  Paulding 's  arrival  Commodore  McCauley 's  courage 
revived,  and  he  was  in  favor  of  remaining  and  defending 
the  yard.  There  is  little  doubt  that  it  might  have  been 
held  for  some  weeks  even  without  the  reinforcements 
already  on  their  way.  Commodore  Paulding  had  all  to 
gether  1000  effective  men  under  his  command.  Though 
not  much  reliance  could  be  placed  on  the  strength  of  the 
walls  enclosing  the  yard,  the  guns  of  the  receiving-ship 
Pennsylvania,  the  Cumberland,  and  the  Pawnee  com 
manded  the  entire  yard,  and  could  have  set  fire  to  Norfolk 
and  Portsmouth.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Confederates 
had  only  a  few  companies  of  soldiers  and  no  heavy  guns. 

1  To  be  found  in  the  Naval  War  Records,  iv,  280. 
17 


258  The  United  States  Navy 

Whatever  Commodore  Paulding's  possibilities  may 
have  been,  he  was  just  as  plainly  a  victim  of  panic  as 
Commodore  McCauley  had  been  before  him.  Within  an 
hour  after  his  arrival,  Paulding  decided  to  abandon  the 
yard.  On  reaching  this  decision  he  immediately  began 
making  preparations.  One  hundred  men  were  to  render 
useless  the  guns  in  the  yard  by  knocking  off  the  trunnions 
with  sledges;  they  pounded  well,  but  accomplished  noth 
ing.  Other  men  were  set  to  work  rolling  cannon  and  shells 
into  the  river.  Still  others  were  to  prepare  the  ships  and 
buildings  for  firing.  The  Cumberland,  the  only  ship  to 
be  saved,  was  towed  a  short  distance  out  by  the  Pawnee, 
and  at  four  or  five  in  the  morning,  a  rocket  from  the 
Pawnee  gave  signal  that  the  fires  were  to  be  ignited. 

But  even  the  work  of  destruction  suffered  from  panic, 
and  evidently  had  been  poorly  planned.  The  moment 
the  National  forces  had  withdrawn,  the  crowds  outside  the 
yard  rushed  in.  Extinguishing  a  slow  fuse  attached  to  a 
mine  designed  to  destroy  the  drydock,  they  saved  it  intact. 
At  the  same  time  others  checked  the  flames  in  the  build 
ings  (only  a  few  of  which  had  been  really  set  on  fire), 
and  secured  most  of  the  valuable  shops  uninjured.  As 
but  very  few  of  the  cannon  were  destroyed,  the  Confed 
erates  gained  nearly  3000  pieces  of  ordnance  of  all  kinds, 
300  of  them  Dahlgren  guns  of  the  latest  type.2 

The  events  at  the  Pensacola  Navy  Yard  furnish  a 
companion  piece  to  the  story  just  narrated.  On  January 
12  preceding,  Captain  James  Armstrong,  in  command, 
had  weakly  surrendered  to  the  State  militia  of  Florida. 

2  These  are  the  figures  given  by  Commodore  Paulding  in  his 
report  to  the  Department  of  April  23,  1861 ;  Commodore  McCauley's 
estimate  is  about  the  same;  other  estimates  vary  greatly,  but  all 
are  less;  Scharf  in  his  history  states,  "There  were  1198  guns  of 
all  kinds  captured  with  the  yard,  of  which  fifty-two  were  9-inch 
Dahlgren  guns." 


Development  in  Guns  259 

Had  it  not  been  for  the  guns  captured  at  Pensacola  and 
Norfolk,  according  to  the  belief  expressed  later  by  Admiral 
Porter,  the  Confederates  could  not  have  armed  their 
fortifications  until  they  had  built  gun  factories  of  their 
own,  or  imported  cannon  from  Europe ;  that  is,  not  until 
nearly  a  year  after  the  beginning  of  hostilities.  / 

The  Union  lost  at  Norfolk  the  steam  frigate  Merrimac, 
40  guns,  the  sloop  of  war  Germantown,  22,  the  sloop  of 
war  Plymouth,  22,  the  brig  Dolphin,  4,  all  of  which  were 
practically  ready  for  sea;  also,  the  older  ships,  still  pos 
sessing  some  usefulness,  Pennsylvania,  United  States, 
Columbus,  Delaware,  Raritan,  and  Columbia;  and,  last 
an  unfinished  ship-of-the-line,  the  New  York.  But  "great 
as  was  .  .  .  the  loss  of  our  ships,  it  was  much  less 
than  the  loss  of  our  guns. ' ' 3 

DEVELOPMENT  IN  GUNS  AND  SHIPS 

The  Civil  War  marks  the  end  of  the  old  in  the  ships 
and  guns  of  our  navy,  and  the  beginning  of  the  new. 
Since  the  events  following  the  loss  of  the  Norfolk  Navy 
Yard  instituted  this  revolution,  it  is  worth  while  here  to 
pause  and  note  certain  changes  that  had  taken  place  in 
the  half  century  preceding. 

Smooth-bore  guns,  firing  solid  shot,  had  increased 
from  the  earlier  18-  and,  24-pounders  to  32 's.  The 
"  Columbiads  "  used  in  the  War  of  1812  and  in  the  Civil 
War  were  guns  of  this  type,  though  previous  to  the  later 
war  the  model  had  been  changed  by  lengthening  the  bore 
and  increasing  the  weight  of  metal  so  as  to  adapt  it  for 
a  heavier  charge.  As  it  was  discovered  that  the  improved 
guns  frequently  did  not  possess  the  requisite  strength, 
they  were  degraded  to  the  rank  of  shell-guns,  and  fired 
with  diminished  charges  of  powder. 

*  Porter,  Naval  History  of  the  Civil  War,  p.  33. 


260  The  United  States  Navy 

The  "Dahlgren"  gun,  designed  by  Admiral  Dahlgren 
in  the  '50  's,  was  regarded  as  the  most  advanced  type  of 
smooth-bore  at  the  time  of  the  Civil  War.  This  was  of 
large  calibre  and  made  of  cast-iron.  Its  special  feature 
was  the  "curve  of  pressures,"  making  it  heavy  at  the 
breech  and  light  at  the  muzzle.  It  meant  a  great  gain  in 
power  with  a  minimum  of  weight,  and  thus  was  especially 
adapted  for  naval  use. 

All  smooth-bore  ordnance  was  muzzle-loading.  These 
pieces  fired  round  shot,  canister,  common  shells,  and 
shrapnel  shell.  The  first  rifled  guns  were  also  muzzle- 
loaders  ;  and  it  was  not  until  1875-80  that  breech-loading 
rifles  were  generally  accepted. 

Experiments  in  rifled  cannon  began  in  Russia  about 
1836.  In  the  Crimean  War  these  guns  did  n'ot  prove 
very  successful,  but  by  the  beginning  of  the  Civil  War 
they  were  regarded  no  longer  as  experiments.  The 
moment  armor  was  introduced  on  ships  they  became  a 
necessity.  Rifled  cannon  had  the  advantage  of  greater 
penetrating  power,  greater  range,  and  increased  accuracy. 

The  "Parrott"  rifle  gun  was  probably  the  best  of  the 
large  ordnance  that  found  extensive  use  in  the  war.  This 
was  a  cast-iron  rifled  tube,  strengthened  by  a  coiled 
wrought-iron  hoop  shrunk  on  the  breech.  The  Parrott 
guns  were  100-,  200-,  and  300-pounders. 

In  the  construction  of  ships  there  had  been  but  one 
important  innovation  since  the  War  of  1812,  and  that  was 
caused  by  the  introduction  of  steam  as  the  propelling 
power.  Ships  were  still  built  on  the  general  lines  of 
frigates  and  sloops  of  war,  and  were  fully  rigged,  for  it 
was  supposed  that  warships  would  ordinarily  use  steam 
only  as  auxiliary  power.  There  were  some  side-wheelers, 
but  ships  of  the  latest  approved  type  built  in  the  United 
States,  such  as  the  Merrimac  and  the  Hartford,  haci  screw 
propellers,  which  evidently  would  be  much  less  vulnerable 


Development  in  Ships  261 

in  battle.  Such  vessels  were  capable  of  making,  under 
steam  alone,  from  eight  to  twelve  knots.  The  first  steam 
man-of-war  ever  launched  was  the  U.  S.  S.  Fulton,  1814, 
and  the  first  screw  warship,  the  U.  S.  S.  Princeton,  1843. 
In  thus  leading  the  navies  of  the  world,  the  United  States 
Navy,  insignificant  as  it  was  in  number  of  ships,  won 
distinction. 

By  the  introduction  of  steam  as  the  motive  power, 
ships  not  only  gained  in  speed,  but  could  be  maneu 
vered  regardless  of  the  wind.  In  consequence,  they  were 
much  better  able  to  attack  or  pass  forts  commanding  har 
bors  and  rivers.  Further,  they  were  adapted  for  a  new 
mode  of  attacking  other  vessels,  that  is,  by  ramming.  This 
method  of  fighting  was  virtually  a  return  to  the  tactics  of 
the  Greek  and  Roman  galleys,  and  it  proved  very  effective 
in  the  confined  space  of  rivers  and  narrow  bays. 

The  Confederate  Navy  Department  early  recognized 
that,  having  no  ships,  shipbuilders,  or  seamen,  they  could 
not  hope  to  battle  successfully  with  the  National  Navy 
except  by  some  new  and  quite  superior  kind  of  fighting 
machine.  They  began  studying  the  torpedo  and  the  iron 
clad,  the  principles  of  both  of  which  were  well  known  in 
navy  circles. 

The  ironclad,  of  which  alone  we  shall  speak  in  this 
chapter,  had  its  beginning  in  the  Crimean  War,  in  which 
it  was  used  by  the  French.  On  October  17,  1855,  three 
so-called  floating  batteries,  the  Lave,  Tonnante,  and  Devas 
tation,  their  hulls  of  timber  covered  with  four  inches  of 
iron  armor,  advanced  to  the  attack  of  Kinburn  and  deliv 
ered  a  very  destructive  fire,  which,  with  that  of  the  ships- 
of-the-line,  frigates,  and  mortar  boats,  compelled  the 
Russian  forts  to  surrender  after  three  hours'  resistance. 
The  significant  feature  of  the  engagement  was  that 
although  the  floating  batteries  took  a  position  only  a  few 
hundred  yards  distant  from  the  forts,  and  received  a 


262  The  United  States  Navy 

terrific  bombardment  in  return,  they  suffered  practically 
no  injury.  This  set  progressive  naval  constructors  to 
thinking;  France  shortly  planned  in  her  navy  various 
changes  which  Great  Britain  viewed  with  apprehension. 


THE  REBUILDING  OF  THE  MERRIMAC 

On  the  23d  of  June,  1861,  Mr.  Mallory,  the  Confed 
erate  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  met  a  board  consisting  of 
Chief  Engineer  William  P.  Williamson,  Lieutenant  John 
M.  Brooke,  and  Naval  Constructor  John  L.  Porter,  to 
make  plans  for  an  ironclad.  The  Confederates  had 
attempted  to  purchase  one,  but  without  success,  and  so 
were  obliged  to  rely  on  their  own  resources.  Mr.  Porter, 
who  had  submitted  the  plans  for  an  ironclad  to  the  U.  S. 
Navy  Department  as  early  as  1846,  brought  to  the  con 
ference  a  model  of  a  boat  of  shallow  draft,  its  upper  works 
entirely  inclosed  by  a  shield  with  armored  sloping  sides. 
But  the  building  of  such  a  vessel  would  require  twelve 
months,  and  presented  many  difficulties,  for  the  South  had 
practically  no  facilities  for  making  engines,  and  almost  no 
machinists.  Aid  was  found  in  the  Norfolk  Navy  Yard. 

When  Commodore  Paulding  was  leaving  the  yard,  he 
set  fire  to  the  abandoned  ships;  but  as  the  Merrimac 
had  already  been  scuttled,  the  flames  destroyed  only  her 
upper  works,  and,  stopping  with  the  berth  deck,  left 
her  engines  and  boilers  practically  uninjured.  To  save 
time,  and  to  take  advantage  of  the  machinery  of  the 
Merrimac,  the  board,  meeting  at  Richmond,  adapted 
its  plan  to  this  vessel,  which  already  had  been  raised  and 
placed  in  drydock. 

The  South  showed  splendid  energy  in  the  recon 
struction  of  the  Merrimac,  as  most  of  the  world  have  con 
tinued  to  call  her,  rather  than  the  Virginia,  as  she  was 
renamed  by  the  Confederates.  Officers  and  constructors 


The  Rebuilding  of  the  Merrimac          263 

did  their  utmost  to  hasten  the  work ;  even  the  blacksmiths, 
machinists,  and  bolt  drivers  caught  the  spirit,  and  signed  a 
voluntary  agreement  to  work  until  eight  o'clock  every 
evening  without  extra  pay. 

The  Merrimac  was  originally  a  screw  frigate,  of  3500 
tons  burden.  Her  hull,  263  feet  long,  was  covered  amid 
ships  with  a  shield  of  178  feet ;  the  sides  of  which  slanted 
at  an  angle  of  35°,  and  rose,  when  she  was  trimmed  for 
battle,  seven  feet  above  the  water.  The  shield  was  made 
of  rafters  of  yellow  pine,  fourteen  inches  thick;  on  this 
was  a  course  of  four-inch  pine  planks  running  fore  and 
aft,  and  on  this  another  of  four-inch  oak  planks  placed 
up  and  down.  Superposed  on  the  wood  was  a  layer  of 
rolled  iron  bars,  eight  inches  wide  and  two  inches  thick, 
running  fore  and  aft,  and  on  these  another  layer  of 
similar  size,  up  and  down.  The  whole  was  bolted  through 
and  through.  Thus  the  vessel  had  an  armor  which,  meas 
ured  perpendicularly  to  the  slanting  sides,  was  four  inches 
of  iron  supported  by  twenty-two  inches  of  wood,  but  which 
horizontally  gave  a  thickness  very  much  greater.  The 
knuckle,  where  the  armor  joined  the  hull,  and  the  two  ends 
of  the  vessel  beyond  the  armor,  were  submerged  to  a 
depth  of  two  feet,  rendering  those  parts  invulnerable. 
The  rudder  and  propeller  were  protected  by  a  heavy 
solid  deck  or  fan  tail.4  The  top  of  the  shield  was  pro 
tected  from  a  plunging  fire  by  an  iron  grating  in  which 

4  There  is  considerable  variance  in  the  descriptions  of  the 
Merrimac,  even  in  statements  made  by  officers  who  served  on  her; 
e.g.,  some  give  the  slant  of  her  shield  as  45°,  affirming  that  her 
decks  were  merely  awash  when  in  battle,  instead  of  submerged,  and 
that  her  rudder  and  propeller  were  unprotected,  etc.  In  this  account, 
the  authors  have  relied  chiefly  on  statements  by  Naval  Constructor 
J.  L.  Porter,  Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,  i,  716,  and  by 
John  W.  H.  Porter,  A  Record  of  Events  in  Norfolk  County,  pp. 
327-366. 


264  The  United  States  Navy 

the  bars  were  two  inches  wide  and  thick,  separated  by 
meshes  two  inches  square. 

The  armament  of  the  Merrimac  consisted  of  ten  guns ; 
of  the  eight,  comprising  her  broadsides,  six  were  smooth 
bore  9-inch  Dahlgrens,  part  of  her  original  battery,  and 
two  were  6.4-inch  rifle  guns;  there  w^ere  also  two  7-inch 
rifle  guns  on  pivot,  one  at  each  end.  The  rifle  guns  were 
made  at  the  Tredegar  Iron  Works,  Richmond,  where  the 
armor  plate  was  rolled,  the  work  being  under  the  super 
vision  of  Lieutenant  Brooke.  The  Merrimac  was  further 
armed  with  a  cast-iron  beak,  wedge  shaped,  weighing 
1500  pounds. 

The  Virginia,  or,  as  we  shall  call  her,  the  Merrimac, 
moved  slowly  down  Elizabeth  River,  at  the  same  time 
making  ready  for  battle  about  midday,  March  8,  1862, 
the  very  earliest  moment  she  was  available.  Many  of  the 
workmen  were  still  on  her  and  hurried  to  give  the  finish 
ing  touches  as  she  drew  out  of  the  navy  yard.  The  engi 
neer  was  running  cautiously,  for  the  shaft  had  scarcely 
been  given  a  turn  previous  to  this  day.  The  officers  moved 
among  their  men,  and  sought  to  give  them  some  acquaint 
ance  with  their  duties.  The  crew  surely  needed  instruc 
tion,  for  it  was  made  up  largely  of  volunteers  from  the 
army.  No  wonder  many  of  the  people  of  Norfolk,  as 
they  cheered  the  Merrimac,  supposed  that  she  was  going 
merely  on  a  trial  trip. 

THE  RAMMING  OP  THE  CUMBERLAND 

It  was  about  twelve  o'clock  when  Lieutenant  George 
U.  Morris,  of  the  Cumberland,  24  guns,  discovered  three 
vessels  under  steam  standing  down  Elizabeth  River 
towards  Sewell's  Point.  The  sense  of  peace  and  security 
then  prevailing  on  the  Union  side  was  indicated  by  the 
sailors'  washing,  which  decorated  the  rigging,  and  hung 


The  Ramming  of  the  Cumberland         265 


limp  in  the  breathless  air.  The  captain  of  the  Cumber 
land,  Commander  William  Radford,  was  absent,  having 
been  ordered  to  the  Roanoke  as  member  of  a  court  of 
inquiry.  The  Congress,  50  guns,  was  a  quarter  of  a  mile 


JTx  JoitfJ  line*  inctcat  fftt 
Omntl  wfar.  Man.  on 


HAMPTON  ROADS 

distant  from  the  Cumberland;  both  were  near  Newport 
News,  while  the  remaining  ships  of  the  fleet,  the  Roanoke, 
Minnesota,  and  St.  Lawrence,  were  anchored  off  Fortress 
Monroe,  eight  miles  distant. 

The  Cumberland  and  the  Congress,  though  suddenly 


266  The  United  States  Navy 

awakened  from  their  repose,  had  ample  time  to  clear  for 
action  and  to  study  the  strange  foe  5  approaching.  The 
Merrimac  was  deliberate  in  her  movements;  her  engines, 
condemned  as  worn  out  and  useless  a  year  before,  when 
the  yard  was  in  the  possession  of  the  Government,  had 
since  not  been  improved  by  fire  and  water.  At  their  best 
they  could  not  drive  her  five  knots  an  hour.  The  great 
bulk  of  the  Merrimac,  and  her  draft,  made  her  difficult  to 
maneuver.  She  drew  twenty-one  feet  forward  and  twenty- 
two  aft,  and  many  times  in  the  battle  of  this  day  and  the 
day  following  her  keel  dragged  in  the  mud.  It  took  over 
half  an  hour  to  wind  her. 

The  commanding  officer  of  the  Merrimac  was  Captain 
Franklin  Buchanan,  who  had  been  forty-six  years  in  the 
United  States  Navy,  and  who  was  in  command  of  the 
Washington  Navy  Yard  at  the  outbreak  of  hostilities. 
By  one  of  the  accidents  not  infrequent  in  this  war,  his 
favorite  brother  was  purser  on  the  Congress,  which  the 
Confederate  ram  was  about  to  engage. 

When  the  Merrimac  had  passed  the  Confederate  bat 
teries  at  Sewell's  Point,  where  she  was  heartily  cheered 
by  the  troops  that  lined  the  shores,  she  was  seen  to  take 
the  South  Channel  and  head  for  Newport  News.  The  two 
National  ships  lying  there  at  anchor  opened  fire  on  her 
when  she  was  three-quarters  of  a  mile  distant,  the  Cumber 
land  first  with  her  heavy  pivot  guns.  The  shore  batteries 
at  Newport  News  also  brought  their  guns  into  action. 

Many  of  the  shot  struck  the  Merrimac,  but  bounded  off 
without  effect.  Of  this  hostile  demonstration  the  strange 
monster  took  no  notice,  but  in  silence,  and  with  an  awful 
deliberation,  continued  to  advance.  Finally,  when  within 
close  range,  Lieutenant  Charles  Simms  carefully  aimed 

G  Stiles,  in  his  Military  Essays  and  Re-collections,  says  the 
Merrimac  looked  "  like  a  house  submerged  to  the  eaves,  borne 
onward  by  a  flood." 


The  Ramming  of  the  Cumberland         267 

her  forward  pivot,  and  the  shell,  going  true  to  its  mark, 
swept  away  practically  the  entire  crew  of  the  after  pivot- 
gun  of  the  Cumberland.6  Passing  near  the  Congress,  the 
Merrimac  gave  the  old  frigate  a  destructive  broadside  with 
her  starboard  battery,  and  received  a  heavy  fire  in  return 
though  with  no  effect.  Without  stopping  to  repeat  the 
fire,  the  ironclad  then  headed  direct  for  the  Cumberland, 
and  rammed  her  under  the  starboard  forechannels. 

The  beak  of  the  Merrimac  was  under  water,  but  when 
it  pierced  the  side  of  the  Cumberland  the  smashing  of 
timbers  could  be  heard  above  the  roar  of  cannon.  The 
shock  was  scarcely  felt  on  the  Merrimac,  but  the  Cumber 
land  had  received  a  fatal  wound.  The  tide  began  to  swing 
the  Merrimac  around,  and  as  she  was  disengaging  herself 
and  backing  clear,  the  ram  broke  off  short.  The  hole  made 
in  the  Cumberland  was  large  enough  to  admit  a  man. 

Just  previous  to  the  moment  of  impact,  the  forward 
pivot-gun  of  the  Merrimac  had  again  been  fired,  a  second 
time  doing  terrible  execution.  On  the  other  hand,  as  one 
of  the  Merrimac's  crew  in  his  excitement  and  enthusiasm 
imprudently  leaped  into  the  porthole  to  sponge  out  his 
gun,  he  was  immediately  shot  through  the  head  by  a 
musket  ball. 

Although  the  Cumberland  had  been  rammed,  her  men, 
controlled  by  splendid,  discipline,  did  not  flinch  because 
of  the  hopelessness  of  the  contest  or  the  carnage  on  their 
decks,  and,  reforming  the  gun-crews,  continued  the  fight. 
Their  shot  did  not  penetrate  the  ironclad,  yet  they  were 
not  altogether  wasted.  For  when  the  ships,  close  along 
side,  chanced  to  fire  at  the  same  moment,  the  shot  shat 
tered  the  muzzles  of  two  guns  of  the  Merrimac  and  ren 
dered  them  useless.  Fragments  of  guns  and  shells  killed 
one  man  on  the  Merrimac,  while  "sixteen  more  were 

6  Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,  i,  698. 


268  The  United  States  Navy 

scorched  with  powder  or  scratched  with  minor  particles 
of  the  debris."  (Surgeon  Phillips,  of  the  Merrimac.) 

The  Merrimac,  on  disentangling  herself,  laboriously 
proceeded  to  turn,  that  she  might  engage  the  Congress. 
Meanwhile  the  crew  of  the  Cumberland,  under  Lieutenant 
Morris,  heroically  held  to  the  fight.  As  she  began  to 
settle,  the  men  were  driven  from  the  lower  decks,  but 
fought  with  the  guns  on  the  spar  deck.  Nor  did  they 
leave  them  so  long  as  the  guns  were  above  water,  that  is, 
not  until  forty-five  minutes  after  the  ship  had  been 
rammed.  As  the  Union  vessel  careened  and  went  down, 
some  of  the  wounded  were  saved  by  being  placed  on  racks 
or  mess-chests,  but  the  loss  was  large.  Out  of  a  comple 
ment  of  376  officers  and  men,  only  255  responded  to 
muster  the  following  day;  nearly  all  of  the  others  had 
been  killed  or  drowned. 

The  Cumberland  partly  regained  an  upright  position 
on  sinking  in  the  shallow  water;  her  mastheads  were  not 
submerged,  and  the  American  flag  still  flew.  Thus  Com 
mander  Radford,  who  had  come  from  Fortress  Monroe  on 
horseback,  and  who  reached  his  ship  only  in  time  to  witness 
her  end,  had  the  consolation  of  seeing  the  colors  still 
flying.7 

THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  CONGRESS  8 

Meanwhile  Captain  Buchanan,  who,  on  leaving  the 
Cumberland,  had  headed  up  the  James,  put  his  helm 
hard-a-starboarcl,  and  as  he  was  coming  about,  Colonel 
J.  T.  Wood,  in  charge  of  the  after  pivot,  put  three  raking 
shells  into  the  Congress.  Lieutenant  Joseph  B.  Smith, 

7  Radford's   and   Morris'   reports   will    be   found   in    the   Naval 
War  Records,  vii,  20  ff. 

8  Built  at  Portsmouth,  N.  H.,  in  1841,  and  connected  only  in 
name  with  the  old  Congress,  one  of  the  six  frigates  forming  the 
first  permanent  navy  of  the  United  States. 


The  Destruction  of  the  Congress          269 

commanding  the  Congress,  attempted  to  save  his  ship  by 
setting  jib  and  topsails,  and,  with  the  assistance  of  the 
tug  Zouave,  running  under  the  protection  of  the  shore 
batteries.  But  the  Congress  soon  grounded  in  shoal  water, 
out  of  reach  of  the  Merrimac's  prow,  but  not  of  her  guns. 
Of  the  events  that  followed,  Lieutenant  Pendergrast,  the 
executive  officer,  says  in  his  official  report: 

''At  3.30  the  Merrimac  took  a  position  astern  of  us, 
at  a  distance  of  about  150  yards,  and  raked  us  fore  and 
aft  with  shells,  while  one  of  the  smaller  steamers  kept 
up  a  fire  on  our  starboard  quarter. 

"In  the  meantime,  the  Patrick  Henry  and  Thomas 
Jefferson  [Jamestown],  rebel  steamers,  approached  us 
from  up  the  James  River,  firing  with  precision  and  doing 
us  great  damage. 

"Our  two  stern  guns  were  now  our  only  means  of 
defense.  These  were  soon  disabled,  one  being  dismounted 
and  the  other  having  its  muzzle  knocked  away.  The 
men  were  swept  away  from  them  with  great  rapidity  and 
slaughter  by  the  terrible  fire  of  the  enemy. 

"At  about  4.30  I  learned  of  the  death  of  Lieutenant 
Smith,  which  happened  about  ten  minutes  previous.  See 
ing  that  our  men  were  being  killed  without  the  prospect 
of  any  relief  from  the  Minnesota,  which  vessel  had  run 
ashore  in  attempting  to  get  up  to  us  from  Hampton  Roads, 
not  being  able  to  bring  a  single  gun  to  bear  upon  the 
enemy,  and  the  ship  being  on  fire  in  several  places,  .  .  . 
we  deemed  it  proper  to  haul  down  our  colors  without 
any  further  loss  of  life  on  our  part. 

"We  were  soon  boarded  by  an  officer  from  the  Merri 
mac,  who  said  that  he  would  take  charge  of  the  ship.  He 
left  shortly  afterwards,  and  a  small  tug  came  alongside, 
whose  captain  demanded  that  we  should  surrender  and 
get  out  of  the  ship,  as  he  intended  to  burn  her  immediately. 

"A  sharp  fire  with  muskets  and  artillery  was  main- 


270  The  United  States  Navy 

tained  from  our  troops  ashore  upon  the  tug,  having  the 
effect  of  driving  her  off.  The  Merrimac  again  opened 
on  us,  although  we  had  a  white  flag  at  the  peak  to  show 
that  we  were  out  of  action."9 

The  Confederates  thought  that  the  fire  directed  against 
them  came  in  part  from  the  ship,  and  were  highly  indig 
nant.  Captain  Buchanan,  who  was  naturally  excitable, 
snatched  a  carbine  from  one  of  his  men,  and,  exposing 
nearly  his  whole  body  above  the  shield  of  the  Merrimac, 
began  firing.  His  anger  and  recklessness,  however,  met  with 
a  heavy  penalty.  His  thigh  bone  was  broken  by  a  musket 
ball  from  the  shore,  and  he  was  obliged  to  yield  the 
command  to  his  lieutenant,  Catesby  ap  R.  Jones.  The 
Confederate  steamers,  although  driven  away  from  the 
Congress  by  the  rifle  guns  on  shore,  set  the  Union  ship  on 
fire  by  red-hot  shot.  She  burned  until  past  midnight, 
when  the  flames  reached  the  magazine  and  blew  her  up. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  battle,  the  Minnesota,  the 
Roanoke,  and  the  St.  Lawrence,  leaving  Fortress  Monroe, 
had  attempted  to  move  up  the  Roads  and  take  part  in 
the  action.  But  by  the  middle  of  the  afternoon  the  tide 
was  ebbing,  and,  as  they  drew  considerable  water,  all 
three  grounded;  the  Minnesota,  which  had  gone  farthest 
of  the  three,  succeeded  in  getting  within  a  mile  and  a  half 
of  Newport  News,  and  witnessed  the  Cumberland  sink 
and  the  Congress  surrender,  without  any  power  on  her 
part  to  aid.  However,  if  the  Minnesota  could  not  rush 
forward  and  grapple  with  the  Merrimac,  no  more  could 
the  Merrimac  cross  the  shoal  water  and  engage  the  Minne 
sota,  and  to  this  the  Minnesota  owed  her  salvation. 

The  fire  of  the  Merrimac  was  not  very  accurate,  and 
at  the  distance  of  a  mile  her  gunners  succeeded  in  putting 
only  one  shell  through  their  enemy 's  bow.  But  the  James- 

9  Naval  War  Records,  vii,  23. 


The  North  Alarmed  271 

town  and  the  Patrick  Henry,  taking  positions  on  the 
Minnesota's  port  bow  and  stern,  with  their  rifle  guns  did 
considerable  damage  until  the  Union  vessel,  bringing  a 
heavy  gun  to  bear,  forced  them  to  withdraw. 

About  this  time  the  St.  Lawrence  succeeded  in  reach 
ing  a  position  near  the  Minnesota  before  grounding  again, 
where  she  fired  several  broadsides  at  the  Merrimac.  Hos 
tilities  ceased  about  6.30,  when  the  pilot  of  the  Merrimac 
declared  that  the  tide  would  leave  her  aground  if  she 
continued  longer  in  her  present  position.  The  Confederate 
vessels  then  steamed  back  to  Sewell's  Point,  where  they 
anchored  for  the  night. 

The  South  had  won  a  decided  victory.  The  conflict, 
according  to  the  Confederate  historian  Scharf,  was 
"  twenty-seven  guns  [the  combined  batteries  of  the  Merri 
mac  and  the  small  steamers]  against  an  armament  of  over 
300  guns,  of  which  100  could  be  brought  into  action  at 
every  moment,  and  on  every  point."  The  Merrimac  had 
moved  about  at  will  in  the  destruction  of  the  Union  ships, 
checked  only  by  the  shallow  water  of  the  Roads  and  her 
own  awkwardness.  The  heavy  guns  of  the  Union  ships 
and  shore  batteries  had  swept  her  decks,  carrying  away 
davits,  anchors,  and  flagstaffs.  Her  smokestack  and  steam- 
pipe  were  riddled;  her  beak  was  broken  off  and  prow 
twisted ;  the  muzzles  of  two  guns  had  been  shattered.  But 
as  her  armor  had  been  scarcely  so  much  as  dented,  the 
injuries  were  insignificant,  and  the  Confederates  awaited 
only  daylight  to  complete  the  work  of  destruction. 

Reports  of  the  victory  of  the  Merrimac  were  soon 
spreading  in  all  directions.  No  wonder  that  the  South 
became  ecstatic  and  that  the  North  was  filled  with  the 
gravest  apprehension.  When  the  news  reached  Washing 
ton  next  morning  (Sunday),  a  Cabinet  meeting  was  imme 
diately  called.  As  the  members  assembled  it  was  evident 
that  they  were  suffering  from  the  general  alarm.  In  the 


The  United  States  Navy 

deliberation  that  followed,  excited  fears  were  expressed 
that  the  blockade  might  now  be  broken,  and  the  Richmond 
campaign  thwarted ;  and,  who  could  tell,  even  New  York 
might  soon  be  laid  under  contribution,  and  Washington 
burned!10 

For  where  were  the  helpless  ships  of  the  Union  to  find 
succor?  Without  seeking  on  their  part,  however,  help 
came  in  a  strange,  most  unseamanlike  craft,  the  Monitor, 
which  arrived  in  Hampton  Roads  that  evening  at  nine 
o  'clock. 

"Nicolay  and  Hay,  Abraham  Lincoln,  v,  226. 


XVII 

THE  BATTLE  OF  HAMPTON  ROADS  (CON 
TINUED):   THE  MONITOR  AND 
THE  MERRIMAC 

A  RACE  IN  SHIPBUILDING 

IT  was  seemingly  a  strange  coincidence  that  within 
eight  hours  after  the  first  ironclad  of  the  South  had 
entered  so  brilliantly  on  her  career,  an  armored  champion 
of  the  North,  also  the  first  of  its  kind,  should  come  upon 
the  same  scene.  But  the  coincidence  admits  of  explanation. 
The  South,  recognizing  her  inability  to  build  and 
man  a  navy,  was  virtually  forced  into  trying  the  iron 
clad,  and,  as  we  have  seen  in  the  last  chapter,  began 
work  on  the  Merrimac  two  months  after  the  beginning  of 
the  war.  News  of  this  alarmed  the  North,  and  three  or 
four  months  later  the  Department  signed  contracts  for 
three  ironclads.  The  smallest  of  these,  the  Monitor,  was 
to  be  completed  in  the  almost  unprecedented  time  of  100 
days.  As  the  navy  departments  of  the  North  and  South 
were  kept  fairly  well  informed  of  the  progress  made  by 
each  other,  there  ensued  a  race  in  shipbuilding  of  grave 
importance;  in  which  the  North  had  the  advantage  of 
superior  shops  and  mechanics,  the  South  of  a  long  start 
and  intensity  of  feeling,  stimulated  by  the  constant  pres 
ence  of  her  enemy.  This  nearness  of  her  foe  promised  the 
South  another  important  advantage:  her  ironclad  would 
have  to  steam  fewer  hours  than  the  Monitor  would  days 
before  striking  the  first  decisive  blow. 

The  South  won  the  race  by  half  a  day,  and  thus  was 
able  to  destroy  two  staunch  old  sailing  ships.  This,  com 
pared  with  the  losses  suffered  by  the  army,  was  trivial. 
18  273 


274  The  United  States  Navy 

But  although  the  navy  did  not  in  general  bear  the  brunt 
of  the  fighting,  much  depended  on  the  ships.  If  the 
Monitor  had  been  delayed  another  week  in  reaching  Hamp 
ton  Roads,  the  whole  character  of  the  war  might  have 
been  changed. 

Early  in  August,  1861,  Congress,  convened  in  extra 
session,  had  appropriated  $1,500,000  ' '  for  the  construction 
or  completing  of  iron-  or  steel-clad  steamships  or  steam 
batteries."  Commodore  Joseph  Smith,  Commodore  Hiram 
Paulding,  and  Commander  Charles  H.  Davis  were  ap 
pointed  a  board  to  investigate  the  plans  and  specifications 
that  were  submitted.  These  old  and  tried  officers,  schooled 
in  everything  that  pertained  to  the  earlier  navy,  admitted 
in  their  report  that  they  approached  "the  subject  with 
diffidence,  having  no  experience  and  but  scanty  knowledge 
in  this  branch  of  naval  architecture. ' '  Nevertheless,  they 
did  not  shirk  their  responsibility,  and  after  careful  con 
sideration  approved  the  plans  for  the  Monitor,  the  Galena, 
and  the  New  Ironsides,  which  ships  were  soon  begun.  In 
fact,  the  Monitor's  keel-plate  was  passing  through  the  roll 
ing  mill  while  the  clerks  of  the  Navy  Department  were 
drawing  up  the  formal  contract.  The  Monitor  was 
launched  January  30,  1862,  and  was  turned  over  to  the 
Government  on  February  19. 

The  inventor  of  the  Monitor  was  John  Ericsson,1  born 
in  Sweden  in  1803.  His  strange  craft  showed  nothing 
less  than  genius  in  its  adaptation  to  the  service  required. 
She  was  of  light  draft  to  navigate  the  shallow  bays  and 

1  Already  Ericsson  had  given  evidence  of  genius.  While  living 
in  England  he  invented  the  screw  propeller  (1836);  and  it  was 
because  his  invention  met  with  utter  indifference  from  British  ship 
owners  and  naval  officers  that  on  the  encouragement  of  an  Amer 
ican  consul  and  naval  officer  he  came  to  the  United  States.  The 
U.  S.  S.  Princeton,  already  mentioned  as  the  first  warship  with  a 
screw  propeller,  was  of  his  designing. 


The  Building  of  the  Monitor 

4 


275 


276  The  United  States  Navy 

rivers  of  the  Southern  States.  As  light  draft  made  impos 
sible  high  armored  sides,  her  exposed  surface  was  small, 
but  heavily  armored,  and  thus  invulnerable  to  any  guns 
of  this  period.  A  revolving  turret  was  introduced  that 
she  might  use  her  few  guns  in  narrow  streams  where 
maneuvering  would  be  impossible.  Engines  below  the 
water  line,  and  propeller  and  rudder  protected  by  a  wide 
overhang,  were  other  elements  of  strength;  the  overhang, 
on  sides  as  well  as  ends,  protected  her  from  ramming  and 
also  from  shot  directed  at  the  water  line,  besides  giving 
her  increased  stability  in  a  rough  sea.2 

The  original  Monitor  was,  in  simple  terms,  a  turret 
on  a  raft,  and  the  whole  was  superposed  on  a  flat-bottomed 
boat.  She  was  of  776  tons  burden.  Her  extreme  length 
was  172  feet;  breadth,  forty-one  and  a  half  feet;  draft, 
ten  and  a  half  feet ;  inside  diameter  of  turret,  twenty  feet ; 
height  of  turret,  nine  feet.3  The  turret  was  composed  of 
eight  thicknesses  of  wrought-iron  plates,  each  one  inch 
thick,  firmly  riveted  together.  The  sides  of  the  hull,  which 
rose  scarcely  two  feet  above  the  water,  were  protected 
by  five  inches  of  armor,  and  the  deck  was  covered  with 
a  plating  one  inch  thick.  She  had  an  armament  of  two 
11-inch  Dahlgren  guns,  the  muzzles  of  which  were  run 
out  through  ports  placed  side  by  side.  When  the  guns 
were  drawn  back,  the  ports  were  closed  by  heavy  iron 
stoppers,  acting  like  pendulums. 

Even  after  the  Monitor  had  been  launched  and  had 
convinced  the  skeptical — of  whom  there  were  many — 
that  she  would  at  least  float,  duty  on  her  was  thought  to 
be  so  hazardous  that  a  crew  was  not  detailed  to  man  her, 

2  Church,  Life  of  John  Ericsson,  i,  263. 

3  Executive  Doc.,  House  of  Rep.,  48th  Cong.  1st  Sess.,  Report 
No.  1725. 


The  Trip  to  Hampton  Roads  277 

but  volunteers  were  called  for.  Lieutenant  J.  L.  Worden 
was  given  the  command,  and  Lieutenant  S.  D.  Greene  was 
made  executive  officer. 

THE  HAZARDOUS  TRIP  TO  HAMPTON  EOADS 

The  Monitor  was  built  at  Green  Point,  Long  Island. 
After  two  short  and  rather  unsatisfactory  trial  trips,  she 
started  for  Hampton  Roads.  She  left  New  York  on 
Thursday,  March  6,  towed  by  the  tugboat  Seth  Low.  Of 
the  experiences  on  that  dangerous  voyage,  Lieutenant 
Greene  wrote  to  his  mother  a  week  later:  " About  noon 
[Friday]  the  wind  freshened  and  the  sea  was  quite  rough. 
In  the  afternoon  the  sea  was  breaking  over  our  decks  at  a 
great  rate  and  coming  in  our  hawse-pipe  forward  in  per 
fect  floods.  Our  berth-deck  hatch  leaked  in  spite  of  all 
we  could  do,  and  the  water  came  down  under  the  tower 
like  a  waterfall.  .  .  .  The  water  came  through  the 
narrow  eye-holes  in  the  pilot  house  with  such  force  as  to 
knock  the  helmsman  completely  around  from  the  wheel."  4 

The  men  on  the  Monitor  had  to  meet  all  kinds  of 
dangers.  Water  swept  over  the  craft  in  such  a  volume 
that  it  went  down  the  blowers  and  the  smokestack.  Engi 
neers  and  firemen  narrowly  escaped  asphyxiation,  and 
when  the  engines  stopped,  the  pumps  were  rendered  use 
less,  and  the  water  in  the  hold  increased  rapidly.  As  the 
wind  was  from  the  west,  by  signaling  the  tug  to  go  nearer 
the  shore,  the  crew  found  relief  in  smoother  water.  At 
eight  P.M.  they  succeeded  in  starting  the  engines,  and  all 
went  well  till  midnight,  when,  passing  a  shoal,  they  once 
more  encountered  a  heavy  sea.  The  wheel  ropes  then 
jumped  off  the  steering  gear  and  became  jammed.  The 
vessel  came  very  near  foundering,  but  by  heroic  persever 
ance,  Worden  and  his  men  finally  succeeded  in  weathering 

4  Published  in  United  Service,  April,  1885. 


278  The  United  States  Navy 

the  storm.  At  four  P.M.  the  following  afternoon  the 
Monitor  passed  Cape  Henry,  and  shortly  after  dark 
reached  Fortress  Monroe.  According  to  orders  already 
sent  by  the  Department  to  Captain  Marston  of  the 
Roanoke,  the  senior  officer  present,  the  Monitor  on  arrival 
was  to  proceed  immediately  to  Washington;  but  in  view 
of  the  desperate  state  of  affairs  at  Hampton  Roads,  Cap 
tain  Marston  decided  to  disregard  the  orders  and  detain 
her  for  the  defense  of  the  fleet. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  IRONCLADS 

Shortly  after  sunrise  on  Sunday  morning,  March  9, 
1862,  the  Merrimac,  attended  by  the  Patrick  Henry  and 
the  Jamestown,  got  under  way  and  headed  for  Fortress 
Monroe ;  then,  striking  the  channel  up  which  the  Minne 
sota  had  labored  the  day  before,  the  squadron  came  slowly 
about  and  made  for  the  Union  ship.  When  still  a  mile 
distant,  the  Merrimac  opened  fire  and  planted  a  large 
shell  under  the  counter  near  the  water  line.  Before  any 
considerable  damage  had  been  done,  however,  the  Monitor 
appeared  from  the  shadow  of  the  Minnesota  and  boldly 
advanced  to  meet  the  Merrimac.  Such  a  novelty  in  ship 
construction  mystified  the  lookouts  on  the  Merrimac. 
Lieutenant  Davidson  of  the  Confederate  ship  is  said  to 
have  remarked,  "The  Minnesota's  crew  are  leaving  her  on 
a  raft."  Soon  the  new  vessel  was  recognized  as  Ericsson's 
invention,  and  many  were  the  observations  concerning  the 
absurdity  of  this  "immense  shingle  floating  on  the  water, 
with  a  gigantic  cheese  box  rising  from  its  centre. ' ' 

At  a  time  seemingly  so  unpropitious,  the  officers  and 
crew  of  the  Monitor  showed  no  ordinary  courage  in  offer 
ing  battle.  All  the  night  before  they  had  been  hard  at 
work  preparing  for  action ;  two  days  and  a  night  previous 
to  that,  they  had  been  struggling  for  their  lives,  and  twice 


The  Monitor  and  the  Merrimac  279 

had  narrowly  escaped  shipwreck;  thus  for  forty-eight 
hours  they  had  had  almost  no  sleep  or  food.  Further,  it 
required  unusual  spirit  to  disregard  the  gloomy  forebod 
ings  that  surrounded  the  Union  fleet,  and  advance  in  a 
small,  untried  craft  to  meet  a  foe  that  had  just  been  proved 
to  be  practically  invulnerable. 

At  about  8.30,  on  the  Monitor's  coming  wi'thin  short 
range,  Lieutenant  Worden  changed  his  course  so  as  to 
pass  the  Merrimac  abeam,  and  gave  the  order  to  com 
mence  firing.  Up  went  a  port,  a  gun  was  thrust  out,  and  a 
heavy  shot  struck  the  Merrimac;  the  latter  responded  with 
a  broadside.  Then  the  vessels,  after  passing,  came  about 
and  passed  again  somewhat  nearer.  The  firing  now  became 
regular;  the  Monitor  discharged  her  guns  every  seven  or 
eight  minutes,  and  used  solid  shot ;  the  Merrimac  with  her 
larger  number  of  guns  fired  more  often,  and  used  only 
shells.  Most  of  the  early  shot  of  the  Merrimac  had  gone 
wide  of  the  mark,  for  her  gunners  had  a  far  smaller  target 
than  that  offered  the  day  before  by  a  frigate.  And  later, 
as  their  missiles  struck,  they  made  no  impression  on  the 
Monitor's  turret,  which  continued  to  revolve  freely — a 
fact  which  brought  great  relief  to  the  men  inside  the 
turret,  now  being  tested  for  the  first  time.  When,  how 
ever,  as  happened  in  three  cases,  a  man  was  leaning  even 
slightly  against  the  wall  of  the  turret  on  its  being  struck, 
he  was  knocked  down  and  stunned.  Thus  Master  Stodder, 
who  had  charge  of  the  machinery  controlling  the  turret, 
was  disabled  about  ten  o'clock,  and  had  to  be  carried 
below.  Fortunately,  Chief  Engineer  Stimers,  who  was 
on  board  as  official  inspector,  was  eager  to  take  part  in 
the  action ;  and  as  he  knew  more  about  the  machinery  of 
the  turret  than  any  one  else  on  the  vessel,  his  service  was 
of  great  value. 

The  Monitor,  because  of  the  anchor- well  in  her  bow, 
was  scarcely  adapted  for  ramming.  The  well  was  a  device 


280  The  United  States  Navy 

of  Ericsson  that  permitted  the  anchor  to  be  raised  or 
lowered  through  the  bottom  without  exposing  men  or 
machinery  to  the  fire  of  the  enemy.  Nevertheless,  Lieu 
tenant  Worden,  on  seeing  that  his  heavy  11-inch  shot  were 
glancing  off  the  slanting  sides  of  the  Merrimac,  secured  a 
favorable  position  and  made  a  dash  for  the  ram,  hoping 
thereby  to  disable  her  rudder  and  propeller.  He  missed 
his  mark  by  three  feet,  and  the  Monitor  passed  clear  of 
the  Merrimac. 

It  had  been  a  part  of  Worden 's  plan  in  engaging  the 
Merrimac  to  protect  the  Minnesota  by  offering  battle  at 
some  distance  from  her.  The  Merrimac  was,  however, 
within  long  range  of  the  Minnesota,  and  when  in  the 
middle  of  the  engagement  the  Monitor  withdrew  for  a 
few  minutes,  Lieutenant  Catesby  ap  R.  Jones,  who  was 
commanding  the  Merrimac,  gave  all  his  attention  to  the 
wooden  ship.  Captain  Van  Brunt  of  the  Minnesota  says, 
* '  On  her  second  approach,  I  opened  with  all  my  broadside 
guns  and  10-inch  pivot,  a  broadside  which  would  have 
blown  out  of  water  any  timber-built  ship  in  the  world. 
She  returned  my  fire  with  her  rifled  bow  gun  with  a  shell, 
which  passed  through  the  chief  engineer's  stateroom, 
through  the  engineer's  mess  room,  amidships,  and  burst 
in  the  boatswain's  room,  tearing  four  rooms  all  into  one 
in  its  passage,  exploding  two  charges  of  powder,  which  set 
the  ship  on  fire,  but  it  was  promptly  extinguished  by  a 
party  headed  by  my  first  lieutenant;  her  second  went 
through  the  boiler  of  the  tugboat  Dragon."  5  By  the  time 
the  Merrimac  had  fired  a  third  shell,  the  Monitor  had 
again  taken  the  offensive,  and  coming  between  the  Minne 
sota  and  the  Merrimac,  compelled  the  latter  to  change  her 
position,  in  doing  which  she  grounded.  Fifteen  minutes 
later  she  was  free,  and  then  headed  down  the  bay,  with 

5  Naval  War  Records,  vii,  11. 


The  Monitor  and  the  Merrimac  281 

the  Monitor  in  pursuit.  This  was  but  a  ruse  on  the  part 
of  the  Merrimac,  for,  getting  into  deeper  water,  after 
considerable  maneuvering  she  attempted  to  ram  the 
Monitor.  But  the  smaller  craft,  much  the  more  agile, 
put  her  helm  over  and  received  only  a  glancing  blow.  The 
heavy  beak  of  the  Merrimac  that  had  gone  down  with 
the  Cumberland  had  not  yet  been  replaced,  and  the  light 
iron  shoe  now  on  her  stem  was  cut  by  the  Monitor's  sharp 
edge.  This  opened  a  leak  on  the  ram,  which  had  been 
started  the  day  before  and  had  been  only  temporarily 
checked.  At  the  moment  of  contact,  Lieutenant  Greene, 
who  with  his  own  hands  fired  all  the  guns  of  the  Monitor 
until  he  left  the  turret  near  the  close  of  the  battle,6  planted 
a  solid  180-pound  shot  in  the  forward  casemate  of  the 
Merrimac.  The  shot  broke  some  of  the  iron  plate  and 
bent  in  the  timber.  Another  shot  striking  in  the  same 
place  would  probably  have  penetrated.  By  order  of  the 
Department,  only  fifteen  pounds  of  powder  was  used  to 
a  charge.  Had  thirty  pounds  been  used,  which  later  was 
found  to  be  not  too  heavy  for  the  guns,  it  is  thought  that 
several  of  the  shot  might  have  pierced  the  shield.  A  gun 
crew  on  the  Merrimac  were  so  affected  by  the  concussion 
that  they  bled  from  nose  and  ears,  but  there  was  no  further 
injury. 

After  the  Monitor  had  been  fighting  for  two  hours, 
ammunition  began  to  fail  in  her  turret,  and  as  this  could 
be  replenished  only  by  bringing  a  hole  in  the  turret 
directly  over  a  scuttle,  she  withdrew  into  shallow  water, 
where  the  Merrimac  could  not  follow.  Fifteen  minutes 
later  she  was  back  and  ready  for  the  fight. 

6  By  the  strange  fortune  of  war,  Lieutenant  Butt,  an  old  Naval 
Academy  chum  of  Greene,  also  took  part  in  this  battle.  As  Greene 
wrote  to  his  mother,  "  My  old  room-mate  was  on  board  the 
Merrimac.  Little  did  we  think  at  the  Academy  we  should  ever 
be  firing  150-pound  shot  at  each  other,  but  so  goes  the  world." 


282  The  United  States  Navy 

The  engagement  had  at  this  time  been  fought  for  three 
hours  without  either  antagonist's  securing  the  advantage. 
Each  was  powerful  in  defense,  and  each  met  with  many 
difficulties  on  assuming  the  offensive.  The  Merrimac  was 
cumbrous  and  unwieldy,  and  her  draft  of  twenty-two  feet 
was  ill  adapted  to  Hampton  Roads.  Her  smokestack  had 
been  so  riddled  by  the  fight  of  the  previous  day,  that  the 
fires  did  not  draw  well,  and  steam  got  so  low  as  scarcely 
to  drive  her  defective  engines.  The  Monitor,  much 
shorter,  and  with  a  draft  of  less  than  twelve  feet,  re 
sponded  quickly  to  her  helm;  as  she  also  had  twice  the 
speed  of  her  antagonist,  she  showed  a  marked  superiority 
in  maneuvering.  She  would  dart  about,  assume  a  position 
where  for  a  time  the  Merrimac  could  not  bring  a  gun  to 
bear,  and,  when  threatened,  retreat  to  shoal  water,  where 
her  huge  enemy  could  not  follow.  But  the  turret  of  the 
Monitor  could  be  operated  only  with  great  difficulty;  it 
was  hard  to  start,  and  when  started  it  was  still  harder  to 
stop.  Consequently  the  guns  had  to  be  fired  '  *  on  the  fly, ' ' 
and  it  was  anything  but  a  simple  matter  to  secure  a  good 
aim  when  all  that  a  man  in  the  turret  could  see  of  the 
outside  world  was  what  he  saw  through  the  narrow  cracks 
between  the  guns  and  the  sides  of  the  ports.  By  the 
revolving  of  the  turret,  the  men  at  the  guns  lost  their 
sense  of  direction;  white  guide  marks  painted  on  the 
stationary  platform  below  were  soon  covered  with  grime, 
so  that  when  word  was  brought  from  the  pilot  house  that 
the  Merrimac  bore  off  the  starboard  or  port  bow,  the 
gunners  had  little  to  guide  them.  It  was  a  constant  source 
of  anxiety  to  Lieutenant  Greene  7  lest  in  the  smoke  and 
confusion  the  guns  of  the  Monitor  might  be  trained  on 
their  own  pilot  house,  which,  being  in  almost  the  extreme 

7  Greene's   story  of   the   battle   will   be   found   in  Battles  and 
Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,  i,  719. 


The  Monitor  and  the  Merrimac  283 

bow,  was  separated  from  the  turret  by  a  third  of  the 
length  of  the  ship.  Communication  between  pilot  house 
and  turret  was  by  a  speaking-tube,  and  when  this  was 
disabled  early  in  the  engagement,  the  paymaster  and  cap 
tain  's  clerk  were  employed  as  messengers ;  since  they  were 
without  sea-training,  orders  were  not  always  rightly 
understood. 

At  about  half  past  eleven,  the  gunners  of  the  Merrimac, 
despairing  of  doing  any  injury  to  the  turret  of  the 
Monitor,  directed  their  fire  against  the  pilot  house.  This 
projected  four  feet  above  the  deck,  and  was  made  of 
wrought-iron  beams,  nine  inches  thick  and  twelve  inches 
deep,  dovetailed  together  at  the  corners.  By  crowding, 
it  now  held  three  people,  Lieutenant  Worden,  the  quarter 
master,  and  the  pilot.  While  Worden  was  looking  through 
the  long  narrow  slit  interposed  between  the  iron  beams, 
which  served  as  a  sight  hole,  a  shell  fired  by  the  Merrimac 
only  a  few  yards  distant  exploded  directly  outside,  and 
his  face  and  eyes  were  painfully  wounded  with  powder 
and  fine  fragments  of  iron.  The  explosion  also  partially 
raised  the  heavy  iron  cover  of  the  conning  tower,  which 
had  been  laid  in  a  groove,  not  bolted  down.  Though 
suffering  extreme  pain,  and  temporarily  blinded,  Worden 
retained  his  presence  of  mind ;  conscious  of  the  flood  of 
light  streaming  in  from  above,  he  feared  that  the  pilot 
house  had  been  demolished,  and  gave  orders  to  sheer  off, 
a  maneuver  that  brought  the  vessel  into  shallow  water 
towards  Fortress  Monroe. 

Lieutenant  Greene,  who  had  been  summoned  to  take 
command,  after  helping  Worden  to  the  cabin,  found  that 
the  Monitor,  though  drifting  aimlessly  about  beyond  the 
reach  of  the  Merrimac,  was  practically  as  fit  for  engage 
ment  as  ever ;  the  pilot  house  had  suffered  little  harm,  and 
the  steering  gear  was  uninjured.  Accordingly,  after  fif 
teen  or  twenty  minutes'  absence,  the  Monitor  was  again 


284  The  United  States  Navy 

pointed  towards  the  Merrimac;  but  it  was  towards  a  retir 
ing  foe.  The  Merrimac  was  on  her  way  back  to  Norfolk. 
The  Monitor  followed  her  a  short  distance,  fired  a  few  shot 
to  indicate  her  willingness  to  continue  the  engagement,  and 
then  returned  to  the  Minnesota.  This  was  shortly  after 
twelve  o'clock;  the  battle  had  been  fought  nearly  four 
hours  without  either  ironclad's  losing  a  man. 

Both  sides  later  expressed  surprise  that  the  Merrimac 
should  have  retired  when  she  did.  Captain  Van  Brunt 
of  the  Minnesota  in  his  official  report  said  that  on  seeing 
the  Monitor  withdraw  after  Worden's  accident,  he  in 
ferred  she  was  leaving  because  she  had  run  short  of 
ammunition  or  had  met  with  serious  injury.  And  he 
admitted  that,  since  the  Minnesota  was  immovably 
aground,  and  had  expended  most  of  her  solid  shot,  he  had 
decided,  when  the  Merrimac  returned  to  the  attack,  to 
destroy  his  ship. 

Lieutenant  Catesby  Jones,  who  was  severely  criticised, 
defended  his  action  as  follows: 

"We  had  run  into  the  Monitor,  causing  us  to  leak, 
and  had  received  a  shot  from  her  which  came  near  dis 
abling  the  machinery,  but  continued  to  fight  her  until 
she  was  driven  into  shoal  water.  The  Minnesota  appeared 
so  badly  damaged  that  we  did  not  believe  that  she  could 
ever  move  again.  The  pilots  refused  to  place  us  any 
nearer  to  her  (they  had  once  run  us  aground).  About 
twelve  [o'clock]  the  pilots  declared  if  we  did  not  go  up 
to  Norfolk  then,  that  we  could  not  do  so  until  the  next 
day. " 8  If  this  explanation  is  not  wholly  satisfactory, 
further  light  may  be  gained  from  a  letter  of  Lieutenant 
Davidson,  C.  S.  N. :  "Our  officers  and  men  were  com 
pletely  broken  down  by  two  days'  and  a  night's  continu 
ous  work  with  the  heaviest  rifled  ordnance  in  the  world."9 


8  Naval  War  Records,  vii,  59. 
»IMd.,  vii,  61. 


Results  285 

During  the  engagement,  the  Monitor  fired  forty-one 
solid  cast-iron  shot.  A  proof  of  the  fair  marksmanship 
was  found  when  the  Merrimac  went  into  dry  dock ;  twenty 
of  the  100  indentations  in  her  armor  were  recognized  as 
caused  hy  the  shot  of  the  Monitor.  While  six  of  the  outer 
plates  of  the  Merrimac  were  cracked,  and  had  to  be 
replaced,  none  of  the  inner  course  were  broken.  The 
Monitor  had  been  struck  twenty-two  times.  The  armor 
of  her  turret  had  been  indented  in  one  place  two  and  a 
quarter  inches,  but  none  of  the  plates  had  been  cracked. 
As  has  been  narrated,  one  of  the  wrought-iron  beams  of 
the  pilot  house,  however,  had  been  fractured  by  a  68- 
pound  shell. 

RESULTS 

The  fight  between  the  Monitor  and  the  Merrimac,  so 
far  as  the  ironclads  were  directly  concerned,  ended  at 
noon,  March  9 ;  but  on  paper,  a  contest  of  the  same  name 
has  been  fought  over  again  and  again  in  a  fruitless  effort 
to  decide  who  was  victor.  "Whether  it  was  a  defeat,  a 
victory,  or  a  drawn  battle,  it  relieved  the  North  of  the 
greatest  apprehension.  The  Monitor,  by  her  remarkable 
defense,  had  saved  the  Minnesota,  the  Roanoke,  and  the 
St.  Lawrence.  She  had  prevented  the  blockade  from 
being  broken  at  Hampton  Roads,  its  most  important  point. 
She  insured  the  supremacy  of  the  sea  to  the  North.  She 
allayed  the  discouragement  and  terror  felt  through  the 
loyal  States  on  the  overwhelming  defeat  of  the  previous 
day,  and  checked  the  wild  rejoicing  of  the  South. 

These  results  were  of  such  moment  that  the  battle  is  to 
be  classed  with  Gettysburg  and  Vicksburg  in  its  influence 
on  the  war.  Its  fame,  for  other  reasons  as  well,  went  far 
beyond  the  United  States.  "Probably  no  naval  conflict 
in  the  history  of  the  world  ever  attracted  so  much  atten 
tion  as  did  the  battle  in  Hampton  Roads,  between  the 
Monitor  and  the  Merrimac.  It  revolutionized  the  navies 


286  The  United  States  Navy 

of  the  world,  and  showed  that  the  wooden  ships,  which 
had  long  held  control  of  the  ocean,  were  of  no  further  use 
for  fighting  purposes."  10 

The  conservative  London  Times  observed,  on  receiving 
the  news  of  the  battle,  "Whereas  we  [the  English]  had 
available  for  immediate  purposes  149  first-class  warships, 
we  have  now  two,  these  two  being  the  Warrior  and  her 
sister  Ironside.  There  is  not  now  a  ship  in  the  English 
Navy,  apart  from  these  two,  that  it  would  not  be  madness 
to  trust  to  an  engagement  with  that  little  Monitor."  " 

As  the  North  immediately  proceeded  to  construct  other 
monitors  of  an  improved  type,  the  danger  of  armed  inter 
vention  by  England  and  France  in  behalf  of  the  seceded 
States  was  materially  lessened. 


THE  SUBSEQUENT  CAREERS  OF  THE  MONITOR  AND  THE 
MERRIMAC 

Each  side  made  elaborate  plans  for  boarding  or  ram 
ming  the  ironclad  of  the  other  in  a  later  engagement ;  but 
each,  recognizing  how  disastrous  would  be  a  defeat,  refused 
to  fight  except  on  terms  promising  a  decided  advantage. 

The  Merrimac,  after  being  repaired,  appeared  twice 
in  the  Roads,  but  made  no  further  attempt  against  the 
Union  fleet,  and  no  engagement  followed.  On  the  10th  of 
May,  1862,  when  the  Confederates  evacuated  Norfolk  and 
Portsmouth,  it  became  a  question  what  should  be  done 
with  the  Merrimac.  Commodore  Tattnall,  who  had  suc 
ceeded  to  the  command  of  the  ram,  despairing,  because 
of  her  draft,  of  taking  her  up  the  James  for  the  defense 
of  Richmond,  as  had  been  planned,  applied  the  torch  and 
destroyed  her  on  May  11. 

10  Knox,  Decisive  Battles  since  Waterloo,  p.  228. 

11  Quoted  by  Knox. 


The  Sinking  of  the  Monitor  287 

The  career  of  the  Monitor  was  also  brief,  and  she  sur 
vived  her  great  rival  by  only  little  more  than  half  a  year. 
She  was  once  more  actively  engaged;  the  occasion,  May 
15,  1862,  was  a  bombardment  of  Drewry's  Bluff,  seven 
miles  below  Richmond,  by  the  Monitor,  Galena,  Aroostook, 
Naugatuck,  and  Port  Royal.  The  ironclad  Galena  was 
perforated  eighteen  times  by  plunging  shot,  and  had  thir 
teen  men  killed  and  eleven  wounded.  The  Monitor  was 
struck  three  times,  but  not  injured.  The  end  of  this, 
the  most  famous  ship  of  modern  history,  came  at  the  very 
conclusion  of  the  year  1862.  On  December  29  the  Moni 
tor  left  Hampton  Roads,  towed  by  the  Rhode  Island, 
bound  for  Charleston,  S.  C.  All  went  well  until  the  even 
ing  of  the  30th,  when,  being  about  fifteen  miles  south  of 
Cape  Hatteras  Shoals,  she  struck  a  rough  sea  and  yawed 
badly.  The  wind  was  from  the  south.  Had  the  Rhode 
Island,  with  her  tow,  early  come  about,  and  run  before 
the  gale,  the  Monitor  might  have  been  saved ;  but  the  Rhode 
Island  held  determinedly  to  her  course.  About  eight 
o  'clock  in  the  evening  the  sea  rose  rapidly ;  from  that  time 
till  midnight  Commander  J.  P.  Bankhead,  with  his  men 
on  the  Monitor,  made  a  heroic  fight  against  the  waves, 
which  swept  repeatedly  over  the  decks,  poured  through 
innumerable  crevices,  and  made  the  engines  work  harder 
and  harder.  Shortly  before  midnight  two  boats  of  the 
Rhode  Island  began  taking  off  the  shipwrecked  crew. 
This,  in  the  raging  sea,  with  the  Monitor  submerged  much 
of  the  time,  was  a  most  hazardous  undertaking;  and  four 
officers  and  twelve  men  of  the  Monitor  were  lost.  Shortly 
after  Commander  Bankhead  had  reached  the  Rhode  Island, 
the  red  light  in  the  turret  of  the  Monitor  disappeared, 
for  the  waves  had  closed  over  her.12 

12  Commander  Bankhead's  report  will  be  found  in  the  Naval 
War  Records,  viii,  347. 


XVIII 
OPERATIONS  ON  THE  WESTERN  RIVERS 

THE  organization  of  combined  naval  and  military 
operations  for  gaining  control  of  the  Mississippi  and  its 
tributaries  was  one  of  the  three  cardinal  recommendations 
of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  at  the  beginning  of  the  war. 
This  appealed  with  especial  directness  to  the  people  of 
the  North  Central  States,  who  realized  that  with  the  Union 
divided  the  vast  system  of  waterways,  the  avenues  of 
commerce,  might  become  useless.  They  also  perceived 
that  the  side  which  held  the  Mississippi  could  easily  carry 
war  into  the  territory  of  the  other. 

Cairo,  Illinois,  at  the  junction  of  three  States  as  well 
as  two  great  rivers,  occupied  a  strategic  position,  and 
became  the  naval  arsenal  and  depot  of  supplies  for  the 
Union  flotilla.  Nearly  all  the  Mississippi  south  of  Cairo, 
1097  miles  by  stream,  480  by  direct  line,  was  in  1861  con 
trolled  by  the  Confederates.  They  had  also  a  strong  line 
of  fortifications  from  Columbus,  Kentucky  (twenty-one 
miles  down  the  river  from  Cairo),  extending  east  to  Fort 
Henry,  Fort  Donelson,  and  to  the  Cumberland  Mountains. 
Attacking  this  line  of  Confederate  defenses,  the  Union 
forces  early  in  1862  gained  several  important  victories; 
and  the  navy,  though  not  always  the  chief  factor,  was 
undeniably  essential. 

Gunboats,  well  protected  and  adapted  to  service  on 
shallow  rivers,  were  at  once  demanded,  and  the  Govern 
ment  contracted  in  August,  1861,  with  James  B.  Eads 
of  St.  Louis  for  seven  ironclads.  In  size  and  form  these 
were  practically  all  the  same,  175  feet  long,  fifty-one  and 
288 


Operations  on  the  Western  Rivers         289 


OPERATIONS  ON  THE  WESTERN  RIVERS 


290  The  United  States  Navy 

a  half  feet  beam,  and  six  feet  in  draft;  each  carried 
thirteen  heavy  guns,  and  had  a  casemate,  sloped  at  an 
angle  of  35°  and  plated  at  the  forward  end  and  abreast 
the  engines  with  two  and  a  half  inches  of  iron.  There 
was  a  single,  large  paddle  wheel  placed  in  an  opening 
forward  of  the  stern  and  thus  protected  from  shot  by  the 
casemate  and  sides.  The  speed  required  by  contract  was 
nine  miles  an  hour.  Thus  were  built  and  made  ready  for 
active  service  in  January,  1862,  the  gunboats  St.  Louis, 
Carondelet,  Cincinnati,  Louisville,  Mound  City,  Cairo, 
and  Pittsburg.  These  with  the  Benton,  a  government 
snagboat  that  had  been  made  over  into  an  ironclad  larger 
and  stronger  than  any  of  the  rest,  formed  the  backbone 
of  the  river  fleet  throughout  the  war.1 

The  fleet  was  built  under  the  general  supervision  of 
the  War  Department.  However,  the  Navy  Department 
co-operated  by  detailing  one  of  its  officers  to  direct  the 
work.  Commander  John  Rodgers  began  the  construction, 
and  Captain  Andrew  II.  Foote,  relieving  him  on  Septem 
ber  6,  1861,  carried  it  on  to  its  completion.  Foote,  a  true 
sailor,  would  have  much  preferred  a  command  on  the  sea ; 
for  the  peculiar  duty  given  him  included  operations  on 
land  and  swamp  as  well  as  river,  and  he  met  problems 
utterly  different  from  any  encountered  previously  in  his 
long  service.  The  fact  that  he  was  under  the  direction  of 
the  War  Department,  receiving  orders  from  generals  who 
little  comprehended  what  a  gunboat  could  and  could  not 
do,  was  not  the  least  of  his  difficulties.  In  fitting  out  the 
fleet  he  was  frequently  embarrassed  by  lack  of  materials, 
money,  and  credit,  but  he  carried  forward  the  work  with 
magnificent  patience  and  determination.  He  later  gained 
high  praise  for  the  successes  he  won  with  this  fleet,  yet 

1Eads,  Recollections  of  Foote  and  the  Gunboats,  in  Battles 
and  Leaders,  i,  338  ff. 


From  Hoppin's  /. 


AXDRKW    H.  FOOTB 


Operations  on  the  Western  Rivers         291 


292  The  United  States  Navy 

he  is  said  to  have  looked  upon  the  fighting  as  secondary, 
and  the  creation  of  this  fleet  as  being  the  great  achievement 
of  his  life. 


THE  ACTION  AT  BELMONT 

The  first  important  service  rendered  by  the  river 
navy  was  on  November  7,  1861,  the  day  Port  Eoyal  was 
taken  by  DuPont.  General  Grant,  with  3000  troops,  sur 
prised  a  Confederate  force  of  2500  at  Belmont,  Missouri, 
just  across  the  Mississippi  from  Columbus.  The  Union 
army  had  come  down  the  river  in  transports,  convoyed  by 
the  Tyler,  Commander  Walke,  and  the  Lexington,  Com 
mander  Stembel.  These  were  river  boats  which,  with  the 
Conestoga,  had  been  purchased  and  made  into  wooden 
gunboats  the  summer  preceding  by  Commander  Rodgers. 

The  Union  army  swept  all  before  them,  but  when  a 
decisive  advantage  had  been  gained,  were  slow  in  obeying 
orders  to  fall  back.  As  a  consequence  they  were  in  immi 
nent  danger  of  being  overwhelmed  by  the  large  Confederate 
reinforcements  that  had  crossed  over  from  Columbus.  The 
gunboats,  which  had  three  times  engaged  the  heavy  Con 
federate  batteries  above  Columbus  commanding  Belmont, 
now  from  an  advantageous  position  opened  on  the  Con 
federate  troops  advancing  to  attack  the  retreating  army 
even  at  their  transports ;  with  grape,  canister,  and  5-second 
shell  they  enfiladed  the  Confederate  lines  and  drove  them 
back  with  considerable  loss.  They  had  occasion  to  pro 
tect  the  transports  even  after  they  had  got  under  way; 
moreover,  when  they  had  proceeded  a  few  miles  up  the 
river,  and  General  McClernand  discovered  that  some  of 
the  troops  had  been  left  behind,  the  gunboats  went  back, 
picked  up  the"  troops  with  their  wounded  and  forty  pris 
oners,  and  then  returned  to  Cairo.  The  incident  may 
seem  not  very  important  in  the  history  of  the  navy,  and 


The  Capture  of  Fort  Henry  293 

yet  without  the  Tyler  and  the  Lexington  the  capture  of  a 
large  part  of  the  Union  force  could  scarcely  have  been 
averted.  Such  a  disaster  would  have  caused  distrust  of 
Grant,  and  might  have  long  prevented  his  being  given  an 
opportunity  to  show  his  great  abilities. 

THE  CAPTURE  OP  FORT  HENRY 

In  January,  1862,  when  Grant  had  his  army  fairly 
well  disciplined,  and  Foote  had  the  seven  ironclads  ready, 
they  considered  attacking  the  Confederate  lines.  Colum 
bus,  with  its  admirable  situation  and  heavy  batteries,  gave 
promise  of  being  able  to  withstand  a  direct  attack  for  a 
long  while.  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson  were  not  so 
strong,  and  if  they  should  fall  the  Union  forces  would 
have  access  to  Tennessee,  Alabama,  and  Mississippi,  and 
could  compel  the  evacuation  of  Columbus. 

Having  gained  General  Halleck's  permission  to  attack 
Fort  Henry,  Foote  left  Cairo,  on  February  2,  with  four 
ironclads  and  three  wooden  gunboats.  Progress  up  the 
Tennessee  was  slow  because  of  torpedoes,  eight  of  which 
the  squadron  fished  out  of  the  channel.  At  the  same 
time  Grant's  army  came  up  the  river  in  transports,  con 
voyed  by  gunboats,  and  landed  within  a  few  miles  of  the 
fort.  For  the  plan  was  that  the  troops,  making  a  detour, 
should  attack  the  rear  of  the  fort  when  the  squadron 
attacked  from  the  river.  Fort  Henry  in  the  official  report 
of  J.  F.  Gilmer,  Chief  Engineer,  Western  Department, 
C.  S.  A.,  is  described  as  "a  strong  field  work  of  fine 
bastion  front,  ...  in  good  condition  for  defense," 
with  "seventeen  guns  mounted  on  substantial  platforms, 
twelve  of  which  were  so  placed  as  to  bear  well  on  the 
river."  The  twelve  guns  were,  one  10-inch  columbiad,  one 
60-pounder  rifle,  two  42-pounders,  and  eight  32-pounders, 


294  The  United  States  Navy 

"all  arranged  to  fire  through  embrasures  formed  by  rais 
ing  the  parapet  between  the  guns  with  sand  bags  care 
fully  laid."2 

On  the  morning  of  February  6,  according  to  agree 
ment,  Foote  steamed  towards  the  batteries,  and  at  half 
past  twelve,  when  1700  yards  distant,  opened  fire.  "The 
three  old  [wooden]  gunboats,"  writes  Foote,  "  took  posi 
tion  astern  and  inshore  of  the  [four]  armored  boats  doing 
good  execution  there  in  the  action,  while  the  armored  boats 
were  placed  in  the  first  order  of  steaming,  approaching 
the  fort  in  a  parallel  line."  3  Foote 's  plan  was  to  present 
the  bows,  the  least  vulnerable  part  of  his  boats,  to  the 
enemy,  and  rely  on  his  bow  guns,  of  which  in  the  armored 
vessels  he  had  eleven;  then,  by  advancing,  to  compel  the 
Confederate  gunners  constantly  to  alter  their  aim  and 
make  it  difficult  for  them  to  secure  the  right  elevation  for 
their  pieces. 

The  fire  of  the  gunboats  called  forth  a  spirited  reply 
from  the  fort,  and  as  the  squadron  slowly  approached 
to  within  600  yards,  the  shooting  on  both  sides  increased 
in  rapidity  and  accuracy.  About  an  hour  after  the  battle 
had  begun,  the  armored  Essex  had  her  casemate  pene 
trated  by  a  shot;  this  killed  one  man,  then  plowing  its 
way  back,  exploded  the  boiler  and  wounded  by  scalding 
twenty-eight,  among  them  Commander  W.  D.  Porter. 
The  Essex,  rendered  helpless,  slowly  drifted  out  of  line 
astern,  and  was  carried  by  the  current  from  the  fort  down 
the  river.  The  other  gunboats  also  were  struck  several 
times.  The  flagship  Cincinnati,  particularly,  was  a  target 
and  had  many  plates  of  her  casemate  broken,  while  her 
smoke  stacks,  after-cabin,  and  boats  were  completely 
riddled.  She  received  onlv  one  shot  that  caused  loss  of 


2  Army  War  Records,  vii,  132. 
>IVid.,  vii,  122. 


The  Capture  of  Fort  Henry  295 

life;  this,  penetrating  the  forward  casemate  on  the  port 
side,  killed  one  man  and  wounded  several. 

Meanwhile  the  Confederates  were  finding  it  increas 
ingly  difficult  to  defend  their  works.  Their  gunners  were 
"under  a  most  terrific  fire  from  the  advancing  foe,  whose 
approach  was  steady  and  constant."  4  Early  in  the  action 
their  rifled  cannon  burst,  killing  three  of  the  men  at  the 
piece  and  disabling  a  number  of  others.  Next,  one  of  the 
32-pounders  was  struck  by  a  heavy  shell,  which  rendered 
the  gun  useless  and  wounded  all  its  crew.  Then  the 
10-inch  columbiad  became  silent ;  the  priming  wire  had 
been  jammed  and  broken  in  the  vent,  and  efforts  to 
remove  it  were  unavailing.  At  1.45  P.M.,  General  Tilgh- 
man,  commanding  the  fort,  saw  that  further  resistance 
was  useless,  for  he  had  but  two  guns  now  in  action.  After 
an  engagement  that  had  lasted  one  hour  and  fifteen  min 
utes,  he  lowered  his  flag  and  surrenderd  to  Foote. 

An  hour  later  Foote  turned  over  the  fort  with  the 
prisoners  to  Grant.  The  army  had  been  so  impeded  by 
well-nigh  impassable  roads  and  swollen  streams  (the  result 
of  heavy  rains  for  two  days  previous  to  the  battle),  that 
it  had  been  able  to  take  no  part  in  the  attack.  In  recog 
nition  of  the  splendid  service  rendered  by  the  gunboats 
and  their  commanding  officer,  the  captured  fort  was  at 
once  renamed  "Fort  Foote." 

On  the  surrender  of  Fort  Henry,  Lieutenant-Com 
mander  Phelps,  with  the  three  wooden  gunboats,  pro 
ceeded  twenty-five  miles  up  the  Tennessee,  where  he 
destroyed  the  bridge  and  rendered  useless  for  through 
traffic  the  important  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad. 
Having  compelled  the  Confederates,  whom  he  surprised 
near  the  bridge,  to  destroy  three  boats  loaded  with  mili 
tary  stores  to  prevent  their  capture,  he  continued  to  Cerro 

*  Report  of  Chief  Engineer  Gilmer. 


296  The  United  States  Navy 

Gordo,  Tennessee.  There  he  seized  a  large  steamer,  the 
Eastport,  which  was  being  remade  into  a  gunboat.  She 
was  such  a  valuable  prize  that  the  Tyler  remained  to 
guard  her  and  to  put  on  board  the  materials  that  had  been 
gathered  for  her  rebuilding.  She  was  later  taken  into  the 
navy,  and  served  for  two  years  in  the  river  operations. 
The  Conestoga  and  the  Lexington,  going  farther  up  the 
river,  had  seized  two  more  steamers,  one  freighted  with 
iron  to  be  sent  to  Richmond.  At  Florence,  Alabama,  they 
discovered  three  steamers,  but  these  were  fired  on  their 
approach.  They  could  not  go  beyond  Florence  because 
of  the  Muscle  Shoal.  Destroying  the  military  stores  along 
the  route  which  they  could  not  carry  back,  the  gunboats 
then  returned  to  Cairo,  just  in  time  to  join  the  expedition 
against  Fort  Donelson.5 

THE  ATTACK  ON  FORT  DONELSON 

Because  the  Union  army  had  been  delayed  in  reaching 
the  position  in  the  rear  of  Fort  Henry,  most  of  the  Con 
federate  army  had  escaped.  While  a  hundred  men  under 
General  Tilghman  had  been  replying  to  the  attack  of  the 
gunboats,  the  main  force  had  slipped  past  the  Federal 
army  and  gone  to  Fort  Donelson,  twelve  miles  distant  on 
the  Cumberland  River.  Here  the  Confederates,  drawing 
in  their  lines,  concentrated  about  18,000  men,  the  com 
mands  of  Generals  Floyd,  Pillow,  and  Buckner.  The  fort 
occupied  a  bluff  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Cumberland,  and 
commanded  the  navigation  of  the  river.  It  was  much 
stronger  than  Fort  Henry,  and  the  Confederates  realized 
its  great  importance  to  them.  It  was  defended  on  the 
water  side  by  two  batteries,  each  about  thirty  feet  above 
high  water  and  well  constructed;  the  lower,  or  down 
stream,  battery  was  armed  with  nine  guns,  one  10-inch 

B  For  Phelps's  report  see  Army  War  Records,  vii,  153. 


The  Attack  on  Fort  Donelson  297 

columbiad  and  eight  32-pounders ;  the  upper  battery  with 
three  guns,  a  6%-inch  rifled  gun  and  two  32-pounder 
carronades. 

After  the  capture  of  Fort  Henry,  General  Grant,  know 
ing  that  the  Confederates  would  make  every  effort  to 
increase  their  force  at  Donelson,  recommended  that  the 
Union  forces  move  forward  at  once  and  make  a  combined 
attack.  Foote  protested  that  the  flotilla  needed  time  for 
preparation,  but  as  Halleck  and  Grant  both  deemed  imme 
diate  action  to  be  a  military  necessity,  he  yielded  to  their 
judgment.  Since  he  had  a  force  insufficient  to  man  more 
than  four  of  his  ironclads,  he  substituted  for  the  two 
gunboats  that  had  been  most  injured  in  the  recent  battle 
two  others  that  had  been  left  behind  at  Cairo,  and  on 
February  12  he  advanced  up  the  Cumberland. 

At  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  the  14th,  Foote 
engaged  the  water  batteries  at  Fort  Donelson.  His  plan 
of  attack  was  similar  to  that  employed  at  Fort  Henry. 
With  the  armored  gunboats  St.  Louis,  Carondelet,  Louis 
ville,  and  Pittsburg  in  line  abreast,  he  slowly  advanced 
upon  the  enemy's  works,  beginning  the  action  at  the  dis 
tance  of  a  mile,  and  reaching  a  position  less  than  400  yards 
away.  The  wooden  gunboats  Tyler  and  Conestoga,  form 
ing  a  second  division,  were  to  shell  the  batteries  from  a 
position  considerably  astern.  As  a  slight  protection  from 
the  plunging  shot  of  the  fort,  all  the  hard  materials  of 
the  boats,  such  as  chains,  coal  in  bags,  and  lumber,  had 
been  placed  along  the  upper  decks. 

The  contest  was  sharply  fought,  and  lasted  for  an 
hour  and  a  half.  The  fire  of  the  batteries  was  terribly 
accurate,  and  not  only  swept  the  tops  of  the  ironclads, 
destroying  everything  that  was  exposed,  but  occasionally 
penetrated  the  casemates  or  ports.  ' '  The  St.  Louis  alone, ' ' 
Foote  writes  of  his  flagship,  "received  fifty-nine  shots, 
four  between  wind  and  water,  and  one  in  the  pilot  house, 


298  The  United  States  Navy 

mortally  wounding  the  pilot  and  others. "  G  The  shot  that 
entered  the  pilot  house  of  the  tit.  Louis  carried  away  the 
wheel.  About  the  same  time  the  Confederates'  fire  injured 
the  tiller-ropes  of  the  Louisville.  The  attempt  made  to 
steer  by  relieving-  tackles  failed  in  the  rapid  current,  and 
the  two  boats,  becoming  unmanageable,  drifted  down  the 
river  and  out  of  action.  On  the  Carondelet,  two  pilots 
had  already  been  disabled,  and  now  the  third  was 
wounded.  The  wheel  had  been  injured,  and  finally  her 
starboard  rudder  was  broken  by  the  Pittsburgh  fouling 
her.  There  was  no  alternative — the  gunboats  were  un 
equal  to  the  task  and  had  to  withdraw. 

Admiral  Mahaii  remarks  on  the  attack,  "Notwith 
standing  its  failure,  the  tenacity  and  fighting  qualities  of 
the  fleet  were  more  markedly  proved  in  this  action  than 
in  the  victory  at  Henry.  The  vessels  were  struck  more 
frequently  (the  flagship  fifty-nine  times,  and  none  less 
than  twenty),  and  though  the  power  of  the  enemy's  guns 
was  about  the  same  in  each  case,  the  height  and  character 
of  the  soil  at  Donelson  placed  the  fleet  at  a  great  disad 
vantage.  The  fire  from  above,  reaching  their  sloping 
armor  nearly  at  right  angles,  searched  every  weak  point. 
.  .  .  Despite  these  injuries,  and  the  loss  of  fifty-four 
killed  and  wounded,  the  fleet  was  only  shaken  from  its 
hold  by  accidents  to  the  steering  apparatus,  after  which 
their  batteries  could  not  be  brought  to  bear."7 

In  his  report,  Foote  expressed  confidence  that  the  gun 
boats  would  have  captured  both  batteries,  had  their  steer 
ing  apparatus  not  been  disabled,  and  had  the  action  con 
tinued  fifteen  minutes  longer.  But  the  statements  made 
by  the  defenders  of  the  fort  scarcely  support  his  belief. 
General  A.  S.  Johnston  reported  at  the  close  of  the  engage- 

Toote's  report  will  be  found  in  the  Army  War  Records,  vii, 
100. 

7Mahan,  The  Gulf  and  Inland  Waters,  p.  27. 


Operations  at  Island  No.  10  299 

ment,  "No  damage  done  to  our  battery  and  not  a  man 
killed,"  and  Chief  Engineer  Gilmer  said  the  same.  The 
gunboats  when  near  were  at  a  disadvantage  because  of 
the  elevation  of  the  batteries.  Foote  perhaps  could  have 
fought  on  more  equal  terms  by  bombarding  the  works 
from  a  distance,  but  later  experience  at  Island  No.  10 
and  at  the  forts  below  New  Orleans  showed  that  a  bom 
bardment  from  a  safe  distance  might  be  kept  up  day  after 
day  and  cause  little  damage.  Foote  was  looking  for  imme 
diate  results,  and  his  dashing  style  of  attack  would  have 
secured  them  had  not  the  fort  been  so  ably  defended. 

A  hard  fought  battle  followed  the  next  day  between 
the  Union  and  Confederate  armies,  in  which  the  Con 
federates  at  first  had  the  advantage,  but  later  were  driven 
back  to  their  fortifications.  Early  on  the  morning  after, 
February  16,  Fort  Donelson  surrendered.  Grant  had 
shown  wisdom  in  beginning  operations  immediately  on 
the  capture  of  Fort  Henry.  The  gunboats  had  been  neces 
sary  for  bringing  up  the  troops  in  safety,  and  although 
the  river  attack  had  been  checked,  the  navy  was  essential 
to  the  ultimate  success. 

OPERATIONS  AT  ISLAND  No.  10 

Less  than  a  week  after  the  capture  of  Fort  Donelson, 
the  Confederates  had  begun  to  transfer  the  military  sup 
plies  at  Columbus  to  a  point  farther  south,  but  they  con 
trived  to  make  the  evacuation  so  skilfully  that  Flag- 
Officer  Foote,  making  a  reconnoissance  while  it  was  in 
progress,  suspected  nothing.  The  next  stand  the  Con 
federates  made  at  Island  No.  10,  so  called  because  of  its 
numerical  position  in  the  series  of  islands  south  of  Cairo. 
It  was  fifty-five  miles  from  that  city,  and  lay  near  the 
shore  opposite  Missouri  close  to  the  boundary  separating 
Kentucky  from  Tennessee.  The  island  has  since  been 


300 


The  United  States  Navy 


swept  away,  and  the  river  has  somewhat  changed.  Here, 
at  that  time,  the  river  by  an  extraordinary  twist,  like  an 
"S"  reversed  (f\j),  gained  in  its  flow  of  twelve  miles 
just  three  to  the  south.  The  island,  two  miles  long  by  two- 
thirds  of  a  mile  wide,  lay  at  the  bottom  of  the  loop  to  the 
right,  occupying,  with  the  batteries  on  the  Tennessee  shore, 
a  position  admirably  adapted  for  defense.  For  the  Con- 


ISLAND   No.  10 

federates  had  the  river  before  them,  and  behind  them 
(to  the  east)  a  large,  impassable  swamp,  which  made  attack 
by  land  forces  impossible  so -long  as  the  defenders  could 
control  the  river.  But  their  position  was  one  of  great 
isolation.  Supplies  could  reach  them  only  by  the  river 
from  the  south,  and  when  their  communications  from  that 
quarter  were  cut  off,  they  were  helpless,  and  retreat  was 
practically  impossible. 

On  March  15,  1862,  Flag-Officer  Foote,  with  a  squad- 


Operations  at  Island  No.  10  301 

ron  consisting  of  six  ironclads  and  ten  mortar  boats, 
supported  by  Colonel  Buford  with  1200  troops,  moved 
down  the  river  to  attack  the  island.  General  Pope,  who 
had  begun  operations  previous  to  their  arrival,  had  occu 
pied  New  Madrid  on  the  loop  above  and  to  the  northwest 
of  Island  No.  10.  Though  he  was  unable  to  cross  the 
river  because  of  Confederate  gunboats,  he  planted  bat 
teries  on  the  west  bank  as  far  south  as  Tiptonville  (on 
the  opposite  bank,  fifteen  miles  down  the  river  from  New 
Madrid),  and  by  them  prevented  Confederate  transports 
from  taking  up  supplies.  On  the  16th  Foote 's  mortar 
boats  took  position  and,  opening  fire,  compelled  several 
regiments  on  the  island  to  change  the  location  of  their 
camp.  Next  day,  at  noon,  the  gunboats  joined  in  an  attack 
on  the  uppermost  fort  on  the  Tennessee  shore,  but  kept 
at  a  safe  distance  of  2000  yards  or  more.  Throughout 
the  siege  Foote  was  cautious.  He  well  knew  that  if  his 
gunboats  were  disabled,  they  would  not  be  carried  out  of 
action  by  the  current  as  at  Henry  and  Donelson,  but 
would  be  swept  immediately  under  the  enemy's  guns. 
Further,  he  had  to  take  into  consideration  that  there  was 
a  Confederate  fleet  stationed  below  the  island  near  Fort 
Pillow,  reported  to  be  not  less  powerful  than  his  own; 
for  if  several  of  his  boats  should  be  lost,  the  Confederate 
fleet  might  capture  the  rest,  and,  steaming  up  the  river, 
strike  a  heavy  blow  at  Cairo. 

The  bombardment  of  the  16th  and  17th,  as  of  the 
days  following,  annoyed  the  enemy,  at  times  temporarily 
silencing  certain  of  the  batteries,  but  seems  to  have  done 
little  injury.  A  rifle  gun  on  the  St.  Louis  burst  during 
the  engagement  of  the  17th,  killing  two  and  wounding 
thirteen,  probably  a  much  greater  loss  than  the  Confed 
erates  suffered  from  the  combined  fire  of  gunboats  and 
mortars.  The  mortars,  as  Foote  later  observed,  lacked 
effectiveness  because  the  forts  were  widely  separated  and 


302  The  United  States  Navy 

presented  a  small  target.  The  Confederate  position, 
indeed,  was  too  strong  to  be  captured  by  direct  attack, 
even  if  the  Union  fleet  had  been  increased  to  two  or  three 
times  its  size.  On  the  island  were  four  batteries  mount 
ing  twenty-three  guns,  on  the  Tennessee  shore  six  bat 
teries  with  thirty-two  guns;  and  there  was,  besides,  a 
floating  battery  moored  near  the  middle  of  the  island 
reported  as  carrying  nine  or  ten  9-inch  guns. 

While  the  flotilla  continued  to  bombard  the  forts  dur 
ing  the  latter  half  of  March,  General  Pope  was  digging  a 
canal  to  cut  off  the  loop  on  which  were  all  the  fortifica 
tions  ;  by  means  of  this  on  April  4  he  was  able  to  take  his 
light  transports  from  above  the  Confederate  works  to 
New  Madrid  without  passing  Island  No.  10.  The  gun 
boats,  however,  drew  too  much  water  to  pass  through  the 
canal,  and  until  Pope  had  gunboats  to  protect  his  troops 
in  crossing  from  Missouri  to  Tennessee,  he  could  not 
attack  from  the  rear  the  Confederate  works  just  opposite 
Island  No.  10. 

On  March  20  Foote  held  a  council  of  war  and  con 
sidered  running  the  batteries  with  part  of  his  squadron. 
All  of  his  officers  with  the  exception  of  Commander 
Walke  opposed  the  plan.  The  risk  was  undeniably  great, 
yet  so  urgent  was  the  need  of  a  gunboat  to  co-operate 
with  the  army  below  New  Madrid,  that  on  March  30 
Foote  ordered  Commander  Walke,  who  was  eagerly  wait 
ing  for  permission,  to  prepare  for  the  perilous  enterprise. 

Meanwhile,  an  expedition,  consisting  of  fifty  men  from 
the  squadron  and  the  same  number  from  the  army  under 
the  command  of  Colonel  Roberts,  performed  a  hazardous 
service.  Late  in  the  evening  of  April  1,  the  party,  in 
five  boats,  crept  down  the  river,  keeping  close  under  the 
shadow  of  the  Kentucky  shore  towards  the  nearest  bat 
tery,  known  as  "No.  1  Fort."  Taking  the  greatest  care 
to  avoid  discovery,  the  men  had  come  within  ten  yards 


The  Carondelet  Passes  the  Batteries       303 

before  the  sentinels  at  the  guns  saw  them  and  gave  the 
alarm.  Landing  with  great  quickness,  the  Union  force 
met  with  no  resistance,  and  having  spiked  every  gun, 
returned  without  losing  a  man. 

This  exploit  was  especially  timely  for  the  Union  forces, 
as  they  were  about  to  send  a  gunboat  down  the  river. 
They  gained  another  advantage  three  days  later,  when 
the  fleet,  by  their  fire,  managed  to  cut  loose  the  floating 
battery,  which  had  been  an  important  defense  of  the 
island.  As  the  current  was  strong,  the  Confederates  were 
not  able  to  secure  the  battery  till  it  had  drifted  three  miles 
below. 

On  the  4th  of  April,  Walke  announced  to  Foote  that 
his  vessel,  the  Carondelet,  was  ready  to  run  the  blockade. 
He  had  made  use  of  some  clever  expedients  to  protect 
her  from  the  enemy 's  fire.  Around  the  boilers  and  engine 
room  he  had  placed  a  barricade  of  heavy  timber  and  loose 
iron.  The  parts  of  the  sides  without  iron  plating  he  had 
strengthened  with  bales  of  hay,  lumber,  and  chain-cables ; 
and  to  her  port  quarter  had  lashed  a  coal  barge  as  an 
added  safeguard  to  the  magazine  and  shell  rooms.  The 
upper  deck  he  had  covered  with  lumber,  cord  wood,  coal 
bags,  chain-cables,  and  hawsers.  And  around  the  pilot 
house  he  had  coiled  cables  and  ropes  from  twelve  to  eigh 
teen  inches  thick.8 

The  plan  was  to  run  the  batteries  that  evening,  though 
conditions  were  not  altogether  favorable,  for  the  after 
noon  indicated  that  a  clear  night  was  to  follow.  How 
ever,  at  sunset  the  sky  became  hazy,  and  at  ten  o'clock, 
when  the  Carondelet  got  under  way,  a  thunder  storm 
was  about  to  break — conditions  decidedly  more  promising. 

During  the  first  half  mile  everything  went  well,  and 

•Walke's  own  account  of  the  preparations  and  the  exploit  is 
to  be  found  in  his  Scenes  and  Reminiscences,  p.  120  ff. ;  also  in 
Battles  and  Leaders,  i,  441  ff. 


304  The  United  States  Navy 

the  Carondelet,  with  her  lights  covered,  was  running  so 
silently  that  there  was  hope  that  she  might  pass  the  bat 
teries  unobserved.  But  just  as  she  came  abreast  the  first, 
her  flues  caught  fire,  and,  blazing  up,  disclosed  her  posi 
tion.  The  flames  were  quickly  checked,  but  five  rockets, 
followed  by  a  cannon  shot  from  Fort  No.  2,  showed  that 
the  alarm  had  been  given.  Since  the  only  course  of  safety 
for  the  Union  vessel  then  lay  in  quick  action,  Walke 
crowded  on  steam  and  made  all  haste  to  pass  the  batteries. 

The  thunder  storm  now  burst  with  great  violence,  and 
vivid  flashes  of  lightning  showed  the  hurried  movements 
of  the  Confederates  as  they  were  running  to  their  guns 
and  charging  them.  Soon,  with  the  heavy  crashes  of 
thunder  and  the  torrents  of  rain  were  mingled  the  roar 
of  the  cannon  and  the  fall  of  shot  and  musket  balls.  In 
order  to  avoid  needless  exposure,  the  men  of  the  Caron 
delet  were  for  the  most  part  under  cover.  But  Com 
mander  Walke,  First  Master  Hoel  (the  chief  pilot),  and 
Wilson  and  Gilmore  (the  two  leadsmen  at  the  bow)  kept 
their  stations  on  deck  through  this  double  storm,  exhibit 
ing  splendid  coolness  and  courage. 

It  was  difficult  to  keep  the  Carondelet  with  the  cum 
bersome  coal  barge  on  the  course  because  of  the  rapid 
current.  And  once,  after  an  unusually  long  pause  between 
the  flashes  of  lightning,  a  timely  illumination  showed  the 
pilot  that  he  was  running  on  a  bar  right  under  the  enemy 's 
guns.  His  prompt  command,  "  Hard-a-port !  "  saved  the 
boat.  The  Confederates  fired  at  almost  the  same  moment, 
but  they  either  did  not  sufficiently  depress  their  guns  or 
were  firing  without  taking  aim,  for  their  shot  had  no 
effect.  The  Carondelet  was  subjected  for  thirty  minutes 
to  an  almost  uninterrupted  fire  of  the  batteries  on  the 
Tennessee  shore,  besides  one  at  the  head  of  the  island; 
and  when  she  had  passed  these,  there  was  still  the  floating 
battery  three  miles  below  to  reckon  with.  A  light  burning 


The  Capture  of  Island  No.  10  305 

on  its  deck  showed  that  the  Confederates  were  there 
awaiting  the  gunboat.  The  Carondelet  was  not  prepared 
to  engage  it,  for  in  running  past  the  forts  everything  on 
her  decks  and  in  her  hold  had  been  arranged  with  the 
idea  of  protection.  Therefore,  bearing  over  to  the  Mis 
souri  shore,  she  slipped  by,  being  fired  on  only  six  or 
eight  times.  About  midnight  she  arrived  at  New  Madrid, 
and  was  joyfully  welcomed  by  the  forces  of  General  Pope. 

It  seems  almost  incredible  that  in  passing  the  gantlet 
of  six  forts  and  more  than  fifty  guns  the  Carondelet 
should  have  escaped  all  injury.  Not  only  had  most  of  the 
Union  officers  believed  that  the  project  was  too  hazardous 
to  justify  attempting  it,  but  the  Confederates  manning 
the  forts  had  been  confident  that  it  was  impossible  of 
execution.  The  risk  was  unquestionably  somewhat  over 
estimated,  for  two  days  later  the  Pittsburg  repeated  the 
exploit.  However,  this  does  not  detract  from  the  courage 
of  Walke  and  his  men. 

''The  passage  of  the  Carondelet/'  remarks  Mahan, 
' l  was  not  only  one  of  the  most  daring  and  dramatic  events 
of  the  war ;  it  was  also  the  death-blow  to  the  Confederate 
defense  of  this  position."  Events  followed  in  rapid  suc 
cession.  On  April  6  General  Granger  accompanied  Com 
mander  Walke  in  the  Carondelet  in  making  a  reconnois- 
sance  of  the  fortifications  on  the  Tennessee  shore  down  to 
Tiptonville.  Before  their  return  the  Union  force  stopped 
to  engage  one  of  the  works,  and,  having  silenced  it,  landed 
and  spiked  the  guns.  On  the  7th  the  Carondelet  and  the 
Pittsburg  took  in  succession  the  Confederate  batteries  on 
the  east  bank  of  the  river  and  enabled  Pope's  army  to 
cross  in  safety.  Already  the  Confederates  had  become 
convinced  that  it  was  impossible  to  hold  Island  No.  10 
much  longer,  and  most  of  their  force  had  withdrawn, 
leaving  but  a  hundred  artillerymen,  who  surrendered 
the  forts  to  Flag-Officer  Foote  late  in  the  evening  of 
20 


306  The  United  States  Navy 

April  7.  But  the  Confederates'  retreat  had  begun  too 
late.  Because  of  the  impassable  swamp  on  the  east,  their 
only  road  to  safety  was  by  way  of  Tiptonville ;  and  when 
Pope  with  great  celerity  threw  his  army  across  the  river, 
he  captured  the  entire  force.  In  this  move  of  the  Union 
army  the  Carondelet  and  the  Pittsburg  had  been  abso 
lutely  essential,  and  Pope  recognized  them  as  having  an 
important  part  in  his  success.  The  number  of  prisoners 
taken  by  Pope  and  Foote  together  was  7273.  Pope  writes 
in  his  report  of  April  9,  "Three  generals,  seven  colonels, 
seven  regiments,  several  battalions  of  infantry,  five  com 
panies  of  artillery,  over  100  heavy  siege  guns,  twenty- 
four  pieces  of  field  artillery,  an  immense  quantity  of 
ammunition  and  supplies,  and  several  thousand  stand  of 
small  arms,  a  great  number  of  tents,  horses,  wagons,  etc., 
have  fallen  into  our  hands.  Before  abandoning  Island 
No.  10,  the  enemy  sank  the  gunboat  Grampus  and  six  of 
his  transports.  These  last  I  am  raising  and  expect  to  have 
ready  for  service  in  a  few  days.  The  famous  floating 
battery  was  scuttled  and  turned  adrift,  with  all  her  guns 
aboard.  She  was  captured  and  run  aground  in  shoal 
water  by  our  forces  at  New  Madrid. ' ' 9 

While  the  gunboats  on  the  Mississippi  were  co-oper 
ating  with  Pope  to  such  advantage,  the  Tyler  and  the 
Lexington  on  the  Tennessee  River  were  rendering  service 
not  less  important  to  Grant  at  Pittsburg  Landing.  On 
April  6  General  A.  S.  Johnston  had  unexpectedly  fallen 
upon  the  Union  army,  and  in  a  fiercely  contested  battle 
lasting  all  day  had  driven  the  Federal  troops  from  their 
camp,  half  way  to  the  river.  In  the  afternoon  the  fighting 
was  especially  determined  on  the  Union  army's  left  wing, 
which  Johnston  attempted  to  turn  so  as  to  get  possession 
of  the  landing  and  the  transports.  General  Hurlbut, 

9  Army  War  Records,  viii,  78. 


Capture  of  Fort  Pillow  and  Memphis     307 

commanding  this  wing,  was  so  hard  pressed  that  he  felt 
that  without  reinforcements  he  could  not  hold  out  for 
more  than  an  hour  longer.  Then  it  was  that  the  Tyler, 
by  a  rapid  and  well-directed  fire,  not  only  silenced  the 
hostile  batteries,  but  checked  the  Confederate  advance. 
Later  in  the  afternoon  the  Tyler  and  the  Lexington  shelled 
the  Confederate  batteries  three-quarters  of  a  mile  above 
the  landing,  and  silenced  them  in  thirty  minutes.  At  5.30 
the  enemy,  almost  everywhere  victorious,  had  succeeded 
in  gaining  a  position  on  the  Union  left,  but  the  gunboats, 
with  the  Federal  field  batteries,  drove  them  back  in  con 
fusion.  Early  that  evening  the  advance  of  Buell's  army, 
from  Nashville,  came  to  the  support  of  the  shattered  left 
wing.  A  disastrous  defeat  had  been  averted,  and  the 
battle  of  Pittsburg  Landing,  or  Shiloh,  renewed  on  the 
following  day,  ended  in  victory. 

THE  CAPTURE  OF  FORT  PILLOW  AND  MEMPHIS 

Four  days  after  the  surrender  of  Island  No.  10,  Flag- 
Officer  Foote  started  down  the  river,  and,  aside  from  one 
slight  skirmish,  met  with  no  opposition  until  he  reached 
Fort  Pillow,  eighty  miles  below  New  Madrid  on  the  Ten 
nessee  side.  Here  General  Pope  joined  him  with  20,000 
troops,  and  though  Fort  Pillow  was  a  strong  position, 
the  combined  force  would  have  captured  it  at  an  early 
date,  had  not  Pope  almost  immediately  been  withdrawn 
by  Halleck  with  all  but  1500  of  his  army. 

Among  the  enemies  the  squadron  had  to  meet  was  the 
so-called  River  Defense  Fleet.  This  was  composed  of 
river  steamboats,  which,  strengthened  by  iron  casings  at 
their  bows  and  by  an  improvised  protection  for  their  boil 
ers  and  engines,  were  to  serve  as  rams.  The  commanders 
were  Mississippi  River  captains  and  pilots,  supposed  to  be 
under  the  military  chief  of  department,  but  not  subject  to 


308  The  United  States  Navy 

orders  from  any  naval  officers.  Farragut  was  destined 
to  meet  some  of  this  fleet  below  New  Orleans;  and  eight 
vessels  of  this  class  were  now  lying  under  the  guns  of 
Fort  Pillow. 

On  May  9,  Captain  C.  H.  Davis  took  temporary  com 
mand  of  the  squadron,  relieving  Flag-Officer  Foote,  who 
was  in  need  of  rest  and  was  troubled  by  a  wound  received 
at  Fort  Donelson.  The  next  morning  the  Confederate 
rams  made  a  sudden  attack  upon  the  Cincinnati,  which, 
with  a  mortar  boat,  had  moved  down  to  bombard  the  fort. 
There  was  a  difficulty  in  signaling,  and  as  a  result  only 
four  of  the  seven  Union  gunboats  took  part  in  the  fight. 
The  Confederates  succeeded  in  ramming  two  of  the  gun 
boats  so  that  they  had  to  be  run  ashore  to  avoid  sinking ; 
on  the  other  hand,  three  of  the  Confederate  rams  were 
disabled. 

The  Confederates  had  shown  considerable  dash  and 
spirit  as  they  made  the  attack,  and  the  injuries  they 
received  were  of  such  a  character  as  to  admit  of  speedy 
repair.  However,  this  was  the  only  time  the  River  Defense 
Fleet  ever  performed  any  service  of  special  value.  Their 
lack  of  organization  rendered  them  incapable  of  vigorous 
and  sustained  action. 

The  bombardment  of  Fort  Pillow  continued  until  the 
night  of  June  4,  when  it  was  evacuated.  Next  morn 
ing  the  squadron  steamed  down  to  Memphis  and  engaged 
the  Confederate  rams  before  the  city.  These  were  eight 
in  number,  and  to  oppose  them  Davis  had  five  gunboats 
and  two  rams.  A  one-sided  engagement  followed,  in  which 
the  Confederates  lost  four  of  their  boats,  in  return  dis 
abling  only  slightly  one  of  the  Union  rams.  The  other 
four  Confederate  vessels  then  fled  down  the  river;  how 
ever,  they  were  pursued,  and  in  a  running  battle  one 
was  destroyed  and  two  were  captured.  On  the  same  day 
the  city  of  Memphis  surrendered ;  so  that  when  Farragut, 


Results  of  the  Western  Campaign         309 

who  had  already  captured  New  Orleans,  brought  his  fleet 
up  the  river  and  passed  the  fortifications  of  Vicksburg, 
Davis  was  able  to  join  forces  with  him. 

During  four  months  the  army  and  navy,  co-operating 
on  the  western  rivers,  had  broken  the  Confederate  line 
of  defense  along  the  southern  border  of  Kentucky,  and 
had  pierced  the  second  line  at  Corinth,  Mississippi  (near 
Pittsburg  Landing).  They  had  also  captured  all  of  the 
fortifications  on  the  Mississippi  down  to  Vicksburg.  Thus 
they  had  saved  Kentucky  for  the  Union,  and  had  largely 
retaken  Tennessee. 

The  battles  at  Fort  Donelson  and  Shiloh  were  the 
first -great  defeats  that  the  Confederate  land  forces  had 
received,  and  served  to  weaken  the  confidence  in  their 
armies,  which  the  South  had  come  to  believe  were  invincible. 
The  people  of  the  North  were  in  danger  of  entertaining 
the  same  view,  especially  as  McClellan,  with  the  superior 
Army  of  the  Potomac,  was  meeting  with  reverse  after 
reverse  in  the  Peninsula  Campaign.  The  successes  won 
by  Grant  and  Foote  in  the  West,  almost  at  the  same  time, 
afforded  a  striking  contrast,  and  served  to  keep  the  North 
from  discouragement. 


XIX 

OPERATIONS  ON  THE  LOWER  MISSISSIPPI 

PASSING  THE  FORTS  BELOW  NEW  ORLEANS 

SCARCELY  had  the  Department  received  news  of  the 
success  of  the  expedition  against  Port  Royal,  when  Assist 
ant  Secretary  Fox  was  planning  another  expedition  for 
the  capture  of  New  Orleans. 

New  Orleans  was  the  largest  city  in  the  Confederacy; 
its  population  in  1860  was  168,675,  more  than  twice  that 
of  Richmond  and  Charleston  combined.  It  was  also  the 
richest  city,  and,  being  the  natural  commercial  centre  for 
Louisiana  and  Texas,  was  forwarding  great  quantities 
of  food  supplies  to  the  Confederate  armies. 

The  general  opinion  of  the  North,  as  well  as  of  the 
South,  was  that  any  attack  on  New  Orleans  would  be 
by  a  slow  advance  down  the  Mississippi.  But  Mr.  Fox,  who 
knew  the  lower  Mississippi  from  having  taken  an  ocean 
steamer  under  his  command  up  to  New  Orleans,  believed 
that  it  was  within  the  power  of  the  navy,  operating  from 
the  Gulf,  to  capture  the  city. 

Strongly  impressed  with  his  project,  Mr.  Fox  arranged 
for  a  conference  at  which,  besides  the  Cabinet  officers, 
General  McClellan  and  Commander  David  D.  Porter  were 
present.  Porter  unhesitatingly  expressed  his  confidence 
in  the  plan ;  the  others  showed  some  doubt,  yet  gave  their 
assent. 

To  command  the  expedition,  the  Department,  after 
some  hesitation,  agreed  on  a  captain  comparatively  un 
known — David  Glasgow  Farragut,  the  choice  of  Mr.  Fox. 
This  officer,  born  near  Knoxville,  Tennessee,  in  1801, 
310 


DAVID  G.  FARRAGUT 


David  G.  Farragut  311 

was  but  nine  years  and  five  months  old  when  he  was 
appointed  midshipman  in  the  navy.  As  has  been  narrated 
in  previous  chapters,  he  had  seen  active  service  in  the 
War  of  1812,  had  taken  part  in  suppressing  the  West 
Indian  pirates,  and  had  engaged  in  the  Mexican  War. 
But  none  of  these  operations  had  given  him  a  chance  to 
show  his  extraordinary  abilities,  and  at  the  age  of  nearly 
sixty-one  he  was  unrecognized. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  Civil  War,  Farragut  was 
awaiting  orders  in  Norfolk,  Virginia,  which  for  forty 
years  had  been  his  home.  There  was  no  wavering  in  his 
allegiance.  On  the  secession  of  Virginia  he  immediately 
left  for  the  North  and  applied  for  a  command.  The 
Government  kept  him  waiting  for  several  months,  for 
after  several  unhappy  experiences  it  had  grown  sus 
picious  of  Southerners.  However,  the  sacrifice  made  by 
Farragut  did  not  altogether  escape  notice:  it  was  the 
spirit  that  he  had  shown  in  so  promptly  leaving  his  State 
and  in  volunteering  for  service  that  caught  the  attention 
of  Mr.  Fox.  This  argued,  in  the  latter 's  opinion,  "  great 
superiority  of  character,  clear  perception  of  duty,  and 
firm  resolution  in  the  performing  of  it." 

When  Farragut  was  called  to  Washington  in  Decem 
ber,  1861,  and  was  informed  of  the  expedition  planned, 
he  said  without  hesitation  that  it  would  succeed,  and  he 
manifested  almost  a  boyish  enthusiasm  on  learning  that 
he  was  to  command  it.1  He  was  to  have  even  more  ships 
than  he  said  were  required.  The  expedition  was  to  be 
purely  naval,  and  the  responsibility  for  success  or  failure 
would  rest  on  the  naval  commander.  Nevertheless,  the 
co-operation  of  the  army  to  hold  whatever  the  navy 

1  Montgomery  Blair,  Postmaster-General  in  Lincoln's  Cabinet, 
was  present  at  the  first  interview  between  Farragut  and  Fox,  and 
gives  a  highly  interesting  report,  to  be  found  in  The  United 
Service,  1881,  p.  39. 


312  The  United  States  Navy 

captured  was  guaranteed,  and  accordingly  18,000  troops 
under  Major-General  Butler  were  sent  later. 

In  the  latter  part  of  February,  1862,  Farragut  arrived 
at  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi.  He  had  come  in  the 
Hartford,  which  he  continued  to  make  his  flagship.  She 
was  a  sloop  of  war  with  auxiliary  steam  power  capable 
of  propelling  her  eight  knots  an  hour.  She  was  a  new 
ship,  having  sailed  on  her  first  cruise  to  China  in  1859. 
Although  rated  a  sloop  of  war,  she  had  a  greater  tonnage, 
and  was  more  formidable,  than  the  ordinary  ship-of-the- 
line  of  the  War  of  1812.  Farragut  believed  in  intro 
ducing  a  gun  wherever  there  was  a  place,  and  the  Hart 
ford,  with  twenty-two  9-inch  Dahlgren  guns,  had  twice  as 
heavy  an  armament  as  many  a  cruiser  of  her  size. 

After  the  Hartford  had  joined  the  blockading  squad 
ron  in  the  Gulf,  two  months  of  preparation  followed.  To 
get  the  large  ships  over  the  bars  before  the  Passes  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Mississippi  was  an  undertaking  that  required 
resourcefulness  and  patience;  thus  it  was  two  weeks' 
work  to  drag  the  Pensacola  through  the  mud  and  into  the 
deep  water  inside.  Finally,  on  April  7,  Farragut  had  his 
fleet  in  the  river  and  ready  for  active  operations.  It 
included,  not  counting  the  boats  in  the  mortar  flotilla 
under  Commander  Porter,  seven  steam  sloops  of  war,  one 
large  side-wheel  ship-of-war,  and  nine  gunboats.  These 
seventeen  vessels  were  armed  with  154  cannon. 

To  oppose  the  progress  of  this  force,  the  Confederates 
had  two  powerful  forts,  eighty  miles  below  New  Orleans 
and  twenty  miles  above  the  head  of  the  Passes.  Fort 
St.  Philip,  mounting  forty-two  guns,  was  on  the  left  bank 
(as  one  goes  down  the  river),  and  being  at  a  bend  in  the 
river  it  could  not  only  command  the  river  front  but  rake 
approaching  ships;  Fort  Jackson,  mounting  fifty-eight 
guns,  was  lower  down  on  the  right  bank,  and  was  the 
stronger  of  the  two.  But,  according  to  Mahan,  about 


Preparations  313 

half  of  the  guns  of  the  forts  were  obsolete  24-pounders, 
for  the  Confederates  were  so  imbued  with  the  idea  that 
any  attempt  to  seize  the  Mississippi  must  be  made  from 
the  north,  that  they  had  given  no  heed  to  the  warnings  of 
army  and  navy  officers  at  New  Orleans.  Besides  the  forts 
the  Confederates  had  a  flotilla  of  fifteen  gunboats,  two 
of  them  ironclad  rams,  and  had  stretched  across  the  river 
under  the  guns  of  Fort  Jackson  two  heavy  chains  sup 
ported  by  a  series  of  hulks. 

On  April  18  Porter's  mortar  boats  took  a  position 
about  3000  yards  below  Fort  Jackson,  and  began  to 
bombard  the  forts.  If  Farragut  had  been  consulted  by 
the -Department,  he  would  have  declined  the  assistance  of 
the  mortar  boats,  for  he  had  little  confidence  in  their 
power  to  reduce  a  strong  fortification.  However,  he  gave 
them  opportunity  to  do  their  utmost.  For  six  days  and 
nights  the  mortars  poured  forth  an  unremitting  fire 
mainly  on  Fort  Jackson,  throwing  nearly  6000  shells.  The 
aim  seems  to  have  been  good,  yet  the  damage  done  to  the 
forts  wras  but  trifling. 

When  the  mortars  had  kept  up  their  fire  for  three 
days  without  appreciable  effect,  Farragut  felt  that  it  was 
time  to  bring  the  ships  into  action.  Accordingly,  on  the 
night  of  the  20th  he  sent  his  fleet-captain,  Henry  H.  Bell, 
with  two  gunboats,  to  destroy  the  barrier  of  logs  and 
schooners  joined,  by  chains  stretched  across  the  river.  The 
men  worked  under  the  fire  of  the  forts,  and  were  greatly 
embarrassed  when  one  of  the  gunboats  ran  aground.  Still 
they  succeeded  in  making  an  aperture  sufficiently  wide  for 
the  largest  ship  to  pass  through. 

Then  followed  two  days  spent  in  preparing  the  ships 
to  run  the  forts.  Each  vessel  was  trimmed  a  few  inches 
by  the  head,  so  that  if  she  touched  bottom  she  would  not 
swing  down  river.  Sheet  cables  were  stopped  up  and 
down  on  the  sides  in  line  with  the  engines;  and  ham- 


314  The  United  States  Navy 

mocks,  coal,  and  bags  of  sand  were  piled  up  to  protect 
the  boilers  from  shot  coming  from  forward  or  aft.  Some 
of  the  commanders  had  the  hulls  of  their  ships  rubbed 
with  mud  to  make  them  less  visible  at  night,  and  one  had 
his  decks  whitewashed  to  make  guns  and  ammunition  more 
easily  seen  and  handled.  In  the  afternoon  previous  to 
the  attack,  Farragut  visited  each  ship  to  make  sure  that 
the  commanding  officer  had  all  in  readiness  and  under 
stood  the  orders.  Though  Farragut  is  popularly  known 
for  his  quickness  and  power  in  action,  he  was  no  less 
remarkable  for  the  wisdom  and  thoroughness  of  his 
preparation. 

Two  o'clock  in  the  morning,  April  24,  1862,  was  the 
time  set  for  the  attacking  ships  to  get  under  way.  They 
were  to  advance  in  two  columns ;  one  was  to  take  a  course 
well  to  the  right  and  attack  Fort  St.  Philip,  the  other,  to 
the  left,  and  attack  Fort  Jackson.  The  original  plan  of 
having  the  two  columns  advance  side  by  side  was  later 
changed ;  and  the  column  on  the  right,  which  consisted  of 
the  First  Division,  three  ships  of  war,  one  side-wheeler, 
and  four  gunboats,  led  by  Captain  Bailey  in  the  Cayuga, 
was  to  precede  the  column  on  the  left,  which  consisted  of 
the  Second  Division,  three  sloops  of  war  under  Flag- 
Officer  Farragut,  and  the  Third  Division,  one  sloop  and 
five  gunboats  under  Captain  Bell.  This  change  made  the 
fleet  weaker  by  being  less  compact,  but  more  than  com 
pensated  for  the  disadvantage  by  reducing  the  danger  of 
collision  when  the  ships  were  passing  the  narrow  opening 
in  the  chain-barrier. 

At  the  appointed  hour,  two  red  lights  displayed  from 
the  flagship  gave  the  signal  to  the  commanders  to  get 
under  way.  In  a  few  minutes  the  clink-clank  of  the 
anchor  chains  was  heard  throughout  the  fleet,  but  because 
of  various  little  delays,  it  was  not  until  3.30  that  the  First 
Division  reached  the  barrier.  The  Cayuga  was  nearly 


Passing  the  Forts  below  New  Orleans     315 

abreast  the  forts  before  the  Confederates  opened  fire. 
Not  strong  enough  to  deal  with  her  powerful  foes,  she 
sped  along;  but  the  sloop  Pensacola,  which  followed, 
carried  twenty-three  heavy  guns,  and  as  she  passed  Fort 
St.  Philip  steamed  slowly,  frequently  stopping  to  return 
the  fire.  Meanwhile  the  mortar  flotilla  had  moved  forward 
so  as  to  shell  both  forts. 

Twenty-five  minutes  after  the  Cayuga  had  begun  the 
attack,  the  Hartford,  leading  the  Second  Division,  had 
passed  the  barrier  and  was  opening  with  her  bow  guns 
on  Fort  Jackson.  The  darkness  and  smoke,  together  with 
the  terrific  fire  from  the  forts,  made  it  difficult  for  the 
Union  ships  to  keep  their  course  or  to  distinguish  friend 
from  foe.  Suddenly,  out  of  the  gloom  and  confusion, 
Farragut  saw  a  fire-raft  coming  directly  for  his  ship. 
The  helm  of  the  Hartford  was  put  over  in  order  to  avoid 
the  raft,  whereupon  the  ship  grounded  on  a  shoal  near 
Fort  St.  Philip.  Under  the  heavy  fire  of  the  forts  she 
was  in  a  trying  position;  and  what  was  far  worse,  a 
Confederate  tugboat,  till  then  unnoticed,  was  pushing  the 
fire-raft  down  upon  her.  In  an  instant  the  port  quarter 
of  the  Hartford  was  a  mass  of  flames,  which  were  licking 
the  paint  and  rising  half  way  to  the  tops.  It  was  one  of 
those  moments  that  are  full  of  destiny,  but  Farragut  was 
equal  to  the  crisis.  His  quiet  self-possession  reassured 
his  men,  and  each  with  alacrity  did  his  part  in  carrying 
out  the  orders.  The  ship's  guns  drove  off  the  tug,  and 
kept  playing  on  the  forts;  the  well-organized  fire  com 
pany,  by  great  exertion,  put  out  the  flames;  the  engines 
backed  the  ship  off  the  shoal,  and  again  she  headed  up  the 


river.2 

The   Brooklyn,   Captain   Craven,   which   followed  the 
Hartford,  also  had  some  grim  experiences.     In  the  dark- 

2  Farragut's  report  will  be  found  in  the  Naval  War  Records, 
xviii,  155. 


316  The  United  States  Navy 

ness  and  blinding  smoke,  Craven  lost  sight  of  the  Hartford, 
and  suddenly  found  his  vessel  running  over  one  of  the 
hulks  that  carried  the  chain-barrier. 

"For  a  few  moments,"  writes  Captain  Craven,  "I 
was  entangled  and  fell  athwart  the  stream,  our  bow 
grazing  the  shore  on  the  left  bank  of  the  river.  While 
in  this  situation  I  received  a  pretty  severe  fire  from  Fort 
St.  Philip.  Immediately  after  the  ship  had  been  extri 
cated  from  the  rafts,  her  head  was  turned  up  stream,  and 
a  few  minutes  thereafter  she  was  feebly  butted  by  the 
celebrated  ram  Manassas.  The  latter  came  butting  into 
our  starboard  gangway,  first  firing  from  her  trap-door, 
when  within  about  ten  feet  of  the  ship,  directly  towards 
our  smokestack,  her  shot  entering  about  five  feet  above 
the  water  line  and  lodging  in  the  sand-bags  which  pro 
tected  our  steam  drum.  I  had  discovered  this  queer- 
looking  gentleman,  while  forcing  my  way  over  the  barri 
cade,  lying  close  to  the  bank,  and  when  he  made  his 
appearance  the  second  time,  I  was  so  close  to  him  that  he 
had  not  an  opportunity  to  get  up  his  full  speed,  and  his 
efforts  to  damage  me  were  completely  frustrated,  our 
chain  armor  proving  a  perfect  protection  to  our  sides. 
He  soon  slid  off  and  disappeared  in  the  darkness.  A  few 
moments  thereafter,  being  all  the  time  under  a  raking 
fire  from  Fort  Jackson,  I  was  attacked  by  a  large  rebel 
steamer.  Our  port  broadside,  at  the  short  distance  of 
only  fifty  or  sixty  yards,  completely  finished  him,  setting 
him  on  fire  almost  instantaneously. 

' '  Still  groping  my  way  in  the  dark,  or  under  the  black 
cloud  of  smoke  from  the  fire-raft,  I  suddenly  found 
myself  abreast  of  St.  Philip,  and  so  close  that  the  leads 
man  in  the  starboard  chains  gave  the  soundings  '  Thirteen 
feet,  sir.'  As  we  could  bring  all  our  guns  to  bear,  for  a 
few  brief  moments  we  poured  in  grape  and  canister,  and 
I  had  the  satisfaction  of  completely  silencing  that  work 


Engaging  the  Confederate  Gunboats       317 

before  I  left  it — my  men  in  the  tops  witnessing,  in  the 
flashes  of  their  bursting  shrapnel,  the  enemy  running  like 
sheep  for  more  comfortable  quarters. 

"After  passing  the  forts,  we  engaged  several  of  the 
enemy's  gunboats.  .  .  .  This  ship  was  under  fire  about 
one  hour  and  a  half. ' '  3 

The  fight  was  by  no  means  ended  for  the  ships  of  the 
First  Division  when  they  had  passed  the  forts,  for,  await 
ing  them,  the  Confederates  had  a  flotilla  of  thirteen  gun 
boats,  besides  two  ironclad  rams.  The  Cayuga,  as  has 
been  told,  had  made  it  her  chief  business  to  get  safely 
by  the  batteries  of  St.  Philip,  while  the  Pensacola  had 
slowed  down  to  engage  them.  As  the  Mississippi  and  the 
Oneida,  which  came  next,  had  kept  their  positions  in  the 
column,  the  Cayuga  emerged  from  the  smoke  to  find 
herself  unsupported. 

"After  passing  the  last  battery  and  thinking  we  were 
clear,"  writes  Lieutenant  George  H.  Perkins,  of  the 
Cayuga,  who  was  acting  as  pilot,  ' '  I  looked  back  for  some 
of  our  vessels,  and  my  heart  jumped  into  my  mouth,  when 
I  found  I  could  not  see  a  single  one.  I  thought  they  all 
must  have  been  sunk  by  the  forts.  Then  looking  ahead  I 
saw  eleven  of  the  enemy 's  gunboats  coming  down  upon  us, 
and  it  seemed  as  if  we  were  'gone'  sure.  Three  of  these 
made  a  dash  to  board  us,  but  a  heavy  charge  from  our 
11-inch  gun  settled  the  Governor  Moore,  which  was  one 
of  them.  A  ram,  the  Manassas,  in  attempting  to  butt  us, 
just  missed  our  stern,  and  we  soon  settled  the  third 
fellow's  '  hash.'  Just  then  some  of  our  gunboats  which 
had  passed  the  forts  came  up,  and  then  all  sorts  of  things 
happened.  There  was  the  wildest  excitement  all  around. 
The  Varuna  fired  a  broadside  into  us,  instead  of  the 
enemy.  Another  of  our  gunboats  attacked  one  of  the 

3  Naval  War  Records,  xviii,  182. 


318  The  United  States  Navy 

Cayuga's  prizes— I  shouted  out,  'Don't  fire  into  that  ship, 
she  has  surrendered!'  Three  of  the  enemy's  ships  had 
surrendered  to  us  before  any  other  of  our  vessels  ap 
peared;  but  when  they  did  come  up  we  all  pitched  in, 
and  settled  the  eleven  rebel  vessels  in  about  twenty 
minutes. ' ' 4 

The  Varuna,  the  fifth  vessel  of  the  First  Division, 
was  the  only  Union  ship  to  be  lost.  She  had  passed 
through  the  Confederate  flotilla,  firing  right  and  left. 
Then,  seeing  ahead  a  small  steamer  that  was  fleeing,  she 
started  in  pursuit.  She  had,  however,  been  observed  by 
Beverly  Kennon,  formerly  of  the  United  States  Navy, 
now  in  command  of  the  Governor  Moore.  Convinced 
that  he  could  do  nothing  against  the  larger  ships,  he  left 
the  melee  and  went  in  pursuit.  Displaying  signal  lan 
terns  such  as  he  had  noticed  the  Union  ships  were  show 
ing,  he  was  almost  upon  the  Varuna  before  he  was  recog 
nized.  He  then  fired  two  destructive  shells  from  his  bow 
gun,  and  when  the  Varuna 's  helm  was  put  hard-a-port 
so  as  to  bring  her  guns  to  bear,  he  rammed.  The  Varuna 
was  a  few  minutes  later  struck  also  by  the  Confederate 
gunboat  Stonewall  Jackson,  and  in  a  sinking  condition 
she  was  headed  for  the  shore.  But  her  guns,  with  those 
of  the  Cayuga,  had  in  the  meantime  disabled  the  Moore, 
causing  the  latter  to  drop  out  of  the  action;  and  as  the 
Varuna,  which  had  settled  on  the  bank,  continued  to 
pour  shot  into  her,  setting  her  afire,  the  Confederate 
gunboat  surrendered  to  the  Oneida,  which  had  just  come 
up. 

The  Itasca,  the  Winona,  and  the  Kennebec,  of  the 
Third  Division,  following  at  the  end  of  the  procession, 
had  not  the  support  of  the  heavy  ships,  and  did  not 
succeed  in  passing  the  forts.  The  Confederates,  though 

4  Letters  of  Captain  George  Hamilton  Perkins,  p.  65. 


The  Capture  of  New  Orleans  319 

driven  from  many  of  their  guns  by  the  fire  of  the  fleet, 
had  quickly  returned,  and  just  as  day  was  breaking,  gave 
all  of  their  attention  to  these  small  vessels.  The  Itasca 
received  a  shot  through  her  boiler,  disabling  her  so  that 
she  was  compelled  to  drift  back.  The  Winona  and  the 
Kennebec  became  entangled  in  the  chain-barrier,  and 
when  they  freed  themselves  and  attempted  to  proceed, 
they  found  the  concentrated  fire  of  the  forts  too  much 
for  them. 

THE  CAPTURE  OF  NEW  ORLEANS 

When  Farragut  collected  his  forces  at  Quarantine, 
five  miles  above  the  forts,  he  had  thirteen  vessels.  Believ 
ing  the  time  had  come  when  he  could  co-operate  with 
the  army,  he  sent  a  messenger  to  General  Butler  and  also 
to  Commander  Porter.  The  Wissahickon  and  the  Kineo 
were  left  behind  to  guard  the  landing  of  the  troops,  should 
they  come  by  way  of  the  Quarantine  Bayou,  as  now  they 
could  with  safety.  With  the  rest  of  the  fleet  Farragut 
then  slowly  steamed  towards  New  Orleans. 

About  10. 3Q  the  following  morning  the  ships  reached 
the  English  Turn,  five  miles  below  New  Orleans,  the  spot 
where  the  British  attack  had  been  repulsed  in  1815.  Here 
the  fleet  was  fired  upon  from  some  new  earthworks  erected 
on  the  lines  of  the  old,  but  the  ships  as  they  drew  abreast 
quickly  silenced  the  shore  batteries. 

"All  the  morning,"  writes  Farragut,  "I  had  seen 
abundant  evidence  of  the  panic  which  had  seized  the 
people  of  New  Orleans.  Cotton-loaded  ships  on  fire  came 
floating  down,  and  working  implements  of  every  kind, 
such  as  are  used  in  shipyards ;  the  destruction  of  property 
was  awful.  .  .  .  The  levee  of  New  Orleans  was  one 
scene  of  desolation;  ships,  steamers,  cotton,  coal,  etc., 
were  all  in  one  common  blaze,  and  our  ingenuity  was 
much  taxed  to  avoid  the  floating  conflagration.  .  .  . 


320  The  United  States  Navy 

"We  now  passed  up  to  the  city  and  anchored  imme 
diately  in  front  of  it,  and  I  sent  Captain  Bailey  on  shore 
to  demand  the  surrender  of  it  from  the  authorities,  to 
which  the  mayor  replied  that  the  city  was  under  martial 
law,  and  that  he  had  no  authority.  General  Lovell,  who 
was  present,  stated  that  he  should  deliver  up  nothing 
but,  in  order  to  free  the  city  from  embarrassment,  he 
would  restore  the  city  authorities  and  retire  with  his 
troops,  which  he  did. ' ' 5 

The  mayor,  in  the  further  correspondence,  continued 
to  make  evasive  replies,  which  soon  became  a  heavy  tax 
on  Farragut's  patience.  The  State  flag  of  Louisiana  was 
still  flying  from  the  city  hall.  It  might  be  some  time 
before  troops  could  be  brought  up  to  occupy  the  city. 
Farragut  had  the  city  helpless  under  his  guns,  but  since 
he  did  not  wish  to  destroy  property  or  take  the  lives  of 
women  and  children,  he  was  in  an  awkward  position. 
However,  the  Union  commander,  simple  and  direct,  as  he 
ever  was,  proved  himself  a  statesman  as  well  as  a  warrior ; 
he  gained  his  point  by  insistence.  The  United  States  flag 
was  raised  from  the  city  hall  and  the  government  build 
ings,  and  the  municipal  officers  acknowledged  the  authority 
of  the  National  forces. 

On  the  evening  of  the  29th  Captain  Bailey  brought 
the  welcome  news  that  Forts  Jackson  and  St.  Philip  had 
surrendered.  There  had  not  been  the  necessity  of  imme 
diate  capitulation ;  yet,  as  New  Orleans  was  the  source  of 
supplies,  the  capture  of  the  city  made  that  of  the  forts, 
sooner  or  later,  inevitable.  The  end  was  hastened  by  a 
mutiny  which  broke  out  in  the  forts,  where  a  considerable 
proportion  of  the  defenders  are  said  to  have  been 
foreigners. 

Running  past  the   forts  below  New  Orleans  was  an 

5  Naval  War  Records,  xviii,    158. 


The  Capture  of  New  Orleans  321 

exploit  of  surprising  boldness.  Previous  to  its  accom 
plishment  several  officers  had  disapproved  of  Farragut 's 
plan.  They  thought  it  bad  policy  to  cut  loose  from  the 
base  of  supplies,  and  doubted  whether  it  were  possible 
for  wooden  ships  to  pass  two  such  powerful  forts.  The 
Confederates  also  had  the  utmost  confidence  in  their  forts, 
and,  believing  that  they  could  annihilate  any  fleet  coming 
within  reach  of  their  guns,  had  been  slow  in  preparing 
other  defenses. 

Two  other  modes  of  operation  had  been  suggested  by 
Commander  Porter:  an  attack  by  the  fleet,  with  reduc 
tion  of  the  forts  before  the  fleet  went  farther ;  and  a  com 
bined  attack  by  the  fleet  and  the  troops.  Farragut 
favored  neither  plan,  because  of  the  delay  it  was  sure  to 
involve.  To  postpone  decisive  action  was  to  give  the  Con 
federates  opportunity  for  strengthening  their  defenses; 
besides,  ammunition  for  his  mortars  was  running  low. 
He  was  not  averse  to  profiting  by  the  assistance  of  the 
army,  but  he  believed  a  joint  movement  could  be  made 
from  above  the  forts  much  better  than  from  below. 

Previous  to  the  engagement,  large  stories  had  been 
circulating  concerning  the  Confederate  ironclads  Manas- 
sas,  Louisiana,  and  Mississippi;  and  if  Farragut  had  been 
more  leisurely  in  his  attack,  he  might  have  found  that 
the  tales  were  not  so  greatly  exaggerated.  The  Mississippi, 
being  unfinished,  was  burned  at  New  Orleans  on  his 
approach;  and  the  Louisiana,  which  had  been  brought 
down  to  assist  the  forts,  proved  ineffective  because  her 
engines  had  not  yet  been  put  into  working  condition.  The 
gunboats  above  the  forts,  commanded  with  two  exceptions 
by  captains  of  Mississippi  steamboats,  belonged  to  the 
River  Defense  Fleet,  another  part  of  which  Foote  and 
Davis  were  engaging  at  Fort  Pillow  and  Memphis.  They 
made  but  a  weak,  ill-organized  fight,  although  they  would 
undoubtedly  have  caused  greater  destruction  had  their 
21 


The  United  States  Navy 

foes  acted  with  more  deliberation.  Farragut  plainly  had 
a  strong  grasp  of  the  situation,  and  recognized  the  prin 
ciple  that  to  increase  the  vigor  of  the  attack  is  to  lessen 
the  risk  involved. 


FROM  NEW  ORLEANS  TO  VICKSBURG 

The  Department,  impressed  by  Farragut 's  exploits 
at  New  Orleans,  believed  there  was  nothing  to  prevent  the 
navy  from  quickly  gaining  entire  control  of  the  Missis 
sippi.  Flag-Officer  Davis,  who  with  his  fleet  was  above 
Memphis,  was  ordered  to  move  down  the  river;  and  Flag- 
Officer  Farragut  was  similarly  ordered  to  move  up  the 
river.  The  two  forces,  having  cleared  the  river  of  all 
obstructions,  were  to  combine. 

It  was  a  simple  matter  for  Farragut  to  send  forward 
one  of  his  smaller  vessels  and  secure  the  submission  of 
Baton  Rouge  and  Natchez.  Vicksburg,  however,  defiantly 
refused  to  surrender.  Consequently,  as  soon  as  he  was 
able,  Farragut  came  up  with  his  fleet,  and  was  joined  by 
1500  troops  under  Colonel  Williams.  A  combined  attack 
was  considered,  but  the  strong  position  of  the  batteries, 
some  of  them  near  the  level  of  the  river  and  others  on  a 
cliff  200  feet  above,  as  well  as  Vicksburg 's  excellent  rail 
road  connections,  by  which  the  Confederates  could  secure 
an  overpowering  force  of  troops  almost  at  an  hour's 
notice,  made  it  evident  that  the  Union  forces  could  do 
little.  Williams'  troops  had  come  with  only  a  few  days' 
rations,  supplies  were  short  also  on  the  ships,  and  the  river 
was  beginning  to  fall.  These  reasons  seemed  to  Farragut 
sufficient  for  taking  his  fleet  without  delay  down  the 
river  to  New  Orleans. 

The  Department,  however,  was  still  determined  to  clear 
the  Mississippi,  and  ordered  the  ships  back  to  Vicksburg. 
Farragut  obeyed  as  soon  as  he  was  able  to  secure  coal  and 


From  New  Orleans  to  Vicksburg          323 

supplies,  but  with  none  of  the  confidence  and  enthusiasm 
with  which  he  had  entered  upon  the  operations  against 
New  Orleans.  It  was  now  June,  and  he  was  apprehensive 
lest  in  navigating  the  Mississippi  500  miles  from  its  mouth 
with  sea-going  ships,  such  as  the  Hartford,  some  of  his 
fleet  might  be  caught  in  the  mud,  when  their  capture  by 
the  enemy  would  be  easy.  The  ships  were  constantly 
running  into  snags,  which,  as  Farragut  wrote  Secretary 
Welles,  were  "more  destructive  to  our  vessels  than  the 
enemy's  shot."  Also,  their  engines  were  showing  signs 
of  wear  under  the  hard  service,  in  which  opportunities 
for  rest  and  overhauling  were  lacking.  And  not  the 
least  of  the  difficulties  was  that  of  bringing  coal  and 
provisions  up  the  river  to  the  fleet.  Confederate  sharp 
shooters  on  the  banks  were  constantly  picking  off  the 
crews;  masked  batteries  sprang  up  like  mushrooms  and 
made  it  impossible  for  the  supply  ships  to  move  with  safety 
except  when  attended  by  gunboats,  which  could  not  be 
sent  without  weakening  the  force  at  Vicksburg. 

When  all  was  ready,  Porter  opened  with  his  mortars 
and  bombarded  the  forts  of  Vicksburg  for  two  days. 
Then  Farragut  decided  to  run  past  the  batteries,  and,  as 
the  Department  had  requested,  join  Davis'  fleet  above. 
Forming  his  fleet  in  two  columns,  the  gunboats  and  lighter 
vessels  to  the  left,  away  from  the  shore  batteries,  he 
weighed  anchor  at  two  o  'clock  on  the  morning  of  June  28, 
and  at  four  was  engaging  the  works. 

"The  Hartford,"  writes  Farragut,  "fired  slowly  and 
deliberately  and  with  fine  effect — far  surpassing  my  expec 
tations  in  reaching  the  summit  batteries.  The  rebels  were 
soon  silenced  by  the  combined  efforts  of  the  fleet  and  of 
the  flotilla  [the  mortar  boats],  and  at  times  did  not  reply 
at  all  for  several  minutes,  and  then  again  at  times  replied 
with  but  a  single  gun.  .  .  . 

'  *  The  Department  will  perceive,  from  this  report,  that 


324  The  United  States  Navy 

the  forts  can  be  passed,  and  we  have  done  it,  and  can  do 
it  again  as  often  as  may  be  required  of  us.  It  will  not, 
however,  be  an  easy  matter  for  us  to  do  more  than  silence 
the  batteries  for  a  time,  as  long  as  the  enemy  has  a  large 
force  behind  the  hills  to  prevent  our  landing  and  holding 
the  place."6 

At  six  o'clock  Farragut  met  Lieutenant-Colonel  Ellet 
with  a  division  of  Davis'  fleet,  and  anchored.  Seven  of 
his  ships  had  succeeded  in  passing  Vicksburg;  but  the 
Brooklyn,  the  Katahdin,  and  the  Kenncbec,  which  brought 
up  the  rear  of  the  two  columns,  became  separated  from 
the  rest  of  the  fleet,  and  after  enduring  a  heavy  fire, 
retired  below  the  town. 

Farragut  had  now  carried  out  his  order  to  the  letter ; 
he  had  cleared  the  river,  at  least  temporarily,  and  had 
joined  the  upper  fleet.  In  reality  he  had  accomplished 
little,  as  he  was  well  aware.  Williams,  who  had  accom 
panied  him  with  3000  troops  in  transports,  was  unable 
to  attack  the  heights  of  Vicksburg.  The  Confederates, 
having  lost  Island  No.  10  and  Memphis,  were  massing  to 
defend  the  position  they  had  still  in  their  possession.  The 
troops  which  the  Government  had  intended  that  General 
Halleck  should  send  to  co-operate  with  the  ships,  he  was 
unable  to  furnish.  The  Department,  at  length  recogniz 
ing  the  true  state  of  affairs,  ordered  Farragut  to  return 
to  New  Orleans.  As  he  was  about  to  obey,  there  occurred 
an  incident  which  occasioned  him  much  chagrin. 

Upon  the  capture  of  Memphis  the  Confederates  had 
saved  the  ironclad  Arkansas,  then  under  construction,  by 
hurrying  her  up  the  Yazoo  River.  The  Yazoo  flows  into 
the  Mississippi  near  Vicksburg,  and  only  four  miles  below 
its  mouth  the  combined  fleets  (xf  Farragut  and  Davis  had 
been  at  anchor  since  July  1. 

8  Naval  War  Records,  xviii,  609,  610. 


The  Career  of  the  Arkansas  325 

On  July  15  Davis,  at  Farragut 's  suggestion,  sent 
Colonel  Ellet  with  three  vessels  to  learn  what  he  might 
of  the  Arkansas.  When  Ellet  had  gone  six  miles  up  the 
Yazoo,  he  met  the  Arkansas  coming  down.  A  running 
battle  ensued  in  which  the  light  Union  ironclad  Carondelet 
doggedly  clung  to  her  enemy,  but  got  rather  the  worst 
of  it.  The  unarmored  Tyler,  after  firing  a  few  shots, 
sped  down  the  river  to  give  warning  to  the  fleet. 

The  ships  were  all  at  anchor  with  fires  banked,  and 
it  was  impossible  for  them  to  get  steam  up  before  the 
Arkansas  appeared  and  was  running  the  gauntlet  for 
Vicksburg.  The  Carondelet 's  fire  had  already  riddled  the 
smokestack  of  the  Arkansas  and  reduced  her  speed  to 
one  knot.  But,  aided  by  the  current,  the  Confederate 
ram  passed  down  the  line,  and,  though  receiving  a  terrific 
pounding,  she  suffered  no  vital  injury,  and  reached 
Vicksburg. 

At  once  Farragut  resolved  to  follow  her  up  and  destroy 
her  under  the  guns  of  the  town.  Early  that  evening  he 
took  his  ships  down  the  river  and  past  the  forts.  But  as 
the  Arkansas,  when  hidden  by  darkness,  had  been  moved 
by  the  Confederates  to  a  protected  position,  she  escaped. 

The  last  of  July,  Farragut  got  his  ships  back  to  New 
Orleans,  and  none  too  soon,  for  a  large  number  of  the 
officers  and  men  were  sick  with  malaria.  He  was,  however, 
still  troubled  that  the  Arkansas  remained  uncaptured. 
His  anxiety  was  relieved  on  August  6,  when,  in  an  attack 
which  the  Confederates  made  on  Baton  Rouge,  the 
Arkansas  dropped  down  the  river  to  lend  her  assistance. 
Her  engines  as  usual  were  working  badly,  and  when  the 
Essex,  Commander  W.  D.  Porter,  dashed  forward  to 
engage  her,  the  Confederates  set  fire  to  the  ram  and 
withdrew. 

Nothing  further  of  importance  was  done  by  the  ships 
on  the  Mississippi  during  the  remainder  of  1862.  Mean- 


326  The  United  States  Navy 

while,  the  Confederates  were  preparing  to  make  a  des 
perate  resistance  at  Vicksburg,  and  had  begun  to  fortify 
another  strong  position,  at  Port  Hudson,  twelve  miles 
north  of  Baton  Rouge. 

In  October,  1862,  David  D.  Porter  was  chosen  to  com 
mand  the  Mississippi  squadron,  still  operating  above  Vicks- 
burg.  He  succeeded  to  the  post  which,  with  its  onerous 
duties,  had  worn  out  Foote  and  Davis.  Previous  to  this 
time  his  dash  and  brilliant  strategy  had  never  had  oppor 
tunity  for  full  exercise,  because  of  his  subordinate  rank. 
But  Lincoln  divined  his  latent  power,  and,  passing  over 
eighty  officers  higher  in  rank,  made  him  acting  rear- 
admiral,  and  gave  him  the  squadron. 

Early  in  January,  1863,  Porter  co-operated  with 
McClernand  in  an  expedition  directed  against  Arkansas 
Post,  a  stronghold  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Arkansas  River, 
fifty  miles  from  its  mouth.  Here  in  a  two  days'  battle 
most  of  the  fighting  was  done  by  the  gunboats,  which 
succeeded  in  silencing  the  batteries.  And  it  was  Admiral 
Porter  who,  just  as  McClernand 's  army  had  finally  secured 
a  favorable  position  for  assault,  received  the  surrender 
of  the  fort  with  its  garrison  of  6000  men.  As  a  result  of 
this  victory  the  fleet  and  transports  above  Vicksburg 
were  secure  from  all  molestation  from  the  Arkansas  and 
White  Rivers. 

When,  in  January,  1863,  Grant  took  command  in 
person  of  the  operations  against  Vicksburg  he  promptly 
sought  out  Porter.  In  the  long  and  arduous  campaign 
that  followed,  the  co-operation  between  the  forces  ashore 
and  those  afloat  was  remarkable  for  its  heartiness  and 
for  the  absence  of  friction.  Of  this  General  Grant  says, 
"The  navy  under  Porter  was  all  it  could  be  during  the 
entire  campaign.  Without  its  assistance  the  campaign 
could  not  have  been  successfully  made  with  twice  the 
number  of  men  engaged.  It  could  not  have  been  made  at 


Farragut  at  Port  Hudson  327 

all  in  the  way  it  was,  with  any  number  of  men,  without 
such  assistance.  The  most  perfect  harmony  reigned 
between  the  two  arms  of  the  service.  There  never  was  a 
request  made,  that  I  am  aware  of,  either  of  the  flag-officer 
or  any  of  his  subordinates,  that  was  not  promptly  com 
plied  with. ' ' 7  While  the  details  of  Porter 's  service  are 
too  complex  even  for  a  general  account,  it  should  be  noted 
that  it  was  by  the  passing  of  Vicksburg  by  a  large  part  of 
Porter's  squadron  that  the  Union  army  was  enabled  to 
cross  the  river  below  in  safety,  and  suddenly  to  attack  the 
Confederate  fortifications  from  the  south  and  east.  Grant 
conducted  in  person  the  brilliant  campaign  that  followed, 
and  captured  Vicksburg  on  July  4,  1863. 

A  half  year  previous  to  the  surrender  of  Vicksburg, 
while  Grant  and  Porter  were  still  above  the  city,  Farragut 
had  proposed  to  Banks,  who  had  relieved  Butler  in 
command  of  troops  at  New  Orleans,  that  the  army  and 
the  navy  should  make  a  joint  attack  on  Port  Hudson. 
Because  of  the  lack  of  preparation  on  the  part  of  the 
army,  the  attack  did  not  take  place  until  March  14,  1863. 
Even  then  it  was  almost  entirely  the  work  of  the  navy, 
and  was  chiefly  an  attempt  to  get  seven  ships  above  Port 
Hudson,  where  they  were  very  much  needed.  The  fortifi 
cations  at  this  point  were  now  so  formidable,  as  Farragut 
was  well  aware,  that  this  was  an  extremely  hazardous 
undertaking.  Only  the  two  ships  leading  the  column,  the 
Hartford  and  the  Albatross,  succeeded  in  passing  the 
batteries.  The  Mississippi,  running  aground  under  the 
works,  had  to  be  fired  to  prevent  her  falling  into  the  pos 
session  of  the  enemy.  The  other  four  ships  suffered  so 
severely  from  the  enemy's  guns  that  they  were  obliged  to 
retire. 

Small  though  his  force  was  above  Port  Hudson,  Farra- 

7  Memoirs,  i,  574. 


328  The  United  States  Navy 

gut  was  able  in  large  part  to  accomplish  his  purpose.  He 
intermittently  patrolled  the  Mississippi  from  Port  Hudson 
to  Vicksburg — as  yet  Porter  had  been  able  to  send  only 
two  of  his  squadron  below  Vicksburg,  the  Queen  of  the 
West  and  the  Indianola,  and  these  had  been  captured. 
Farragut  also  blockaded  the  Red  River,  and  by  cutting 
off  supplies  to  Vicksburg  and  Port  Hudson  very  materially 
assisted  in  their  downfall. 


RESULTS 

The  importance  of  the  naval  operations  on  the  Missis 
sippi  in  1862  and  1863  is  not  likely  to  be  overestimated. 
At  their  termination,  with  the  river  in  Union  control, 
the  Confederacy  was  split  in  two.  The  rich  and  fertile 
States  of  Louisiana,  Arkansas,  and  Texas  could  no  longer 
forward  supplies  across  the  Mississippi  to  the  armies 
fighting  in  Virginia  and  elsewhere.  The  Confederate 
States  that  were  more  particularly  the  seat  of  war  could 
furnish  little,  and  armies  without  food  and  clothing  are 
doomed. 

The  capture  of  New  Orleans  had  still  another  very 
important  result.  It  deterred  France  from  action  hostile 
to  the  United  States.  Louis  Napoleon  had  already  sug 
gested  to  England  the  advisability  of  recognizing  the 
Confederate  States;  and  just  as  Farragut  was  about  to 
open  fire  on  Forts  Jackson  and  St.  Philip,  Napoleon  was 
conferring  with  Mr.  Lindsay,  a  member  of  the  British 
Parliament  and  a  Southern  sympathizer.  "Mr.  Lindsay 
spoke  of  the  Federal  blockade  as  being  ineffectual,  and 
not  in  accordance  with  the  fourth  article  of  the  Congress 
of  Paris,  and  mentioned  facts  in  support  of  his  opinion. " 
The  Emperor  fully  concurred  in  Mr.  Lindsay's  opinion, 
and  said  that  "he  had  from  the  first  considered  the  restora 
tion  of  the  Union  impossible,  and  for  that  reason  had 


Results  329 

deprecated  the  continuance  of  a  contest  which  could  not 
lead  to  any  other  result  than  separation."  Moreover,  he 
assured  Mr.  Lindsay  that  "he  would  at  once  dispatch  a 
formidable  fleet  to  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi,  if  Eng 
land  would  send  an  equal  force,  and  that  they  would 
demand  free  egress  and  ingress  for  their  merchantmen 
with  their  cargoes  of  goods,  and  supplies  of  cotton  which 
were  essential  to  the  world. ' ' 8  When  the  Northern  troops 
were  in  possession  of  New  Orleans,  the  Government  was 
very  willing  that  the  city's  commerce  should  again  be 
renewed,  but  to  have  abandoned  the  blockade  of  the  Con 
federate  ports  would  have  been  fatal  to  a  successful  ter 
mination  of  the  war. 

•  North  American  Review,  cxxix,  346. 


XX 

BATTLE  OF  MOBILE  BAY 

HAD  Farragut  been  free  after  the  capture  of  New 
Orleans  to  choose  the  next  point  of  attack,  instead  of 
making  two  futile  expeditions  to  Vicksburg  in  the  spring 
and  summer  of  1862,  he  would  have  moved  against  Mobile. 
At  that  time  its  capture  would  have  been  an  easy  matter 
for  the  fleet  under  his  command.  Two  years  later,  when 
the  Department  ordered  the  attack,  the  undertaking  was 
of  much  greater  magnitude,  for  the  Confederates  had 
vastly  strengthened  the  defenses. 

On  the  surrender  of  Port  Hudson,  July,  1863,  Farragut 
turned  over  to  Porter  the  command  of  all  the  Mississippi 
above  New  Orleans,  and  on  August  1  sailed  for  New 
York.  He  needed  rest,  and  the  Hartford,  the  Brooklyn, 
and  the  Richmond  required  extensive  overhauling.  With 
both  objects  attained,  the  admiral  and  his  ships  returned 
in  January,  1864,  to  take  a  further  part  in  the  blockade 
of  the  Gulf. 

After  the  fall  of  New  Orleans,  Mobile  became  the 
Confederates'  most  important  port  for  the  shipment  of 
cotton.  Its  situation  near  the  head  of  a  bay  thirty  miles 
long,  with  two  large  rivers  flowing  into  the  bay,  and  with 
a  railroad  system  well  developed,  made  its  retention  by 
the  Confederates  of  great  importance.  For  nearly  two 
years  previous  to  Farragut 's  return  in  1864,  the  general 
blockade  had  been  regarded  as  technically  effective.  Still, 
it  constantly  happened  that  the  swift  blockade  runners, 
creeping  along  the  shore  on  a  dark  night,  would  make  a 
bold  dash  and  gain  the  protection  of  the  forts  command- 
330 


Defenses  of  Mobile  331 

ing  the  entrance  to  the  bay  before  the  Union  ships  could 
come  up  with  them. 

These  forts  were,  in  the  order  of  their  strength  and 
importance,  Morgan,  Gaines,  and  Powell.  Fort  Morgan, 
on  the  east  side  of  the  main  channel  at  the  southern  end 
of  Mobile  Point,  was  a  pentagonal,  bastioned  work,  with 
a  full  scarp  wall  of  brick,  four  feet  and  eight  inches  thick. 
It  mounted  eighty-six  guns  and  had  a  garrison  of  640 
men.  As  the  channel  passed  close  under  its  guns,  it  was 
an  admirable  defense  to  the  bay.  Fort  Gaines  was  on 
Dauphin  Island,  three  miles  to  the  northwest  of  Morgan. 
And  Fort  Powell  was  six  miles  farther  in  the  same  direc 
tion,  commanding  one  of  the  passes  navigable  for  small 
steamers  only.  Since  neither  Gaines  nor  Powell  had  any 
part  in  the  battle  about  to  be  described,  they  will  not  be 
considered  further.  On  the  flats  to  the  south  and  east  of 
Gaines,  a  long  row  of  piles  had  been  driven  to  prevent  the 
passage  of  small  boats,  and  where  the  piles  ended,  a  double 
row  of  torpedoes  had  been  planted  toward  Morgan. 

Further  to  strengthen  the  forts,  the  Confederates  had 
ready,  some  months  before  Farragut  could  make  his  attack, 
the  ironclad  Tennessee,  built  on  the  general  lines  of  the 
Merrimac.  Though  not  so  long  as  the  latter,  the  Tennessee 
had  a  somewhat  heavier  armor,  and  also  had  an  advantage 
in  her  shallow  draft  of  fourteen  feet.  Her  beak  and  her 
powerful  battery  of  four  6-inch  and  two  7-inch  rifles 
made  her  a  dangerous  foe  to  the  wooden  ships;  indeed, 
she  was  commonly  regarded  as  the  most  powerful  ship 
afloat.  Supporting  the  Tennessee  were  three  wooden  gun 
boats,  which  were  reported  to  Farragut  by  refugees  and 
deserters  also  as  ironclads. 

After  making  a  reconnoissaiice  on  arriving  off  Mobile, 
Farragut  informed  the  Department  of  the  need  of  an 
ironclad  and  of  troops  to  make  a  successful  attack  upon 
the  forts.  It  was  not  until  the  last  of  July  that  troops 


332  The  United  States  Navy 

could  be  sent,  and  not  until  the  4th  of  August  that  the 
four  monitors  assigned  him  had  all  arrived.  On  the  5th 
of  August,  1864,  Farragut  proceeded  to  the  attack. 

He  had  made  careful  preparations  for  passing  the 
forts,  similar  to  those  in  the  operations  below  New 
Orleans;  and  since  a  large  proportion  of  his  fourteen 
wooden  ships  were  only  of  the  gunboat  class,  he  resorted  to 
the  expedient  tried  at  Port  Hudson  of  having  his  ships 
proceed  in  pairs ;  on  the  port  side  of  each  of  the  heavy 
vessels  was  lashed  a  light  vessel,  the  latter  being  thus 
protected  from  the  fire  of  Fort  Morgan.  The  fight  was 
to  be  the  most  desperate  one  that  Farragut  had  engaged 
in  since  he  was  a  boy  on  the  Essex;  he  seemed  to  know 
this  in  advance,  and  there  is  a  deep  seriousness,  almost 
melancholy,  not  characteristic  of  the  admiral,  that 
appears  in  a  letter  written  August  4 : l 

1 1  MY  DEAREST  WIFE  :  I  write  and  leave  this  letter  for 
you.  I  am  going  into  Mobile  Bay  in  the  morning,  if  God 
is  my  leader,  as  I  hope  He  is,  and  in  Him  I  place  my 
trust.  If  He  thinks  it  is  the  proper  place  for  me  to  die, 
I  am  ready  to  submit  to  His  will,  in  that  as  all  other 
things.  .  .  . 

"Your  devoted  and  affectionate  husband,  who  never 
for  one  moment  forgot  his  love,  duty,  or  fidelity  to  you, 
his  devoted  and  best  of  wives, 

11  D.  G.  FARRAGUT." 

There  were  two  favoring  conditions  that  he  desired  in 
making  the  attack:  a  flood  tide,  and  a  westerly  wind  to 
blow  the  smoke  of  the  guns  from  the  ships  upon  Fort 
Morgan.  Early  Friday  morning,  August  5,  he  had  both. 

Long  before  daylight  Farragut  had  given  orders  for 
the  ships  to  be  ready  to  advance.  At  5.30,  while  sipping 

1  Loyall  Farragut,  Life  of  Farragut,  p.  405. 


Farragufs  Preparations 


333 


\ 


\ 


\ 


^ 

»^  O+ 

TENNESSEE  \ 

SURRENDERED      \ 


PORTGAINES 


/ 


1.  Tecumseh 

2.  Manhattan 

3.  Winnebago 

4.  Chickasaw 

5.  Brooklyn 

6.  Octorora 

7.  Hartford 

8.  Metacomet 

9.  Richmond 

10.  Port  Royal 

11.  Lackawanna 

12.  Seminole 

13.  Monongahela 

14.  Kennebec 

15.  Ossipee 

16.  Itasca 

17.  Oneida 

18.  Galena 


°&V. 


v ^••' 

~3ELMA 

~CAINES     t 

~MOAGAIf 


.-••' 


<V- 


BATTLE  OF 
MOBILE  BAY 


BATTLE  OF  MOBILE  BAT 


334  The  United  States  Navy 

a  cup  of  tea  at  the  conclusion  of  breakfast,  he  turned  to 
his  fleet-captain  and  quietly  said,  "Well,  Drayton,  we 
might  as  well  get  under  way."  In  a  minute  there  came 
back  answering  signals  from  the  expectant  captains,  and 
the  ships,  lashed  in  couples,  took  their  assigned  positions. 

The  column  was  led  by  the  Brooklyn,  Captain  James 
Alden,  and  the  Octorora,  Lieutenant-Commander  Charles 
Green.  Following  them  came  the  flagship  Hartford,  Cap 
tain  Percival  Drayton,  and  the  Metacomet,  Lieutenant- 
Commander  James  E.  Jouett.  Since  the  ships  would  be 
subject  to  a  raking  fire  on  approaching  Fort  Morgan,  and 
could  bring  but  very  few  guns  into  action  until  abreast 
the  fort,  the  monitors  Tecumseh,  Manhattan,  Winnebago, 
and  Chickasaw,  which  could  fire  in  any  direction,  were  to 
form  a  column  to  starboard  and  in  advance  of  the  ships, 
engaging  the  fort  to  protect  the  ships'  approach.  That 
the  fleet  might  demoralize  the  gunners  in  Fort  Morgan 
by  a  hot  fire  of  grape  and  shrapnel,  the  vessels  were  to 
pass  close  to  the  fort,  to  the  east  of  a  certain  red  buoy. 
It  was  said  that  the  buoy  marked  the  limit  of  the  line  of 
torpedoes,  so  that  this  order  had  a  double  reason. 

The  Tecumseh,  Commander  T.  A.  M.  Craven,  opened 
the  battle,  firing  the  first  shot  at  6.47.2  Meanwhile,  the 
Confederate  vessels  Tennessee,  Morgan,  Games,  and 
Selma  had  emerged  from  behind  the  fort,  and  had  taken 
position  in  echelon  across  the  channel,  with  their  port 
batteries  toward  the  advancing  fleet;  the  Tennessee  was 
the  farthest  to  the  left,  and  rested  a  little  to  the  west 
ward  of  the  red  buoy.  The  ram  had  been  designated  by 
Farragut  as  the  antagonist  especially  of  the  Tecumseh 
and  Manhattan,  and  Craven  was  all  eagerness  to  engage 
her.  Accordingly,  after  his  first  fire,  Craven  loaded  the 


2  For    Farragut's    report    of    the    battle,    see    the    Naval    War 
Records,  xxi,  405  ff. 


Passing  Fort  Morgan  335 

guns  each  with  sixty  pounds  of  powder  and  a  steel  shot, 
and  held  them  in  readiness. 

Fort  Morgan  had  opened  on  the  approaching  ships 
shortly  after  seven,  and  for  half  an  hour  was  raking  them 
while  they  could  answer  only  with  their  bow-chasers.  At 
the  end  of  that  time,  the  Brooklyn  and  the  Hartford, 
drawing  abreast  of  the  fort,  brought  their  broadsides  into 
action,  and  Farragut,  from  his  station  in  the  port  main 
rigging,  saw  the  gunners  driven  from  the  barbette  and 
water  batteries.  But  his  satisfaction  was  of  short  dura 
tion;  suddenly  all  went  wrong. 

Commander  Craven,  in  the  Tecumseh,  was  about  300 
yards  in  advance  and  to  starboard  of  the  Brooklyn,  and 
as  he  approached  the  red  buoy,  remarked  to  his  pilot, 
"The  admiral  ordered  me  to  go  inside  [to  the  east  of] 
that  buoy,  but  it  must  be  a  mistake."3  Just  at  that 
moment  the  Tennessee  moved  slightly  forward  and  to  the 
west.  Craven,  in  his  doubt  as  to  the  course  and  in  his 
eagerness  to  grapple  with  the  enemy,  put  on  full  speed 
and  made  directly  for  the  ram.  This  led  him  slightly  to 
the  west  of  the  buoy. 

The  bow  gun  of  the  Tennessee  was  heavily  loaded  to 
meet  the  monitor,  and  the  attention  of  onlookers  was 

8  From  Farragut's  notes  on  the  battle,  quoted  by  his  son  (Life 
of  Farragut,  p.  422).  Immediately  after  this  the  admiral  added, 
"  He  ran  just  his  breadth  of  beam,  too  far  westward,  struck  a 
torpedo,  and  went  down  in  two  minutes."  There  is,  however,  a 
lack  of  agreement  in  the  reports  qf  various  officers  as  to  just 
where  the  Tecumseh  ran  on  the  torpedo.  This  is  important,  for 
on  it  hinges  the  question,  did  Craven  disobey  the  admiral's  orders? 
Mr.  Julian  M.  Spencer,  who,  as  first  lieutenant  on  the  Morgan, 
was  an  eye-witness  of  the  disaster,  says,  in  a  statement  made  to 
the  authors,  "  The  Tecumseh  was  well  to  the  east  of  the  red  buoy. 
Craven  did  not  strike  the  line  of  torpedoes,  but  he  must  have  run 
upon  a  torpedo  that  was  adrift  and  in  the  ship-channel.  This  I 
am  positive  of,  not  only  because  I  saw  the  Tecumseh  when  she 


336  The  United  States  Navy 

eagerly  directed  towards  the  ironclads  about  to  engage 
each  other,  when  suddenly  a  muffled  roar  was  heard ;  the 
Tecumseh  careened  violently,  and  then  settled  so  quickly 
that  113  men  out  of  a  complement  of  135  were  carried 
down  with  her.  A  torpedo  had  exploded  under  her  turret, 
and  within  less  than  two  minutes  nothing  but  eddies 
marked  where  the  large  sea-going  monitor  had  been.  Com 
mander  Craven  was  among  the  lost.  It  is  related  by 
Mr.  Collins,  the  pilot,  who  was  with  him  in  the  conning 
tower  when  the  explosion  occurred,  that  as  both  instinc 
tively  turned  to  the  ladder,  the  only  means  of  escape, 
Craven  drew  back,  saying,  "  After  you,  pilot."  The 
commander's  noble  courtesy  cost  him  his  life.4 

Captain  Alden,  in  the  Brooklyn,  leading  the  column 
of  wooden  ships,  was  a  close  spectator  of  the  disaster. 
At  this  time,  or  slightly  earlier,  his  lookout  reported 
torpedo-buoys,  almost  under  his  bows.  Alden  at  once 
backed  his  engines,  and  then  stopped.  He  was  signaled 
by  the  admiral  to  go  forward,  but  he  either  did  not  see 
the  signal  or,  with  the  torpedoes  ahead  and  the  monitors 
close  to  starboard,  did  not  know  how  to  obey,  for  he 
remained  inactive.  Meanwhile,  the  other  ships  were  com 
ing  on,  and  the  column  was  in  danger  of  becoming  hope- 
sank,  but  also  because  it  was  what  the  other  officers  of  the 
Morgan  remarked  when  we  talked  over  the  fight  afterwards  in 
the  wardroom."  Supporting  this  view,  at  least  in  part,  is  a  letter 
of  Captain  J.  VV.  Whiting,  of  the  Confederate  Army  (quoted  in 
the  Naval  War  Records,  xxi,  598):  "I  was  on  duty  at  Fort 
Morgan  when  the  enemy's  fleet  entered  the  bay  on  the  morning  of 
August  5,  and  saw  the  monitor  Tecumseh  when  she  went  down. 
I  am  of  the  opinion  that  she  sank  before  reaching  the  line  of 
torpedoes.  This  opinion  is  entertained  by  such  other  of  the 
officers  of  the  fort  as  witnessed  the  sinking,  and  by  the  pilots  on 
lookout  duty,  and  privates  who  had  been  detailed  to  assist  in 
planting  the  torpedoes." 

4  Narrated  in  Parker's  Battle  of  Mobile  Bay,  p.  27. 


Passing  Fort  Morgan  337 

lessly  entangled  right  under  the  guns  of  Fort  Morgan. 
Already  the  defenders,  seeing  the  confusion,  were  firing 
with  increased  vigor. 

Admiral  Farragut,  from  the  rigging  of  the  Hartford, 
had  witnessed  the  destruction  of  the  monitor.  He  had 
also  seen  the  Brooklyn  stop  and  back,  though  he  did  not 
know  the  reason  why.  On  his  starboard  bow  were  the 
Brooklyn  and  the  Octorora  athwart  the  channel,  on  his 
starboard  beam  were  the  monitors  Winnebago  and  Chick- 
asaw,  while  the  fleet  was  rapidly  massing  together,  so 
that  in  a  minute  more  even  retreat  would  be  impossible. 
It  was,  as  Mahan  terms  it,  "the  supreme  moment  of  his 
life."  On  a  right  and  immediate  decision  depended  the 
crowning  victory  of  his  long  naval  career.  An  error 
would  mean  colossal  defeat,  of  terrible  costliness  to  the 
Union,  and  a  tragic  ending  to  all  his  years  of  preparation 
and  his  brilliant  exploits  on  the  Mississippi.  "In  later 
days,  Farragut  told  that  in  the  confusion  of  these 
moments,  feeling  that  all  his  plans  had  been  thwarted, 
he  was  at  a  loss  whether  to  advance  or  retreat.  In  this 
extremity  the  devout  spirit  that  ruled  his  life,  and  so 
constantly  appears  in  his  correspondence,  impelled  him 
to  appeal  to  Heaven  for  guidance,  and  he  offered  up  this 
prayer:  'O  God,  who  created  man  and  gave  him  reason, 
direct  me  what  to  do.  Shall  I  go  on?'  'And  it  seemed,' 
said  the  admiral,  'as  if  in  answer  a  voice  commanded, 
Goon.'"5 

Since  the  signal  to  the  Brooklyn,  to  go  ahead,  had 
produced  no  effect,  Farragut  decided  to  take  the  lead 
himself.  And  as  he  could  not  take  the  safe  course  to 
starboard,  he  determined  to  pass  to  port.  Ordering  the 
Hartford  to  drive  her  engine  forward,  and  the  Metacomet, 
lashed  alongside,  to  back  hers,  he  twisted  short  around, 

6  Mahan,  Admiral  Farragut,  p.  277. 
22 


338  The  United  States  Navy 

and,  passing  the  stern  of  the  Brooklyn,  made  directly  for 
the  line  of  torpedoes.  There  came  from  the  Brooklyn  a 
warning  cry  of  torpedoes  ahead. 

"Damn  the  torpedoes!"  shouted  the  admiral,  intent 
only  on  his  high  purpose.  ' '  Four  bells !  Captain  Drayton, 
go  ahead !  Jouett,  full  speed ! ' '  The  Hartford  and  Meta- 
comet  crossed  the  line  of  torpedoes,  and  men  on  board 
said  they  heard  some  of  the  primers  snap,  but  no  torpedo 
exploded.  The  Brooklyn  and  Octorora  followed  in  their 
wake,  and  the  column  straightened  out  as  by  magic. 

Meanwhile  Farragut  had  not  been  forgetful  of  the 
few  survivors  of  the  Tecumseh,  still  struggling  near  where 
the  monitor  had  sunk,  but  directed  Jouett  to  send  a  boat. 
Acting  Ensign  Henry  C.  Nields,  a  mere  boy,  had  charge 
of  the  boat  and  pulled  within  a  few  hundred  yards  of 
the  fort,  where  he  was  exposed  to  the  fire  of  both  foes 
and  friends.  He  rescued  ten  men,  and  rowing  back  to  the 
fleet,  succeeded  in  reaching  the  Oneida,  where  he  remained 
till  the  end  of  the  battle. 

When  the  leading  ships  had  passed  beyond  the  danger 
of  the  torpedoes,  they  found  the  Confederate  squadron 
awaiting  them.  The  three  wooden  gunboats  slowly 
retreated,  firing  as  they  went,  and  doing  considerable 
damage  to  the  Hartford,  which  for  fifteen  minutes  was 
obliged  to  endure  their  fire,  and  because  of  the  narrow 
channel  could  not  bring  her  guns  into  action.  Admiral 
Buchanan,  who  was  commanding  the  Tennessee,  made  a 
dash  at  the  Hartford,  but  the  latter,  which  was  much 
quicker,  easily  eluded  the  ram,  and  after  returning  her 
fire,  continued  up  the  bay.  Then  Buchanan  gave  his 
attention  successively  to  the  Brooklyn,  the  Richmond,  and 
the  Lackawanna,  exchanging  shots  with  each,  but  causing 
no  serious  damage.  The  Monongahela  attempted  to  ram 
the  Tennessee,  but  succeeded  in  giving  her  only  a  glancing 
blow. 


Passing  Fort  Morgan  339 

By  this  time  the  Hartford  had  reached  a  position 
where  she  could  bring  her  guns  to  bear  on  the  three  gun 
boats  that  had  been  annoying  her ;  she  then  quickly  drove 
them  off,  and  so  damaged  the  Gaines  that  the  latter  was 
with  difficulty  kept  afloat  till  she  had  reached  Fort 
Morgan.  Meanwhile  the  Metacomet  was  pursuing  the 
Selma,  and  succeeded  in  capturing  her.  The  Morgan,  and 
a  little  later  also  the  Tennessee,  took  refuge  under  the 
guns  of  the  fort. 

Shortly  after  eight  o'clock,  the  three  Union  monitors 
and  all  fourteen  of  Farragut's  wooden  ships  had  safely 
passed  the  fort,  with  comparatively  little  injury  except  to 
the  Oneida.  This  vessel,  which  occupied  an  exposed  posi 
tion  at  the  end  of  the  column,  received  a  shot  from  Fort 
Morgan  that  penetrated  her  boilers  and  completely  dis 
abled  her.  Here  the  wisdom  of  Farragut's  sending  the 
ships  in  couples  became  apparent.  The  Oneida's  consort, 
the  Galena,  aided  by  the  tide,  brought  her  through,  and 
into  the  bay  beyond. 

As  the  Union  vessels  one  by  one  reached  a  position 
four  miles  above  Fort  Morgan,  where  there  was  a  large 
pocket,  they  were  directed  to  anchor.  Soon  the  stewards 
had  breakfast  preparing,  and  officers  and  men  were  relax 
ing  after  the  intense  strain.  Farragut,  on  the  poop  of 
the  Hartford,  was  talking  with  his  fleet-captain,  Drayton, 
who  observed  that  although  the  engagement  was  ended 
they  still  had  their  strongest  foe,  the  Tennessee,  to  meet 
again.  The  same  thought  had  been  in  Farragut's  mind, 
and  he  had  resolved  to  go  himself  on  the  Manhattan,  with 
the  other  monitors,  to  attack  the  ram  that  evening  under 
the  fort;  he  planned  to  board  her,  taking  advantage  of 
the  darkness  to  compel  the  Confederate  gunners,  if  they 
fired,  to  shoot  at  friend  as  well  as  at  foe.  But  it  proved 
unnecessary  to  resort  to  this  desperate  measure,  for  at 
8.45  A.M.,  before  all  his  vessels  had  anchored,  it  was 


340  The  United  States  Navy 

reported  that  the  Tennessee  was  coming  out,  and  later 
that  she  was  heading  for  the  Union  flagship. 

One  cannot  but  admire  the  daring  of  Admiral 
Buchanan  in  thus  boldly  advancing  in  broad  daylight, 
single-handed,  to  engage  an  entire  fleet.  But  his  act  was 
nothing  less  than  recklessness,  and  by  it  he  threw  away 
the  evident  advantages  he  possessed.  With  his  heavy 
rifled  guns,  of  much  greater  range  than  the  smooth-bores 
forming  the  chief  part  of  the  Union  ships'  batteries,  he 
could  have  hammered  at  the  wooden  ships  from  a  distance, 
dealing  destruction  and  receiving  no  injury  in  return.  If 
the  fleet  should  have  attempted  to  attack  the  ram,  he 
could  have  retreated  to  the  fort,  or,  choosing  a  position  in 
shallow  water,  have  prevented  Farragut  from  using  his 
heavier  vessels.  The  Tennessee  was  too  slow  to  be  effective 
as  a  ram,  so  that  she  had  little  to  gain  by  action  at  close 
quarters.  Thus  Buchanan,  steaming  into  the  midst  of  the 
Union  fleet,  where  the  water  was  deep  and  the  channel 
broad,  was  offering  battle  on  terms  most  advantageous  to 
his  enemies. 

Mess-gear  on  the  Union  vessels  was  hurriedly  put  away, 
and  preparations  were  made  for  another  engagement. 
The  stronger  wooden  ships  were  ordered  to  attack  "not 
only  with  their  guns,  but  bows  on  at  full  speed."  Dr. 
Palmer,  the  fleet-surgeon,  who,  in  going  his  rounds,  hap 
pened  to  be  just  leaving  the  flagship  in  his  launch,  was 
dispatched  by  Farragut  with  orders  for  the  monitors  to 
attack. 

The  Union  ironclads  had  already  shown  themselves 
slow  and  difficult  to  maneuver,  and  it  was  the  wooden 
Monongahela,  which  had  not  yet  come  to  anchor,  that 
began  the  second  engagement.  She  struck  the  Tennessee 
a  blow  that  carried  away  her  own  iron  prow  and  cut-water 
(already  weakened  by  the  attempt  to  ram  when  passing 
the  fort),  but  did  no  injury  to  the  Confederate.  The 


The  Fight  with  the  Tennessee 

(\ 


341 


342  The  United  States  Navy 

Lackawanna  followed  close  after,  and  struck  the  Tennessee 
at  full  speed.  Again  it  was  the  attacking  ship  that 
suffered,  for  though  her  stem  was  crushed  to  the  plank 
ends  above  and  below  the  water  line,  the  only  perceptible 
effect  on  the  Tennessee  was  to  give  her  a  heavy  list.  The 
Lackawanna  received  two  destructive  shells  through  her 
bows,  but,  in  return,  on  separating,  fired  a  9-inch  shell 
that  destroyed  one  of  her  enemy's  port  shutters,  driving 
the  fragments  into  the  casemate. 

The  Hartford  was  the  third  vessel  to  strike  the  ram. 
The  blow,  however,  was  but  a  glancing  one,  for  the  Con 
federate  had  turned  towards  the  Union  flagship  on  her 
approach.  As  the  Hartford  scraped  past,  she  fired  her 
entire  port  broadside  of  9-inch  guns,  but  the  shot  bounded 
off  with  no  effect.  The  Tennessee  in  reply  was  able  to 
fire  only  one  shell,  but  this,  passing  through  the  berth 
deck  of  the  Hartford.,  killed  five  men  and  wounded  eight. 
When  the  two  vessels  came  together,  Admiral  Farragut, 
who  had  been  standing  on  the  quarter-deck,  jumped  on 
the  rail,  holding  to  the  port  mizzen  rigging,  just  above 
the  ram.  His  flag  lieutenant,  Watson,  fearful  for  his 
safety,  passed  a  rope  around  him  and  secured  it  to  the 
rigging — this  had  been  done  also  on  entering  the  bay, 
when  Captain  Drayton,  seeing  the  admiral  in  the  main 
rigging  near  the  top,  ordered  Quartermaster  Knowles  thus 
to  protect  him  from  a  fall. 

Both  the  Hartford  and  the  Lackawanna  now  made  a 
circuit  to  get  into  position  to  charge  again  on  the  ram,  but 
while  thus  maneuvering,  the  Lackawanna  came  crashing 
into  the  flagship  just  forward  of  the  mizzenmast,  breaking 
two  ports  into  one,  dismounting  a  Dahlgren  gun,  and 
cutting  the  hull  down  within  two  feet  of  the  water.  In  a 
moment  Farragut  was  climbing  over  the  side  to  see  the 
extent  of  the  damage.  "Immediately,"  says  Captain 
Drayton,  "there  was  a  general  cry  all  round,  'Get  the 


The  Fight  with  the  Tennessee  343 

admiral  out  of  the  ship ! '  and  the  whole  interest  of  every 
one  near  was,  that  he  should  be  in  a  place  of  safety." 
Farragut,  however,  had  no  intention  of  leaving  the  Hart 
ford,  and  when  he  discovered  that  she  would  still  float, 
he  repeated  his  orders  to  make  for  the  ram.  But  again 
there  was  confusion  in  the  maneuvers,  and  the  flagship 
narrowly  escaped  being  rammed  a  second  time  by  the 
Lackawanna. 

In  the  meantime  the  monitors  had  approached  and 
were  attacking  the  ram.  One  gun  of  the  Manhattan  was 
disabled,  but  with  the  other  she  planted  a  15-inch  shot  that 
penetrated  the  armor  and  woodwork  of  the  casemate,  and 
was  held  only  by  the  netting  inside.  The  turrets  of  the 
Winnebago  would  not  turn,  and  her  guns  could  be  fired 
only  by  pointing  the  ship  ;  in  consequence,  her  effectiveness 
was  much  lessened.  But  the  double-turreted  monitor 
Chickasaw,  brilliantly  handled  by  Lieutenant-Commander 
Perkins  (the  youngest  of  Farragut's  captains),  secured 
a  position  under  the  stern  of  the  Tennessee,  and  there 
she  stuck,  as  the  Confederate  pilot  said  later,  "like  a 
leech." 

On  the  Tennessee,  throughout  the  engagement,  Admiral 
Buchanan  superintended  the  handling  of  the  guns.  After 
the  collision  with  the  Hartford,  the  engineer  reported  that 
the  ram  was  leaking  rapidly,  whereupon  the  Confederate 
admiral  sent  word  to  Commander  J.  D.  Johnston,  in  the 
pilot  house,  to  steer  for  Fort  Morgan.  Then  it  was  that 
the  Chickasaw  secured  her  position  under  the  stern  and  so 
annoyed  the  ram. 

The  wheel  chains  of  the  Tennessee,  which  by  a  colossal 
blunder  in  construction  lay  exposed  on  the  deck,  were 
carried  away.  Next,  a  port  cover  was  struck  by  an  11-inch 
shot  from  the  Chickasaw;  the  impact  instantly  killed  a 
machinist  who  was  working  there,  and  threw  iron  splinters 
which  mortally  wounded  one  of  the  gunners  and  broke 


344  The  United  States  Navy 

Buchanan's  leg  above  the  knee.  Johnston,  to  whom 
Buchanan  then  gave  over  the  command,  did  his  utmost 
to  save  the  vessel,  but  he  could  do  very  little.  The  reliev 
ing  tackles  by  which  he  was  steering  the  ship  were  shot 
away,  and  the  tiller  was  unshipped  from  the  rudder  head. 
The  smokestack,  riddled  by  shot,  had  fallen  over  when  the 
Tennessee  was  struck  by  the  wooden  vessels,  and  the 
steam  was  going  down  rapidly.  Two  quarter  ports  in 
tended  for  the  after  gun  had  been  so  jammed  that  they 
could  not  be  removed,  and  two  of  the  broadside  port  covers 
had  been  entirely  unshipped  by  the  fire  of  the  fleet. 
Because  of  these  injuries  it  happened  that  in  the  last 
half  hour  of  the  fight,  that  is,  following  the  collision  with 
the  Hartford,  the  Tennessee  was  unable  to  fire  a  shot. 
During  this  period  the  Chiclcasaw  had  kept  up  a  persistent 
pounding  from  her  position  under  the  stern,  never  more 
than  fifty  yards  away,  and  had  fired  fifty-two  11-inch 
shot.  Of  the  monitor's  fire  Johnston  remarks  in  his  report, 
"the  shot  were  fairly  raining  upon  the  after  end  of  the 
shield,  which  was  now  so  thoroughly  shattered  that  in  a 
few  moments  it  would  have  fallen  and  exposed  the  gun 
deck  to  a  raking  fire  of  shell  and  grape. ' ' 6 

The  Tennessee  lay  helpless  as  a  log,  and  Buchanan, 
recognizing  her  condition,  said  to  Johnston,  who  had 
sought  him  out  on  the  berth  deck,  "Do  the  best  you  can, 
sir,  and  when  all  is  done,  surrender."  The  Ossipee  was 
now  charging  down  at  full  speed,  and  the  Hartford,  the 
Monongahela,  and  the  Lackawanna  were  seeking  another 
opportunity  to  ram.  Convinced  that  the  Tennessee  was 
nothing  more  than  a  target  for  the  Union  ships,  Johnston 
went  out  on  the  casemate  and  hauled  down  her  colors, 
shortly  afterwards  reappearing  and  hoisting  a  white  flag. 

6  Buchanan's  and  Johnston's  reports  will  be  found  in  the  Naval 
War  Records,  xxi,  576-581. 


The  Capture  of  the  Forts  345 

LeRoy,  of  the  Ossipee,  at  once  attempted  to  stop  his  ship, 
but  the  momentum  carried  him  on,  and  he  struck  the 
ram  on  her  starboard  quarter.  The  blow,  however,  did 
no  harm. 

The  engagement  ended  at  ten  o'clock,  having  lasted 
three  hours  and  a  quarter,  with  a  half  hour's  intermis 
sion.  The  losses  of  the  Union  fleet  were  large,  amounting 
to  fifty-two  killed  and  170  wounded.  The  Hartford 
suffered  far  more  severely  than  any  other  ship;  twenty- 
five  of  the  killed,  or  nearly  one-half  of  the  entire  number, 
were  of  her  crew.  This  was  because  for  several  minutes 
she  had  endured  the  concentrated  fire  of  the  Confederate 
gunboats  without  being  able  to  reply,  and  also  twice  had 
entered  into  close  action  with  the  Tennessee.  The  fire 
of  the  Confederate  ships  did  far  more  damage  than  that 
of  Fort  Morgan.  When  the  men  drowned  in  the  Tecumseh 
are  included,  the  total  Union  loss  mounts  to  335.  That  of 
the  Confederate  fleet  was  in  comparison  very  small,  ten 
killed  and  sixteen  wounded. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  same  day,  August  5,  the 
Chickasaw  shelled  Fort  Powell  and  compelled  its  evacua 
tion  during  the  night.  The  following  day  she  attacked 
Fort  Gaines,  and,  assisting  the  army,  induced  that  work 
to  capitulate  on  August  7.  Fort  Morgan  had  defiantly 
refused  to  surrender,  and  held  out  several  days  longer. 
When,  however,  heavy  siege  guns  and  the  whole  fleet, 
including  the  three  monitors  and  the  captured  Tennessee, 
opened  on  it,  resistance  soon  became  impossible;  the 
defenders  endured  the  bombardment  for  one  day,  and  on 
the  next,  August  23,  surrendered. 

Farragut,  having  now  complete  control  of  the  bay, 
could  seal  the  port  to  blockade  runners,  and  had  accom 
plished  all  that  he  had  contemplated.  It  was  not  his  pur 
pose  to  attempt  the  capture  of  the  city  of  Mobile — of 
questionable  advantage  when  it  was  taken.  An  army 


346  The  United  States  Navy 

of  20,000  to  30,000  men,  he  estimated,  would  be  required 
for  this,  and  almost  as  many  to  hold  it ;  only  the  lighter- 
draft  monitors  and  the  gunboats  would  be  able  in  the 
shallow  water  to  lend  their  co-operation.  Consequently 
he  was  content  to  clear  the  lower  bay  of  torpedoes  and 
remain  there  quietly  for  several  months. 

As  we  consider  the  importance  of  the  battle  of  Mobile 
Bay,  it  is  evident  that  the  perfecting  of  the  blockade  in 
the  Gulf  States,  accomplished  by  the  capture  of  the  forts 
and  the  possession  of  the  bay,  was  of  great  moment. 
More  than  that,  Farragut's  victory  came  at  a  political 
crisis,  and,  because  it  was  opportune,  strongly  affected  a 
decision  of  vital  consequence  to  the  republic. 

Near  the  close  of  summer,  1864,  the  friends  of  Lincoln, 
looking  forward  to  the  election  of  the  following  November, 
had  become  greatly  alarmed.  Reliable  reports  from 
Illinois,  Indiana,  and  Pennsylvania  indicated  that  those 
States  were  strongly  opposed  to  the  administration  and 
its  policies.  They  were  tired  of  war.  And  the  platform 
adopted  by  the  Democratic  party  at  its  national  conven 
tion — in  substance,  resolved,  that  the  war  is  a  failure — 
indicated  what  kind  of  policy  was  likely  to  be  substituted 
if  Lincoln  were  not  re-elected.  But  the  battle  of  Mobile 
Bay  and  Sherman's  capture  of  Atlanta,  which  followed 
shortly  after  and  gave  it  a  cumulative  force,  put  a  new 
aspect  upon  the  war.  As  Seward,  in  a  brief  speech  at 
Washington,  said,  "  Sherman  and  Farragut  have  knocked 
the  bottom  out  of  the  Chicago  [Democratic]  nomina 
tions."  In  September,  Sheridan  won  his  brilliant  suc 
cesses  at  Winchester  and  Fisher's  Hill.  The  political 
campaign  was  now  prosecuted  with  vigor.  Lincoln's 
adherents  had  little  need  to  argue ;  they  had  but  to  point 
to  recent  events.  On  November  8,  when  the  election  took 
place,  the  people  gave  Lincoln  212  electoral  votes  to  his 
opponent's  twenty-one.  "  In  spite  of  burdensome  taxa- 


Farragut  Honored  347 

tion,  weariness  of  war,  and  mourning  in  every  household, 
they  had  decided  on  this  election  day  of  1864  to  finish  the 
work  they  had  begun."  7 

After  his  exploits  in  Mobile  Bay,  Farragut  had  been 
ordered  to  command  the  expedition  planned  against  Fort 
Fisher.  But  his  long  service  in  the  Gulf  States  had  been 
unusually  severe ;  any  man,  no  matter  how  young,  must 
have  felt  the  strain,  and  Farragut,  who  was  past  sixty- 
three,  could  not  go  on  indefinitely.  Accordingly,  the 
command  of  the  expedition  was  given  to  Admiral  Porter, 
and  Farragut  was  ordered  north.  His  arrival  in  New 
York  City,  December,  1864,  was  an  occasion  for  universal 
rejoicing.  A  committee  of  municipal  officers  and  repre 
sentative  citizens  waited  on  him,  inviting  him  to  make  New 
York  City  his  home,  and  accompanying  their  invitation 
with  a  gift  of  $50,000.  The  same  month  the  Government 
showed  its  appreciation  by  creating  for  him  the  grade  of 
vice-admiral.  In  July,  1866,  Congress  passed  an  act  mak 
ing  him  admiral,  an  honor  which  it  had  never  conferred 
before,  and  has  but  twice  since.  The  following  year,  when 
commanding  the  European  squadron,  he  was  received 
with  marked  attention  by  the  crowned  heads  of  Europe, 
and  everywhere  was  greeted  "with  the  enthusiasm  and 
distinguished  consideration  that  were  aroused  among  naval 
officers  by  the  presence  of  the  man  who  had  bestowed  upon 
their  profession  a  lustre  unequalled  by  any  other  deeds 
of  that  generation."8 

7  Rhodes,  History  of  the  United  States,  iv,  539. 
8Mahan,  Admiral  Farragut,  p.  298. 


XXI 

THE  WAR  ON  ALBEMARLE  SOUND 

IMPORTANCE  OF  ALBEMARLE  SOUND 

DURING  the  winter  of  1861-62,  following-  up  the  suc 
cesses  at  Hatteras  and  Pamlico  Sound,  the  North  had 
taken  measures  to  gain  control  of  Albemarle  Sound.  This 
step  was  necessary  for  several  reasons:  the  Confederates 
found  this  sound  a  refuge  from  which  to  prey  upon  coast 
wise  commerce;  the  North  needed  harbors  in  Southern 
territory  for  repair  shops  and  coaling  stations ;  numerous 
rivers  penetrating  the  heart  of  the  Confederacy  flow  into 
this  sound,  and  on  their  banks  are  many  important  towns ; 
two  railroads  and  four  canals  formed  excellent  means  of 
communication,  and,  most  important  of  all,  Norfolk  might 
be  severed  from  her  main  sources  of  supply  in  the  rear, 
and  troops  might  thus  co-operate  in  the  attacks  on  this 
important  city.  Furthermore,  the  control  of  Albemarle 
Sound  threatened  the  Norfolk  Navy  Yard,  and  made 
imminent  the  cutting  off  of  Norfolk  from  Richmond  and 
the  severing  of  railroad  communication  between  these 
cities  and  the  States  farther  south.  The  South,  after  the 
loss  of  Pamlico  Sound,  made  strenuous  efforts  to  fortify 
Roanoke  Island,  commanding  the  entrance  to  Albemarle 
Sound,  but  the  scant  forces  under  General  Wise  and  the 
small  fleet  of  Captain  Lynch  proved  inadequate. 

Early  in  January,  1862,  12,000  troops  under  General 
Burnside,  and  a  large  but  nondescript  naval  force,  con 
sisting  mainly  of  river  steamers,  ferry-boats,  and  tug 
boats,  under  Flag-Officer  Goldsborough  and  Commander 
Rowan,  sailed  for  Albemarle  Sound.  The  army  and  navy, 
co-operating  most  harmoniously,  captured  the  Confederate 
348 


Events  on  Albemarle  Sound 


349 


forts  and  garrisons  on  Roanoke  Island,  February  8.  They 
next  took  possession  of  Elizabeth  City  and  the  Pasquotank 
River,  which  commanded  the  approach  to  the  Dismal 


ALBEMARLE  AND  PAMLICO  SOUNDS 


Swamp  Canal  to  Norfolk.  Having  gained  control  of  the 
sound,  the  Union  forces  steamed  up  the  Neuse  River,  and, 
in  spite  of  the  fact  that  New  Berne  was  protected  by  forts 
and  barricades  of  sunken  vessels  and  iron-pointed  piles, 


350  The  United  States  Navy 

captured  the  town,  at  that  time  the  second  commercial 
city  in  North  Carolina.  This  was  on  March  14;  and 
when,  a  month  and  a  half  later,  the  Union  forces  had  taken 
Fort  Macon,  Federal  control  of  the  sounds  and  the  adja 
cent  rivers  was  virtually  complete. 


THE  RAM  ALBEMARLE 

The  Confederates,  feeling  keenly  the  loss  of  their 
power  on  the  sounds,  made  two  abortive  attempts,  on 
March  14,  1863,  and  on  January  30,  1864,  to  recapture 
New  Berne.  Moreover,  the  attempts  made  by  the  Southern 
Government  to  build  ironclads  on  the  rivers  emptying  into 
the  sounds  kept  the  Union  forces  busy  in  making  incur 
sions  up  the  streams  to  the  towns  of  Washington,  Ply 
mouth,  and  Hamilton.  Notwithstanding  the  Northern 
fleet  and  army  in  these  waters,  Captain  Cooke  and  Gilbert 
Elliott,  early  in  1863,  managed  to  lay,  at  Edward's  Ferry 
on  the  Roanoke  River,  the  keel  of  a  ram,  the  Albemarle. 
Cooke,  who,  by  reason  of  his  zeal,  gained  the  name  "iron 
monger  captain,"  ransacked  the  adjacent  country  for  iron, 
and  by  the  spring  of  1864  launched  and  armed  a  vessel 
that  threatened  for  a  time  to  destroy  the  wooden  Union 
fleet,  and  restore  the  sounds  to  Southern  control. 

The  Albemarle  was  122  feet  in  length,  with  a  beam 
of  forty-five  feet  and  a  draft  of  eight  feet,  She  was 
built  of  massive  pine  timbers,  dovetailed,  and  covered 
with  four-inch  planking.  On  her  deck  was  an  octagonal 
shield,  or  casemate,  sixty  feet  long,  with  faces  sloping  so 
as  to  make  projectiles  glance  off.  This  casemate  was  also 
of  very  heavy  timber  covered  with  planking,  and  was 
sheathed  in  two  layers  of  two-inch  iron.  The  ram  of  the 
Albemarle  was  of  solid  oak,  plated  with  heavy  iron,  and 
tapering  to  an  edge.  The  ironclad  had  two  engines,  each 
of  200  horsepower,  to  drive  her  twin  screws.  Her  anna- 


The  Ram  Alb  e  marie  351 

ment  consisted  of  two  100-pound  Armstrong  guns, 
mounted  one  in  the  bow  and  the  other  in  the  stern ;  and 
the  casemate  was  so  pierced  that  these  guns  on  pivots 
could  be  used  on  either  broadside,  or  as  quarter  guns. 

On  the  morning  of  April  18,  1864,  the  Albemarle 
started  down  the  Roanoke  to  co-operate  with  General 
Hoke,  who  had  on  the  previous  day  begun  an  assault  on 
Plymouth.  As  the  ram  could  not  be  steered  in  the  swift 
current,  she  proceeded  down  stream  stern  foremost, 
with  chains  dragging  from  the  bow.  Forges  and  sledge 
hammers  were  still  at  work  completing  the  armor  of  the 
casemate.  "The  never-failing  Cooke  had  started  his 
voyage  in  a  floating  workshop.  .  .  .On  the  turtleback 
numerous  stages  were  suspended,  thronged  with  sailors 
wielding  sledge  hammers.  Upon  the  pilot  house  stood 
Captain  Cooke,  giving  directions.  Some  of  the  crew  were 
being  exercised  at  one  of  the  big  guns.  'Drive  in  spike 
number  ten!'  sang  out  the  commander.  'On  nut  below 
and  screw  up !  Serve  vent  and  sponge !  Load  with  car 
tridge  ! '  was  the  next  command.  '  Drive  in  number  eleven, 
port  side — so !  On  nut  and  screw  up  hard !  Load  with 
shell — Prime ! '  And  in  this  seeming  babel  of  words  the 
floating  monster  glided  by  on  her  trial  trip  and  into 
action."  * 

The  ram  made  her  way  safely  over  the  obstructions  of 
old  sunken  vessels,  piles,  and  torpedoes  placed  in  the  river 
near  Warren's  Neck  to  prevent  her  co-operation  in  an 
attack  on  Plymouth.  Early  on  the  morning  of  the  19th, 
Captain  Cooke  saw,  farther  down  the  stream,  two  Union 
gunboats,  the  Miami  and  the  South-field,  coming  up  to  in 
tercept  him.  These  vessels,  under  the  command  of  Lieu 
tenant  Flusser,  had  been  lashed  together,  by  means  of 
long  spars  and  chains  festooned  between  them,  with  the 

1  Quoted  in  Maclay,  History  of  the  United  States  Navy,  ii,  525. 


352  The  United  States  Navy 

object  of  seizing  the  ram  as  in  a  vise  and  then  pounding 
her  to  pieces  by  means  of  their  heavy  9-inch  guns  and 
rifled  100-pounders.  But  Cooke  was  on  his  guard;  he 
hugged  the  shore  until  nearly  abreast  of  the  Union  vessels, 
then  turning  suddenly  toward  mid-stream,  with  throttles 
wide  open  he  passed  the  bow  of  the  Miami,  and  plunged 
the  heavy  ram  into  the  Southfield's  starboard  side,  sinking 
her  instantly.  The  ram's  sharp  beak  was  held  and  her 
bow  submerged  by  the  Southfield.  As  the  water  poured 
into  the  Albemarle's  ports,  it  looked  for  a  moment  as  if 
she,  too,  were  doomed.  But  when  the  Union  vessel  rolled 
heavily  on  her  side  in  the  shallow  water,  she  released  her 
hold  of  Cooke 's  ironclad,  which  was  rapidly  filling  from 
the  forward  ports. 

Lieutenant  Flusser  on  the  Miami  at  once  opened  with 
his  heavy  guns,  and  he  himself  fired  a  shell  with  a  ten- 
second  fuse,  which,  on  rebounding  from  the  ram 's  slanting 
sides,  exploded  and  killed  him.  The  Miami's  crew,  seeing 
that  their  projectiles  were  glancing  off  harmlessly  like 
so  many  pebbles,  now  attempted  to  board,  but  the 
Albemarle's  deck  was  quickly  crowded  with  men  ready  to 
thwart  this  attempt.  Hereupon  the  Union  vessel,  a  fast 
side-wheeler,  without  receiving  a  blow,  made  good  her 
escape.  The  Albcmarlc  kept  up  a  steady  fire  the  rest  of 
the  day  into  the  forts  defending  Plymouth,  and  on  April 
20,  General  Wessells,  with  1500  Union  soldiers,  surren 
dered  to  the  Confederates  under  General  Hoke. 

On  May  5,  the  Albemarle,  accompanied  by  the  Bomb 
shell,  captured  at  Plymouth,  and  the  transport  Cotton 
Plant,  emerged  from  the  Roanoke  River  to  attack  Captain 
Melancton  Smith's  "pasteboard  fleet,"  consisting  of  the 
double-enders  Mattabesett,  Sassacus,  Wyalusing,  and 
Miami,  the  ferryboat  Commodore  Hull,  and  the  gunboats 
Whitehead  and  Ceres.  The  Union  commander  had  been 
preparing  for  the  inevitable  conflict  as  best  he  could.  He 


Attack  on  Smith's  Fleet  353 

had  equipped  the  Miami  with  a  torpedo,  and  a  strong 
net  with  which  to  foul  the  ram's  propellers.  His  plan 
of  attack  was  to  take  advantage  of  the  double-enders ' 
quick  maneuvering  qualities,  approach  the  enemy  as  near 
as  possible  without  endangering  the  side-wheels,  discharge 
his  powerful  guns,  and  then  quickly  return  for  a  similar 
circuit. 

The  Albemarle  opened  the  battle  at  long  range  with 
a  well-aimed  shot  at  the  Mattabesett,  which  cut  away  her 
rails  and  spars  and  wounded  six  men  at  the  guns.  But 
as  the  Albemarle  then  attempted  to  ram,  the  Union  ship 
skilfully  avoided  her.  Like  a  pack  of  wolves  attacking 
a  stag,  Captain  Smith's  fleet  surrounded  the  ironclad. 
The  firing  from  the  Union  vessels  was  rapid,  but  had  no 
effect  on  the  ram's  iron  sides;  even  the  100-pound  shot 
from  the  pivot-rifles  glanced  harmlessly  off.  All  attempts, 
also,  to  send  shot  through  the  ports  of  the  ram,  or  to  find 
vulnerable  spots  on  her,  proved  futile.  At  this  juncture 
Captain  Roe 's  ship,  the  Sassacus,  whose  prow  had  a  three- 
ton  bronze  beak,  backed  slowly;  then,  with  waste  and 
oil  thrown  on  her  fires,  the  Union  vessel  sprang  at  the 
iron  monster.  "All  hands  lie  down,"  was  the  order  as 
the  frail  vessel  crashed  into  the  ram,  careening  the  iron 
clad  and  hurling  her  crew  off  their  feet.  At  the  same 
moment  a  shell  from  the  Albemarle  tore  through  the 
Sassacus.  A  second  shot  exploded  the  double-ender's 
boiler.  Mingled  with  the  cries  of  agony  from  the  scalded 
and  frantic  men  was  heard  the  rattle  of  small  arms  as 
the  crew  of  the  Sassacus,  with  pistols,  muskets,  and  hand- 
grenades,  repelled  the  boarders.  During  this  time  the 
other  vessels,  except  the  Miami,  could  not  or  did  not 
make  any  attempt  to  come  to  close  quarters,  owing  partly 
to  a  signal,  given  by  mistake,  that  the  Wyalusing  was 
sinking.  An  attempt  of  the  Miami  to  use  her  torpedo, 
owing  to  her  poor  maneuvering,  failed.  In  the  gathering 
23 


354  The  United  States  Navy 

darkness,  the  Albemarle  retreated  up  the  river;  the  muzzle 
of  one  of  her  guns  was  cracked,  her  tiller  disabled,  and  her 
smokestack  riddled. 

The  ram's  object  in  thus  giving  battle  to  the  Union 
fleet  in  order  to  co-operate  with  the  Confederate  land 
forces  in  an  attack  on  New  Berne  had  failed.  On  May  24, 
the  Albemarle  again  appeared,  this  time  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Roanoke  to  drag  for  torpedoes  laid  there  for  her 
destruction.  From  this  date  until  October  27  she  lay  in 
' '  inglorious  inactivity ' '  at  Plymouth.  Meanwhile  Captain 
Cooke,  by  reason  of  illness,  was  superseded  by  Lieutenant 
Warley.  The  existence  of  the  ram  continued,  in  spite  of 
her  inaction,  to  be  a  grave  menace  to  the  Union  fleet, 
and  consequently  to  the  control  of  the  sounds. 

LIEUTENANT  GUSHING  PLANS  TO  DESTROY  THE  RAM 

In  this  crisis  Lieutenant  William  B.  Gushing,  then 
only  twenty-one  years  old,  made  a  suggestion  to  the  Navy 
Department  to  destroy  the  Albemarle  by  torpedoes.  This 
young  man  had  on  several  previous  occasions  been  remark 
ably  successful  in  dare-devil  adventures.  In  November, 
1862,  he  made  a  successful  raid  in  the  Ellis  up  New  River 
Inlet,  N.  C.  The  following  January,  with  twenty-five 
men,  he  captured  an  earthwork  at  Little  River.  In  Feb 
ruary,  1864,  in  the  Cape  Fear  River,  Gushing  boldly 
entered  the  Confederate  lines  and  captured  one  of  General 
Hebert's  staff  officers.  In  a  cutter,  with  fifteen  men,  the 
following  June,  he  made  a  reconnoissance  near  Wilming 
ton,  N.  C.,  preliminary  to  destroying  the  ironclad  Raleigh, 
captured  the  mail  from  the  fort  orderly,  and  ascertained 
that  the  Raleigh,  retreating  up  Gape  Fear  River  after  an 
attack  on  a  Union  fleet,  had  "broken  her  back"  on  a  bar. 
Thereupon  Gushing,  with  remarkable  skill,  having  eluded 
a  large  force  of  guard  boats,  returned  safely  to  his  vessel 


Development  of  Torpedo  Warfare          355 

without  the  loss  of  a  man.  To  such'  a  youngster  the 
Department  readily  entrusted  the  destruction  of  the 
Albemarle. 

Gushing  was  sent  to  New  York  to  select  suitable  vessels 
for  his  "torpedo-boats,"  and  chose  two  boats  built  for 
picket  duty.  "They  were  open  launches,  about  thirty 
feet  in  length,  with  small  engines,  and  propelled  by  a 
screw.  A  12-pounder  howitzer  was  fitted  to  the  bow  of 
each,  and  a  boom  was  rigged  out  some  fourteen  feet  in 
length,  swinging  by  a  goose-neck  hinge  to  the  bluff  of  the 
bow.  A  topping  lift,  carried  to  a  stanchion  inboard, 
raised  or  lowered  it,  and  the  torpedo  was  fitted  into  an 
iron  slide  at  the  end.  This  was  intended  to  be  detached 
from  the  boom  by  means  of  a  heel-jigger  leading  inboard, 
and  to  be  exploded  by  another  line,  connected  with  a 
pin  which  held  a  grape  shot  over  a  nipple  and  cap."  2 

TORPEDOES  IN  THE  CIVIL  WAR 

Various  forms  of  early  torpedoes  or  submarine  mines 
had  been  invented  by  Bushnell  during  the  Revolution, 
and  by  Robert  Fulton  during  the  War  of  1812,  but  the 
first  successful  mechanisms  for  submarine  explosion  came 
into  use  during  the  Civil  War,  in  the  course  of  which 
about  twenty-eight  vessels  were  either  sunk  or  seriously 
injured  by  such  devices.  The  ingenious  machines  included 
such  classes  as  frame  torpedoes,  floating  or  buoyant  tor 
pedoes,  electric  torpedoes,  spar  torpedoes  made  fast  to 
the  early  forms  of  torpedo-boats,  and  submarines  or 
"Davids,"  as  the  Goliath  slayers  were  called.  Under 
the  general  term  of  torpedoes  were  included  even  such 
infernal  machines  as  the  coal  torpedoes,  irregular  cast- 
iron  shells  filled  with  powder,  painted  to  resemble  coal, 
and  surreptitiously  hidden  in  coal  heaps  intended  for 

2  Cushing,  Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,  iv,  634. 


356  The  United  States  Navy 

Union  vessels;  another  form  was  a  clockwork  device  with 
a  harmless-looking  exterior  intended  to  be  carried  aboard 
ship  and  exploded  at  the  time  set.  Numerous  forms  of 
mines  were  planted  in  rivers  and  bays  to  destroy  vessels, 
which  frequently  provided  themselves  with  nets  and  guard 
boats  to  fend  these  off. 

The  Confederates  were  the  first  to  adopt  the  new 
weapon.  In  spite  of  considerable  opposition  even  in  the 
South  to  what  was  regarded  as  an  inhuman  mode  of 
warfare,  the  Southern  Government  established  in  October, 
1862,  a  torpedo  bureau  in  its  Navy  Department.  In 
1863  one  of  its  "cigar-shaped  torpedo-boats"  made  an 
attack  off  Charleston  on  the  New  Ironsides,  and  failed 
only  because  of  the  Union  vessel's  great  thickness  of  iron 
and  timber.  Another  form  of  these  "Davids,"  on  Feb 
ruary  17,  1864,  sank  in  four  minutes  the  heavily  armed 
steam  sloop  of  war  Housatonic,  also  off  Charleston.  This 
torpedo-boat  had  been  a  submarine,  but  after  suffocating 
three  crews  in  attempts  at  submersion,  it  made  its  final 
and  only  successful  attack  on  the  surface,  when  its  crew 
perished  with  the  Housatonic. 

Of  the  spar  torpedo  there  were  various  forms  that 
had  been  successfully  used  in  the  war.  The  type  adopted 
by  Gushing  was  the  invention  of  Engineer  Lay  of  the 
navy.  It  consisted  of  a  copper  cylinder  at  the  bottom  of 
which  was  a  cone  containing  a  fulminate  cap.  Within  the 
cylinder  was  a  tube  running  the  whole  length,  in  the 
end  of  which  a  grape  shot,  held  up  by  a  trigger  pin,  was 
so  arranged  that  by  a  slight  pull  the  pin  was  withdrawn 
and  the  grape  fell  on  the  cap  in  the  cone  and  exploded  a 
charge  of  from  fifty  to  seventy  pounds  of  powder  in  the 
space  between  the  outer  cylinder  and  the  tube.  In  the 
upper  part  of  the  apparatus  was  an  air  chamber  that 
enabled  the  torpedo,  when  detached  from  the  spar,  to 
float  in  an  upright  position.  In  handling  such  a  complex 


Gushing  Destroys  the  Albemarle          357 

mechanism  the  most  delicate  touch  was  required.  The 
torpedo-boat  had  to  stop  just  at  the  right  place  to  give 
free  play  for  lowering  the  spar  under  the  overhang  of 
the  vessel.  Gushing,  as  he  used  the  torpedo  against  the 


From  Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,  by  permission 

CUSHING'S  LAUNCH  AND  TORPEDO 

A,  Spar.  B,  Torpedo.  C,  Stanchion.  D,  Windlass.  E,  Topping  Lift.  F,  Heel- 
Jigger.  G,  Trigger  Line,  a,  Powder  Chamber,  b,  Air  Chamber,  c,  Pin  holding 
Grape  Shot  in  place  and  attached  to  Trigger  Line  G.  d,  Grape  Shot. 

Albemarle,  had  attached  to  his  person  four  lines:  the 
detaching  lanyard,  the  trigger  line,  and  two  cords  run 
ning  respectively  to  the  engineer's  wrist  and  ankle  to 
direct  the  movements  of  the  launch.3 


THE  DESTRUCTION  OF  THE  ALBEMARLE 

On  the  way  southward,  through  the  canals  to  Chesa 
peake  Bay  and  thence  to  Norfolk,  Gushing  had  lost  one  of 
his  picket  boats.  With  the  other,  after  many  adventures 
in  passing  through  hostile  country,  he  finally  reached  the 
Union  fleet  anchored  off  the  mouth  of  Eoanoke  River. 

3  Submarine  Warfare,  by  Lieut. -Commander  J.  S.  Barnes, 
U.  S.  N.,  gives  a  brief  but  excellent  history  of  early  forms  of 
torpedoes. 


358  The  United  States  Navy 

The  young  officer  then  disclosed  his  plan  to  his  crew,  and 
gave  them  the  chance  to  avoid  the  hazardous  undertak 
ing,  but  they  volunteered  to  a  man. 

The  Albemarle,  protected  by  several  thousand  soldiers 
deployed  in  the  surrounding  country,  was  moored  at 
Plymouth,  eight  miles  from  the  mouth  of  the  river.  A 
mile  below  the  town  was  the  wreck  of  the  Southfield,  on 
whose  hurricane  deck  a  guard  was  stationed  to  give 
warning  of  the  approach  of  danger.  The  ram,  according 
to  her  commander,  Captain  Warley,  had  a  crew  of  only 
sixty, — "too  small  to  keep  an  armed  watch  on  deck  at 
night  and  do  picketing  besides. ' ' 

On  the  dark  and  slightly  rainy  night  of  October  27, 
1864,  Gushing  started  up  the  river  and  passed  the  wreck 
of  the  South  field  unobserved.  His  own  very  interesting 
account  of  his  adventures  that  night  and  the  next  day  is 
in  part  as  follows: 

"We  passed  within  thirty  feet  of  the  pickets  without 
discovery,  and  neared  the  vessel.  I  now  thought  that  it 
might  be  better  to  board  her,  and  *  take  her  alive, '  having 
in  the  two  boats  twenty  men  well  armed  with  revolvers, 
cutlasses,  and  hand-grenades.  To  be  sure,  there  were 
ten  times  our  number  on  the  ship,  and  thousands  nearby ; 
but  a  surprise  is  everything,  and  I  thought  if  her  fasts 
were  cut  at  the  instant  of  boarding,  we  might  overcome 
those  on  board,  take  her  into  the  stream,  and  use  her  iron 
sides  to  protect  us  afterward  from  the  forts.  Knowing 
the  town,  I  concluded  to  land  at  the  lower  wharf,  creep 
around,  and  suddenly  dash  aboard  from  the  bank;  but 
just  as  I  was  sheering  in  close  to  the  wharf  a  hail  came, 
sharp  and  quick,  from  the  ironclad,  and  in  an  instant  was 
repeated.  I  at  once  directed  the  cutter  to  cast  off,  and  go 
down  to  capture  the  guard  left  in  our  rear,  and,  ordering 
all  steam,  went  at  the  dark  mountain  of  iron  in  front  of 
us.  A  heavy  fire  was  at  once  opened  upon  us,  not  only 


Gushing  Destroys  the  Albemarle          359 

from  the  ship,  but  from  men  stationed  on  the  shore.  This 
did  not  disable  us,  and  we  neared  them  rapidly.  A 
large  fire  now  blazed  upon  the  bank,  and  by  its  light  I 
discovered  the  unfortunate  fact  that  there  was  a  circle 
of  logs  around  the  Albemarle,  boomed  well  out  from  her 
side,  with  the  very  intention  of  preventing  the  action  of 
torpedoes.  To  examine  them  more  closely,  I  ran  along 
side  until  amidships,  received  the  enemy 's  fire,  and  sheered 
off  for  the  purpose  of  turning,  a  hundred  yards  away, 
and  going  at  the  booms  squarely,  at  right  angles,  trusting 
to  their  having  been  long  enough  in  the  water  to  have 
become  slimy — in  which  case  my  boat,  under  full  headway, 
would  bump  up  against  them  and  slip  over  into  the  pen 
with  the  ram.  This  was  my  only  chance  of  success,  and 
once  over  the  obstruction  my  boat  would  never  get  out 
again.  As  I  turned,  the  whole  back  of  my  coat  was  torn 
off  by  buckshot,  and  the  sole  of  my  shoe  was  carried  away. 
The  fire  was  very  severe. 

"In  a  lull  of  the  firing,  the  captain  hailed  us,  again 
demanding  what  boat  it  was.  All  my  men  gave  comical 
answers,  and  mine  was  a  dose  of  canister  from  the 
howitzer.  In  another  instant  we  had  struck  the  logs  and 
were  over,  with  the  headway  nearly  gone,  slowly  forging 
up  under  the  enemy 's  quarter  port.  Ten  feet  from  us  the 
muzzle  of  a  rifle  gun  looked  into  our  faces,  and  every 
word  of  command  on  board  was  distinctly  heard. 

"My  clothing  was  perforated  with  bullets  as  I  stood 
in  the  bow,  the  heel-jigger  in  my  right  hand  and  the 
exploding  line  in  the  left.  We  were  near  enough  then, 
and  I  ordered  the  boom  lowered  until  the  forward  motion 
of  the  launch  carried  the  torpedo  under  the  ram's  over 
hang.  A  strong  pull  of  the  detaching-line,  a  moment's 
waiting  for  the  torpedo  to  rise  under  the  hull,  and  I  hauled 
in  the  left  hand  just  cut  by  a  bullet. 

"The  explosion  took  place  at  the  same  instant  that 


360  The  United  States  Navy 

TOO  pounds  of  grape,  at  ten  feet  range,  crashed  among 
us,  and  the  dense  mass  of  water  thrown  out  by  the  torpedo 
came  down  with  choking  weight  upon  us.4 


GUSHING 's  ESCAPE 

"Twice  refusing  to  surrender,  I  commanded  the  men 
to  save  themselves;  and  throwing  off  sword,  revolver, 
shoes,  and  coat,  struck  out  from  my  disabled  and  sinking 
boat  into  the  river.  It  was  cold,  long  after  the  frosts,  and 
the  water  chilled  the  blood,  while  the  whole  surface  of 
the  stream  was  plowed  up  by  grape  and  musketry,  and  my 
nearest  friends,  the  fleet,  were  twelve  miles  away;  but 
anything  was  better  than  to  fall  into  the  enemy's  hands, 
so  I  swram  for  the  opposite  shore.  As  I  neared  it  a  man 
[Samuel  Higgins,  fireman],  one  of  my  crew,  gave  a  great 
gurgling  yell  and  went  down. 

"The  Confederates  were  out  in  boats,  picking  up  my 
men ;  and  one  of  the  boats,  attracted  by  the  sound,  pulled 
in  my  direction.  I  heard  my  own  name  mentioned,  but 
was  not  seen.  I  now  'struck  out'  down  the  stream,  and 
was  soon  far  enough  away  again  to  attempt  landing.  This 
time,  as  I  struggled  to  reach  the  bank,  I  heard  a  groan  in 
the  river  behind  me,  and,  although  very  much  exhausted, 
concluded  to  turn  and  give  all  the  aid  in  my  power  to  the 
officer  or  seaman  who  had  bravely  shared  the  danger 
with  me. 

"Swimming  in  the  night,  with  eye  at  the  level  of  the 
water,  one  can  have  no  idea  of  distance,  and  labors,  as  I 
did,  under  the  discouraging  thought  that  no  headway  is 
made.  But  if  I  were  to  drown  that  night,  I  had  at  least 
an  opportunity  of  dying  while  struggling  to  aid  another. 

4  Captain  Warley,  of  the  Albemarle,  states  that  the  launch 
was  at  this  time  "  so  close  that  the  gun  could  not  be  depressed 
enough  to  reach  her."  Battles  and  Leaders,  iv,  642. 


Cushing's  Escape  361 

The  swimmer  proved  to  be  Acting  Master's  Mate  Wood 
man,  who  said  that  he  could  swim  no  longer.  Knocking 
his  cap  from  his  head,  I  used  my  right  arm  to  sustain 
him,  and  ordered  him  to  strike  out.  For  ten  minutes  at 
least,  I  think,  he  managed  to  keep  afloat,  when  his  phys 
ical  force  being  completely  gone,  he  sank  like  a  stone. 

"Again  alone  upon  the  water,  I  directed  my  course 
toward  the  town  side  of  the  river,  not  making  much  head 
way,  as  my  strokes  were  now  very  feeble,  my  clothes  being 
soaked  and  heavy,  and  little  chop-seas  splashing  with 
choking  persistence  into  my  mouth  every  time  I  gasped 
for  breath.  Still  there  was  a  determination  not  to  sink, 
a  will  not  to  give  up,  and  I  kept  up  a  sort  of  mechanical 
motion  long  after  my  bodily  force  was  in  fact  expended. 
At  last,  and  not  a  moment  too  soon,  I  touched  the  soft 
mud,  and  in  the  excitement  of  the  first  shock  I  half  raised 
my  body  and  made  one  step  forward;  then  fell,  and 
remained  half  in  the  mud  and  half  in  the  water  until 
daylight,  unable  even  to  crawl  on  hands  and  knees,  nearly 
frozen,  with  my  brain  in  a  whirl,  but  with  one  thing 
strong  in  me — the  fixed  determination  to  escape. 

"As  day  dawned  I  found  myself  in  a  point  of  swamp 
that  enters  the  suburbs  of  Plymouth,  and  not  forty  yards 
from  one  of  the  forts.  The  sun  came  out  bright  and 
warm,  proving  a  most  cheering  visitant,  and  giving  me 
back  a  good  portion  of  the  strength  of  which  I  had  been 
deprived  before.  Its  light  showed  me  the  town  swarming 
with  soldiers  and  sailors,  who  moved  about  excitedly,  as 
if  angry  at  some  sudden  shock.  It  was  a  source  of  satis 
faction  to  me  to  know  that  I  had  pulled  the  wire  that  set 
all  these  figures  moving,  but  as  I  had  no  desire  of  being 
discovered,  my  first  object  was  to  get  into  a  dry  fringe 
of  rushes  that  edged  the  swamp ;  but  to  do  this  required 
me  to  pass  over  thirty  or  forty  feet  of  open  ground,  right 
under  the  eye  of  a  sentinel  who  walked  the  parapet. 


362  The  United  States  Navy 

"Watching  until  he  turned  for  a  moment,  I  made  a 
dash  across  the  space,  but  was  only  half  way  over  when 
he  again  turned,  and  forced  me  to  drop  down  right 
between  two  paths,  and  almost  entirely  unshielded.  Per 
haps  I  was  unobserved  because  of  the  mud  that  covered 
me  and  made  me  blend  with  the  earth;  at  all  events  the 
soldier  continued  his  tramp  for  some  time,  while  I,  flat 
on  my  back,  lay  awaiting  another  chance  for  action.  Soon 
a  party  of  four  men  came  down  the  path  on  my  right,  two 
of  them  being  officers,  and  passed  so  close  to  me  as  almost 
to  tread  upon  my  arm.  They  were  conversing  upon  the 
events  of  the  previous  night,  and  were  wondering  'how 
it  was  done, '  entirely  unaware  of  the  presence  of  one  who 
could  give  them  the  information.  This  proved  to  me 
the  necessity  of  regaining  the  swamp,  which  I  did  by 
sinking  my  heels  and  elbows  into  the  earth  and  forcing 
my  body,  inch  by  inch,  toward  it.  For  five  hours  then, 
with  bare  feet,  head,  and  hands,  I  made  my  way  where 
I  venture  to  say  none  ever  did  before,  until  I  came  at 
last  to  a  clear  place,  where  I  might  rest  upon  solid  ground. 
...  A  working-party  of  soldiers  was  in  the  opening, 
engaged  in  sinking  some  schooners  in  the  river  to  obstruct 
the  channel.  I  passed  twenty  yards  in  their  rear  through 
a  corn  furrow,  and  gained  some  woods  below.  Here  I 
encountered  a  negro,  and  after  serving  out  to  him  twenty 
dollars  in  greenbacks  and  some  texts  of  Scripture  (two 
powerful  arguments  with  an  old  darkey),  I  had  confidence 
enough  in  his  fidelity  to  send  him  into  town  for  news  of 
the  ram. 

"When  he  returned,  and  there  was  no  longer  doubt 
that  she  had  gone  down,  I  went  on  again,  and  plunged  into 
a  swamp  so  thick  that  I  had  only  the  sun  for  a  guide  and 
could  not  see  ten  feet  in  advance.  About  two  o'clock  in 
the  afternoon  I  came  out  from  the  dense  mass  of  reeds 
upon  the  bank  of  one  of  the  deep,  narrow  streams  that 


Gush/ing's  Escape  363 

abound  there,  and  right  opposite  to  the  only  road  in  the 
vicinity.  It  seemed  providential,  for,  thirty  yards  above 
or  below,  I  never  should  have  seen  the  road,  and  might 
have  struggled  on  until,  worn  out  and  starved,  I  should 
find  a  never-to-be-discovered  grave.  As  it  was,  my  fortune 
had  led  me  to  where  a  picket  party  of  seven  soldiers  were 
posted,  having  a  little  flat-bottomed,  square-ended  skiff 
toggled  to  the  root  of  a  cypress  tree  that  squirmed  like 
a  snake  in  the  inky  water.  Watching  them  until  they 
went  back  a  few  yards  to  eat,  I  crept  into  the  stream  and 
swam  over,  keeping  the  big  tree  between  myself  and  them, 
and  making  for  the  skiff.  Gaining  the  bank,  I  quietly 
cast  loose  the  boat  and  floated  behind  it  some  thirty  yards 
around  the  first  bend,  where  I  got  in  and  pulled  away  as 
only  a  man  could  when  his  liberty  was  at  stake. 

"Hour  after  hour  I  paddled,  never  ceasing  for  a 
moment,  first  on  one  side,  then  on  the  other,  while  sun 
shine  passed  into  twilight,  and  that  was  swallowed  up  in 
thick  darkness  only  relieved  by  the  few  faint  star  rays 
that  penetrated  the  heavy  swamp  curtain  on  either  side. 
At  last  I  reached  the  mouth  of  the  Roanoke,  and  found  the 
open  sound  before  me.  My  frail  boat  could  not  have  lived 
in  the  ordinary  sea  there,  but  it  chanced  tp  be  very  calm, 
leaving  only  a  slight  swell,  which  was,  however,  sufficient 
to  influence  my  boat,  so  that  I  was  forced  to  paddle  all 
upon  one  side  to  keep  her  on  the  intended  course. 

"After  steering  by  a  star  for  perhaps  two  hours  for 
where  I  thought  the  fleet  might  be,  I  at  length  discovered 
one  of  the  vessels,  and  after  a  long  time  got  within  hail. 
My  '  Ship  ahoy !  '  was  given  with  the  last  of  my  strength, 
and  I  fell  powerless,  with  a  splash,  into  the  water  in  the 
bottom  of  my  boat,  and  waited  results.  I  had  pulled 
every  minute  for  ten  successive  hours,  and  for  four  my 
body  had  been  *  asleep/  with  the  exception  of  my  arms 
and  brain.  The  picket-vessel,  Valley  City,  upon  hearing 


364  The  United  States  Navy 

the  hail,  at  once  got  under  way,  at  the  same  time  lowering 
boats  and  taking  precaution  against  torpedoes.  It  was 
some  time  before  they  would  pick  me  up,  being  convinced 
that  I  was  the  rebel  conductor  of  an  infernal  machine,  and 
that  Lieutenant  Gushing  had  died  the  night  before.  At 
last  I  was  on  board,  had  imbibed  a  little  brandy  and  water, 
and  was  on  my  way  to  the  flagship. 

"As  soon  as  it  became  known  that  I  had  returned, 
rockets  were  thrown  up  and  all  hands  were  called  to  cheer 
ship ;  and  when  I  announced  success,  all  the  commanding 
officers  were  summoned  on  board  to  deliberate  upon  a 
plan  of  attack.  In  the  morning  I  was  well  again  in  every 
way,  with  the  exception  of  hands  and  feet,  and  had  the 
pleasure  of  exchanging  shots  with  the  batteries  that  I 
had  inspected  the  day  before.  I  was  sent  in  the  Valley 
City  to  report  to  Admiral  Porter  at  Hampton  Roads,  and 
soon  after  Plymouth  and  the  whole  district  of  the  Albe- 
marle,  deprived  of  the  ironclad's  protection,  fell  an  easy 
prey  to  Commander  Macomb  and  our  fleet. ' ' 5 

The  Albemarle  had  sunk  instantly  in  the  eight  feet  of 
water  at  her  berth.  Of  Gushing 's  crew,  he  himself  and 
Iloughton  escaped,  Higgins  and  Woodman  were  drowned, 
and  the  remaining  eleven  men  were  captured. 

For  his  brave  deed,  than  which,  as  Captain  Warley 
said,  "a  more  gallant  thing  was  not  done  during  the 
war,"  Gushing  received  substantial  recognition.  He  was 
given  a  vote  of  thanks  by  Congress,  and  although  not  yet 
twenty-two  was  promoted  to  the  rank  of  lieutenant- 
commander. 

6  Battles  and  Leaders,  iv,  634,  ff. 


XXII 

ACTIONS  IN  FOREIGN  WATERS 

THE  WYOMING  AT  SHIMONOSEKI 

WHILE  the  Federal  Navy  was  using  the  utmost  of  its 
resources  in  tightening  the  line  of  blockade,  in  opening 
the  Mississippi,  and  in  capturing  harbor  defenses,  the 
activity  of  Confederate  commerce-destroyers  made  it 
necessary  to  detach  several  cruisers  to  hunt  them  down  in 
foreign  waters.  One  of  these  Federal  cruisers,  the  screw- 
•sloop  Wyoming,  Commander  David  McDougal,  was 
ordered  to  the  Pacific  in  pursuit  of  the  Confederate  steam 
ship  Alabama.  As  the  Alabama's  business  was  to  destroy 
commerce  rather  than  to  engage  a  man-of-war,  she  avoided 
meeting  the  Federal  vessel. 

After  a  fruitless  search  for  the  Alabama,  Commander 
McDougal,  early  in  the  summer  of  1863,  arrived  on  the 
Japanese  coast.  There  he  received  a  dispatch  from  the 
American  minister  to  the  effect  that  the  guns  of  the 
Wyoming  were  greatly  needed  to  protect  American 
lives  and  property  at  Yokohama.  McDougal  went  thither 
at  once  and  made  his  vessel  a  refuge  for  American  resi 
dents  until  safe  quarters  could  be  found  for  them  on  shore. 
The  American  commander  found  himself  face  to  face  with 
a  wholly  unexpected  situation.  At  that  time  Japan  was 
on  the  verge  of  a  civil  war  which,  like  the  Boxer  rebellion 
in  1900,  represented  a  determined  effort  on  the  part  of 
the  rebels  to  expel  the  "foreign  devils"  from  the  nation. 

This  disturbance  was  the  sequel  of  Perry's  mission  to 
Japan.  In  1858,  the  Japanese  prime  minister  signed  the 
completed  treaty  establishing  commercial  and  diplomatic 
relations  with  the  United  States,  but  this  act  of  amity 

365 


366  The  United  States  Navy 

five  years  later  precipitated  civil  war  in  Japan.  Although 
for  250  years  Japan  had  been  at  peace,  the  embers  of 
rebellion  had  long  been  smoldering,  and  the  act  that 
admitted  the  foreigner  only  fanned  them  into  open  blaze. 
The  trouble  at  bottom  was  that  the  "Shogun,"  or 
' '  Tycoon ' ' — the  viceroy  of  Japan — had  become  all-power 
ful;  while  the  Mikado  himself,  because  of  a  policy  of 
seclusion  that  had  been  forced  on  him,  had  become  only 
a  figurehead.  Since  the  treaty  with  America  had  been 
signed  under  the  authority  of  the  Tycoon,  the  rebels  took 
up  arms  in  a  double  cause  of  patriotism,  to  restore  the 
Mikado  to  his  old-time  authority  and  to  expel  the 
foreigner. 

The  insurgents  represented  some  of  the  most  warlike 
elements  of  the  population,  especially  the  great  clans  of 
Choshiu  and  Satsuma,  which  surrounded  the  Mikado  at 
Kioto,  and  proclaimed  his  throne  the  seat  of  authority. 
They  persuaded  him  to  issue  an  edict  setting  June  25, 
1863,  as  the  date  on  which  all  foreigners  should  be  ex 
pelled.  The  Tycoon,  who  was  bound  by  treaty  to  the 
United  States  and  other  powers,  was  helpless.  He  sent  in 
his  resignation,  but  the  Mikado  refused  to  accept  it,  and 
left  the  viceroy  to  get  out  of  his  predicament  as  best  he 
could. 

The  chief  of  the  Choshiu  clan  proceeded  at  once  to 
fortify  the  straits  of  Shimonoseki,  the  gateway  to  the 
inland  sea  of  Japan,  and  to  make  war  on  his  own  account. 
On  the  llth  of  July,  McDougal  received  the  news  that  an 
American  steamer,  the  Pembroke,  had  been  fired  on  with 
out  warning  in  the  straits,  and,  according  to  the  report, 
had  been  sunk  with  all  on  board.  At  this  time  McDougal 
was  under  orders  to  return  to  America,  but  realizing  that 
the  situation  called  for  prompt  action  on  his  part,  he 
weighed  anchor  and  on  the  evening  of  the  15th  arrived 
off  the  eastern  end  of  the  straits. 


The  Attack  of  the  Wyoming  367 

At  this  point  the  inland  sea  narrows  down  to  a  channel 
about  three  miles  in  length,  and  varies  from  one-half 
mile  to  a  mile  in  width.  The  town  of  Shimonoseki  lies 
at  the  foot  of  high  bluffs  which  overlook  the  channel.1 
Through  this  the  tides  run  like  a  mill  race,  over  sunken 
rocks  and  shoals  that  have  long  made  the  place  famous 
for  shipwrecks. 

It  was  here  that  the  Pembroke,  while  she  awaited  a 
pilot  and  the  turn  of  the  tide,  had  been  fired  on.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  she  came  off  with  small  injury,  but  others 
were  not  so  fortunate.  A  French  dispatch  boat  was 
attacked  shortly  after  the  Pembroke  and  narrowly  escaped 
sinking  in  mid-channel.  Her  commander  reported  his 
experience  to  Captain  Casembroot  of  the  Dutch  steam 
frigate  Medusa  of  16  guns.  On  account  of  the  long 
standing  friendship  between  the  Dutch  and  the  Japanese, 
Casembroot  went  to  Shimonoseki  with  the  expectation  of 
making  peace ;  but  hardly  wras  the  Medusa  in  the  channel 
when  she  was  under  heavy  fire.  Before  she  could  get 
away  she  had  been  hulled  thirty-one  times,  and  had  lost 
four  killed  and  five  wounded.  A  day  or  two  later,  a 
French  gunboat  was  hulled  three  times  as  she  dashed  past 
the  batteries  at  full  speed,  and  a  Satsuma  vessel,  which 
was  mistaken  for  a  foreigner,  was  sent  to  the  bottom.  It 
was  evident  that  the  Japanese  knew  how  to  handle  their 
guns,  and  had  the  range  of  the  channel. 

At  five  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  16th,  the 
Wyoming  got  under  way.  Her  entry  into  the  straits  was 
announced  by  signal  guns  on  shore,  and  as  soon  as  she 
came  in  range  she  was  fired  upon  by  the  batteries.  She 
made  no  reply,  however,  until  she  reached  the  narrowest 
part  of  the  straits.  At  that  point  the  larger  shore  bat 
teries  concentrated  their  fire ;  beyond,  in  more  open  water 


1  For  map  of  Japan,  see  p. 


228. 


368  The  United  States  Navy 

lay  three  armed  merchantmen,  all  heavily  manned,  and 
with  their  crews  yelling  defiance.  These  ships  were  the 
bark  Daniel  Webster,  the  brig  Lanrick,  and  the  steamer 
Lancefield,  all,  oddly  enough,  American  vessels  which  had 
been  purchased  by  the  Choshiu  clansmen.  In  the  land 
batteries,  too,  were  five  8-inch  Dahlgren  guns  which  had 
recently  been  presented  to  Japan  by  the  United  States. 
The  bark  lay  anchored  close  to  the  town  on  the  northern 
shore,  the  brig  was  about  fifty  yards  outside  and  a  little 
beyond,  while  the  steamer  lay  further  ahead  and  outside, 
that  is,  nearer  mid-channel.  As  McDougal  approached  the 
narrows,  he  noticed  a  line .  of  stakes  which  he  rightly 
guessed  had  been  used  by  the  Japanese  to  gauge  their  aim. 
Accordingly,  he  avoided  the  middle  of  the  channel  and 
steered  close  under  the  batteries.  This  shrewdness  prob 
ably  was  the  salvation  of  the  Wyoming,  for  the  batteries 
at  once  opened  a  tremendous  cannonade  which  would  have 
sunk  a  dozen  vessels  in  mid-channel,  but  which  only  tore 
through  her  rigging.  She  soon  cleared  the  narrows  and 
bore  out  into  the  open  water  where  her  guns  could  reply. 

Commander  McDougal  then  gave  orders  to  "go  in 
between  those  vessels  and  take  the  steamer."  The  Yoko 
hama  pilots  2  protested  loudly,  but  the  American  had  made 
up  his  mind  to  take  the  chances  of  shallow  water  and 
headed  for  the  three  ships.  At  this  moment  a  fresh 
battery  of  four  guns  opened  a  raking  fire,  but  the 
Wyoming  answered  with  a  single  shell  so  accurately  aimed 
that  it  tore  the  entire  battery  to  pieces.  Dashing  ahead, 
she  came  abreast  of  the  bark  at  close  quarters,  and 
exchanged  broadsides.  Then  opening  with  her  starboard 
guns  on  the  brig,  she  fought  the  two  ships  at  the  same  time. 
The  firing  was  so  close  that  the  long  guns  of  the  Wyoming 
seemed  almost  to  touch  the  muzzles  of  the  enemy,  and  it 

2  These  pilots  had  been  furnished  by  the  Tycoon's  government. 


The  Attack  of  the  Wyoming  369 

was  in  these  few  minutes  at  close  quarters  that  the  greater 
part  of  the  American  loss  occurred.  The  forward  gun 
division  suffered  most  on  account  of  its  exposed  position, 
sustaining,  in  fact,  all  the  casualties  of  the  day  except 
three.  The  Japanese  handled  their  guns  so  rapidly  that 
the  brig  alone  managed  to  pour  three  broadsides  into  the 
Wyoming.  On  the  latter  every  gun  was  served  to  the 
utmost  and  every  shot  told  on  the  hulls  of  the  enemy. 

Passing  on,  McDougal  rounded  the  bow  of  the  steamer 
and  maneuvered  for  a  fighting  position.  The  brig  was 
already  settling,  but  the  Daniel  Webster,  in  spite  of  the 
great  holes  in  her  side,  still  kept  up  a  steady  fire,  and  six 
land  batteries  now  reopened  with  the  Wyoming  as  a  fair 
target.  The  steamer,  meanwhile,  weighed  anchor  and, 
moving  to  the  opposite  side,  seemed  to  be  getting  ready  to 
ram  the  American.  At  this  critical  moment  the  rushing 
tides  sent  the  Wyoming's  bow  aground,  but  after  some 
minutes  her  engines  succeeded  in  backing  her  off. 

Then,  ignoring  the  shore  batteries  and  the  Daniel 
Webster,  McDougal  opened  fire  with  his  two  11-inch 
Dahlgren  pivot  guns  on  the  steamer  Lancefield.  Both 
shells  took  effect  in  her  hull ;  another  from  the  forward 
pivot  tore  through  her  boiler,  and  in  a  cloud  of  smoke 
and  steam  the  vessel  went  down.  Meanwhile,  the  bark 
Daniel  Webster  had  been  firing  as  fast  as  the  guns  could 
be  loaded,  and  the  six  shore  batteries  were  a  continuous 
line  of  smoke  and  flame.  McDougal  now  trained  his  guns 
to  reply.  In  a  few  minutes  the  bark  was  torn  to  splinters, 
and  then  one  shore  battery  after  another  was  silenced. 
When  satisfied  that  he  had  destroyed  every  thing  within 
range,  he  turned  and  steamed  slowly  back.  On  his  return 
he  was  practically  unmolested. 

This  action  had  lasted  one  hour  and  ten  minutes,  in 
the  course  of  which  the  Wyoming  had  been  hulled  ten 
times,  her  rigging  had  been  badly  cut,  her  smokestack 
24 


370  The  United  States  Navy 

perforated,  and  she  had  lost  five  killed  and  seven  wounded. 
The  battle  had  been  won  by  the  coolness  and  nerve  of 
the  American  commander,  and  a  fine  feature  of  the  story 
is  that  while  most  of  the  Wyoming's  crew  had  never 
before  been  under  fire,  even  when  the  ship  was  aground 
and  the  pilots  were  paralyzed  with  terror  the  bluejackets 
stood  by  their  guns  like  veterans.  Those  were  the  days, 
too,  when  a  white  man  caught  by  the  insurgents  endured 
the  unspeakable  death  of  the  "torture  cage,"  and  the 
men  knew  that  their  commander  had  ordered  that  if  the 
ship  became  helpless  by  grounding  or  by  shot  she  was 
to  be  blown  up  with  all  on  board. 

A  few  days  after  McDougal's  exploit  a  heavy  French 
frigate  with  a  gunboat  entered  the  straits  and  destroyed 
what  was  left  of  the  batteries  by  landing  a  force  of 
marines.  Some  months  later,  however,  the  clansmen 
rebuilt  their  forts  and  succeeded  in  closing  the  straits 
for  fifteen  months.  Finally,  a  large  allied  fleet  put  an 
end  to  the  uprising  and  restored  safety  to  the  foreigner 
in  Japan.  But  no  other  operation  impressed  the  insur 
gents  with  the  same  respect  as  the  attack  of  the  Wyoming, 
singlehanded,  against  their  entire  force. 

The  Dutch  captain  who  had  taken  his  punishment 
without  accomplishing  anything  in  return,  was  knighted 
on  his  arrival  in  Holland,  and  ail  his  crew  received  medals. 
McDougal,  on  the  other  hand,  got  no  promotion  and  not 
even  contemporary  fame  among  his  countrymen,  for  1863 
was  the  crucial  year  of  the  Civil  War,  and  his  exploit  in 
far-away  Japan  was  lost  in  the  roar  of  battles  at  home. 
As  Roosevelt  once  said  of  this  fight,  ''Had  that  action 
taken  place  at  any  other  time  than  during  the  Civil  War, 
its  fame  would  have  echoed  all  over  the  world. ' ' 3 

3  Quoted  by  E.  S.  Maclay,  A  History  of  the  United  States  Navy 
ii,  396. 


The  Cruise  of  the  Alabama  371 

THE  ALABAMA  AND  THE  KEARSARGE 

The  Confederate  sloop  of  war  Alabama,  which  Com 
mander  McDougal  failed  to  meet  in  the  Pacific,  had,  in 
the  course  of  two  years,  practically  banished  American 
merchantmen  from  the  ocean.  Built  like  her  sister  ships, 
Florida,  Georgia,  and  Shenandoah,  in  the  dockyards  of 
Liverpool,  she  was  from  the  first  suspected  of  being  a 
vessel  of  war  designed  for  the  Confederacy;  and  the 
United  States  minister,  Adams,  was  so  energetic  in  pressing 
on  Lord  Russell  his  evidence  of  her  destination  that  even 
the  British  authorities,  pro-Confederate  as  they  were, 
reluctantly  issued  orders  to  restrain  her  from  getting 
to  sea. 

As  the  Confederate  agents  learned  of  these  orders  in 
advance,  the  Alabama  was  hastily  taken  out  (July  29, 
1862)  on  a  "trial  spin"  in  the  Mersey,  from  which  she 
never  returned.  Instead,  she  steamed  to  the  secluded  port 
of  Praya  in  Terceira,  one  of  the  Azores.  There  she  was 
met  by  the  bark  Agrippina  from  London,  carrying  a  cargo 
of  ammunition,  coal,  and  supplies  of  various  sorts,  which 
was  transferred  to  the  Alabama.  Scarcely  was  this  done 
when  the  steamer  Bahama  from  Liverpool  arrived  with 
the  future  officers  of  the  Alabama — including  Captain 
Semmes — thirty  of  her  crew,  and  $100,000  in  money.  Con 
siderable  difficulty  was  experienced  in  fitting  out  the 
Alabama  in  the  Azores  on  account  of  the  evident  pur 
pose  for  which  she  was  intended,  but  under  cover  of 
various  excuses  to  the  Portuguese  officials,  the  work  went 
on  rapidly.  On  August  24,  after  gaining  the  open  sea, 
Captain  Semmes  summoned  his  crew  and  announced  to 
them  the  character  of  his  ship  and  of  the  cruise  he  intended 
to  make.  Then  he  lowered  the  English  ensign,  hoisted  the 
Confederate  colors,  and  read  aloud  his  commission  from 


372  The  United  States  Navy 

President  Davis.  With  that  formality  the  Alabama  began 
her  career. 

After  a  few  minutes  of  deliberation,  eighty-five  of  the 
crew  who  had  shipped  in  the  Alabama  at  Liverpool  stepped 
to  the  capstan  and  signed  the  articles  as  seamen  in  the 
Confederacy.  Among  them  were  many  English  man-of- 
warsmen,  who  were  the  bone  and  sinew  of  the  crew.  The 
rest  of  the  complement — except  the  southern  coast-pilots 
who  came  with  the  Bahama — was  made  up  later  by  volun 
teers  from  the  crews  of  the  prizes. 

Of  the  officers,  Master 's-mate  Fullam,  Assistant  Sur 
geon  Llewellyn,  and  Fourth  Lieutenant  Low  also  were 
Englishmen ;  Fullam  and  Low  were  at  the  time  of  their 
enlistment  members  of  the  Royal  Naval  Reserve.  It  was 
due  to  the  latter 's  superb  seamanship  that  the  Alabama 
was  saved  from  foundering  during  a  hurricane  early  in 
her  career.  The  remaining  watch  officers,  the  captain,  and 
the  surgeon  were  from  the  Southern  States. 

Captain  Semmes,  like  most  of  the  Confederate  naval 
officers,  had  received  his  training  in  the  "old  navy,"  in 
which  he  had  risen  to  the  grade  of  commander.  He  was 
captain  of  the  Somers  at  the  time  she  foundered  off  Vera 
Cruz  during  the  Mexican  War,  but  had  been  honorably 
acquitted  of  blame  by  the  subsequent  court-martial.  His 
first  command  under  the  Confederacy  was  the  Sunder,  a 
converted  packet  steamer;  but  this,  after  a  brief  though 
successful  cruise,  he  was  forced  to  abandon  at  Gibraltar, 
where  it  had  been  blockaded  by  Federal  vessels.  His 
second  command,  the  one  with  which  his  name  is  chiefly 
associated,  was  the  Alabama.  This  vessel,  rated  as  a 
"screw-sloop,"  was  220  feet  long,  thirty-two  feet  in 
beam,  and  eighteen  feet  from  deck  to  keelson.  She 
carried  two  horizontal  engines  of  300  horsepower  each,  and 
bunkers  holding  coal  sufficient  for  eighteen  days'  steaming. 
In  order  to  economize  his  coal  supply,  Semmes  cruised 


The  Cruise  of  the  Alabama 


373 


374  The  United  States  Navy 

most  of  the  time  only  with,  his  sails.  The  Alabama  was 
rigged  as  a  barkentine,  and  proved  a  good  traveller  under 
canvas.  She  had  a  device  by  which  her  propeller  could 
be  quickly  detached  from  the  shaft  and  hoisted  so  as  not 
to  retard  her  progress  while  under  sail. 

Captain  Semmes  did  not  have  far  to  seek  for  his  first 
prizes.  After  capturing  and  burning  nine  American 
merchantmen  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Azores,  he  steered 
across  the  Atlantic,  taking  in  all  twenty  prizes  before  he 
headed  toward  the  West  Indies  for  fresh  coal.  At  one 
time  he  took  a  ship  within  200  miles  of  New  York,  and 
though  searched  for  by  Federal  war  vessels,  managed  to 
keep  out  of  sight.  While  he  was  at  Martinique,  coaling 
from  the  Agrippina,  which  met  him  by  appointment,  he 
was  blockaded  by  the  San  Jadnto,  Commander  Roncken- 
dorff,  but  two  nights  later  Semmes  escaped  to  sea  unob 
served.  From  the  West  Indies  he  sailed  to  the  Gulf ;  and, 
hoping  to  intercept  some  Federal  transports  that  he  knew 
were  due  at  Galveston,  he  laid  his  course  for  that  point. 
While  off  Galveston  he  lured  away  one  of  the  blockading 
squadron,  the  Hatteras,  a  converted  paddle-wheel  river 
boat,  and  sank  her,  getting  away  again  before  the  other 
vessels  could  come  to  the  rescue.  From  this  point  Semmes 
began  a  slow  cruise,  along  the  Brazilian  coast,  round  the 
Cape  of  Good  Hope,  to  the  East  Indies.  There  he  re 
mained  seven  months;  then,  eluding  the  Wyoming,  he 
returned  round  the  Cape. 

On  June  11,  1864,  the  Alabama  entered  the  harbor  of 
Cherbourg  for  fresh' coal  and  general  overhauling.  Since 
the  day  she  went  into  commission,  August  24,  1862,  she 
had  been  on  one  continuous  cruise,  covering  about  75,000 
miles,  during  which  she  had  burnt  fifty-seven  merchant 
men  and  released  a  large  number  on  ransom  bond.  The 
total  valuation  of  these  vessels  reached  a  high  figure,  but 
the  loss  to  American  commerce  was  far  more  serious 


The  Cruise  of  the  Alabama  375 

because  the  ships  that  were  not  captured  were  sold  or 
kept  in  port,  and  the  American  carrying  trade  was  turned 
over  to  British  bottoms.  By  the  time  the  Alabama  entered 
Cherbourg  practically  all  American  shipping,  save  the 
Arctic  whalers,  had  been  annihilated  or  driven  to  cover, 
and  even  the  whaling  fleet  was  soon  afterwards  destroyed 
by  the  Shenandoah. 

The  amount  of  damage  inflicted  by  the  Shenandoah 
came  within  half  a  million  of  the  sum  represented  by  the 
work  of  the  Alabama,  but  since  the  depredations  of  the 
former  in  the  whaling  fleet  took  place  after  June,  1865 — 
when  the  war  had  been  ended  two  months — her  cruise,  as 
an  act  of  hostility,  was  worse  than  useless.  While  the  dam 
age  inflicted  by  these  two  vessels  more  than  doubled  that 
of  the  ten  other  Confederate  cruisers  combined,  it  is  neces 
sary  to  bear  in  mind  that  there  were  these  others  as  well, 
operating  with  varying  degrees  of  success,  but  on  a  com 
paratively  insignificant  scale.4  Like  the  Alabama  and  the 
Shenandoah,  the  most  efficient  of  these  minor  commerce- 
destroyers  were  built  to  order  or  purchased  on  the  Clyde, 
and  some  of  them  never  saw  the  Southern  coast  during 
their  entire  career.  The  extraordinary  success  of  Captain 
Semmes  was  due  to  the  diligent  study  he  had  made  of 
trade  routes  during  his  brief  cruise  on  the  Sumter,  and 
his  careful  system  of  time-calculation,  by  which  he  would 
remain  in  one  vicinity  just  long  enough  for  news  of  his 
whereabouts  to  start  a  Union  man-of-war  after  him,  and 
then  shift  to  another  cruising  ground. 

The  wholesale  destruction  of  defenseless  merchantmen 
naturally  aroused  the  bitterest  feeling  in  the  North  against 
Captain  Semmes,  and,  it  might  be  added,  he  reciprocated 

4  The  following  are  the  names  of  these  cruisers,  given  in  the 
order  of  the  amount  of  damage  inflicted  by  each:  Florida,  Talla 
hassee,  Georgia,  Chickamauga,  Sumter,  Nashville,  Retribution,  Jeff. 
Davis,  Rallie,  and  Boston. 


376  The  United  States  Navy 

the  sentiment.  He  was  referred  to  as  a  "pirate,"  not 
only  by  loyal  newspapers,  but  also  by  Secretary  Welles 
and  the  President,  and  there  was  much  high  talk  of 
hanging  the  captain  and  crew  of  the  Alabama  at  the  yard- 
arm  if  they  ever  were  caught.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  if 
Semmes  was  a  pirate  so  also  was  Paul  Jones,  David  Porter, 
or  any  other  commissioned  officer  of  any  government  who 
has  attacked  the  commerce  of  his  enemy.  As  a  recog 
nized  belligerent  power,  the  Confederacy  could  commis 
sion  vessels  entitled  to  all  the  privileges  of  a  man-of-war, 
among  which  the  destruction  of  the  enemy's  shipping 
could  certainly  be  included.  The  irregularity  of  burning 
his  prizes  instead  of  sending  them  to  a  Confederate  prize 
court  was  forced  on  Semmes  by  the  existence  of  the 
blockade,  which  made  it  impossible  for  a  prize  to  reach  a 
Confederate  port.  Semmes,  who  was  a  lawyer  as  well  as 
a  naval  officer,  examined  the  ship's  papers  himself,  and 
constituted  himself  in  all  cases  the  prize  court.  He  con 
ducted  his  cruise  with  extraordinary  skill,  and  it  is  not 
too  much  to  say  that  Semmes  with  the  Alabama  injured 
the  United  States  more  than  did  all  the  rest  of  the  Con 
federate  Navy  put  together. 

As  soon  as  the  Alabama  arrived  at  Cherbourg,  the 
United  States  minister  to  France  telegraphed  the  fact 
to  Commander  Winslow  of  the  United  States  sloop  Kear- 
sarge,  then  lying  at  Flushing,  Holland.  Three  days  after 
the  arrival  of  the  Alabama  the  Kearsarge  appeared  off 
the  port.  Winslow  came  in  close  enough  to  send  a  boat 
ashore,  but  did  not  anchor,  for  fear  the  "twenty-four 
hour  rule"  might  be  applied  to  allow  the  Alabama  to 
escape.  Then  for  five  days  the  Kearsarge  maintained  a 
patient  blockade,  steaming  back  and  forth  just  outside  the 
breakwater,  waiting  for  the  Alabama  to  come  out.  Semmes 
had  asked  permission  to  use  the  naval  dock  at  Cherbourg 
for  a  stay  of  two  months,  during  which  he  had  intended 


The  Kearsarge  and  the  Alabama          377 

to  give  his  ship  a  thorough  overhauling;  but  this  request 
was  denied  as  being  incompatible  with  the  position  of 
France  as  a  neutral.  Hitherto  Semmes  had  very  properly 
refused  to  fight  the  San  Jacinto,  the  Wyoming,  the  Van- 
derbilt,  and  the  other  cruisers  sent  after  him;  but  at 
Cherbourg  the  French  naval  officers  gave  him  emphat 
ically  to  understand  that  the  conduct  of  the  Kearsarge 
was  a  "challenge"  which  no  "man  of  honor"  could 
decline.5  This  made  it  virtually  impossible  for  one  like 
Semmes  to  avoid  a  combat,  in  which,  as  he  must  have 
realized,  he  had  little  to  gain  and  everything  to  lose.  The 
North  could  have  readily  made  good  the  loss  of  the 
Kearsarge  with  any  one  of  a  number  of  cruisers  in  Euro 
pean  waters,  but  the  South  could  not  replace  a  sunken 
Alabama.  Having  applied  for  and  received  permission 
from  Commodore  Samuel  Barren,  the  Confederate  officer 
in  charge  of  naval  matters  abroad,  Semmes  forwarded  to 
Commander  Winslow  through  the  United  States  consul  a 
note  to  the  effect  that  if  the  Kearsarge  would  wait,  the 
Alabama  would  come  out  and  fight  as  soon  as  she  could  get 
her  coal  on  board.  On  Saturday,  he  announced  that  on  the 
next  day  he  would  go  out  to  fight  the  Kearsarge.  The 
sentiment  in  France  was  overwhelmingly  in  favor  of  the 
Confederate  vessel,  although  the  officials  of  Cherbourg 
were  scrupulous  in  observing  the  laws  of  neutrality. 

By  ten  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  19th  the  prepara 
tions  on  the  Alabama  were  complete,  and  shortly  after 
ward  she  got  under  way.  As  she  left  the  harbor  she  was 
escorted  by  the  French  ironclad  Couronne,  which  stood 
by  to  see  that  the  action  took  place  outside  the  marine 
league.  As  soon  as  Commander  Winslow  of  the  Kearsarge 
saw  his  antagonist  coming  out  to  meet  him,  he  sent  his 
crew  to  quarters  and  headed  out  to  sea,  in  order  to  draw 

8  Harper's  Magazine,  Nov.  1910,  p.  873  ff. 


378  The  United  States  Navy 

her  a  safe  distance  from  neutral  waters.  The  Couronne, 
after  accompanying  the  Alabama  beyond  the  three  mile 
limit,  returned  to  port;  but  an  English  steam  yacht,  the 
Deerhound,  which  had  also  followed  the  men-of-war,  kept 
on  her  course  in  order  to  be  a  spectator  of  the  coming 
fight. 

When  the  Kearsarge  had  led  the  way  about  seven  miles 
off  the  coast,  she  turned  to  meet  her  enemy.  The  follow 
ing  details  of  the  engagement  are  from  the  narrative  of 
Lieutenant  Sinclair  of  the  Alabama:* 

' '  The  Kearsarge  suddenly  turned  her  head  inshore  and 
steamed  toward  us,  both  ships  being  at  this  time  about 
seven  or  eight  miles  from  the  shore.  When  at  about  one 
mile  distant  from  us,  she  seemed  from  her  sheer-off  with 
helm  to  have  chosen  this  distance  for  her  attack.  We  had 
not  yet  perceived  that  the  Kearsarge  had  the  speed  of  us. 
We  opened  the  engagement  with  our  entire  starboard 
battery,  the  writer's  32-pounder  of  the  port  side  having 
been  shifted  to  the  spare  port,  giving  us  six  guns  in 
broadside;  and  the  shift  caused  the  ship  to  list  to  star 
board  about  two  feet,  by  the  way,  quite  an  advantage, 
exposing  so  much  less  surface  to  the  enemy,  but  somewhat 
retarding  our  speed.  The  Kearsarge  had  pivoted  to  star 
board  also ;  and  both  ships  with  helms  a-port  fought  out 
the  engagement,  circling  around  a  common  centre,  and 
gradually  approaching  each  other.  The  enemy  replied 
soon  after  our  opening ;  but  at  the  distance  her  pivot  shell- 
guns  were  at  a  disadvantage,  not  having  the  long  range 
of  our  pivot  guns,  and  hence  requiring  judgment  in 
guessing  the  distance  and  determining  the  proper  elevation. 
Our  pivots  could  easily  reach  by  richochet,  indeed  by 
point-blank  firing,  so  at  this  stage  of  the  action  and  with 
a  smooth  sea,  we  had  the  advantage. 


6  Sinclair,  Two  Years  on  the  Alabama,  p.  267,  ff. 


The  Kearsarge  and  the  Alabama          379 

"The  battle  was  now  on  in  earnest;  and  after  about 
fifteen  minutes'  fighting,  we  lodged  a  110-pound  per 
cussion-shell  in  her  quarter  near  her  screw;  but  it  failed 
to  explode,  though  causing  some  temporary  excitement 
and  anxiety  on  board  the  enemy,  most  likely  by  the  con 
cussion  of  the  blow.  We  found  her  soon  after  seeking 
closer  quarters  (which  she  was  fully  able  to  do,  having 
discovered  her  superiority  in  speed),  finding  it  judicious 
to  close  so  that  her  11-inch  pivots  could  do  full  duty  at 
point-blank  range.  We  now  ourselves  noted  the  advan 
tage  in  speed  possessed  by  our  enemy;  and  Semmes  felt 
her  pulse,  as  to  wrhether  very  close  quarters  would  be 
agreeable,  by  sheering  towards  her  to  close  the  distance; 
but  she  had  evidently  reached  the  point  wished  for  to 
fight  out  the  remainder  of  the  action,  and  demonstrated  it 
by  sheering  off  and  resuming  a  [course]  parallel  to  us. 
Semmes  would  have  chosen  to  bring  about  yard-arm  quar 
ters,  fouling,  and  boarding,  relying  upon  the  superior 
physique  of  his  crew  to  overbalance  the  superiority  in 
numbers;  but  this  was  frustrated,  though  several  times 
attempted,  the  desire  on  our  part  being  quite  apparent. 
We  had  therefore  to  accept  the  situation,  and  make  the 
best  of  it  we  could,  to  this  end  directing  our  fire  to  the 
midship  section  of  our  enemy,  and  alternating  our  battery, 
with  solid  shot  and  shell,  the  former  to  pierce,  if  possible, 
the  cable  chain-armor,  the  latter  for  general  execution. 

"  Up  to  the  time  of  shortening  the  first  distance 
assumed,  our  ship  received  no  damage  of  any  account,  and 
the  enemy  none  that  we  could  discover,  the  shot  in  the 
quarter  working  no  serious  harm  to  the  Kearsarge.  At 
the  distance  we  were  now  fighting  (point-blank  range), 
the  effects  of  the  11-inch  guns  were  severely  felt,  and  the 
little  hurt  done  the  enemy  clearly  proved  the  unservice- 
ableness  of  our  powder,  observed  at  the  commencement  of 
the  action. 


380  The  United  States  Navy 

"The  boarding  tactics  of  Semmes  having  been  frus 
trated,  and  we  unable  to  pierce  the  enemy's  hull  with  our 
fire,  nothing  could  place  victory  with  us  but  some  unfore 
seen  and  lucky  turn.  At  this  period  of  the  action  our 
spanker-gaff  was  shot  away,  bringing  our  colors  to  the 
deck;  but  apparently  this  was  not  observed  by  the  Kear- 
sarge,  as  her  fire  did  not  halt  at  all.  We  could  see  the 
splinters  flying  off  from  the  armor  covering  of  our  enemy ; 
but  no  penetration  occurred,  the  shot  or  shell  rebounding 
from  her  side.  Our  colors  were  immediately  hoisted  to  the 
mizzenmast-head.  The  enemy  having  now  the  range,  and 
being  able  with  her  superior  speed  to  hold  it  at  ease,  had 
us  well  in  hand,  and  the  fire  from  her  was  deliberate  and 
hot.  Our  bulwarks  were  soon  shot  away  in  sections ;  and 
the  after-pivot  gun  was  disabled  on  its  port  side,  losing  in 
killed  and  wounded  all  but  the  compressor-man.  The 
quarter-deck  32-pounder  of  this  division  was  now  secured, 
and  the  crew  sent  to  man  the  pivot  gun.  The  spar  deck 
was  by  this  time  being  rapidly  torn  up  by  shell  burst 
ing  on  the  between-decks,  interfering  with  working  our 
battery;  and  the  compartments  below  it  had  all  been 
knocked  into  one.  The  Alabama  was  making  water  fast, 
showing  severe  punishment;  but  still  the  report  came 
from  the  engine  room  that  the  ship  was  being  kept  free 
to  the  safety-point.  She  also  had  now  become  dull  in 
response  to  her  helm,  and  the  sail-trimmers  were  ordered 
out  to  loose  the  head-sails  to  pay  her  head  off.  We  were 
making  a  desperate  but  forlorn  resistance,  which  was 
soon  culminated  by  the  death  blow.  An  11-inch  shell 
entered  us  at  the  water  line,  in  the  wake  of  the  writer's 
gun,  and  passing  on,  exploded  in  the  engine  room,  in  its 
passage  throwing  a  volume  of  water  on  board,  hiding  for 
a  moment  the  guns  of  this  division.  Our  ship  trembled 
from  stem  to  stern  with  the  blow.  Semmes  at  once  sent 
for  the  engineer  on  watch,  who  reported  the  fires  out,  and 


The  Kearsarge  and  the  Alabama          381 


water  beyond  the  control  of  the  pumps.  We  had  pre 
viously  been  aware  that  our  ship  was  whipped,  and  fore- 
and-aft  sail  was  set  in  endeavor  to  reach  the  French  coast ; 
the  enemy  then  moved  inshore  of  us,  but  did  not  attempt 


KEARSARGE-ALABAMA 

JUNE  19, 1864 


DRAWN  FROM 'THE  DIAGRAM  SUBMITTED  TO  THE  SECRETARY  OP  THE  NAVY  BY 
COMMANDER  WINSLOW 

to  close  any  nearer,  simply  steaming  to  secure  the  shore- 
side  and  await  events. 

"It  being  now  apparent  that  the  Alabama  could  not 
float  longer,  the  colors  were  hauled  down,  and  the  pipe 
given,  'All  hands  save  yourselves.'  Our  waist-boats  had 


382  The  United  States  Navy 

been  shot  to  pieces,  leaving  us  but  two  quarter-boats, 
and  one  of  them  much  damaged.  The  wounded  were 
dispatched  in  one  of  them  to  the  enemy  in  charge  of  an 
officer,  and  this  done  we  awaited  developments.  The 
Kearsarge  evidently  failed  at  once  to  discover  our  sur 
render,  for  she  continued  her  fire  after  our  colors  had 
been  struck — perhaps  from  the  difficulty  of  noting  the 
absence  of  a  flag  with  so  much  white  in  it,  in  the  powder 
smoke.  But  be  the  reason  what  it  may,  a  naval  officer,  a 
gentleman  by  birth  and  education,  would  certainly  not 
be  guilty  of  firing  on  a  surrendered  foe;  hence  we  may 
dismiss  the  matter  as  an  undoubted  accident. 

"The  Kearsarge  was  at  this  time  about  300  yards 
from  us,  screw  still  and  vessel  motionless,  awaiting  our 
boat  with  the  wounded.  The  yacht  was  steaming  full 
power  towards  us  both.  In  the  meantime  the  two  vessels 
were  slowly  parting,  the  Alabama  drifting  with  her  fore- 
and-aft  sails  set  to  the  light  air.  .  .  . 

"The  Decrhound  approached  the  Kearsarge  and  was 
requested  by  Captain  Winslow  to  assist  in  saving  life ;  and 
then,  scarcely  coming  to  a  full  stop,  turned  to  us,  at  the 
same  time  lowering  all  her  boats,  the  Kearsarge  doing  the 
same.  The  officers  and  crew  of  our  ship  were  now  leaving 
at  will,  discipline  and  rule  being  temporarily  at  an  end. 
The  ship  was  settling  to  her  spar  deck,  and  her  wounded 
spars  were  staggering  in  the  'steps,'  held  only  by  the  rig 
ging.  The  decks  presented  a  woeful  appearance,  torn  up 
in  innumerable  holes,  and  air-bubbles  rising  and  bursting, 
producing  a  sound  as  though  the  boat  were  in  agony.  .  .  . 
The  Alabama's  final  plunge  was  a  remarkable  freak. 
She  shot  up  out  of  the  water  bow  first,  and  descended  on 
the  same  line,  carrying  away  with  her  plunge  two  of  her 
masts,  and  making  a  whirlpool  of  considerable  size  and 
strength. ' ' 

The  loss  of  the  Alabama  in  this  engagement  amounted 


The  Controversy  383 

to  twenty-six  killed  or  drowned  and  twenty  wounded, 
three  mortally.  The  wounded  were  brought  to  the  Kear- 
sargc,  and  her  boats  picked  up  fifty  prisoners  more.  Nine 
escaped  to  Cherbourg  on  a  French  pilot  boat  and  forty- 
two  were  carried  to  Southampton  on  the  Deerhound.7 

Captain  Semmes,  who  had  been  wounded  in  the  arm 
by  a  fragment  of  shell,  was  kept  afloat  by  his  first  lieu 
tenant,  Kell,  until  both  were  picked  up  by  one  of  the 
Deerhound' s  boats.  Master 's-mate  Fullam,  who  brought 
the  first  boat  load  of  wounded  to  the  Kearsarge,  was  sent 
back  under  parole  in  order  that  he  might  assist  in 
the  rescue  of  the  drowning  crew.  Before  this  task  was 
finished,  he,  too,  made  for  the  Deerhound.  In  a  few 
minutes  the  yacht,  instead  of  returning  with  the  prisoners 
to  the  Kearsarge  as  Winslow  expected,  put  on  full  speed 
for  Southampton. 

The  reception  of  Captain  Semmes  and  his  officers  in 
England  was  most  enthusiastic.  A  few  newspapers,  like 
the  London  Daily  News,  took  the  opposite  side,  and 
referred  to  the  hero  of  the  hour  as  a  "runaway  smuggler" 
and  "nimble-footed  buccaneer,"  but  these  were  rare 
exceptions.  This  general  cordiality  on  the  part  of  the 
English  is  not  surprising  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the 
welcome  accorded  to  the  Alabama  in  the  ports  of  the 
British  empire  had  invariably  been  so  hearty  as  to  strain 
to  the  breaking  point  all  pretense  of  neutrality.  The 
reasons  were  that  the  ship  was  a  product  of  a  British 
shipyard,  manned  chiefly  by  a  British  crew,  and  number 
ing  British  officers  in  the  wardroom ;  and  in  less  than  two 
years  she  had  driven  from  the  seas  England 's  most  formid 
able  commercial  rival. 

Scarcely  was  the  defeated  captain  on  English  soil 
before  he  wrote  to  the  press,  opening  a  controversy  re- 

7  Figures  from  Ellicott's  Life  of  Winslow. 


384  The  United  States  Navy 

markable  for  the  violence  of  its  contradictions.  In  the 
first  place  he  charged  the  Federal  captain  with  lack  of 
''chivalry"  in  hanging  chains  over  the  sides  amidships  to 
protect  the  engines.  To  Semmes  this  was  a  sly  ' '  Yankee ' ' 
trick,  constituting  the  Kearsarge  ironclad,  while  she  was 
rated  only  as  a  wooden  ship.  If  he  had  known  this  cir 
cumstance,  he  declared,  he  would  never  have  risked  the 
Alabama  in  such  unequal  combat.  The  idea  had  been 
suggested  to  Winslow  the  year  before  by  his  able  execu 
tive,  Lieutenant- Commander  Thornton,  who  had  seen  the 
device  used  by  Farragut  during  the  passage  of  the 
defenses  of  New  Orleans.  The  idea  had  been  put  into 
effect  at  once  as  a  special  protection  to  the  engines  when 
the  coal  bunkers  were  'empty,  as  was  the  case  when  the 
Kearsarge  fought  the  Alabama,  and  it  attracted  no  little 
attention  in  European  ports.  Lieutenant  Sinclair,  who 
must  have  known  his  commander's  statements  to  the 
contrary,  says  in  "half  a  dozen  places  that  the  chain  pro 
tection  of  the  Kearsarge  was  a  matter  of  common  knowl 
edge  on  the  Alabama.  He  adds,  ' '  Winslow  for  protecting 
his  ship  with  chain  armor  should,  in  the  humble  judg 
ment  of  the  writer,  submitted  with  diffidence,  be  accounted 
as  simply  using  proper  prudence  in  the  direct  line  of  duty. 
He  had  not  given,  accepted,  or  declined  a  challenge.  But 
it  was  his  duty  to  fight  if  he  could  and  to  win.  Semmes 
knew  all  about  it  and  could  have  adopted  the  same  scheme. 
It  was  not  his  election  to  do  so. " 8 

The  more  serious  charge  that  Semmes  brought  against 
Winslow  was  that  of  inhumanity.  He  declared  that 
Winslow  had  fired  into  a  surrendered  ship,  and  was  crim 
inally  negligent  in  the  rescue  of  the  Alabama's  crew. 
These  statements  provoked  equally  scathing  counter 
charges  from  Winslow  and  his  officers.  According  to 
them,  after  the  Alabama  surrendered  she  fired  two  guns 

8  Two  Years  on  the  Alabama,  p.  273. 


The  Controversy  385 

at  the  Kearsarge.  Furious  at  this  breach  of  the  flag  of 
truce,  Winslow  opened  fire  again  till  he  was  assured  of 
the  Alabama's  surrender.  Surgeon  Brown  of  the  Kear 
sarge  fully  corroborated  Winslow 's  account,  adding  that 
he  was  informed  by  the  prisoners  that  two  of  their  junior 
officers  "swore  they  would  never  surrender,  and  in  a 
mutinous  spirit  rushed  to  the  two  port  guns  and  opened 
fire  on  the  Kearsarge."9  This  Lieutenant  Kell  of  the 
Alabama  emphatically  denied,  and  so  the  question  of  fact 
must  always  stand  in  doubt.10  As  to  the  dilatory  rescue  of 
prisoners,  Surgeon  Brown  gave  as  his  opinion  that 
Winslow  would  have  done  better  to  run  alongside  the 
sinking  Alabama  than  to  lie  some  400  yards  away.  How 
ever,  Winslow 's  asking  the  Deerkound  to  save  lives,  and 
allowing  Fullam's  boat  to  return,  together  with  the  fact 
that  his  own  uninjured  boats  were  immediately  called 
away,  clear  him  of  the  charge  of  inhumanity.  The  diffi 
culty  with  the  Kearsarge' s  boats  lay  in  the  fact  that  only 
two  were  uninjured — the  sailing  launch  and  the  second 
cutter — and  these  were  the  least  accessible. 

In  the  North,  as  well  as  among  the  officers  of  the 
Kearsarge,  indignation  was  kindled  by  the  conduct  of 
Semmes  in  escaping  to  an  English  vessel  after  his  sur 
render  to  the  Kearsarge,  and  by  the  conduct  of  the 
Deerhound  in  running  away  with  the  prisoners.  For  thus 
allowing  the  yacht  to  get  away,  Winslow  was,  in  many 
quarters,  sharply  criticised.  The  only  justification  of 
Semmes 's  conduct  lies  in  his  belief  that  the  Federal  ship 
had  already  broken  faith  by  firing  on  a  surrendered  vessel, 
and  that  fact  relieved  him  of  all  obligations.  Second 
Lieutenant  Joseph  Wilson  of  the  Alabama,  however, 
refused  to  go  aboard  the  Deerhound,  and  was  the  only 
officer  to  surrender  his  sword  to  Commander  Winslow.  For 

9  Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,  iv,  619. 

10  Ibid.,  p.  610. 

25 


386  The  United  States  Navy 

this  he  was  released  on  parole  by  Winslow  with  a  special 
letter  of  recommendation  which  gave  him  a  speedy  ex 
change.  This  conduct  makes  a  sharp  contrast  with  that 
of  Fullam,  which  is  inexcusable. 

As  to  the  Deerhound,  the  Federal  commander  should 
have  known  that  once  his  prisoners  were  on  her  decks 
they  were  on  neutral  territory,  and  could  neither  be 
touched  by  him  nor  surrendered  by  her  captain.  Any 
attempt  to  take  them  by  force  would  have  been  only  a 
repetition  of  the  Trent  blunder.  The  case  of  the  Deer- 
hound  led  subsequently  to  special  rulings  in  international 
law  covering  the  services  of  neutral  vessels  in  saving  the 
drowning.  To-day,  in  the  same  situation,  the  Deerhound 
would  be  obliged  to  give  up  the  rescued  men  to  the  vic 
torious  commander. 

The  Kearsarge  in  this  engagement  had  a  broadside 
of  five  guns  to  her  opponent's  six,  but  the  Federal  bat 
tery  was  heavier  at  the  point-blank  range  in  which  the 
greater  part  of  the  action  was  fought.  The  conclusive 
victory,  however,  was  due  rather  to  the  great  superiority 
in  the  gunnery  of  the  Kearsarge.  The  Alabama's  crew 
fired  three  broadsides  to  the  Kearsarge's  one,  but  this 
rapidity  seems  to  have  contributed  to  the  wildness  of 
the  Confederate  fire.11  Only  one  dangerous  wound  was 
inflicted,  a  100-pound  shell  that  lodged  in  the  stern  post 
of  the  Kearsarge,  but  failed  to  explode.  Two  shots  were 
deflected  by  the  chains  that  hung  over  the  side,  but  accord 
ing  to  the  testimony  of  the  Federal  officers,  even  if  these 
shots  had  penetrated  they  would  have  cleared  the  engines 
and  boilers.  Eleven  other  shot  or  shell  pierced  the  hull, 
most  of  them  through  the  bulwarks.  The  rest  of  the 
shot  seem  to  have  gone  high,  for  three  boats  were  de- 

11  Lieutenants  Kell  and  Sinclair  attributed  the  ineffectiveness 
of  the  Alabama's  fire  to  damaged  powder,  a  circumstance  which 
Kell  says  he  did  not  discover  in  the  careful  overhauling  of  ammu 
nition  made  by  him  prior  to  the  battle. 


The  Alabama  Claims  387 

stroyed,  the  smokestack  was  badly  perforated,  and  the 
rigging  was  considerably  cut.  On  the  other  hand,  the  guns 
of  the  Kearsarge  were  handled  deliberately  and  with  such 
precision  that  the  Alabama  was  literally  shot  to  pieces. 

The  newspaper  warfare  over  this  battle  was  not  its 
most  important  sequel.  In  September,  1872,  the  "Geneva 
Tribunal,"  which  had  convened  as  a  board  of  arbitration 
on  the  claims  of  the  United  States  against  Great  Britain, 
found  the  defendant  guilty  of  a  violation  of  neutrality  in 
that  she  had  permitted  Confederate  men-of-war  to  be 
built,  bought  or  equipped  in  her  ports,  and  awarded  to 
the  plaintiff  $15,500,000  for  the  value  of  ships  and  cargoes 
destroyed  by  the  Alabama,  Shenandoah,  and  Florida. 
This  sum  was  increased  by  interest  to  about  $16,000,000. 

The  theory,  which  is  still  widely  held,  that  the  Alabama 
was  responsible  for  the  disappearance  of  the  American 
merchant  marine  after  the  war  cannot  be  maintained. 
Though  she  and  her  consorts  drove  practically  all  Amer 
ican  ships  to  cover,  they  captured  only  five  per  cent  of 
the  whole  number,  and  only  thirty-two  per  cent  were  sold 
or  transferred  temporarily  to  neutral  hands.12  Under 
normal  conditions,  the  American  carrying  trade  ought  to 
have  revived  after  the  Civil  War  as  it  had  done  after 
the  War  of  1812.  The  reason  it  did  not  revive  is  to  be 
found  in  changed  economic  conditions  brought  about,  at 
least  in  part,  by  an  increased  tariff,  which  made  it  impos 
sible  to  build  and  man  ships  as  cheaply  as  our  commer 
cial  rivals,  and  by  the  laws  of  navigation,  which  forbade 
the  purchase  of  foreign  vessels  for  use  under  the  American 
flag.  These  measures  operated  severely  against  the  mer 
chant  marine  and  drove  American  capital  from  ships 
into  railroads,  factories,  and  mines. 

12  Figures  from  "  A  Memorandum  of  the  Admiralty  to  the  Royal 
Commission  on  the  Supply  of  Food  and  Raw  Materials  to  the  War," 
quoted  by  Thursfield,  Nelson  and  Other'  Naval  Sketches,  p.  306. 


XXIII 

THE  BLOCKADE  AND  THE  END  OF  THE  WAR 

THE  BLOCKADE 

THE  blockade  of  the  entire  Southern  coast,  the  begin 
ning  of  which  has  been  described  in  Chapter  XV,  was  in 
part  prompted  by  the  proclamation  of  President  Davis, 
April  17,  1861,  calling  for  privateers  to  prey  on  the 
commerce  of  the  Northern  States.  In  respect  to  both  the 
blockade  and  privateering,  the  United  States,  although 
not  a  signatory  to  the  Declaration  of  Paris  of  1856,  was 
considerably  affected  by  it.  In  this  compact  the  great 
powers  of  Europe  had  denned  a  blockade  to  be  binding 
only  when  it  had  been  made  effectual  (thus  refusing  to 
recognize  " paper  blockades")  ;  and  they  had  agreed  not 
to  resort  to  privateering.  To  make  Europe  respect  the 
blockade,  therefore,  the  North  was  obliged  to  put  forth 
prodigious  efforts  to  close  the  Southern  ports;  and  yet, 
since  the  United  States  had  not  signed  the  Declaration  of 
Paris,  the  North  was  precluded  from  objecting  to  the 
South 's  resorting  to  that  last  hope  of  a  country  without 
a  navy — privateering.  Furthermore,  as  a  nation  does 
not  blockade  its  own  ports,  the  adoption  of  this  mode  of 
warfare  against  the  South  put  the  Union  in  an  anomalous 
position.  In  spite  of  the  efforts  of  the  administration  at 
Washington  at  the  beginning  to  regard  the  closure  of 
ports  in  the  nature  of  an  embargo,  or  '  *  domestic  municipal 
duty,"  Europe  could  not  so  consider  it,  and  hence  the 
proclamation  of  a  blockade  left  England  no  alternative 
except  to  recognize  the  South  as  a  belligerent.  This 
England  did  in  a  proclamation  of  neutrality  on  May  13 ; 
but  she  declined  to  go  beyond  this,  and  refused  to  recog- 

388 


Southern  Privateers  .389 

nize  the  Confederate  States  as  a  sovereign  power.  To 
make  the  blockade  effective,  therefore,  so  as  to  avoid  Euro 
pean  intervention,  the  small  navy  of  the  United  States 
had  before  it  an  enormous  task ;  for  by  * '  effective, ' '  within 
the  meaning  of  the  law  of  nations,  was  understood  that 
there  must  be  "evident  danger  in  entering  or  leaving 
port."  In  spite  of  the  greatness  of  the  undertaking, 
this  blockade  was  legally  effective  after  being  in  operation 
six  months.  Furthermore,  by  the  capture  of  one  Southern 
port  after  another,  the  cordon  was  drawn  so  tight  that  it 
became  gradually  a  military  occupation. 

In  accordance  with  President  Davis'  proclamation, 
letters  of  marque  were  issued  to  owners  of  private  vessels. 
As  the  North  had  a  commerce  ranking  second  in  the 
world  at  that  time,  this  was  a  means  of  striking  the  Union 
in  its  most  vulnerable  point ;  on  the  other  hand,  the  South 
had  no  commerce  on  which  the  North  could  retaliate.  The 
later  stringency  of  the  blockade,  and  the  nondescript 
character  of  the  letters  of  marque,  caused  the  gradual 
dying  out  of  this  mode  of  warfare — not,  however,  before 
considerable  damage  had  been  done  on  the  unsuspecting 
trading  vessels  of  the  North. 

The  first  privateer  to  be  captured,  the  Savannah, 
brought  up  anew  the  question  of  the  status  of  the  Con 
federacy.  The  crew  of  this  vessel  were  tried  for  treason, 
on  the  ground  that  they  were  levying  war  against  their 
own  country.  Moreover,  the  North  maintained  that  an 
insurgent's  man-of-war  was,  in  the  eyes  of  international 
law,  a  pirate.  The  crew  of  the  Savannah  were  kept  in 
prison  for  several  months,  but  no  further  penalty  was 
applied.  The  South  had  threatened  to  treat  a  like  number 
of  army  prisoners  in  its  hands  in  the  same  way  that  the 
Federal  Government  dealt  with  the  Savannah's  crew. 
Lincoln  had  from  the  first  been  in  favor  of  a  liberal  policy, 
and  the  insurrection  had  assumed  such  proportions  that  it 


390  The  United  States  Navy 

would  have  been  impossible  to  regard  a  whole  section  of 
the  country  as  guilty  of  treason.  No  real  justification 
could  be  given  for  imprisoning  privateersmen  as  pirates, 
and  on  February  16,  1862,  they  were  put  on  the  same 
footing  as  army  prisoners. 

The  blockade  began  at  Hampton  Roads,  which  was 
nearest  to  both  centres  of  government.  The  only  serious 
attempt  to  break  it  at  this  point  was  made  by  the  Merri- 
mac.  The  other  two  lines  of  blockade  were  on  the  Atlantic 
and  the  Gulf  coasts.  In  the  Gulf  the  capture  of  New 
Orleans,  the  principal  commercial  city  in  that  quarter, 
made  the  task  less  difficult  than  along  the  Atlantic,  and 
as  the  plans  of  operation  of  the  two  squadrons  were  very 
similar,  we  can  gain  sufficient  idea  of  the  operations  of 
the  blockaders  by  considering  only  the  work  of  the 
Atlantic  squadron. 

The  duties  of  this  squadron  proved  so  difficult  that  it 
was  divided  early  in  the  war  between  two  squadrons :  the 
North  Atlantic,'  under  Goldsborough,  and  later  under 
Porter;  and  the  South  Atlantic,  successively  under 
DuPont  and  Dahlgren.  The  task  of  these  squadrons  was 
arduous  for  several  reasons:  the  Atlantic  seaboard  from 
the  Carolinas  to  Florida,  with  its  numerous  inlets  and  sand 
bars,  has  practically  a  double  coast  line ;  several  friendly 
ports  not  far  away,  particularly  Nassau  and  the  small 
towns  of  the  Bermudas,  gave  the  blockade-runners  a 
convenient  market  for  the  cotton  so  much  needed  by 
British  manufacturers ;  furthermore,  specially  designed 
steam  blockade-runners,  connecting  the  three  important 
commercial  centres,  Wilmington,  Charleston,  and  Savan 
nah  with  Nassau  and  Europe,  kept  the  squadron  always 
on  the  qui  vive. 

This  remarkable  type  of  vessel,  the  blockade-runner, 
had  no  armament  to  speak  of,  nor  was  it  intended  to 
make  any  resistance.  It  was  presumably  a  merchantman. 


Blockade  Running  391 

The  South,  not  being  a  manufacturing  community,  had 
to  import  munitions,  and  to  pay  for  military  stores  it  had 
to  send  abroad  its  one  great  staple,  cotton.  To  effect 
this  exchange  and  to  elude  the  Federal  ships,  the  blockade- 
runners  early  in  the  war  came  into  being.  As  the  cordon 
of  Northern  vessels  grew  more  taut,  there  was  an  increas 
ing  need  in  the  South  for  ships  whose  main  points  were 
speed,  stowage  space,  and  invisibility.  "The  typical 
blockade-runner  of  1863-64  was  a  long,  low  side-wheel 
steamer  of  from  400  to  600  tons,  with  a  slight  frame,  sharp 
and  narrow,  its  length  perhaps  nine  times  its  beam.  It 
had  feathering  paddles,  and  one  or  two  raking  telescopic 
funnels,  which  might  be  lowered  close  to  the  deck.  The 
hull  rose  only  a  few  feet  out  of  the  water,  and  was  painted 
a  dull  gray,  or  lead  color.  ...  Its  spars  were  two 
short  lower-masts,  with  no  yards,  and  only  a  small  crow 's- 
nest  on  the  foremast.  The  deck  forward  was  constructed 
in  the  form  known  as  'turtle-back'  to  enable  the  vessel  to 
go  through  a  heavy  sea.  Anthracite  coal,  which  made  no 
smoke,  was  burned  in  the  furnaces.  .  .  .  When  running 
in,  all  lights  were  put  out;  the  binnacle  and  fire-room 
hatch  were  carefully  covered,  and  steam  was  blown  off 
under  water. ' ' J 

The  blockading  squadrons  had  to  be  eternally  vigilant, 
with  steam  up  night  and  day,  to  catch  these  vessels,  which 
frequently  made  fifteen  knots.  Some  of  the  Northern 
ships  cruised  in  wide  circuits  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Nassau  and  the  Bermudas,  where  they  were  often  more 
successful  than  nearer  home;  the  unsuspecting  blockade- 
runner  was  thus  at  times  caught  off  his  guard.  To  circum 
vent  the  vigilant  Northern  fleets,  the  steamers,  with  their 
cargoes  of  "hardware,"  the  innocent  name  under  which 
they  listed  the  arms  and  ammunition  in  their  holds,  prac- 

1  Soley,  The  Blockade  and  Cruisers,  p.  156. 


392  The  United  States  Navy 

tised  every  ruse  to  avoid  capture.  When  the  beacon 
lights  on  the  coast  were  extinguished,  these  craft  made 
their  dash  for  port,  guided  by  signal  fires,  or  by  the  lights 
on  the  blockading  fleet.  If  the  squadron  commander,  dis 
covering  this,  kept  a  light  only  on  the  flagship,  or  on  a 
different  blockader  every  night,  the  information  was 
carried  with  remarkable  speed  to  Nassau,  and  the  next 
runner  was  ready  for  the  new  order  of  things.  At  one 
time  an  order  was  issued  that  a  vessel,  discovering  a 
steamer  slipping  in  under  cover  of  darkness,  should  fire 
a  gun  in  the  direction  the  pursued  was  taking,  in  order  to 
give  a  clue  of  the  whereabouts  of  the  chase.  A  few  days 
afterwards  blockade-runners  were  equipped  with  rockets 
to  be  shot  off  at  right  angles  to  the  intended  course. 
Wilkinson,  in  his  interesting  Narrative  of  a  Blockade- 
Runner,  describes  another  device  frequently  used  by  the 
pursued  vessel.  The  engineer  was  ordered  to  make  a 
black  smoke;  at  the  moment  when  the  lookout  with  his 
glass  gave  the  word  that  the  pursuer  in  the  gathering 
twilight  was  just  out  of  sight,  the  dampers  were  closed, 
and  the  runner  sped  away  in  a  different  direction,  leav 
ing  the  Union  vessel  to  chase  a  shadow.  The  start  from 
Nassau  or  the  ports  in  the  Bermudas  was  made  when  there 
would  be  a  high  tide  and  no  moonlight  for  the  run  into 
port.  If  very  hard  pressed,  the  pursued  vessel  might 
run  ashore,  where  a  nearby  battery  could  cover  the  land 
ing  of  the  cargo,  though  the  vessel  might  be  sacrificed. 

Many  of  the  blockade-runners  were  owned  by  com 
panies  financed  by  Southern  and  British  investors.  Even 
the  Confederate  Government  shared  in  the  business. 
Suitable  vessels  were  bought  in  England,  and  were  put 
in  command  of  naval  officers  of  the  Southern  Government. 
One  of  these  owned  by  the  Government  was  the  famous 
It.  E.  Lee,  a  Clyde-built  side-wheel  steamer,  which,  under 
the  able  Captain  Wilkinson,  ran  the  blockade  successively 


Operations  before  Charleston  393 

twenty-one  times  within  a  year.  Indeed,  this  vessel  and 
the  Kate  made  trips  as  regularly  as  a  packet.  The  traffic 
became  so  profitable  that  even  officers  of  the  British  Navy 
condescended  to  take  command,  under  assumed  names, 
for  ships  often  paid  as  high  as  £1000  to  their  captains 
for  the  round  trip  from  a  Southern  port  to  Nassau.  With 
cotton  at  four  pence  a  pound  in  Wilmington,  and  two 
shillings  a  pound  in  Liverpool,  these  captains  could  gain 
sufficient  to  retire  on  after  six  months'  service.  The  com 
panies  engaged  in  this  lucrative  trade  could  afford  to 
lose  a  vessel  after  two  successful  trips. 

The  strictness  of  the  blockade  and  the  occupation  of 
one  Southern  port  after  another  eventually  put  an  end 
to  this  trade.  During  the  war  the  blockading  fleets  capt 
ured  or  destroyed  1150  vessels,  with  their  cargoes,  aggre 
gating  in  value  $30,000,000. 


OPERATIONS  BEFORE   CHARLESTON 

After  the  capture  of  Port  Royal,  DuPont  had  directed 
his  energy  to  making  the  blockade — especially  of  Charles 
ton — thoroughly  effective.  The  able  Assistant  Secretary 
of  the  Navy,  Fox,  who  had  the  greatest  faith  in  monitors, 
hurried  as  many  of  these  ' '  marvelous  vessels  ' '  to  DuPont 
as  he  could,  and  ordered  the  latter  to  capture  Charleston. 

This  city  was  well  defended  by  a  large  army  under 
Beauregard,  by  numerous  forts,  by  ironclads,  and  by 
mines,  to  say  nothing  of  the  natural  defenses  of  sand 
bars,  which  kept  the  blockading  fleet  well  outside  and 
gave  the  shallow  draft  blockade-runners  an  opportunity 
to  make  their  dashes  through  the  inlets.  Moreover,  the 
harbor  was  a  veritable  cul  de  sac,  from  which  there  was 
little  chance  of  escape  for  vessels  of  any  type  once  caught 
inside. 

The  Confederates  made  several  attempts  to  break  the 


394  The  United  States  Navy 

blockade  on  the  South  Atlantic  coast,  which  kept  DuPont  's 
attention  too  much  occupied  to  risk  the  loss  of  vessels  in 
premature  attempts  on  Charleston.  In  January,  1863, 
the  ironclad  rams  Chicora  and  Palmetto  State  emerged 
early  one  morning  from  Charleston  harbor  and  inflicted 
signal  damage  on  the  wooden  gunboats  Mercedita  and 
Keystone  State,  before  the  scattered  blockaders  could  close 
in  on  the  rams.  In  this  affair  there  seems,  on  the  Union 
side,  to  have  been  a  lack  of  co-operation  and  of  rapid 
communication  by  signal;  for  the  dispersed  ships  took 
the  sally  of  the  rams  for  one  of  the  frequent  attempts 
of  blockade-runners,  and  when  they  came  up  the  Con 
federate  vessels  were  retreating  to  the  cover  of  the  forts. 
As  a  result  of  this  attack  Beauregard,  by  proclamation, 
declared  that  the  blockade  of  Charleston  was  raised,  a 
statement  which  was  soon  proved  untrue. 

Admiral  DuPont  determined  to  test  the  new  monitors 
before  he  made  his  attempt  on  Charleston.  These  vessels 
were  still  largely  an  experiment,  and  the  commander  of 
the  squadron  was  by  no  means  so  sure  of  their  endurance 
against  powerful  forts  as  was  the  Assistant  Secretary  of 
the  Navy.  With  this  object  in  view,  DuPont  sent,  in 
February,  1863,  the  Montauk  to  test  her  powers  against 
Fort  McAllister.  At  this  time  the  Nashville,  a  Con 
federate  cruiser,  was  lying  in  the  Great  Ogeechee  River 
behind  the  fort.  "With  her  cargo  of  cotton,  she  had  been 
trying  for  some  time  to  slip  through  the  blockade.  Cap 
tain  Worden,  of  the  Montauk,  found  that  he  could  bear 
the  fire  of  the  earthwork  with  little  damage  to  his  vessel, 
but  he  noticed  also  that  he  did  no  harm  to  the  fort.  More 
over,  as  the  Nashville  had  retreated  up  the  river,  he  could 
not  get  within  striking  distance  of  her.  Worden  kept  a 
close  watch,  however,  and  on  the  evening  of  February  27, 
after  a  careful  reconnoissance,  he  discovered  that  the 
Nashville  was  aground.  Waiting  until  daylight,  that  he 


.     Operations  before  Charleston  395 

might  see  better,  he  planted  his  ironclad  under  the  guns 
of  Fort  McAllister,  and  coolly  dropped  his  11-inch  and 
15-inch  shells  with  fatal  precision  upon  the  Nashville;  in 
a  few  minutes  the  cruiser  was  in  flames,  and  later  blew 
up.  The  Mont  auk,  under  the  concentrated  fire  of  the 
fort,  had  been  hit  only  five  times,  and  retreated  unharmed 
from  her  target  practice.  On  her  way  out,  however,  she 
struck  a  torpedo,  which  caused  a  serious  leak,  neces 
sitating  her  running  on  a  mud  flat  for  temporary  repairs. 
She  was  able  later  to  rejoin  the  fleet. 

Shortly  afterwards  three  monitors  were  sent  to  make 
a  further  test  against  the  same  fort.  In  these  attacks  the 
vessels,  did  little  damage  to  the  fort,  and  the  admiral 
wrote  to  the  Department,  "  Whatever  degree  of  impene 
trability  they  might  have,  there  was  no  corresponding 
quality  of  destructiveness  against  forts." 

Under  Department  coercion,  however,  Admiral 
DuPont,  with  the  New  Ironsides  2  and  his  seven  monitors, 
made  an  attack  on  Charleston  on  April  7,  1863.  The 
channel  was  not  deep  enough  for  vessels  of  the  draft  of 
the  Ironsides;  moreover,  there  was  continual  danger  from 
the  torpedoes  at  the  entrance  to  the  harbor.  After  an 
hour's  fighting  under  these  difficulties,  DuPont  withdrew 
his  ships  to  ascertain  the  damage  received,  with  the  pur 
pose  of  renewing  the  battle  next  day,  if  after  consultation 
with  his  captains  he  felt  the  risk  was  not  foolhardy.  The 
ironclad  Keokuk,  which  had  been  stationed  nearest  to 
Fort  Sumter,  had  been  struck  ninety  times,  nineteen  shot 

2  The  New  Ironsides  was  a  ship-rigged  armor-clad,  the  most 
powerful  vessel  in  the  Northern  Navy.  Over  her  heavy  oak 
framework  she  had  four  inches  of  armor.  With  her  engines  of 
1800  horsepower  and  her  sails  she  could  make  eleven  knots.  Her 
armament  consisted  of  sixteen  11-inch  Dahlgren  guns  and  of  two 
200-pounder  Parrott  rifles. 


396  The  United  States  Navy 

penetrating  her  below  the  water  line.  Both  her  turrets 
were  pierced  in  many  places.  She  sank  the  following 
morning.  The  other  vessels  had  been  struck  in  a  degree 
corresponding  to  their  proximity  to  the  forts.  The  defenses 
of  Charleston,  on  the  other  hand,  seemed  practically 
intact. 

In  spite  of  another  proclamation  of  General  Beaure- 
gard  that  the  blockade  of  Charleston  was  raised  as  a 
result  of  the  battle  of  April  7,  Admiral  DuPont  quickly 
repaired  his  vessels  and  kept 'the  cordon  of  ships  around 
the  harbor.  General  Gilmore,  a  Federal  engineer  of  great 
ability,  succeeded  in  landing  troops  at  Morris  Island,  and 
thus  enabled  the  fleet  to  operate  closer  in  shore  and  render 
blockade-running  more  difficult  than  before. 

At  this  time  information  came  to  the  fleet  that  the 
powerful  ram  Atlanta  and  other  Confederate  ironclads 
at  Savannah  were  about  to  leave  Wilmington  River  for 
Warsaw  Sound  to  break  up  the  blockade  in  this  vicinity. 
The  Atlanta,  formerly  the  Fingal,  a  Clyde-built  iron 
steamer,  had  been  transformed  into  a  ram.  The  usual 
heavy-timbered  casemate  covered  with  four  inches  of  iron 
had  been  superposed  on  the  razed  deck.  Brooke  rifles 
were  so  placed  in  the  casemate  as  to  be  fired  either  laterally 
or  fore-and-aft.  Admiral  DuPont  dispatched  two  moni 
tors,  the  Weehawken,  Captain  John  Rodgers,  and  the 
Naliant,  Captain  Downes,  to  intercept  the  Atlanta. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  June  17,  1863,  Captain 
Rodgers  discovered  the  ram  coming  down  the  river.  With 
the  cool  deliberation  that  characterized  him,  Rodgers  let 
the  ram  open  fire  and  approach  to  within  300  yards  of 
the  Weehawken.  Then  he  discharged  his  huge  Dahlgren 
smooth-bores.  The  first  four  shot  struck  with  terrific 
effect.  The  very  first  missile,  a  15-inch  cored  shot,  pene 
trated  the  armor.  Just  fifteen  minutes  after  the  Wee- 


Fall  of  Charleston  397 

hawken  opened,  the  Atlanta  hauled  down  her  colors.  The 
Nahant  did  not  get  a  chance  to  take  part  in  the  contest. 

Captain  Rodgers  was  an  excellent  disciplinarian,  and 
by  much  practice  had  made  his  men  skilled  marksmen. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Atlanta  had  a  new  crew,  and  went' 
into  battle  in  great  hurry  and  disorder.  Of  the  eight  shot 
which  she  fired,  none  hit.  The  result  showed  also  that  in 
the  contest  between  armor  and  guns,  some  improvement 
had  been  made  in  penetrating  power  since  the  day  when 
the  first  Monitor  tried  to  pierce  the  Merrimac. 

Admiral  DuPont  decided  not  to  renew  the  attack  on 
Charleston  without  the  co-operation  of  a  large  land  force. 
The  admiral,  earlier  in  his  career,  had  shown  no  com 
punction  in  attacking,  even  with  wooden  vessels,  Port 
Royal,  but  on  that  occasion  he  could  pass  the  forts  and 
attack  them  from  the  rear.  On  account  of  his  decision  not 
to  make  another  attempt  on  Charleston,  the  Assistant 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  ordered  Admiral  Dahlgren  to  the 
command  of  the  South  Atlantic  squadron;  the  latter 
relieved  DuPont  on  July  6,  1863. 

Admiral  Dahlgren  soon  realized  that  much  was  ex 
pected  of  him.  He  was  told  that  Charleston  must  be 
taken.  Yet  his  judgment  coincided  with  his  predecessor's ; 
and  when,  goaded  by  official  pressure  and  newspaper 
attacks,  he  called  in  October  a  council  of  war,  finding  that 
his  officers  thought  as  he  did,  he  decided  not  to  attack 
Charleston  with  his  present  force.  The  city  was  finally 
taken  sixteen  months  later  in  just  the  way  that  DuPont 
had  urged,  by  a  powerful  army  operating  from  the  rear. 
General  Hardee,  who  had  escaped  from  Savannah  before 
the  capture  of  that  city  by  Sherman,  had  assumed  com 
mand  of  the  Confederate  forces  at  Charleston.  Hemmed 
in  here  by  Sherman's  army,  he  was  compelled  to  evacuate 
on  February  18,  1865. 


398  The  United  States  Navy 

CAPTURE  OP  FORT  FISHER 

We  have  seen  in  a  former  chapter  that  the  North 
Atlantic  squadron  under  Goldsborough  wrested  the  con 
trol  of  the  North  Carolina  sounds  from  the  Confederates 
and  destroyed  the  Albemarle,  the  greatest  menace  to  the 
blockade  in  these  waters.  After  Goldsborough  was 
relieved,  Admiral  Lee  took  command  and  brought  the 
squadron  to  a  still  higher  degree  of  efficiency.  In  October, 
1864,  Admiral  David  D.  Porter  succeeded  Lee  and  began 
preparations  for  the  capture  of  Fort  Fisher. 

The  possession  of  this  earthwork,  commanding  "  the 
last  gateway  between  the  Confederate  States  and  the  out 
side  world, ' '  was  of  the  utmost  importance  to  the  North  to 
end  the  long-drawn-out  agony  of  the  war.  It  defended  the 
approach  to  Wilmington,  N.  C.,  on  which  the  starving, 
ill-clad,  and  poorly  equipped  remnant  of  Lee's  army 
depended  for  its  supplies  of  food,  clothing,  and  ammuni 
tion,  brought  by  blockade-runners  from  Nassau.  The 
stores  of  flour  in  Virginia  were  exhausted;  bread  was 
three  dollars  (Confederate  currency)  a  loaf  in  Richmond, 
and  Lee's  army  was  on  half-rations.  Meat,  too,  was  very 
scarce,  and  the  soldiers  often  eked  out  their  scanty  fare 
with  rats,  muskrats,  etc.  Lee  had  informed  Colonel  Lamb, 
the  commander  of  Fort  Fisher,  that  if  Wilmington  was 
lost,  his  troops  would  have  to  fall  back  from  Richmond. 
The  importance  of  Wilmington  to  the  Confederates  may 
be  inferred  from  the  fact  that  "between  October  26,  1864, 
and  January,  1865,  8,632,000  Ibs.  of  meat,  1,507,000  Ibs. 
of  lead,  1,933,000  Ibs.  of  saltpetre,  546,000  pairs  of  shoes, 
316,000  pairs  of  blankets,  half  a  million  pounds  of  coffee, 
69,000  rifles,  and  43  cannon  were  obtained  through  this 
port  from  the  outer  world,  while  cotton  sufficient  to  pay 
for  these  purchases  was  exported. ' ' 3 

8  Cambridge  Modern  History,  vii,  557.  Figures  taken  from  the 
report  of  the  Confederate  Secretary  of  the  Treasury. 


Fort  Fisher  and  Wilmington  399 

On  December  20,  1864,  the  largest  fleet  hitherto 
assembled  under  the  Union  flag,  commanded  by  Admiral 
Porter,  and  accompanied  by  6500  troops  under  General 
Butler,  arrived  off  Fort  Fisher.  The  armada  consisted 
of  nearly  sixty  vessels,  five  of  which  were  ironclads;  the 
powerful  New  Ironsides  and  the  four  monitors,  Monad- 
nock,  Canonicus,  Saugus,  and  Mahopac.  In  Porter's  fleet 
were  also  our  largest  steam-frigates,  Minnesota,  Colorado, 
and  W abash. 

Fort  Fisher  was  situated  at  the  southern  extremity 
of  a  narrow  tongue  of  land,  called  Federal  Point.  The 
earthwork  was  in  the  shape  of  a  right  angle,  the  vertex 
of  which  pointed  northeast.  One  leg  of  this  angle  ex 
tended  westward  across  the  peninsula  from  the  ocean  to 
Cape  Fear  River,  and  the  other  ran  southward  along  the 
sea-shore.  Hence  the  fort  had  a  land  face  and  a  sea  face. 
It  was  the  best-constructed  earthwork  known,  and  had 
the  most  recent  ideas  adopted  in  its  structure.  The  para 
pets  were  twenty-five  feet  thick.  Heavy  traverses  had 
been  constructed  to  protect  the  gunners  against  enfilading 
fire,  and  there  were  numerous  bomb-proof  chambers.  On 
the  land  face  twenty  heavy  guns  were  mounted,  and  on 
the  sea  face  twenty-four,  all  in  barbette,  and  among  these 
guns,  which  ranged  from  six  to  ten  inches,  were  colum- 
biads,  Brooke,  and  Blakely  rifles,  a  150-pounder  Arm 
strong,  and  some  mortars.  Moreover,  in  front  of  the  land 
face  was  a  high  palisade  of  logs  pierced  for  musketry, 
and  farther  out,  a  network  of  subterranean  torpedoes  was 
set  as  a  defense  against  infantry.  The  defenders  of  this 
great  work,  however,  had  many  difficulties  to  overcome. 
The  walls  of  the  fort  were  so  massive  that  soldiers  in  the 
gun  chambers  could  not  see  the  approach  immediately  in 
front  for  a  hundred  feet.  Hence  they  had  to  expose 
themselves  on  the  parapet  to  make  a  reconnoissance  of  an 
attack  at  close  quarters.  To  defend  the  huge  work, 


400  The  United  States  Navy 

Colonel  Lamb  had  only  1900  men.  His  supply  of  ammuni 
tion  was  also  small;  he  had  not  over  3600  shot  and  shell 
for  his  forty-four  heavy  guns  and  three  mortars,  and  only 
thirteen  shells  for  his  150-pounder  Armstrong. 

On  the  night  of  December  23,  the  Louisiana,  an  old 
Union  gunboat,  loaded  with  powder,  was  sent  in  close  to 
the  fort  and  exploded  by  means  of  a  clockwork  device. 
This  preliminary  attempt  to  destroy  the  earthwork  proved 
an  utter  failure.  The  next  day  the  Federal  fleet  in  four 
great  lines  made  the  attack.  The  first  line  bombarded  the 
land  face;  the  ironclads,  which  constituted  a  separate 
unit,  anchored  farther  inshore  to  concentrate  their  fire 
on  the  bastion  at  the  northeast  salient;  lines  numbers  two 
and  three  attacked  the  sea  face;  and  the  reserve  line  was 
to  land  troops,  cover  landings,  and  carry  dispatches.  The 
ships  kept  up  the  bombardment  all  day  of  the  24th.  The 
next  day,  Christmas,  the  troops  landed,  but  General 
Butler,  after  a  reconnoissance,  declared  that  "the  place 
could  not  be  carried  by  assault,  as  it  was  left  substantially 
unimpaired  by  the  navy  fire."  To  the  great  dissatisfac 
tion  of  Porter  and  Grant,  the  first  attack  on  Fort  Fisher 
proved  "an  ignominious  failure."  The  fleet  had  suffered 
little  damage  from  the  fort's  fire,  but  the  bursting  of 
100-pounder  Parrott  rifles  on  five  of  the  Union  vessels 
had  killed  sixteen  men  and  wounded  many  others. 

General  Grant,  at  the  request  of  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy,  immediately  sent,  in  Butler's  stead,  General  Terry, 
an  officer  of  great  decision.  On  January  13,  the  fleet, 
in  formation  like  that  of  the  previous  attack,  renewed 
the  bombardment  of  Fort  Fisher.  Line  number  one 
shelled  the  woods  to  the  north  of  the  land  face  to  clear 
the  way,  and  by  afternoon  6000  troops,  with  twelve  days' 
provisions,  were  landed.  The  fleet's  fire  continued  night 
and  day.  The  vessels  aimed  with  deliberation,  making 
the  guns  of  the  fort  their  targets.  Notwithstanding  this 


Second  Attack  on  Fort  Fisher  401 

slow  shooting,  the  naval  fire  of  the  fleet's  600  guns, 
Colonel  Lamb  tells  us,  amounted  often  to  two  shots  per 
second,  while  the  gunners  in  the  fort,  being  compelled  to 
husband  their  ammunition,  were  ordered  to  fire  each  piece 
only  once  every  half  hour.  In  the  interim  of  firing,  the 
gunners  took  refuge  in  the  bomb-proofs,  but  the  bursting 
of  the  11-  and  15-inch  shells  from  the  New  Ironsides  and 
the  monitors,  to  say  nothing  of  the  countless  shot  from 
the  other  vessels,  was  doing  terrible  execution  in  the 
little  garrison.  Colonel  Lamb  had  appealed  in  vain  to 
General  Bragg,  for  reinforcements. 

General  Terry  was  meanwhile  entrenching  himself  two 
miles  north  of  the  fort.  All  day  of  the  14th  and  the  fol 
lowing  night  the  fleet  kept  up  the  relentless  fire  on  the 
earthwork,  especially  on  the  land  face,  with  the  purpose 
of  making  the  attack  for  the  troops  as  easy  as  possible. 
The  network  of  torpedoes  had  been  cut  to  pieces  by  the 
navy  gunners.  Admiral  Porter  and  General  Terry  had 
prearranged  the  final  plan  of  assault.  At  a  signal  from 
the  troops,  the  fleet  was  to  change  the  direction  of  its  fire, 
and  a  detachment  of  sailors  and  marines  was  to  attack 
the  sea  face,  while  the  soldiers  were  to  attempt  to  scale 
the  parapets  at  the  western  end  of  the  land  face. 

On  the  morning  of  the  15th,  the  navy  gunners,  who 
had  had  ample  practice  to  get  accurate  range,  renewed 
the  storm  of  shot  and  shell,  and  by  noon  there  was  but  one 
serviceable  heavy  gun  left  on  the  land  face.  By  three 
in  the  afternoon  the  signal  came  from  General  Terry,  and 
at  the  blast  of  the  whistles  of  fifty  vessels,  the  direction 
of  the  navy  fire  was  changed  to  the  higher  parts  of  the 
earthwork.  The  detachment  of  sailors  and  marines,  armed 
only  with  cutlasses  and  revolvers,  advanced  along  a  half- 
mile  of  sand  dunes,  exposed  to  the  rifles  of  the  defenders, 
and  to  the  enfilading  fire  of  grape  and  shells  from  the 
guns  of  the  fort.  The  2000  sailors,  in  three  divisions, 
26 


402 


The  United  States  Navy 


Results  403 

under  Lieutenant-Commander  Breese,  acted  as  a  diversion, 
and  thus  helped  toward  the  success  of  the  troops.  But, 
although  the  bluejackets  showed  magnificent  courage,  yet 
in  their  exposed  positions,  with  no  means  of  throwing  up 
entrenchments,  they  were  foredoomed  to  failure  in  their 
attack.  The  navy  lost  300  killed  and  wounded  in  this 
assault. 

Meanwhile  the  troops  were  taking  one  traverse  after 
another  on  the  land  face.  The  accurate  fire,  especially 
of  the  Ironsides,  prepared  the  way  for  the  capture  by  the 
soldiers  of  each  new  traverse  to  the  eastward.  Under  the 
cover  of  night,  the  disorganized  companies  of  sailors  and 
marines  emerged  from  their  shelters  behind  sand  dunes, 
and  crept  around  the  northeast  salient  to  join  the  soldiers 
in  their  attack.  The  Confederates  were  compelled  to 
abandon  the  bastion,  and  then  one  traverse  after  another 
on  the  sea  face.  Colonel  Lamb  and  his  handful  of  men, 
having  fought  to  the  last  ditch,  surrendered  at  ten  o'clock 
on  the  night  of  the  15th. 

The  capture  of  Fort  Fisher  had  cost  the  Federal  army 
691  men,  and  the  navy  309,  killed,  wounded,  and  miss 
ing,  but  the  results  were  worth  while.  The  fall  of  Fort 
Fisher  opened  the  way  for  General  Schofield,  who  now 
joined  Terry  and  assumed  command,  to  capture  Wilming 
ton  a  few  weeks  later.  Of  this  event,  Scharf,  the  Con 
federate  historian,  says:  "  The  fall  of  Wilmington  was 
the  severest  blow  to  the  Confederate  cause  which  it  could 
receive  from  the  loss  of  any  port.  It  was  far  more 
injurious  than  the  capture  of  Charleston,  and,  but  for 
the  moral  effect,  even  more  hurtful  than  the  evacuation 
of  Richmond.  With  Wilmington  open,  the  supplies  that 
reached  the  Confederate  armies  would  have  enabled  them 
to  maintain  an  unequal  contest  for  years;  but  with  the 
fall  of  Fort  Fisher  the  constant  stream  of  supplies  was 
effectually  cut  off."  In  March,  Schofield  joined  Sherman, 


404  The  United  States  Navy 

who  was  marching  up  through  the  Carolinas.  In  April 
Lee  retreated  from  Richmond  to  meet  his  fate  at  Appo- 
mattox. 

The  surrender  of  Lee  at  Appomattox  practically  ended 
the  war.  After  the  capture  of  Mobile,  which  took  place 
contemporaneously  with  Grant's  victory  over  Lee,  the 
Confederate  troops  and  ships  in  Alabama  retreated  up 
the  Tombigbee  River.  On  May  4,  Commander  Farrand, 
in  charge  of  the  Confederate  naval  forces  in  this  State, 
made  a  proposal  to  give  up  all  the  vessels  under  him.  ' '  On 
the  10th  of  May  the  formal  surrender  took  place,  and  the 
insurgent  navy  ceased  to  be  an  organization.  ...  On 
the  second  of  June,  Galveston  was  surrendered,  and  the 
supremacy  of  the  Government  was  once  more  established 
on  the  entire  coast,  from  Maine  to  and  including  Texas. 

"Immediately  after  the  fall  of  Fort  Fisher  and  the 
capture  of  Wilmington,  measures  were  taken  for  the 
gradual  reduction  of  the  naval  forces  employed  on  the 
duties  of  blockade.  The  recovery  of  Charleston,  Mobile, 
and  Galveston  justified  a  still  further  diminution,  and  as 
these  events  occurred,  measures  were  promptly  taken  to 
reduce  the  squadrons  and  economize  expenses. ' ' 4  Finally, 
by  a  series  of  proclamations  of  President  Andrew  John 
son,  made  from  May  22  to  August  29,  1865,  the  blockade 
of  Southern  ports  was  gradually  ended. 

WHAT  THE  NAVY  ACCOMPLISHED 

The  revolutionized  navy  accomplished  a  giant's  task. 
Brought  to  its  highest  state  of  perfection  by  Assistant 
Secretary  Fox,  it  co-operated  with  the  army  in  making 
the  Confederacy  an  island.  By  the  operations  on  the 
Mississippi,  it  split  the  South  in  two  and  cut  off  supplies 

4  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  December,  1865,  pp. 
viii,  ix. 


The  Navy  in  the  Civil  War  405 

from  the  West.  And  by  the  coast  blockade,  in  extent 
and  effectiveness  without  parallel  in  the  world's  history, 
it  rendered  incalculable  service.  While  it  remains  true 
that  the  Civil  War  was  primarily  a  military  war,  still 
the  army  received  great  help  from  the  navy,  and  vice 
versa.  The  Mississippi  could  probably  not  have  been 
opened  without  Farragut's  help,  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  navy  needed  a  Sherman  to  bring  about  the  capture 
of  Charleston. 


XXIV 

THE  NAVY  IN  THE  YEARS  OF  PEACE 

THE  PERIOD  OF  NAVAL  DECAY 

IN  the  brief  period  since  1850,  the  United  States  Navy 
had  been  revolutionized.  The  wooden  frigates  of  other 
days  were  supplanted  in  this  short  interval  by  ironclads 
propelled  by  steam.  So  great  was  this  sudden  change 
that  it  has  been  aptly  said  that  the  sailor  of  the  Invincible 
Armada  would  have  been  more  at  home  on  a  frigate  in 
1840,  than  the  "marline  spike  seaman  "  of  the  middle 
of  the  nineteenth  century  was  in  the  new  types  of  ships 
that  came  into  being  during  the  Civil  War.  In  other 
words,  three  centuries  had  not  effected  such  great  changes 
as  had  the  brief  quarter  of  a  century  ending  in  1865. 

These  revolutionary  changes  were  mainly  the  inven 
tion  of  rifled  guns,  the  heavy  smooth-bores  of  Dahlgren, 
and  the  torpedo ;  the  introduction  of  ironclads ;  and  the 
application  of  steam  to  ships  of  war.  Of  all  these  changes, 
perhaps  the  greatest  was  the  supplanting  of  sail  by  steam. 
This  made  possible  the  revival  of  the  ram,  which  had  gone 
out  after  the  oar-galleys  were  succeeded  by  sailing  vessels. 
The  first  forms  of  steam  ships,  the  side-wheelers,  were 
exceedingly  vulnerable ;  but  a  great  advance  was  made  by 
the  invention  of  the  screw-propeller,  which  permitted  the 
defense  of  the  machinery  by  submersion  and  by  armor- 
plating  on  the  sides.  And,  as  every  new  mode  of  defense 
leads  to  new  means  of  offense,  the  torpedo  was  devised 
for  use  against  the  under-water  body,  the  only  vulnerable 
part  of  this  latest  type  of  ironclad.  Thus  began  the  race, 
still  going  on,  between  armor  and  ordnance. 

But,  as  far  as  the  United  States  was  concerned,  the 

406 


' 


The  Period  of  Naval  Decay  407 

development  in  the  science  of  naval  warfare  that  had  been 
so  rapid  during  the  Civil  War  ceased  abruptly  with  its 
close.  The  nation,  weary  of  the  tremendous  burden  of 
armies  and  fleets,  demanded  a  wholesale  reduction  in  the 
military  establishment.  The  general  opinion  was  that  the 
chances  of  a  conflict  with  any  European  nation  were 
remote,  and  since  ships  and  men  had  been  forthcoming  in 
sufficient  numbers  to  crush  the  forces  of  secession  in  the 
greatest  civil  war  in  history,  there  would  be  time  enough 
to  raise  armies  and  build  fleets  when  another  war  came. 

For  the  reduction  of  the  navy  at  this  time  there  were 
also  special  reasons.  An  inventory  of  the  ships  made 
after  the  war  showed  that  most  of  them  were  unfit  because 
of  faulty  design,  the  use  of  unseasoned  timber,  and  hur 
ried  construction.  Common  sense  demanded  the  weeding 
out  of  these,  and  the  few  vessels  that  remained  Congress 
regarded  as  sufficient  for  a  peace  footing,  with  the  addi 
tion  of  four  new  monitors.  These  monitors,  however,  were 
built  in  the  style  prevailing  during  the  Civil  War,  with 
wooden  hulls  heavily  plated  with  iron ;  and  by  1874  they 
had  rotted  so  badly  that  they  were  ordered  broken  up 
and  rebuilt  in  iron.  Congress  subsequently  stopped  the 
work  of  reconstruction,  and  for  twenty  years  the  United 
States  had  not  a  single  armored  ship.  During  the  admin 
istration  of  President  Hayes  our  navy  was  inferior  to 
that  of  any  European  nation ;  even  Chile 's  two  ironclads, 
if  properly  handled,  would  have  been  more  than  a  match 
for  all  our  ships  combined.  The  most  discouraging  feature 
of  the  situation  was  that  the  navy  at  this  time  seemed  to 
be  without  friends  at  Washington,  and  the  country  at 
large  was  wholly  indifferent  to  its  needs.  All  naval  appro 
priations  that  could  be  got  out  of  Congress  were  designed 
to  keep  existing  ships  in  repair,  and  much  of  this  money 
was  wasted  because  the  congressmen  were  more  interested 
in  "making  business"  for  their  constituencies  than  in 


408  The  United  States  Navy 

repairing  the  ships.  The  Navy  Department,  in  order  to 
have  any  men-of-war  at  all,  was  forced  to  rebuild  ships 
under  the  old  names,  paying  for  them, out  of  the  proceeds 
from  the  sale  of  condemned  hulks  and  out  of  the  appro 
priation  for  ''repairs." 

One  excuse  can  be  offered  for  the  attitude  of  Congress 
towards  the  navy.  After  the  Civil  War,  changes  in  naval 
construction  followed  each  other  with  such  bewildering 
rapidity  that  naval  constructors  and  line  officers  held  the 
most  divergent  opinions  as  to  the  types  of  ship  worth 
building,  the  amount  of  sail  power  to  be  retained,  the 
kind  of  engines,  the  use  of  steel  or  iron,  the  amount  of 
armor  plate,  etc.  Naturally,  this  utter  lack  of  agreement 
among  the  experts  made  Congress  unwilling  to  appropriate 
money  for  new  vessels  which  might  prove  costly  blunders. 

The  year  1881,  when  Garfield  succeeded  to  the  Presi 
dency,  marks  the  lowest  point  to  which  the  navy  has  ever 
sunk  since  the  days  when  the  United  States  had  to  pay 
a  ransom  to  Algiers.  Out  of  the  140  vessels  on  the  navy 
list  in  1881,  twenty-five  were  tugs,  and  only  a  few  of  the 
rest  in  condition  to  make  a  cruise.  Not  a  single  ship 
was  fit  for  warfare.  An  engraving  published  in  1881 
pictured  the  "Fleet"  being  reviewed  by  the  President,  a 
pathetic  attempt  to  put  the  best  face  possible  on  our 
miserable  ships.  This  group  represented  the  best  dozen 
vessels  in  the  navy  at  that  time;  they  were  all  built  of 
wood,  and  included  not  only  the  side-wheel  steamer  Pow- 
liatan,  a  relic  of  the  forties,  but  also  the  ancient  frigate 
Constitution!  And  the  batteries  mounted  by  these  ships 
were  chiefly  smooth-bores  left  over  from  the  Civil  War. 
No  wonder  that  an  American  captain  in  those  days  was 
ashamed  to  take  his  ship  to  European  waters! 

If  the  year  1881  represents  the  lowest  ebb  in  the  Amer 
ican  Navy,  it  marks  also  the  turning  of  the  tide.  The 
policy  of  trusting  to  luck  in  our  relations  with  foreign 


The  Birth  of  the  New  Navy  409 

nations  began  to  lose  favor.  Long  before,  this  the  weak 
ness  of  our  navy  had  been  felt  during  the  strained  rela 
tions  with  Great  Britain  arising  from  the  Alabama  Claims 
shortly  after  the  war,  and  again  when  war  with  Spain 
seemed  imminent  over  the  Virginius  affair  in  1873.  And 
when,  in  1880,  France  laid  hands  on  the  Isthmus  of  Pana 
ma  without  any  regard  for  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  it  began 
to  dawn  on  the  Americans  that  European  nations  laughed 
at  the  demands  of  our  State  Department  when  backed 
by  nothing  better  than  a  few,  rotting,  wooden  hulls  mount 
ing  antiquated  guns. 

THE  BIRTH  OF  THE  NEW  NAVY 

The  first  step  toward  a  new  navy  was  taken  by  Sec 
retary  Hunt,  with  the  approval  of  President  Garfield,  in 
the  appointment  of  an  advisory  board  to  prepare  a  report 
on  the  needs  of  the  navy.  President  Arthur,  in  his  first 
annual  message  (1881),  declared  his  policy  in  regard  to 
the  navy  in  the  following  words,  "I  cannot  too  strongly 
urge  upon  you  my  conviction  that  every  consideration  of 
national  safety,  economy,  and  honor  imperatively  demands 
a  thorough  rehabilitation  of  the  navy."  Although  he 
was  hampered  by  the  reluctance  of  Congress,  President 
Arthur  succeeded  in  beginning  the  regeneration  of  the 
American  Navy. 

The  advisory  board,  mentioned  above,  recommended 
the  construction  of  thirty-eight  unarmored  cruisers,  five 
rams,  five  torpedo  gunboats,  ten  cruising  torpedo-boats, 
and  ten  harbor  torpedo-boats.  The  smaller  vessels  were 
to  be  all  of  steel,  and  of  the  cruisers  it  was  recommended 
that  eighteen  should  be  of  steel  and  twenty  of  wood. 
Strange  as  it  seems  now,  the  minority  members  of  the 
board,  including  three  naval  constructors  and  Chief 
Engineer  Isherwood — the  great  engineer  of  the  Civil 


410  The  United  States  Navy 

War — opposed  the  use  of  steel  and  recommended  iron, 
largely  on  the  ground  that  we  had  no  plants  capable  of 
producing  the  steel  required.  The  new  market,  however, 
created  new  plants  to  meet  its  needs,  and  the  decision  of 
the  majority  resulted  in  the  rapid  development  of  one  of 
the  greatest  American  industries,  the  manufacture  of 
steel. 

Congress  was  now  willing  to  do  something  to  better 
the  navy,  but  not  prepared  for  the  ambitious  program 
recommended  by  the  Advisory  Board.  The  House  Naval 
Committee  accepted  the  decision  on  steel  as  "the  only 
proper  material  for  the  construction  of  vessels  of  war," 
and  urged  the  building  of  two  cruisers  capable  of  an 
average  speed  of  fifteen  knots,  four  cruisers  capable  of  a 
speed  of  fourteen  knots,  and  one  ram.  It  ignored  the 
torpedo-boats  and  recommended  only  one  ram  because  it 
regarded  the  type  as  experimental. 

The  House  Committee  had  thus  made  a  sweeping  reduc 
tion  of  the  number  of  ships  called  for  by  the  Board,  but 
Congress  was  not  willing  to  go  even  as  far  as  the  Com 
mittee.  The  act  of  August  5,  1882,  called  for  only  "two 
steam  cruising  vessels  of  war  ...  to  be  constructed  of 
steel  of  domestic  manufacture:  .  .  .  said  vessels  to  be 
provided  with  full  sail  power  and  full  steam  power." 
Then  Congress  neglected  to  make  any  appropriation  for 
them!  The  only  effective  clause  of  this  act  was  a  pro 
vision  appointing  a  second  advisory  board.  This  board 
promptly  recommended  five  vessels,  one  of  about  4000 
tons,  three  of  about  2500  tons,  all  of  steel,  and  one  iron 
dispatch  boat  of  1500  tons. 

The  act  of  March  3,  1883,  provided  for  these  ships 
with  the  exception  of  one  of  the  smaller  cruisers.  These 
four,  the  first  of  the  "white  squadron,"  were  the  Chicago, 
the  Boston,  the  Atlanta,  and  the  Dolphin.  In  the  same 
year,  to  put  an  end  to  the  practice  of  rebuilding  old  ships 


The  Birth  of  the  New  Navy  411 

out  of  money  for  "repairs,"  Congress  prohibited  the 
repairing  of  any  wooden  vessel  when  it  amounted  to 
twenty  per  cent  of  the  cost  of  building  a  new  one.  This 
action  instantly  dropped  forty-six  ships  from  the  naval 
list.  Later  on  the  figure  was  changed  from  twenty  to 
ten  per  cent,  and  the  patchwork  policy  was  definitely 
abandoned. 

The  decay  of  the  navy  after  the  Civil  War  had 
resulted  in  the  lack  of  facilities  in  this  country  for  the 
manufacture  of  steel  plates  or  of  modern  ordnance. 
American  inventors  of  guns,  like  Hotchkiss,  for  example, 
had  been  compelled  to  go  abroad  to  sell  their  patents. 
When  in  1885  the  Government  was  ready  to  mount  modern 
guns  on  the  warships,  it  had  to  get  the  forgings  and  cast 
ings  abroad.  In  five  years,  however,  by  the  creation  of 
a  home  market  for  ships  and  guns,  manufacturing  plants 
were  developed  in  America  capable  of  turning  out  the 
highest  types  of  large  calibre  and  machine  guns,  as  well 
as  every  other  requisite  for  the  construction  of  a  modern 
battleship. 

Four  more  vessels  were  ordered  in  1885,  the  cruisers 
Newark  and  Charleston,  and  the  gunboats  Yorktown  and 
Petrel.  The  Charleston  was  the  first  of  our  men-of-war 
to  abandon  sail  power  and  to  use  only  military  masts.  The 
following  year  Congress  ordered  the  completion  of  the 
four  monitors,  work  on  which  had  been  suspended  twelve 
years  before,  and  the  construction  of  one  other.  These 
were  the  Miantonomoh,  Amphitrite,  Monadnock,  Terror, 
and  Monterey.  With  each  succeeding  year  thereafter, 
new  vessels  were  added.  In  1890  the  Government  took  a 
long  stride  forward  in  naval  construction ;  hitherto  there 
were  no  ships  larger  than  cruisers,  but  in  this  year  Con 
gress  authorized  three  first-class  battleships — the  Indiana, 
the  Massachusetts,  and  the  Oregon.  Eight  years  later 
our  successes  in  the  War  with  Spain  gave  the  navy  a 


412  The  United  States  Navy 

tremendous  impetus,  which  has  since  put  the  United  States 
for  the  first  time  in  the  front  rank  among  the  naval 
powers  of  the  world. 


THE  NAVY  IN  POLAR  EXPLORATION 

The  years  of  peace  have  afforded  splendid  instances 
of  heroism  in  the  service  of  polar  exploration,  which  are 
well  worthy  to  rank  with  the  more  famous  deeds  of  war. 
The  record  begins  with  the  year  1837,  when  an  expedi 
tion  was  fitted  out  for  "maritime  observation"  in  the 
South  Pacific  and  Antarctic.  So  much  quarrelling  marked 
the  organization  of  the  expedition  that  several  officers  in 
turn  declined  to  accept  the  command.  Finally  it  was 
given  to  a  junior  officer,  Lieutenant  Charles  Wilkes, 
U.  S.  N.,  noted  later  for  his  connection  with  the  "Trent 
affair. ' '  The  squadron  consisted  of  five  small  ships  rang 
ing  from  780  to  96  tons,  "  wretchedly  prepared  for  an 
extended  voyage,  and  especially  unsuited  for  Antarctic 
navigation. ' ' *  However,  what  his  expedition  lacked  in 
equipment,  Wilkes  very  nearly  made  up  by  his  resource 
fulness,  persistence,  and  courage.  It  was  not  until  fur 
ther  exploration  was  a  physical  impossibility  that  he 
reluctantly  turned  his  ice-shattered  squadron  home.2 
The  most  important  result  of  his  voyage  of  three  years 
and  ten  months  was  conclusive  evidence  as  to  the  exist 
ence  of  the  Antarctic  continent,  which  had  been  a  matter 
of  speculation.  The  next  naval  expedition  and  all  sub 
sequent  ones  were  sent  to  the  Arctic. 

In  the  spring  of  1845  Captain  Sir  John  Franklin,  of 
the  British  Navy,  set  sail  with  two  ships  to  discover  the 
Northwest  Passage.  The  last  message  received  from  him 

1Greely,  Handbook  of  Arctic  Discoveries,  p.  289. 
2  One  of  his  vessels  was  lost  with  all  on  board. 


The  Search  for  Franklin  413 

by  the  Admiralty  was  dated  the  following  July,  and 
although  the  squadron  was  fitted  out  with  supplies  for 
three  years,  as  time  went  by  with  no  word  whatever  from 
the  party,  anxiety  deepened,  and  one  relief  expedition 
after  another  was  dispatched.  In  1850  American  sym 
pathy  was  represented  by  a  squadron  of  two  ships  under 
Lieutenant  E.  J.  De  Haven,  U.  S.  N.  The  expenses  of  the 
enterprise  were  shared  by  private  subscription,  headed  by 
Mr.  Grinnell  of  New  York,  and  by  the  Government.  The 
American  vessels  entered  northern  waters  almost  at  the 
same  time  as  those  of  English  relief  parties.  No  clues 
except  a  few  graves  of  the  Franklin  party  were  dis 
covered.  In  August  Lieutenant  De  Haven  decided  to 
return,  but  a  succession  of  gales,  combined  with  severe 
cold,  caught  his  ships  before  he  could  reach  clear  water. 
The  two  vessels  were  frozen  into  the  ice  pack,  and  drifted 
helplessly  with  the  currents.  The  imprisonment  lasted 
over  eight  months,  and  all  the  while  the  two  vessels  were 
in  daily  peril  of  being  crushed.  The  life  on  board  was  made 
almost  unendurable  by  the  strain  of  constant  danger,  the 
monotony,  the  privations,  and  the  fearful  cold,  against 
which  there  was  no  adequate  protection.  For  1050  miles 
the  ships  were  carried  by  the  drift  before  the  midsummer 
sun  released  them  from  their  prison  of  ice.  During  the 
northerly  drift  of  the  floe,  De  Haven  discovered  Mur- 
daugh  Island  and  the  wide  plateau  to  which  he  gave  the 
name  "Grinnell  Land."  His  ships  were  so  weakened  by 
the  strain  they  had  undergone,  that  he  abandoned  the  idea 
of  continuing  the  search  for  the  Franklin  party,  and  sailed 
for  the  United  States,  reaching  New  York  on  September 
30,  1851. 

The  next  expedition  had  for  its  aim  the  discovery  of 
the  Pole.  In  the  summer  of  1879  a  party  left  San  Fran 
cisco  in  the  steamer  Jeannette,  Lieutenant-Commander 


414  The  United  States  Navy 

G.  W.  De  Long,  U.  S.  N.,  commanding.  It  was  organized 
by  James  Gordon  Bennett,  proprietor  of  the  New  York 
Herald,  with  the  co-operation  of  the  Government.  It 
was  known  that  the  Japanese  current  splits  in  Behring 
Strait,  sending  one  branch  to  the  west  coast  of  North 
America,  and  the  other  into  the  Arctic  Ocean  in  a  north 
easterly  direction.  Before  this  time  no  polar  explorers 
had  ever  set  out  by  way  of  Behring  Strait,  and  the  idea 
of  the  Jeannette  party  was  to  try  to  reach  the  Pole  by 
following  this  northeasterly  branch  of  the  Japanese  cur 
rent.  The  first  voyage,  however,  was  to  be  more  of  a 
preliminary  or  experimental  nature  than  of  an  actual 
dash  for  the  Pole. 

The  Jeannette  early  encountered  ice  floes,  which 
crowded  her  off  her  intended  course.  Finally,  De  Long 
decided  to  winter  at  Wrangell  Land,  then  supposed  to  be 
part  of  a  huge  Arctic  continent.  By  September  6,  the 
vessel  was  wedged  and  frozen  solidly  into  a  floe  and 
carried  to  the  northwest  of  Wrangell  Land,  which  proved 
to  be  only  a  small  island.  All  winter  she  drifted  with  the 
ice,  in  imminent  danger  of  being  crushed.  Once  she  cer 
tainly  would  have  foundered  but  for  the  skill  of  her 
chief  engineer,  G.  W.  Melville.  Summer  did  not  bring 
the  party  their  expected  release,  and  still  another  year 
dragged  by  in  the  icy  prison,  with  only  sickness  to  vary 
the  fearful  monotony  of  their  existence.  Finally,  on 
June  12,  1881,  the  long-threatened  disaster  fell — the 
Jeannette  was  sunk  by  the  ice,  leaving  her  people  stranded 
on  the  floes  in  mid  ocean.  To  add  to  the  hardships  of  their 
situation,  two  of  the  officers  and  three  of  the  men  were 
sick,  provisions  were  scanty,  and  the  clothing  of  the  entire 
party  was  so  worn  that  many  a  march  had  to  be  made 
over  the  snow  and  ice  with  bare  feet. 

There  was  one  chance  of  escape,  and  that  was  to  reach 
the  settlements  on  the  Lena  delta,  500  miles  away.  To  this 


The  Jeannette  Expedition  415 

end  De  Long  and  his  men  laid  their  course,  partly  by 
boat  and  partly  by  sledge.  Unluckily,  at  the  outset  they 
had  against  them  the  northerly  drift  of  the  ice  floes, 
which  carried  them  twenty-eight  miles  in  the  opposite 
direction,  to  the  northernmost  point  ever  reached  in  that 
sea,  before  they  could  make  any  gains  to  the  southward. 

On  September  12,  exactly  three  months  after  their 
desperate  retreat  began,  the  three  boats  of  the  expedition 
were  separated  by  a  violent  gale,  just  off  the  Lena  delta. 
Melville,  commanding  the  whale  boat,  entered  a  mouth  of 
the  Lena  and  succeeded,  with  his  nine  men,  in  reaching  a 
Siberian  village  on  its  banks,  after  fearful  sufferings. 
The  second  cutter,  commanded  by  Lieutenant  Chipp, 
evidently  foundered,  for  nothing  was  ever  heard  or  seen 
of  it  or  its  crew  after  the  night  of  the  storm.  The  first 
cutter,  under  Commander  De  Long,  with  the  surgeon  and 
twelve  men,  succeeded  in  entering  the  Lena  delta,  and 
struggled  southwards. 

It  was  the  fate  of  this  party  not  to  meet  any  of  the 
natives  of  the  region  or  to  know  of  villages  nearby  which 
might  have  proved  their  salvation.  They  were  soon  fac 
ing  death  from  starvation.  De  Long,  remaining  with  his 
sick  and  dying,  dispatched  his  two  strongest  seamen  to 
hasten  up  the  course  of  the  Lena  and  bring  relief.  By 
the  end  of  October  these  men  managed  to  reach  a  village, 
more  dead  than  alive.  They  gave  one  of  the  natives  a 
pencil  message  to  be  taken  with  quickest  dispatch  to  the 
nearest  Russian  official,  thence  to  be  forwarded  to  St. 
Petersburg;  but  the  native,  having  heard  that  another 
American — Melville — was  in  the  neighborhood,  carried 
the  dispatch  to  him. 

This  was  the  first  word  Melville  had  heard  from  his 
shipmates,  and  although  the  early  winter  had  set  in,  and 
his  feet  and  legs  were  still  in  such  condition  from  frost 
bite  that  he  was  unable  to  stand,  he  organized  a  sledging 


416  The  United  States  Navy 

outfit  and  made  the  journey  to  the  village  where  the  two 
survivors  were.  Thence,  with  these  two  seamen  and  some 
native  guides,  he  started  north  to  find  De  Long  and  his 
men.  At  various  points,  along  the  river  he  found  records 
left  by  De  Long,  but  was  baffled  by  the  fact  that  De  Long 
had,  toward  the  end  of  his  march,  crossed  on  the  ice  to  the 
opposite  banks.  The  search  was  blocked  by  a  furious 
snowstorm  on  November  14,  and  Melville  narrowly  missed 
giving  his  own  life  in  the  vain  quest. 

As  early  as  possible  the  following  spring  he  renewed 
his  search,  and  on  the  23d  of  March,  1882,  he  came  upon 
the  bodies  of  De  Long  and  his  men.  The  last  entry  in  the 
commander's  diary  was  October  30,  1881,  recording  briefly 
the  death  of  tAvo  and  the  approaching  end  of  a  third  in  the 
party.  Probably  by  the  first  of  November  the  last  man 
had  died  of  starvation. 

Meanwhile,  in  1881,  a  party  under  Lieutenant  A.  W. 
Greely,  IT.  S.  A.,  had  gone  north  for  three  years  of  explora 
tion  and  scientific  observation  in  Grinnell  Land.  A  store 
ship  was  to  be  sent  them  in  1882,  and  another  in  1883.  As 
it  happened,  the  first  supply  ship  was  unable,  on  account 
of  ice,  to  reach  either  Fort  Conger  or  Lady  Franklin  Bay, 
and  instead  of  leaving  the  supplies  in  a  "  cache ' '  on  shore, 
returned  to  the  United  States  with  everything  on  board. 
The  second  vessel  was  sunk  by  the  ice,  its  crew  returning 
on  the  steamer  Y  antic  which  accompanied  it.  The  failure 
of  these  two  expeditions  made  the  situation  of  the  Greely 
party  critical.  While  Congress  wasted  valuable  time  in 
quarrels  over  the  necessary  appropriation,  Secretary 
Chandler  took  the  responsibility  on  himself  of  purchasing 
two  Scotch  whalers,  the  Bear  and  the  Thetis,  and  fitting 
them  out  to  undertake  the  rescue  at  the  earliest  prac 
ticable  moment  in  the  summer  of  1884.  Queen  Victoria 
gracefully  repaid  the  American  efforts  for  the  relief  of 


The  Arctic  Regions 


417 


418  The  United  States  Navy 

the  Franklin  party  by  contributing  the  Alert,  a  ship  espe 
cially  designed  for  polar  service  and  regarded  as  the 
stoutest  wooden  vessel  afloat.  The  squadron  of  three 
vessels  was  placed  under  Commander  W.  S.  Schley,  who 
conducted  the  relief  with  the  most  praiseworthy  skill  and 
dispatch.  On  June  22,  1884,  they  discovered  the  sur 
vivors  of  the  Greely  party,  including  Lieutenant  Greely 
himself,  in  a  tent  on  Cape  Sabine,  and  conveyed  them  to 
the  ships,  with  the  greatest  difficulty,  during  a  violent 
gale.  These  survivors  were  almost  at  the  point  of  death 
from  starvation,  but  all  except  one  recovered  on  the 
return  voyage  to  the  United  States.  The  indomitable 
Melville  had  returned  from  Siberia  just  in  time  to  go 
north  again  with  the  Schley  expedition,  and  was  one  of 
the  first  to  clasp  hands  with  Lieutenant  Greely  in  the 
tent  on  Cape  Sabine. 

The  conquest  of  the  Pole  was  at  last  accomplished  by 
an  officer  of  the  American  Navy  after  a  siege  of  twenty- 
three  years.  In  1886,  Civil  Engineer  Robert  E.  Peary, 
U.  S.  N.,  made  a  reconnoissance  of  the  Greenland  ice  cap. 
In  1891—2  he  discovered  and  named  Melville  Land  and 
Heilprin  Land,  lying  beyond  Greenland,  and  by  the  same 
expedition  he  determined  the  insularity  of  Greenland. 
The  ten  years  between  1892  and  1902  were  spent  in  explora 
tion.  In  the  expedition  of  1898-1902  Peary  attained  a 
new  "farthest  north"  for  the  western  hemisphere.3  His 
expedition  of  1905-1909,  with  the  Roosevelt,  was  crowned 
with  success.  On  April  6,  1909,  the  climax  of  all  northern 
exploration  was  reached,  and  the  American  flag  was 
unfurled  at  the  North  Pole.  The  attainment  of  this  point 
revealed  the  fact  that  the  supposed  Polar  continent  did 

'Till  then  the  farthest  north  had  been  a  point  reached  by 
Lieutenant  Lockwood,  U.  S.  A.,  a  member  of  the  Greely  expedition. 


Diplomatic  Services  419 

not  exist,  and  that  the  pole  was  only  a  point  in  the  ice- 
covered  Arctic  sea. 

Peary's  success  was  the  logical  outcome  of  his  years 
of  preparation.  .  Every  expedition  heretofore  had  been 
defective  in  important  details  of  planning  and  equipment. 
Peary  made  the  most  of  the  experience  of  each  voyage. 
He  established  the  most  practicable  route  to  the  Pole,  he 
invented  his  own  sledge  to  meet  the  local  conditions,  and, 
in  short,  reduced,  detail  by  detail,  the  whole  problem  of 
Arctic  exploration  to  a  science. 


DIPLOMATIC  SERVICES  OF  NAVAL  OFFICERS 

The  exploit  of  Commodore  Matthew  C.  Perry,  in  1854, 
in  opening  the  trade  of  Japan  to  the  world,  thus  induc 
ing  the  "  Hermit  Nation  "  to  take  her  rightful  place 
in  the  family  of  nations,  is  probably  the  greatest  feat 
of  the  kind  in  the  history  of  the  world.  But  it  is  by 
no  means  the  only  instance  of  the  navy's  being  called  on 
to  act  in  a  diplomatic  capacity. 

In  the  famous  letter  of  Paul  Jones  to  the  Marine 
Committee  (September,  1775),  defining  the  duties  of  the 
naval  officer,  occurs  this  passage:  "The  naval  officer 
should  be  familiar  with  the  principles  of  international 
law.  ...  He  should  also  be  conversant  with  the  usages 
of  diplomacy  and  capable  of  maintaining,  if  called  upon, 
a  dignified  and  judicious  diplomatic  correspondence; 
because  it  often  happens  that  sudden  emergencies  in 
foreign  waters  make  him  the  diplomatic  as  well  as  mili 
tary  representative  of  his  country,  and  in  such  cases  he 
may  have  to  act  without  opportunity  of  consulting  civic 
or  ministerial  superiors  at  home,  and  such  action  may 
easily  involve  the  portentous  issue  of  peace  or  war  between 
great  powers."  The  introduction  of  cables  and  wireless 
plants  has  in  nowise  lessened  this  service,  for,  seemingly, 


420  The  United  States  Navy 

instructions  that  leave  the  conduct  of  affairs,  often  of  the 
most  delicate  and  important  nature,  to  the  "discretion  and 
sound  judgment"  of  the  senior  naval  officer  present,  are 
issued  as  frequently  as  in  the  earlier  period  of  our  history. 
A  reading  between  the  lines  of  some  of  the  paragraphs 
of  the  navy  blue  book  is  enough  to  show  the  extent 
and  nature  of  the  mental  equipment  required  for  the 
successful  performance  of  the  trying  duties  that  so  often 
confront  the  officer  in  times  of  peace.  For  instance,  the 
commander-in-chief  of  a  naval  force,  in  the  absence  of  a 
diplomatic  or  consular  officer  of  the  United  States  at  a 
foreign  port  has  authority— 

(a)  To  exercise  the  powers  of  a  consul  in  relation  to 
mariners  of  the  United  States ; 

(6)  To  communicate  or  remonstrate  with  foreign  civil 
authorities  as  may  be  necessary ; 

(c*)  To  urge  upon  citizens  of  the  United  States  the 
necessity  of  abstaining  from  participation  in  political 
controversies  or  violations  of  the  laws  of  neutrality. 

"On  occasions  wiiere  injury  to  the  United  States  or 
to  citizens  thereof  is  committed  or  threatened,  in  viola 
tion  of  the  principles  of  international  law  or  treaty  rights, 
he  shall  .  .  .  take  such  steps  as  the  gravity  of  the  case 
demands.  .  .  .  The  responsibility  of  any  action  taken 
by  a  naval  force,  however,  rests  wholly  upon  the  com 
manding  officer  thereof. ' ' 

"Although  due  weight  should  be  given  to  the  opinions 
and  advice  of  the  consular  and  diplomatic  representa 
tives  of  the  United  States,  a  commanding  officer  is  solely 
and  entirely  responsible  to  his  own  immediate  superior 
for  all  official  acts  in  the  administration  of  his  command. ' ' 

' '  The  use  of  force  against  a  foreign  and  friendly  state, 
or  against  anyone  within  the  territories  thereof,  is  illegal. 
The  right  to  self-preservation,  however,  is  a  right  which 
belongs  to  states  as  well  as  to  individuals,  and  in  the  case 


Diplomatic  Services  421 

of  states  it  includes  the  protection  of  the  state,  its  honor, 
and  its  possessions,  and  the  lives  and  property  of  its  citi 
zens  against  arbitrary  violence,  actual  or  impending, 
whereby  the  state  or  its  citizens  may  suffer  irreparable 
injury.  The  conditions  calling  for  the  application  of  the 
right  of  self-preservation  can  not  be  denned  beforehand, 
but  must  be  left  to  the  sound  judgment  of  responsible 
officers,  who  are  to  perform  their  duties  in  this  respect 
with  all  possible  care  and  forbearance." 

"He  shall  exercise  great  care  that  all  under  his  com 
mand  scrupulously  respect  the  territorial  authority  of 
foreign  civilized  nations  in  amity  with  the  United  States. ' ' 

"So  far  as  lies  within  their  power,  commanders-in- 
chief  and  captains  of  ships  shall  protect  all  merchant 
vessels  of  the  United  States  in  lawful  occupations,  and 
advance  the  commercial  interests  of  this  country,  always 
acting  in  accordance  with  international  law  and  treaty 
obligations." 

Two  prominent  things  are  noted  in  the  above:  first, 
the  requirement  of  a  thorough  knowledge  of  international 
law  and  various  treaty  provisions;  second,  the  insistence 
upon  the  responsibility  remaining,  in  all  circumstances, 
with  the  naval  officer — a  responsibility  not  lessened  by 
advice  from  diplomats,  nor  removed  by  general  instruc 
tions  from  the  Government.  The  officer  must  decide,  and 
quickly,  grave  questions  that  may  involve  peace  or  war. 

That  the  confidence  reposed  in  the  abilities  of  officers 
by  both  the  Navy  and  State  departments  has  not  been 
misplaced,  is  shown  by  many  instances  of  fine  work  done 
by  naval  officers  in  various  ports  of  the  world. 

President  Cleveland,  in  one  of  his  annual  messages, 
wrote:  "  It  appearing  at  an  early  state  of  the  Brazilian 
insurrection  that  its  course  would  call  for  unusual  watch 
fulness  on  the  part  of  the  Government,  our  naval  force 
in  the  harbor  of  Rio  de  Janeiro  was  strengthened.  Our 


The  United  States  Navy 

firm  attitude  of  neutrality  was  maintained  to  the  end. 
The  insurgents  received  no  encouragement  of  eventual 
asylum  from  our  commanders."  Again,  in  the  same 
message  it  is  reported  that ' '  our  naval  commanders  at  the 
scene  of  disturbances  in  Bluefields,  Nicaragua,  by  their 
constant  exhibition  of  firmness  and  good  judgment,  con 
tributed  largely  to  the  prevention  of  more  serious  con 
sequences  and  to  the  restoration  of  quiet  and  order.  .  .  . 
Although  the  practice  of  asylum  is  not  favored  by  this 
Government,  yet  in  view  of  the  imminent  peril  which 
threatened  the  fugitives,  and  solely  from  considerations 
of  humanity,  they  were  afforded  shelter  by  our  naval 
commander. ' ' 

An  event  in  which  readiness  in  dealing  with  a  critical 
situation  was  strikingly  shown,  occurred  in  the  Brazilian 
insurrection  of  1894.  The  Brazilian  Navy  was  in  pos 
session  of  the  revolutionists,  who  held  the  bay  of  Rio 
de  Janeiro,  where  much  interference  was  made  with  the 
movements  of  peaceful  merchantmen.  Saldanha  da 
Gama,  the  rebel  leader,  threatened  to  fire  on  any  ship 
that  should  go  to  the  piers  to  discharge  its  cargo;  and 
merchantmen,  despite  the  fact  that  yellow  fever  was 
decimating  their  crews,  were  obliged  to  lie  out  in  the  bay 
and  await  the  end  of  the  war. 

Such  was  the  condition  of  affairs  when  Rear-Admiral 
A.  E.  K.  Benham,  IT.  S.  N.,  arrived.  He  at  once  told  the 
American  captains  to  go  to  the  piers  and  trust  him  to 
protect  them  from  harm.  Inspirited  by  this  promise, 
Captain  Blackford,  of  the  bark  Amy,  and  two  other 
captains,  gave  notice  on  Sunday,  January  29,  1894,  that 
they  would  take  their  ships  in  to  the  wharves  on  the 
following  morning.  Da  Gama,  hearing  of  this,  made 
proclamation  that  he  would  fire  on  any  vessel  that  ven 
tured  to  do  so,  and  a  conflict  seemed  impending.  The 
commanders  of  the  war-vessels  of  other  nations  looked 


Diplomatic  Services  423 

anxiously  to  see  if  the  American  admiral  would  hold  fast 
to  his  position.  Day  had  hardly  dawned  before  active 
preparations  were  visible  on  the  small  American  squadron, 
which  was  soon  cleared  for  action,  the  cruiser  Detroit 
taking  a  station  from  which  she  could  command  two  of 
Da  Gama's  vessels,  the  Guanabara  and  the  Trajano. 

When  the  Detroit  reached  her  station,  the  Amy  began 
to  warp  in  towards  her  pier.  From  the  Guanabara  came 
a  warning  musket  shot.  In  an  instant  more  a  ball  from 
the  Detroit  hurtled  across  the  bow  of  the  Brazilian,  fol 
lowed  by  another  that  struck  her  side.  These  were  in 
the  way  of  admonition.  Seeing  a  couple  of  tugs  maneuver 
ing  as  if  with  purpose  to  ram  his  vessel,  Commander 
Brownson  took  the  Detroit  in  between  the  two  Brazilian 
warships,  and  occupied  a  position  that  would  have  enabled 
him  to  sink  them  and  their  tugs  at  the  same  time. 

This  decisive  action  ended  the  affair.  No  further 
shot  came  from  a  Brazilian  gun,  and  the  Amy,  followed 
by  the  other  two  vessels,  made  her  way  unharmed  to  the 
wharves. 

President  McKinley's  message  of  December,  1898,  con 
tained  the  following:  "A  menacing  rupture  between 
Costa  Rica  and  Nicaragua  was  happily  composed  by  the 
signature  of  a  convention  between  the  parties,  the  act 
being  negotiated  and  signed  on  board  the  United  States 
steamer  Alert,  then  lying  in  Central  American  waters.  It 
is  believed  that  the  good  offices  of  the  commander  of  that 
vessel  contributed  largely  toward  this  gratifying  out 
come."  Another  incident  involving  the  navy  is  referred 
to  in  the  same  message:  "Pending  the  consideration  of 
the  treaty  providing  for  the  annexation  of  the  Hawaiian 
Islands,  I  directed  the  U.  S.  S.  Philadelphia  to  convey 
Rear-Admiral  Miller  to  Honolulu,  and  intrusted  to  his 
hands  an  important  legislative  act,  to  be  delivered  to  the 
President  of  the  Hawaiian  Republic,  with  whom  the 


424  The  United  States  Navy 

admiral  and  the  minister  were  authorized  to  make  appro 
priate  arrangements  for  transferring  the  sovereignty  of 
the  islands  to  the  United  States. ' ' 

That  Admiral  Dewey's  valuable  services  did  not  end 
with  the  battle  of  Manila  Bay  is  shown  by  the  words  of 
the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  on  the  occasion  of  the  presen 
tation  of  a  sword,  the  nation's  gift,  October  3,  1899: 
"Later  [after  the  battle],  by  your  display  of  large  powers 
of  administration,  by  your  poise  and  prudence,  and  by 
your  great  discretion,  not  only  in  act  but  also  in  word, 
you  proved  yourself  a  great  representative  citizen  of  the 
United  States,  as  well  as  already  its  great  naval  hero." 

Finally,  President  McKinley,  in  1899,  wrote:  "The 
habitual  readiness  of  the  navy  for  every  emergency  has 
won  the  confidence  and  admiration  of  the  country.  The 
officers  have  shown  peculiar  adaptation  for  the  perform 
ance  of  new  and  delicate  duties  which  our  recent  war  has 
imposed." 

Thus  ministers,  secretaries,  and  presidents  acknowl 
edge  the  indebtedness  of  the  country  to  the  services  of 
naval  officers  in  the  preservation  of  order,  the  settlement 
of  difficult  problems,  and  the  upholding  of  the  country's 
honor. 

A  survey  of  the  general  work  of  officers  other  than  that 
directly  connected  with  the  preparation  and  conduct  of 
war  is  arrested  at  once  by  the  name  of  Rear- Admiral  A.  T. 
Mahan.  Uniting  as  he  does  the  professional  knowledge 
of  the  naval  officer  with  the  endowment  of  the  scholar  and 
historian,  he  stands  unique,  and  enjoys  a  reputation  as 
an  expert  in  naval  matters  even  higher  in  Germany  and 
England  than  in  the  United  States.  "It  is  a  mere 
truism,"  writes  a  British  naval  authority,  "to  say  that 
Captain  Mahan  has  taught  all  serious  students  of  naval 
warfare  in  two  worlds  how  to  think  rightly  on  the  prob- 


Special  Duties  425 

lems  it  presents.  The  phrase  'sea  power,'  as  applied, 
though  not  invented,  by  him,  is  one  of  those  happy 
inspirations  of  genius  which  flash  the  light  of  philosophy 
on  a  whole  department  of  human  action. ' '  * 

The  work  of  Rear- Admiral  Mahan  is  personal  and,  as 
we  have  said,  unique ;  but  there  are  many  other  services  of 
a  non-military  character  of  great  importance,  which  any 
naval  officer  is  liable  to  be  called  on  to  perform.  Such 
are  the  duties  relating  to  surveying,  the  making  of  charts, 
scientific  expeditions,  services  with  international  peace 
conferences,  relief  expeditions  on  the  occasion  of  great 
calamities,  and  the  like.  Rear-Admiral  Pillsbury's 
exhaustive  survey  and  investigation  of  the  Gulf  Stream; 
the  preparation  and  correction  of  charts  and  sailing 
directions  by  the  officers  of  the  Hydrographic  Office; 
scientific  work  by  officers  of  the  Albatross  in  connection 
with  the  Fisheries  Commission;  the  services  of  Rear- 
Admiral  Sperry  at  peace  conferences  in  Switzerland  and 
Holland ;  the  duty  of  Rear- Admiral  Davis  as  a  member  of 
the  board  appointed  to  investigate  the  Dogger  Bank 
incident  in  the  North  Sea,  an  incident  that  threatened 
for  a  time  war  between  England  and  Russia ;  the  prompt 
aid  given  by  the  Battle  Fleet  to  the  earthquake  sufferers 
in  Italy ;  Lieutenant  Bernadou  's  chemical  researches .  in 
smokeless  powder — all  these  testify  to  the  demands  made 
upon  the  profession  when  the  horizon  is  free  from  war 
clouds,  and  emphasize  the  need  of  preparation  for  work 
in  many  fields  of  labor  far  removed  from  the  pomp  and 
circumstance  of  war. 

4  Thursfield,  Nelson  and  Other  Naval  Studies,  p.  82. 


XXV 

WAR  WITH  SPAIN:    THE  BATTLE  OF 
MANILA  BAY 

CAUSES  OF  THE  WAR 

THE  intervention  of  the  United  States  on  behalf  of 
Cuba,  against  the  mother  country  Spain,  was  the  logical 
result  of  many  years  of  misrule  in  the  island.  The  unwise 
and  sometimes  cruel  governors  were  responsible  for  con 
stant  insurrections,  which  provoked  filibustering  on  the 
part  of  American  sympathizers  and  caused  almost  inces 
sant  friction  between  our  country  and  Spain.  In  1854 
the  seizure  of  the  American  ship  Black  Warrior,  on  a 
charge  of  violating  the  custom-house  regulations,  seriously 
menaced  our  peace.  Again,  in  1869,  the  seizure  and  long 
detention  of  the  American  steamer  Colonel  Lloyd  Aspin- 
wall,  on  the  apparently  unfounded  charge  of  landing 
arms  for  the  insurgents,  excited  public  feeling.  And  in 
1873,  when  the  Spaniards  captured  the  filibuster  Virginius 
(claiming  American  registry)  and  summarily  shot  several 
Americans  in  her  crew,  there  was  a  burst  of  indignation 
throughout  the  United  States.  In  each  case  war  was 
averted  by  Spain's  making  a  tardy  reparation,  but  the 
settlement  served  only  to  postpone  the  final  conflict. 

In  1876  General  Campos  was  sent  to  Cuba.  Adopt 
ing  a  conciliatory  tone,  he  brought  peace  to  the  island, 
which  lasted  from  1878  to  1895.  Then  an  insurrection 
occurred  which  he  was  unable  to  suppress.  He  resigned, 
in  consequence,  and  was  succeeded  by  General  Weyler 
in  February,  1896.  This  governor  determined  to  rule 
with  an  iron  hand.  He  decreed  the  death  penalty  for 
numerous  petty  offenses,  and  by  his  reconcentration  policy 

426 


Copyrighted,  1903,  by  Clinedinst,  Washington 

GEORGE  DEWEY 


Causes  of  the  Spanish-American  War     427 

huddled  the  people  into  the  cities  so  that  plantations  were 
left  uncultivated.  Cuba  now  entered  upon  a  terrible  era 
of  famine  and  desolation.  President  Cleveland  offered, 
through  Secretary  Olney,  to  help  Spain  in  bringing  peace 
to  the  island,  but  the  offer  was  refused.  Relief,  in  the 
form  of  food  and  supplies,  was  sent  to  Cuba  by  our 
Government  and  by  charitable  associations.  Weyler  was 
recalled  in  October,  1897,  and  the  new  Spanish  ministry 
under  Sagasta  sent  General  Blanco,  an  honest  but  weak 
governor,  to  bring  order  out  of  chaos.  Blanco  offered 
autonomy  to  the  Cubans,  but  could  not  induce  the  insur 
gent  leaders  to  listen  to  him.  The  good  intentions  of 
Spain  came  too  late. 

The  distress  in  the  island  became  greater.  Consul- 
General  Lee  reported  to  Washington,  in  May,  1897,  that 
from  600  to  800  Americans  were  among  the  destitute. 
President  McKinley  made  a  public  appeal  for  funds, 
which  resulted  in  contributions  amounting  to  $200,000. 
The  American  Red  Cross  Society  took  charge  of  the  relief 
work.  Meanwhile,  Congress  was  from  time  to  time  debat 
ing  whether  or  not  to  recognize  Cuba  as  a  belligerent,  or 
even  as  an  independent  state.  In  our  country  at  large, 
the  activity  of  Cuban  agents  and  sympathizers  in  the 
United  States,  and  the  inflammatory  editorials  of  certain 
of  our  newspapers,  increased  the  popular  feeling  against 
Spain.  Moreover,  affairs  in  Havana  had  assumed  so 
threatening  an  aspect  that  Consul  Lee  feared  for  the 
safety  of  our  citizens  in  that  city.  Hence  the  battleship 
Maine,  which  had  been  lying  for  some  time  at  Key  West 
in  readiness  for  an  emergency  call,  was  sent  to  Havana, 
where  she  arrived  on  January  25,  1898. 

A  succession  of  events  followed  that  had  an  important 
bearing  in  fanning  into  flame  the  smoldering  fires  of  war. 
On  February  9,  1898,  a  private  letter,  written  by  the 
Spanish  minister  at  Washington  to  the  editor  of  a 


428  The  United  States  Navy 

Madrid  newspaper,  had,  through  theft  in  the  Havana 
post  office,  come  into  the  hands  of  the  insurgents.  In 
this  communication  the  diplomatist  had  declared  that 
Sagasta's  policy  of  conciliation  was  "a  loss  of  time  and 
a  step  in  the  wrong  direction."  Commenting  on  a  mes 
sage  of  President  McKinley,  he  had  characterized  the 
American  executive  as  "weak  and  catering  to  the  mob," 
and  had  used  other  objectionable  language.  The  publica 
tion  of  this  letter  aroused  the  wrath  of  the  American 
people.  Instead  of  peremptorily  recalling  her  representa 
tive,  Spain  allowed  him  to  resign,  and  sent  another  in 
his  place.  This  scant  reparation  for  a  serious  offense  did 
not  help  matters.  To  cap  the  climax,  a  few  days  later 
the  people  of  the  United  States  were  horrified  to  hear  of 
the  blowing  up  of  one  of  their  finest  battleships  in  Cuban 
waters. 

On  February  15,  1898,  the  Maine,  after  an  uneventful 
three  weeks  at  Havana,  was  lying  in  apparent  security 
moored  to  a  buoy  500  yards  from  the  arsenal ;  about  200 
yards  distant  lay  the  Ward  Line  steamer  City  of  Wash 
ington,  and  a  little  farther  off  the  Spanish  cruiser 
Alphonso  XII.  At  9.45  that  evening,  without  the  slightest 
warning,  there  was  an  explosion  under  the  keel  of  the 
Maine,  so  violent  as  to  shake  the  whole  water  front  of  the 
city,  put  out  the  adjacent  electric  lights,  and  throw  down 
many  telephone  poles.  The  unfortunate  ship  had  been 
wrecked  in  a  moment's  time,  and  her  total  destruction 
followed  in  a  great  flame  that  shot  up  from  her  magazines, 
illuminating  the  whole  harbor,  and  showing  to  the  hurry 
ing  people  on  shore  the  locality  of  the  disaster. 

All  of  the  officers  but  two  were  saved,  but  of  the 
ship 's  company  of  353  men  only  forty-eight  escaped  unin 
jured,  and  the  number  of  the  dead  in  the  end  reached  266. 

A  naval  court  of  inquiry  entered  upon  an  exhaustive 
investigation  of  the  affair,  sending  down  divers  to  examine 


Events  Preceding  Hostilities  429 

the  hull  of  the  Maine,  then  fast  sinking  into  the  mud  of 
Havana  harbor.  These  divers  found  evidence  that  the 
cause  of  the  explosion  had  been  external,  the  bottom  of 
the  hull  having  been  driven  upward  to  the  level  of  the 
gun  deck.  The  decision  of  the  court  was  that,  in  its 
opinion,  "the  Maine  was  destroyed  by  a  submarine  mine, 
which  caused  the  partial  explosion  of  two  or  more  of  her 
magazines." 

A  hasty  investigation  made  subsequently  by  the 
Spanish  authorities  led  to  the  opposite  verdict,  that  the 
cause  of  the  disaster  was  internal,  and  that  the  destruction 
of  the  Maine  was  due  to  the  explosion  of  her  own  maga 
zines.  But  this  decision  had  no  effect  on  American  public 
opinion. 

The  real  causes  of  the  war  were  the  conditions  in  Cuba 
and  the  long-standing  wrongs  to  our  trade  and  citizens. 
But,  as  is  often  the  case  in  wars,  the  great  causes  lie 
dormant  until  some  acute  crisis,  as  in  this  case  the  destruc 
tion  of  the  Maine,  stretches  public  patience  to  the  breaking 
point.  General  Woodford,  the  American  minister  to. 
Spain,  was  advised  to  defer  decisive  action  regarding  the 
unfortunate  event,  in  order  to  give  the  United  States  a 
brief  interval  to  prepare  the  navy,  and  especially  the 
army,  for  the  threatening  war. 

EVENTS  PRECEDING  HOSTILITIES 

On  the  9th  of  March,  both  Houses  of  Congress,  by  a 
unanimous  vote,  appropriated  fifty  million  dollars  "for 
the  national  defense  to  be  expended  at  the  discretion  of 
the  President."  That  this  was  none  too  soon  was  dis 
closed  when  the  application  of  the  fund  was  undertaken. 
Our  coasts  were  practically  undefended.  Our  navy  needed 
large  provision  for  increased  ammunition  and  supplies, 


430  The  United  States  Navy 

and  even  for  additional  ships  to  cope  with  any  sudden 
attack  from  the  navy  of  Spain. 

The  battleship  Oregon,  which  was  on  the  Pacific  coast 
at  the  time  of  the  destruction  of  the  Maine,  was  at  once 
put  into  drydock.  She  was  of  little  use  in  the  Pacific 
and  would  make  a  great  addition  to  the  Atlantic  naval 
strength  in  case  of  war.  Her  famous  trip  of  15,000  miles 
around  the  Horn,  begun  on  March  6,  caused  the  Wash 
ington  authorities  considerable  alarm.  The  Oregon 
learned  of  the  existence  of  war  on  April  30,  when  she 
reached  Rio  de  Janeiro.  As  the  destination  of  a  Spanish 
fleet  under  Admiral  Cervera  was  a  matter  of  conjecture, 
Captain  Charles  E.  Clark  had  considerable  anxiety  lest 
his  vessel,  deemed  so  essential  to  our  needs  on  the  Atlantic 
coast,  should  be  caught  by  a  whole  squadron.  On  May 
25,  however,  with  his  ship  in  excellent  condition,  he 
reached  the  coast  of  Florida.  But  we  have  been  antici 
pating  the  events  that  culminated  in  war. 

The  proposals  of  Spain  to  the  Cuban  people,  offering 
autonomy  and  other  measures  of  relief,  had  been  rejected 
by  the  Cubans,  and  the  insurrection  continued.  Where 
upon  President  McKinley,  seeing  no  prospect  of  a  change, 
sent  a  special  message  to  Congress  on  April  11,  1898: 
"The  war  in  Cuba  is  of  such  a  nature  that  short  of 
subjugation  or  extermination  a  final  military  victory  for 
either  side  seems  impracticable.  The  alternative  lies  in 
the  physical  exhaustion  of  the  one  or  the  other,  or  perhaps 
of  both.  The  prospect  of  such  a  protraction  and  con 
clusion  of  the  present  strife  is  a  contingency  hardly  to  be 
contemplated  with  equanimity  by  the  civilized  world, 
and  least  of  all  by  the  United  States,  affected  and  injured 
as  we  are,  deeply  and  intimately,  by  its  very  existence. 

"The  only  hope  of  relief  and  repose  from  a  condition 
which  can  no  longer  be  endured  is  the  enforced  pacifica 
tion  of  Cuba.  In  the  name  of  humanity,  in  the  name  of 


Events  Preceding  Hostilities  431 

civilization,  in  behalf  of  endangered  American  interests 
which  give  us  the  right  and  duty  to  speak  and  to  act,  the 
war  in  Cuba  must  stop. 

"I  ask  the  Congress  to  authorize  and  empower  the 
President  to  take  measures  to  secure  a  full  and  final 
termination  of  hostilities  between  the  Government  of  Spain 
and  the  people  of  Cuba,  and  to  secure  in  the  island  the 
establishment  of  a  stable  government,  capable  of  main 
taining  order  and  observing  its  international  obligations, 
insuring  peace  and  tranquillity,  and  to  use  the  military 
and  naval  forces  of  the  United  States  as  may  be  necessary 
for  these  purposes." 

The  response  of  Congress  to  this  message  was,  on  the 
19th  of  April,  by  a  vote  of  42  to  35  in  the  Senate  and 
311  to  6  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  the  passage 
of  a  joint  resolution  declaring — "First,  That  the  people 
of  the  Island  of  Cuba  are,  and  of  right  ought  to  be,  free 
and  independent.  Second,  That  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
United  States  to  demand,  and  the  Government  of  the 
United  States  does  hereby  demand,  that  the  Government 
of  Spain  at  once  relinquish  its  authority  and  government 
in  the  island  of  Cuba  and  withdraw  its  land  and  naval 
forces  from  Cuba  and  Cuban  waters.  Third,  That  the 
President  of  the  United  States  be,  and  he  hereby  is, 
directed  and  empowered  to  use  the  entire  land  and  naval 
forces  of  the  United  States,  and  to  call  into  the  actual 
service  of  the  United  States,  the  militia  of  the  several 
States,  to  such  an  extent  as  may  be  necessary  to  carry-these 
resolutions  into  effect.  Fourth,  That  the  United  States 
hereby  disclaims  any  disposition  or  intention  to  exercise 
sovereignty,  jurisdiction,  or  control  over  said  island  except 
for  the  pacification  thereof,  and  asserts  its  determination 
when  that  is  accomplished  to  leave  the  government  and 
control  of  the  island  to  its  people." 

In   accordance   with  this   joint  resolution,   President 


432  The  United  States  Navy 

McKinley  immediately  forwarded,  on  April  20,  to  General 
Woodf ord  an  ultimatum  to  which  a  * '  full  and  satisfactory 
response ' '  was  required  by  noon  of  April  23.  The  Spanish 
minister  at  Washington,  on  hearing  of  this  joint  resolution 
and  the  instructions  to  Woodford,  at  once  demanded  his 
passport.  On  April  21,  before  our  minister  at  Madrid 
could  deliver  the  ultimatum,  he  was  informed  by  the 
Spanish  Government  that  diplomatic  relations  between 
the  countries  were  at  an  end. 

Meanwhile  Rear-Admiral  Sicard,  commanding  the 
North  Atlantic  Squadron,  had  kept  his  men  busy  for  two 
months  at  target  practice,  in  anticipation  of  war,  and  had 
brought  his  command  to  a  high  standard  of  efficiency. 
During  this  time  he  kept  his  squadron  off  Key  West  in 
order  to  be  near  Cuba  in  case  of  a  declaration  of  war.  On 
April  21,  on  account  of  ill  health,  he  was  relieved  by  Cap 
tain  William  T.  Sampson,  now  made  an  acting  rear- 
admiral.  Sampson  was  at  once  ordered  to  proceed  to  Cuba 
to  institute  a  blockade  of  the  north  coast  of  the  island  for 
a  distance  ranging  between  forty  miles  west  of  Havana 
and  fifty  miles  east  of  that  city.  He  was  also  to  blockade 
on  the  south  side  of  Cuba  the  port  of  Cienfuegos,  which 
had  railroad  communication  with  the  capital.  This  block 
ade  was  published  to  the  world  next  day,  April  22,  by 
President  McKinley 's  proclamation.  On  April  25,  an 
act  declared  that  war  between  the  United  States  and 
Spain  existed  and  had  existed  from  and  including  April 
21.  t  A  Spanish  fleet,  which  had  been  mobilized  at  the 
Cape  Verde  Islands  under  Admiral  C'ervera,  left  this 
rendezvous  on  April  29  for  unknown  parts.  Two  days 
later  came  Admiral  Dewey's  crushing  blow  to  the  power 
of  Spain  in  the  East,  which  relieved  the  military  tension 
somewhat  on  the  Atlantic  coast.  In  this  rapid  sequence 
of  events  the  United  States,  in  the  early  days  of  the  war, 
played  an  extremely  cautious  game.  This  country 


Comparison  of  Naval  Forces  433 

credited  Spain  with  ample  preparations  for  a  war  that 
had  been  threatening  for  some  months.  The  inefficiency 
of  the  Castilian  Government  and  its  military  weakness 
became  apparent  only  after  the  first  moves  in  the  great 
game  had  been  made. 

On  paper  the  naval  strength  of  Spain  was  greater  than 
that  of  the  United  States.  It  was  said  at  the  beginning  of 
hostilities  that  Spanish  warships  in  commission  numbered 
137,  to  eighty-six  in  the  American  service.  But  such 
figures  are  deceptive.  The  United  States  had,  besides 
vessels  of  less  tonnage,  six  armored  ships  of  8000  tons 
or  more.  In  this  number  were  the  four  first-class  battle 
ships  Iowa,  Indiana,  Massachusetts,  and  Oregon,  each 
of  which  was  of  10,000  tons  or  more.  Spain  had  nothing 
equal  to  these.  The  flower  of  the  Castilian  Navy  con 
sisted  of  nine  armored  men-of-war,  ranging  from  6840  to 
9900  tons.  The  rest  of  the  Spanish  Navy  comprised,  for 
the  most  part,  old  iron  and  wooden  ships.1  But  the  dis 
parity  between  the  figures  on  paper  and  the  real  facts 
was  not  known  even  among  some  leading  Spanish  officials. 
Lieutenant  Jose  Muller  y  Tejeiro,  the  second  in  command 
of  the  naval  forces  of  the  Province  of  Santiago,  says,  if 
we  may  anticipate :  "No  one  wanted  to  believe  that  they 
[Cervera's  ships]  were  the  only  ones  that  Spain  was  going 
to  send,  since  they  were  called  the  'first  division,'  and  at 
least  two  more  divisions  were  expected.  The  only  ones 
who  had  no  illusions,  who  knew  what  to  expect,  who  were 
acquainted  with  the  true  condition  of  affairs,  were  those 
who  had  arrived  in  the  ships.  From  the  admiral  down 
to  the  last  midshipman,  they  knew  perfectly  well  that 
there  were  no  more  fleets,  no  more  divisions,  no  more 
vessels,  and  that  these  six  ships  (if  the  destroyers  may  be 

1  These  figures  were  taken  from  Brassey,  Naval  Annual,  1898, 
pp.  332,  340.       Compare  also  the  Naval  Pocket  Book,  p.   750,  and 
Titherington,  History  of  the  Spanish-American  War,  pp.  99-100. 
28 


434  The  United  States  Navy 

regarded  as  such)   were  all  that  could  be  counted  on  to 
oppose  the  American  fleet. ' ' 2 

Since  this  was  not  a  matter  of  common  knowledge, 
the  American  Navy  made  its  preparations  to  meet  a 
superior  foe.  It  is  greatly  to  the  credit  of  the  United 
States,  as  it  is  to  the  discredit  of  Spain,  that  the  former 
was  ready  for  the  emergency  and  the  latter  was  not. 
At  the  first  real  intimation  of  war,  the  officers  at  Key 
West  drilled  their  crews  night  and  day,  especially  at 
target  practice,  while  the  Spaniards  let  the  valuable  time 
between  February  and  April  slip  by  in  procrastination. 
Hence,  if  it  be  said  that  the  enemy  had  to  fight  against 
great  odds,  we  may  answer  that  the  disgrace  of  Spain 
was  all  the  greater.  Besides,  American  officers  at  the 
beginning  of  hostilities  had  no  idea  of  the  weakness  of 
the  Spanish  Navy,  or  if  they  did,  they  acted  as  if  the 
enemy's  paper  statements  were  truths. 

THE  WAR  IN  THE  PHILIPPINES 

An  encounter  had  taken  place  April  27,  at  Matan- 
zas,  Cuba,  where  a  detachment  of  the  blockading  squadron 
shelled  the  harbor  forts,  but  the  first  engagement  of  im 
portance  occurred  four  days  later  in  the  Philippines,  a 
colonial  possession  of  Spain  since  the  days  of  Magellan. 
As  in  Cuba,  the  rule  of  Spain  in  the  East  was  a  long 
story  of  misgovernment  and  rebellion.  In  1896  a  formid 
able  revolt  broke  out,  and  Blanco,  the  captain-general  at 
Manila,  did  not  succeed  in  suppressing  it.  Other  Spanish 
generals  followed  Blanco  with  similar  lack  of  success, 
and  early  in  1898  General  Basilic  Augustin  was  put  in 
command  of  the  Spanish  forces  in  the  Philippines.  Mean 
while  the  leader  of  the  Filipinos,  Aguinaldo,  opened  nego- 

'Tejeiro,  Battles  and  Capitulation  of  Santiago  de  Cuba,  pub 
lished  by  the  Office  of  Naval  Intelligence,  War  Notes,  No.  1,  p.  28. 


Dewey  in  the  East  435 

tiations  with  the  United  States  through  the  American 
consul  at  Singapore ;  the  insurrection  in  these  islands,  in 
the  end,  however,  served  only  to  complicate  the  problem 
for  the  United  States. 

Commodore  Dewey,  with  his  squadron  consisting  of 
the  Olympia,  flagship,  the  Baltimore,  the  Boston,  the 
Raleigh,  the  Concord,  the  Petrel,  and  the  McCulloch,  was 
lying  in  the  cosmopolitan  harbor  of  Hong  Kong,  when, 
on  April  24,  he  was  notified  by  the  Navy  Department  of 
the  beginning  of  war,  and  was  ordered  to  proceed  at  once 
to  the  Philippine  Islands  and  to  capture  or  destroy  the 
enemy's  vessels. 

Dewey  had  not  been  idle  while  lying  in  this  neutral 
port.  For  weeks  he  had  been  preparing  for  the  threaten 
ing  conflict.  He  had  dismantled  the  unserviceable 
Monocacy,  a  wooden  vessel,  and  had  distributed  her  crew 
among  his  other  men-of-war.  He  purchased,  right  at 
hand,  two  ships  of  considerable  size — the  Zafiro  and 
Nanshan — loaded  them  with  coal  and  provisions,  and 
also  filled  the  bunkers  of  all  his  other  vessels  with  coal. 
And,  finally,  he  dressed  his  white  squadron  in  a  war-coat 
of  drab. 

As  the  law  of  nations  allows  belligerents  a  stay  of 
only  twenty-four  hours  in  a  neutral  port  after  war  has 
been  declared,  Dewey  was  requested  by  the  British  Gov 
ernment  to  leave  Hong  Kong.  He  therefore  withdrew  to 
Mirs  Bay,  about  thirty  miles  distant.  As  the  latter  port 
is  in  Chinese  territory,  and  as  China  had  not  at  this  time 
announced  her  position  of  neutrality,  the  American  com 
modore  could  take  refuge  here  until  he  had  completed  his 
preparations.  From  Mirs  Bay,  on  April  27,  he  set  forth 
upon  his  quest  for  the  Spanish  fleet. 

On  arriving  at  the  Philippines,  Dewey  sent  his  scouts 
into  every  harbor  and  inlet  likely  to  be  tenanted  by  the 


436  The  United  States  Navy 

enemy.  Subig  Bay,  where  it  was  half  hoped  the  Spanish 
admiral  would  be  found,  was  empty  of  war  vessels.  Still 
skirting  the  Luzon  coast,  Dewey's  ships  arrived  off  the 
entrance  to  Manila  Bay  at  midnight,  April  30. 

With  an  opening  on  the  China  Sea  to  the  westward,  the 
Bay  of  Manila  is  in  shape  not  unlike  a  vast  balloon.  In 
this  entrance,  ideally  placed  by  nature  to  guard  the 
approach  to  Spain's  richest  spot  in  her  Oriental  colonies, 
tower  the  islands  of  Corregidor  and  Caballo.  Twenty- 
six  miles  to  the  northeast  lies  the  city  of  Manila,  the 
commercial  centre  of  the  vast  Philippine  group. 

Ten  miles  to  the  south  and  west  of  Manila  is  Cavite, 
on  an  arm  of  land  which  points  outward,  completely 
sheltering  a  large  sheet  of  water,  where  the  Spanish 
Admiral  Montojo  had  anchored  his  fleet.  Cavite  was  the 
seat  of  Spanish  naval  activity  in  the  East.  It  contained 
a  dock,  an  arsenal,  and  a  marine  railway. 

Dewey's  hardihood  in  entering  hostile  waters  during 
the  hours  of  darkness  will  be  best  understood  when  it  is 
remembered  that  throughout  the  Eastern  seas  it  was  the 
belief  that  the  defenses  of  Manila  were  impregnable,  so 
ample  had  been  the  precaution  of  Spain.  Strong  testi 
mony  to  Dewey's  heroism  is  the  fact  that  he  went  to 
his  work  anticipating  all  the  dangers  that  his  own  skill, 
prudence,  and  scientific  knowledge  could  suggest.  He 
naturally  supposed  that  Spain's  chief  city  in  the  East  was 
prepared  for  such  an  onset  as  he  meditated.  He  gave 
his  enemy  credit  for  the  plans  of  defense  that  he  himself 
would  have  adopted,  had  their  positions  been  reversed. 
Before  entering  Manila  Bay,  he  called  his  captains 
together  and  made  known  his  plan  of  operations.  The 
ships  were  to  slip  past  the  islands  and  into  the  bay  under 
cover  of  the  darkness,  and  when  inside  they  were  to 
engage  the  enemy  wherever  found. 


The  Battle  of  Manila  Bay  437 

THE  BATTLE  OF  MANILA  BAY 

With  all  lights  extinguished,  on  a  night  of  misty  dark 
ness,  the  commodore  led  the  way,  followed  by  the  re 
mainder  of  the  line.  When  the  lights  of  Corregidor  were 
plainly  visible,  and  while  under  the  very  sweep  of  its  guns, 
"All  hands"  was  called  and  coffee  served.  The  fleet 
was  passing  without  challenge,  when  suddenly  a  shower 
of  sparks  from  the  McCulloch's  funnel  was  followed  by 
the  boom  of  a  gun  from  the  enemy,  then  another,  and  still 
a  third.  To  this  last  the  Boston  and  the  McCulloch  replied. 
The  flashing  and  booming  from  the  island  continued  for 
a  few  minutes  longer — then  silence. 

The  perils  of  torpedoes  and  mines  still  remained  to 
the  groping  vessels;  the  possibility  of  being  rammed  by 
the  Spanish  fleet  was  present  in  every  mind,  yet  Dewey 's 
squadron  kept  on.  Afterward,  an  officer,  in  analyzing  the 
sensations  of  that  time,  said :  ' '  This  invisible  fleet  ahead 
was  a  test  out  of  which  no  man  came  without  a  sigh  of  re 
lief.  It  is  a  hard  thing  to  whisper  an  order,  I  know,  so 
perhaps  it  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  that  there  should  have 
been  a  break  or  vibration  in  men's  voices  as  they  passed 
the  necessary  word  from  mouth  to  mouth.  We  were  all 
keyed  up,  but  it  was  not  long  before  the  fighting  string  in 
every  man's  heart  was  twanging  and  singing  like  a  taut 
bow." 

After  safely  anchoring  his  supply  ships  out  of  range, 
Dewey  led  his  fleet  in  a  circle  to  the  eastward  to  meet 
the  Spanish  admiral,  who  had  aligned  his  ships  at  Cavite 
with  the  intention  of  compelling  a  standing  fight. 

Admiral  Dewey  reported  under  date  of  May  4,  1898 : 
"  The  squadron  then  proceeded  to  the  attack.  The  flag 
ship  Olympia,  under  my  personal  direction,  led,  fol 
lowed  at  a  distance  by  the  Baltimore,  Raleigh,  Petrel, 
Concord,  and  Boston,  in  the  order  named,  which  forma- 


438 


The  United  States  Navy 


*! 


The  Battle  of  Manila  Bay  439 

tion  was  maintained  throughout  the  action.  The  squadron 
opened  fire  at  5.41  A.M." 

The  enemy  had  been  firing  without  effect  at  the  Amer 
icans  for  half  an  hour  before  Commodore  Dewey  had  his 
vessels  in  the  formation  he  desired.  At  the  end  of  this 
time  he  turned  to  the  captain  of  the  Olympia  and  said, 
"You  may  fire  when  you  are  ready,  Gridley!"  Almost 
simultaneously  with  the  quietly  uttered  permission  to 
return  the  enemy's  fire,  the  roar  of  the  Olympia' 's  guns 
sounded  as  the  flagship  presented  her  side  to  the  line  of 
fire,  and  each  ship  in  turn  took  up  the  refrain.  Dewey 's 
plan  was  to  begin  firing  when  at  a  range  of  5000  yards,  to 
pass  the  Spanish  ships,  gradually  lessening  the  range  to 
2000  yards,  and  then  to  countermarch  in  a  line  approxi 
mately  parallel  to  that  of  the  enemy's  fleet.  His  vessels 
would  thus  turn  an  alternate  side  in  firing,  enabling  every 
battery  to  come  into  play  in  succession,  thereby  easing  the 
strain  on  each.  Such  a  plan  was  not  counted  upon  by 
the  Spanish  admiral,  who  had  anticipated  a  combat  ship 
to  ship,  and  it  reflects  the  highest  credit  upon  Dewey 's 
strategy. 

Again  referring  to  the  American  commodore's  account 
of  the  action,  we  find:  "The  enemy's  fire  was  vigorous, 
but  generally  ineffective.  Early  in  the  engagement  two 
launches  put  out  towards  the  Olympia  with  the  apparent 
intention  of  using  torpedoes.  One  was  sunk,  and  the 
other  disabled  by  our  fire  and  beached,  before  an  oppor 
tunity  was  had  to  fire  torpedoes.  At  7.00  A.M.  the  Spanish 
flagship,  Reina  Cristina,  made  a  desperate  attempt  to 
leave  the  line  and  came  out  to  engage  at  short  range,  but 
was  received  with  such  a  galling  fire,  the  entire  battery 
of  the  Olympia  being  concentrated  upon  her,  that  she  was 
barely  able  to  return  to  the  shelter  of  the  point.  The 
fires  started  in  her  by  our  shells  at  this  time  were  not 
extinguished  until  she  sank. 


440  The  United  States  Navy 

"The  three  batteries  at  Manila  had  kept  up  a  contin 
uous  report  from  the  beginning  of  the  engagement,  which 
fire  was  not  returned  by  this  squadron.  The  first  of  these 
batteries  was  situated  on  the  south  mole  head,  at  the 
entrance  to  the  Pasig  River.  The  second  was  on  the 
south  bastion  of  the  walled  city  of  Manila,  and  the  third 
at  Malate,  about  one  and  a  half  miles  farther  south.  At 
this  point  I  sent  a  message  to  the  Governor-General  to 
the  effect  that  if  the  batteries  did  not  cease  firing,  the 
city  would  be  shelled.  This  had  the  effect  of  silencing 
them." 

Admiral  Montojo's  report  gives  the  following  view 
from  the  Spanish  side:  "Although  we  recognized  the 
hopelessness  of  fighting  the  American  ships,  we  were  busy 
returning  their  fire.  The  Reina  Cristina  was  hit  repeat 
edly.  Shortly  after  6.30  o'clock  I  observed  fire  forward. 
Our  steering  gear  wras  damaged,  rendering  the  vessel 
unmanageable,  and  we  were  being  subjected  to  a  terrible 
hail  of  shot  and  shell.  The  engines  were  struck.  We  esti 
mated  we  had  seventy  hits  about  our  hull  and  super 
structure.  The  boilers  were  not  hit,  but  the  pipe  to  the 
condenser  was  destroyed.  A  few  minutes  later,  I  observed 
the  after  part  on  fire.  A  shell  from  the  Americans  had 
penetrated  and  burst  with  deadly  effect,  killing  many  of 
our  men.  The  flag  lieutenant  said  to  me :  '  The  ship  is  in 
flames.  It  is  impossible  to  stay  on  the  Cristina  any 
longer.'  He  signaled  to  the  gunboat  Isla  de  Cuba,  and  I 
and  my  staff  were  transferred,  and  my  flag  was  hoisted  on 
her.  My  flagship  was  now  one  mass  of  flames ;  I  ordered 
away  all  the  boats  I  could  to  save  the  crew." 

Commodore  Dewey,  continuing  his  report,  says :  "At 
7.35  I  ceased  firing  and  withdrew  the  squadron  for  break 
fast.  At  11.16  A.M.  [the  squadron]  returned  to  the  attack. 
By  this  time  the  Spanish  flagship,  and  almost  the  entire 
Spanish  fleet,  were  in  flames.  At  12.30  P.M.  the  squadron 


The  Battle  of  Manila  Bay  441 

ceased  firing,  the  batteries  being  silenced,  and  the  ships 
sunk,  burned,  or  deserted.  At  12.40  P.M.  the  squadron 
returned  and  anchored  off  Manila,  the  Petrel  being  left 
behind  to  complete  the  destruction  of  the  smaller  gun 
boats  that  were  behind  the  point  of  Cavite.  This  duty 
was  performed  by  Commander  E.  P.  Wood  in  the  most 
expeditious  and  complete  manner  possible. ' ' 

Says  an  eye-witness  of  the  battle,  "Every  ship  in  the 
Spanish  fleet,  with  one  exception,  fought  valiantly;  but 
to  the  Don  Antonio  de  Ulloa  and  her  commander,  Robion, 
should  be  given  the  palm  for  that  form  of  desperate 
courage  and  spirit  which  leads  a  man  to  die  fighting.  The 
flagship  and  the  Boston  were  the  executioners.  Under 
their  shells  the  Ulloa  was  soon  burning  in  half  a  dozen 
places,  but  her  fighting  crew  gave  no  sign  of  surrender. 
Shot  after  shot  struck  her  hull  until  it  was  riddled  like 
a  sieve.  Shell  after  shell  struck  her  upper  works,  but 
there  were  no  signs  of  surrender.  The  main  deck  crew 
escaped,  but  the  captain  and  his  officers  clung  to  the 
wreck.  On  the  lower  deck  the  gun  crews  stuck  to  their 
posts  like  the  heroes  they  were.  .  .  .  Her  commander 
nailed  the  Spanish  ensign  to  what  was  left  of  the  mast, 
and  the  Don  Antonio  de  Ulloa  went  down,  not  only  with 
her  colors  flying,  but  also  with  her  lower  guns  still  roar 
ing  defiance." 

Having  completed  his  work  of  destruction,  Dewey 
now  turned  to  a  task  of  mercy — that  of  caring  for  the 
wounded.  These  he  established  in  hospitals  on  shore.  To 
Admiral  Montojo  he  sent  the  following  message :  "I  have 
pleasure  in  clasping  your  hand  and  offering  my  congratu 
lations  on  the  gallant  manner  in  which  you  fought.*' 

Of  the  annihilated  Spanish  squadron,  the  Reina  Cris- 
tina,  a  steel  cruiser  of  3500  tons,  built  in  1886,  was  the 
only  vessel  that  might  be  considered  formidable.  The 
Isla  de  Cuba,  and  the  Isla  de  Luzon  were  small  cruisers 


442  The  United  States  Navy 

of  1030  tons  each,  and  the  Don  Antonio  de  Ulloa  and 
the  Don  Juan  de  Austria  were  old  iron  ships  in  need  of 
repairs.  The  Castilla,  of  3342  tons,  was  a  wooden  relic  of 
older  days.  She  rapidly  became,  under  the  fire  of  the 
American  vessels,  a  burning  slaughter  house.  Montojo 
should  have  dismantled  her  and  mounted  her  guns  ashore. 
Besides  these  vessels,  the  Spaniards  had  two  gunboats,  the 
General  Lezo  and  the  Marques  del  Duero,  of  500  tons 
each,  two  transports,  the  Manila  and  Isla  de  Mindanao, 
and  four  little  torpedo  boats.  * '  In  offensive  and  defensive 
power  the  squadron  was  far  inferior  to  Dewey's  fine 
quartette  of  cruisers,  but  it  had  a  great  advantage  in 
position,  fighting  in  its  own  waters,  where  it  knew  the 
ranges,  and  had  the  aid  of  batteries  on  shore. ' ' 3 

According  to  Admiral  Montojo 's  report,  the  enemy 
lost  381  killed  and  wounded.  The  damage  done  to  the 
American  squadron  was  inconsiderable.  Several  of  the 
vessels  were  struck,  and  even  penetrated,  but  the  slight 
injuries  admitted  of  speedy  repairs,  and  the  squadron 
was  soon  after  the  battle  in  as  good  condition  as  before. 
There  were  none  killed,  and  only  seven  men  very  slightly 
wounded. 

Although  Dewey  had  a  more  powerful  force  than  the 
Spanish,  he  had  the  disadvantage  of  advancing  into 
strange  waters,  where,  for  all  he  knew,  torpedoes  and 
mines  were  laid.  He  had  also  the  shore  batteries  to  con 
tend  against,  which  made  the  opposing  weight  of  metal 
more  than  equal  to  his.  "The  Spanish  admiral,"  says  a 
contemporary  journal,  ''though  he  must  have  been  aware 
that  the  American  squadron  was  somewhere  in  the  vicinity, 
could  not  bring  himself  to  believe  that  the  American 
commodore  would  have  the  audacity  to  steam  into  a 
mined  harbor  in  the  night  time,  with  forts  on  both  sides, 

3  Titherington,  History  of  the  Spanish- American  War,  p.  136. 


The  Battle  of  Manila  Bay  443 

and  the  Spanish  squadron  ready  to  receive  him.  But 
Dewey  took  the  chances,  and  his  being  beforehand  was 
half  the  victory.  Many  men,  equally  as  brave  in  action, 
would  have  delayed  to  reconnoitre,  and  thereby  have  given 
time  for  the  enemy  to  make  additional  preparations  to 
receive  him/' 

Some  of  the  qualities  of  character  that  contributed  to 
Dewey 's  success  were  referred  to  soon  after  the  war  by 
one  who  knew  him  well:  ''Dewey  has  been  a  life-long 
student  of  everything  connected  with  the  sea.  He  is  a 
constant  reader,  but  in  his  studies  he  seldom  goes  outside 
of  nautical  science,  or  some  collateral  branch,  such  as 
naval  history.  He  made  a  study  of  harbors,  too,  and  is 
a  thorough  geographer.  I  attribute  his  success  at  Manila 
in  part  to  his  knowledge  of  the  harbor.  He  undoubtedly 
knew  just  what  he  was  doing  and  where  he  was  going 
when  he  made  that  midnight  dash  which  seems  to  be  so 
amazing  to  people  who  don't  know  him." 

Although  Dewey  had  seized  the  cable  connecting  the 
Philippine  Islands  with  the  rest  of  the  world,  he  was 
prevented  from  using  it  by  Spain's  contract  with  the 
company  at  Hong  Kong.  Hence  he  had  to  send  dispatch 
boats  back  and  forth  to  Hong  Kong  to  communicate  with 
Washington.  During  the  battle,  the  Spanish  general 
Augustin  had  sent  a  dispatch  to  his  home  Government 
which  gave  the  impression  that  the  victory  was  Spain's, 
and  this  was  the  only  news  the  Americans  had  until 
May  7,  when  Dewey 's  cablegram,  sent  from  Hong  Kong, 
told  a  different  story.  This  was  received  with  great 
joy  in  the  United  States,  and  immediately  upon  its 
arrival  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  congratulated  Commo 
dore  Dewey  upon  the  overwhelming  victory.  He  also 
communicated  to  the  American  commander  that  the  Presi 
dent  had  appointed  him  an  acting  rear-admiral.  Congress 


444  The  United  States  Navy 

shortly  after  passed  a  resolution  giving  the  victor  a  vote 
of  thanks  and  a  sword. 

As  a  result  of  the  battle,  Dewey  was  in  possession  of 
the  arsenal  at  Cavite,  and  of  the  fort  on  Corregidor,  but 
he  decided  not  to  bombard  the  defenses  nearer  the  city 
until  he  had  troops  to  hold  what  the  navy  might  capture. 
He  was  also  short  of  ammunition.  In  answer  to  his 
request  for  supplies  and  troops,  the  Washington  authori 
ties  at  once  dispatched  the  cruiser  Charleston,  loaded  with 
ammunition,  and  on  May  11  the  War  Department  put 
General  Merritt  in  command  of  the  new  Philippine  army 
corps  to  be  organized  immediately.  The  Charleston  was 
ordered  to  capture  en  route  the  Spanish  island  Guam,  a 
task  which  it  easily  accomplished.  The  first  instalment 
of  troops  arrived  at  Manila  on  June  30,  the  same  day  that 
the  Charleston  reached  her  destination.  Of  the  monitors 
Monterey  and  Monadnock,  which  had  also  been  dispatched 
on  the  long  journey  across  the  Pacific,  the  former  arrived 
in  time  for  the  bombardment  of  the  Philippine  capital, 
which  will  be  taken  up  in  a  later  chapter. 

Dewey 's  victory  of  May  1  destroyed  Spain's  power 
in  the  East.  Its  completeness  everywhere  caused  sur 
prise,  and  not  only  aroused  tremendous  enthusiasm  for 
the  navy  at  home,  but  strongly  impressed  Europe  with 
the  growth  of  American  sea  power.  The  victory  gave 
promise  of  a  speedy  conclusion  of  the  war. 


XXVI 

THE  WEST  INDIAN  CAMPAIGN 

THE  BLOCKADE  OF  CUBA 

THE  orders  to  Sampson  of  April  21  had  definitely 
forbidden,  for  the  present,  an  attack  on  Havana,  which 
had  been  considered  by  the  captains  of  his  fleet.  There 
were  no  troops  ready  to  hold  what  ground  the  navy  might 
gain.  Also,  it  was  of  the  greatest  moment  to  save  the 
vessels  under  Sampson 's  command  for  the  more  important 
work  of  destroying  Spain's  naval  force.  But  according 
to  these  orders  his  chief  duty  for  the  time  being  was  to 
institute  a  blockade.  This  at  once  isolated  the  Spanish 
army  in  Cuba,  and  forced  upon  Spain  a  counter  naval 
move,  unless  she  were  willing  to  abandon  her  most  impor 
tant  insular  possession  in  the  West  Indies.  Since  the 
holding  of  Cuba  was  the  issue  of  the  war,  Spain  would 
naturally  make  every  effort  to  relieve  her  army  in  the 
island. 

The  United  States  rightly  directed  the  energy  of  the 
navy  in  the  first  days  to  the  blockade  of  Cuba.  Some 
writers  maintain  that  the  seizure  of  private  property  at 
sea  is  a  relic  of  barbarism,  and  should  be  tolerated  no 
more  than  such  seizure  by  troops  on  land.  But  if  the 
end  can  be  attained  without  bloodshed;  if,  for  instance, 
by  a  siege  on  land  a  garrison  can  be  starved  into  sub 
mission,  why  waste  unnecessarily  the  lives  of  men?  The 
blockade,  says  Mahan,  "is  the  most  scientific  warfare, 
because  the  least  sanguinary,  and  because,  like  the  highest 
strategy,  it  is  directed  against  the  communications — the 
resources — not  the  persons  of  the  enemy.  It  has  been  the 

445 


446  The  United  States  Navy 

glory  of  sea-power  that  its  ends  are  attained  by  draining 
men  of  their  dollars  instead  of  their  blood. ' ' x 

The  blockade  was  effective  from  the  very  beginning. 
All  told,  the  United  States  Navy  took  about  fifty-six 
prizes  during  the  war,  while  the  Spanish  captured  but 
one,  the  Saranac,  a  seizure  which  was  subsequently 
declared  illegal.  To  avoid  any  possible  conflict  with 
neutral  governments  regarding  the  closure  of  Cuban 
ports,  the  United  States  limited  the  parts  of  the  island 
to  be  blockaded  so  that  there  could  be  no  doubt  raised 
as  regards  effectiveness  of  blockade. 

In  the  threatening  state  of  affairs  just  prior  to  the 
breaking  out  of  hostilities,  and  during  the  early  days  of 
the  war,  there  had  been  some  time  to  mobilize  the  vessels 
on  the  Atlantic  coast.  Eear-Admiral  Sampson's  com 
mand  comprised  two  main  divisions :  his  own,  with  its  base 
at  Key  West,  within  easy  reach  of  Cuba ;  and  Commodore 
Schley's  "  flying  squadron,"  assembled  at  Newport  News 
in  readiness  to  meet  any  move  of  the  Spanish  fleet  under 
Cervera,  who  was  lying  at  St.  Vincent  in  the  Cape  Verde 
Islands.  Also  a  "  northern  patrol  squadron,"  under 
Commodore  Ilowell,  was  hurriedly  organized  to  protect 
the  coast  from  Delaware  northward.  Gradually,  as  the 
weakness  of  Spam's  military  power  and  the  destination 
of  Cervera 's  fleet  became  more  apparent,  the  fears  of 
the  coast  cities  were  allayed,  and  the  vessels  of  Howell's 
squadron  were,  one  by  one,  withdrawn  to  aid  in  the 
blockade  of  Cuba. 

SEARCH  FOR  CERVERA  's  SQUADRON 

As  stated  in  the  last  chapter,  Admiral  Cervera  left  the 
Cape  Verde  Islands  on  April  29,  for  an  unknown  destina 
tion.  As  early  as  February  12,  1898,  he  had  written  to 

1  Mahan,  Lessons  of  the  War  with  Spain,  p.  106. 


Movements  of  Cervera  and  Sampson       447 

the  Minister  of  Marine,  asking  for  information  regarding 
the  distribution  and  movements  of  United  States  ships, 
their  bases  of  supplies,  charts  and  plans  of  the  possible 
theatre  of  war,  and  the  objective  of  his  fleet  in  the  event 
of  hostilities.  "I  cannot  help  thinking,"  writes  the 
admiral,  "  of  a  possible  war  with  the  United  States,  and 
I  believe  it  would  be  expedient  if  I  were  given  all  available 
information."  He  then  enumerated  some  of  the  matters 
on  which  he  sought  enlightenment,  and  continued,  "If 
I  had  information  on  these  matters,  I  could  go  ahead  and 
study,  and  see  just  what  is  best  to  be  done,  and  if  the 
critical  day  should  arrive,  we  could  enter  without  vacilla 
tion  upon  the  course  we  are  to  follow."  The  reply  to 
this  reasonable  and  pathetic  request  was  vague  and  un 
practical.  Again  and  again  Admiral  Cervera  wrote  for 
information  and  instructions,  and  as  often  he  was  put 
off  by  the  incapacity  or  ignorance  of  the  Minister  of 
Marine.  Finally,  the  orders  above  mentioned  were  issued, 
and  Cervera  sailed  westward  with  a  squadron  consisting 
of  the  cruisers,  Maria  Teresa  (flagship),  Cristobal  Colon, 
Vizcaya  and  Almirante  Oquendo,  and  the  three  torpedo- 
boat  destroyers,  Furor,  Pluton,  and  Terror. 

Immediately  upon  hearing  the  news,  Secretary  Long 
informed  Sampson  of  Cervera 's  departure  and  suggested 
the  West  Indies  as  his  probable  destination.  At  the  same 
time,  the  Harvard,  St.  Louis,  and  Yale,  vessels  that  had 
been  taken  into  the  navy  from  the  merchant  marine,  were 
sent  as  scouts  to  cruise  off  Martinique,  Guadeloupe,  and 
Porto  Rico,  to  bring  back  word  of  the  first  appearance 
of  the  Spaniards.  The  strategists  at  Washington  assumed 
quite  naturally  that  the  probable  objective  of  Cervera 
was  Porto  Rico ;  this  Spanish  possession,  lying  nearest 
to  the  enemy's  sources  of  supplies,  would  be  an  excellent 
stopping  place  for  coaling  and  for  further  operations  at 
Cuba  or  against  the  Atlantic  coast.  As  the  vessels  of 


448 


The  United  States  Navy 


Movements  of  Cervera  and  Sampson       449 

Cervera's  squadron  were  credited  with  great  speed,  they 
were  expected  to  arrive  in  West  Indian  waters  about 
May  8.  To  intercept  him,  Sampson  left  his  naval  base, 
Key  West,  on  May  4,  but  on  account  of  the  slowness  of 
the  monitors  Terror  and  Amphitrite,  he  did  not  reach 
San  Juan,  Porto  Rico,  until  early  in  the  morning  of 
May  12.  At  once  he  began  a  bombardment  of  the  forts 
defending  the  city,  but  as  daylight  dawned,  it  became 
clear  that  Cervera  was  not  in  the  harbor.  The  American 
fleet,  having  ascertained  the  strength  of  the  defenses  of 
San  Juan,  then  turned  backward  unscathed  to  its  other 
duty,  the  blockade  of  Cuba.  Doubtless  Sampson  could 
have  forced  the  surrender  of  San  Juan,  but,  without 
troops  to  hold  the  city,  he  would  have  had  to  keep  his 
fleet  at  Porto  Rico,  at  the  risk  of  not  destroying  the 
enemy's  fleet,  and  to  the  neglect  of  the  blockade. 

The  first  American  vessel  to  get  any  news  of  the 
movements  of  the  enemy's  squadron  was  the  Harvard, 
which  on  May  11  learned  that  the  Furor  had  that  day 
called  at  Fort  de  France.  But  the  Harvard  was  detained 
at  St.  Pierre  by  rumors  that  the  enemy  were  lying  in 
wait  for  her  outside.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  Cervera  was 
defending  the  city,  but  as  daylight  dawned  it  became 
clear  that  the  Spanish  fleet  was  in  the  southeastern  part 
of  the  Caribbean,  Secretary  Long,  surmising  that  the  real 
destination  must  be  Cuba,  ordered  Schley  to  proceed  to 
Key  West,  and  on  the  same  day,  May  15,  he  sent  the 
swift  scouts  Minneapolis,  St.  Paul,  and  Harvard  to  follow 
Cervera.  Sampson,  meanwhile,  had  left  his  squadron  off 
the  north  coast  of  Cuba,  and  hurried  in  the  New  York 
to  Key  West,  where  he  met  Schley  on  May  18.  On  the 
morning  of  the  19th,  Schley,  with  his  squadron,  pro 
ceeded  to  Cienfuegos,  at  the  very  hour  when  Cervera 
entered  Santiago.  On  nearing  his  destination,  Schley 
noticed  volumes  of  smoke  arising  from  behind  the  high 


450  The  United  States  Navy 

forts  that  screened  the  entrance  to  the  harbor,  and  hence 
he  inferred  that  the  enemy's  fleet  must  be  here.  The 
signal  corps  had,  meanwhile,  sent  the  news  of  the  arrival 
of  Cervera  at  Santiago,  but  there  was  considerable  doubt 
in  which  of  the  two  harbors  the  enemy  was  really  hidden. 
This  uncertainty  entailed  considerable  delay.  Only  after 
thorough  confirmation  of  the  Santiago  report,  and  after  a 
reconnoissance  at  Cienfuegos,  did  Commodore  Schley 
start,  on  May  24,  for  Santiago.  As  it  was  thought  that 
Cervera  would  try  to  reach  Havana,  Admiral  Sampson  did 
not  dare  leave  the  north  coast  of  Cuba  until  he  felt  sure 
that  Cervera  was  bottled  up  at  Santiago.  After  coaling 
some  of  his  vessels,  Sampson  on  May  29  withdrew  the  main 
part  of  his  force  from  the  blockade  of  Havana,  and 
hastened  to  Santiago. 

All  this  shows  that  despite  the  weakness  of  Cervera 's 
squadron,  the  Spaniards  had  a  great  advantage  in  so 
far  as  they  prevented  concentration  of  power  on  the 
part  of  the  Americans  at  any  one  spot.  This  is  only  one 
of  the  many  illustrations  in  history  of  what  naval  strate 
gists  call  the  advantage  of  a  "fleet  in  being";  that  is,  a 
fleet  at  large,  not  itself  in  command  of  the  sea,  but  suffi 
ciently  strong  to  deny  that  command  to  the  other  side. 
As  long  as  the  Spanish  fleet  was  "in  being,"  especially 
as  its  destination  was  unknown,  it  threatened  not  only  the 
military  operations  in  Cuba  but  the  entire  coast  of  the 
United  States. 

On  his  arrival  Commodore  Schley  instituted  a  block 
ade  of  Santiago,  after  having  definitely  assured  himself 
that  the  enemy  were  in  the  bay.  On  May  31  he  bombarded 
the  forts  guarding  the  entrance,  but  without  material 
result.  It  was  evident  that  well-ordered  land  operations 
were  indispensable  to  hold  what  the  navy  might  gain. 

Admiral  Sampson,  shortly  after  his  arrival  early  in 
June,  formulated  a  careful  and  complete  plan  of  blockade 


Preparations  for  Battle  451 

of  Santiago.  A  mile  from  the  Morro  he  placed  three 
steam  launches  as  picket  boats.  Outside  of  these  he 
stationed  the  smaller  vessels  of  the  fleet,  and  three  or  four 
miles  from  shore  he  arranged  his  battleships  and  cruisers 
in  a  semicircle.  At  night  a  battleship  approached  to  the 
middle  line  and  kept  its  searchlight  steadily  on  the  harbor 
entrance,  while  a  sister  ship  lay  close  by  to  answer  any 
fire  from  the  enemy. 

On  June  6  Sampson  bombarded  the  Morro,  Fort  Agua- 
dores,  and  Socapa.  The  fleet  fired  in  all  about  2000  shots. 
The  batteries  were  frequently  hit  and  lost  three  men 
killed  and  forty  wounded.  As  the  forts  were  so  much 
above  sea  level,  many  of  the  shells  passed  over  them  and 
did  considerable  damage  in  the  village  on  Smith  Key.  It 
was  by  these  high  shots  that  the  Reina  Mercedes,  which 
was  lying  in  the  harbor,  was  injured;  she  was  struck 
thirty-five  times  and  was  twice  set  on  fire.  The  reply 
of  the  Spanish  batteries  was  feeble;  the  Massachusetts 
was  hit  once,  but  the  other  vessels  of  Sampson 's  fleet  were 
unscathed. 

Meanwhile,  on  the  night  of  June  3,  Naval  Constructor 
Hobson,  aided  by  seven  volunteers,  had  attempted  to 
block  the  narrow  outlet  from  Santiago  harbor  by  sinking 
the  collier  Merrimac  in  the  channel,  under  a  fierce  fire  from 
the  shore  batteries.  All  the  men  escaped  with  their  lives, 
as  by  a  miracle,  but  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Spaniards. 
It  is  most  gratifying  to  note  that  the  bravery  of  this  little 
band  of  heroes  was  cordially  appreciated  by  the  Spanish 
admiral,  who  sent  a  flag  of  truce  to  notify  Admiral 
Sampson  of  their  safety,  and  to  compliment  them  on  their 
daring  act.  They  were  subsequently  exchanged,  July  7. 

On  June  7,  the  cutting  of  the  last  Cuban  cable  isolated 
the  island.  Thereafter  the  invasion  was  vigorously  prose 
cuted.  Three  days  later,  under  a  heavy  protecting  fire,  a 
landing  force  of  600  marines  from  the  Oregon,  Marble- 


452  The  United  States  Navy 

head,  and  Yankee,  was  effected  in  Guantanamo  Bay,  where 
it  had  been  determined  to  establish  a  naval  station.  This 
important  and  essential  port  was  taken  from  the  enemy 
after  severe  fighting  by  the  marines,  who  were  the  first 
organized  force  of  the  United  States  to  land  in  Cuba. 

The  position  thus  won  was  held  in  spite  of  desperate 
attempts  to  dislodge  our  troops.  By  June  16  additional 
forces  of  marines  had  been  landed  and  strongly  intrenched. 
On  June  22  the  advance  of  the  invading  army  under 
Major-General  Shafter  made  at  Daiquiri,  about  fifteen 
miles  east  of  Santiago,  a  landing  which  was  accomplished 
under  great  difficulties,  but  with  dispatch.  On  June 
23  the  movement  against  Santiago  was  begun.  On 
the  24th  the  first  serious  engagement  took  place.  By 
nightfall  ground  within  five  miles  of  Santiago  was  won, 
and  this  advantage  was  steadily  increased.  On  July  1  a 
severe  battle  took  place,  our  forces  gaining  the  outworks 
of  Santiago ;  on  the  2d  El  C'aney  and  San  Juan  were 
taken  after  a  desperate  charge,  and  the  investment  of  the 
city  was  completed.  The  navy  co-operated  by  shelling 
the  town  and  the  coast  forts. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  SANTIAGO 

On  the  third  of  July,  the  day  following  this  success 
of  our  land  forces,  occurred  the  decisive  contest  of  the 
war.  The  line  of  blockading  ships  at  this  time  formed  a 
long  arc  about  the  harbor  entrance,  lying  at  distances 
varying  from  one  and  a  half  to  two  miles  off  shore.  The 
squadron  ranged  from  east  to  west  in  the  following  order : 
the  Indiana,  New  York,  Oregon,  Iowa,  Texas,  and 
Brooklyn.  Shortly  before  nine  o'clock  on  the  morning 
of  the  3d,  the  flagship  New  York  left  her  place  between 
the  Indiana  and  the  Oregon  to  go  four  miles  east  of  her 
station  in  order  that  Admiral  Sampson  might  confer  in 


The  Battle  of  Santiago  453 

person  with  General  Shafter.  With  the  flagship  were  the 
converted  yacht  Hist  and  the  torpedo-boat  Ericsson.  The 
auxiliary  Gloucester,  formerly  the  yacht  Corsair,  lay 
slightly  to  the  east  of  the  Indiana  and  closer  to  the  harbor ; 
while  to  the  west  of  the  Brooklyn  lay  the  gunboat  Vixen. 

About  forty  minutes  after  the  New  York  left  her 
station,  the  prow  of  a  Spanish  cruiser  was  discovered 
heading  out  of  the  harbor,  and  at  the  same  instant  several 
of  the  American  ships  hoisted  the  signal,  "  Enemy's  ships 
escaping. "  "  General  quarters ' '  was  sounded  throughout 
the  squadron,  the  men  sprang  to  the  guns,  and  forced 
draft  was  applied  to  the  furnaces  in  the  effort  to  get  up 
enough  steam  to  close  in  upon  the  Spanish  squadron 
before  it  could  escape.  The  Spanish  column,  headed  by 
the  flagship,  left  the  harbor  mouth  in  the  following  order : 
Infanta  Maria  Teresa,  Vizcaya,  Cristobal  Colon,  and 
Almirante  Oquendo.  As  soon  as  the  Maria  Teresa  cleared 
the  harbor,  she  turned  sharply  to  the  west,  followed  by 
the  rest  of  the  line,  all  under  full  speed. 

The  New  York,  lying  so  far  to  the  eastward,  could 
take  no  part  in  the  early  stages  of  the  action,  though 
her  engines  were  taxed  to  the  limit  in  the  effort  to  get 
within  range.  As  soon  as  the  enemy  was  sighted,  she  flew 
the  admiral's  signal,  "  Close  in  toward  harbor  entrance 
and  attack  vessels,"  but  the  other  ships  of  the  squadron, 
owing  to  the  complete  preparation  that  had  been  made 
for  every  emergency,  needed  no  orders  to  begin  the  engage 
ment.  In  a  few  minutes  the  Spanish  cruisers,  with  their 
running  start,  had  swung  past  the  blockading  line,  and 
the  battle  became  a  chase,  in  which  the  Texas  and  the 
Brooklyn  had  the  advantage  of  position. 

Meanwhile,  Lieutenant-Commander  Wainwright  of 
the  Gloucester,  as  soon  as  he  saw  the  enemy  heading  west, 
steamed  directly  toward  the  Spanish  vessels  and  opened 
fire  upon  them  with  his  light  guns.  Then,  anticipating 


454  The  United  States  Navy 

the  appearance  of  the  two  torpedo-boat  destroyers,  Pluton 
and  Furor,  he  slowed  down,  giving  his  ship  a  heavy  head 
of  steam,  so  that  when  the  destroyers  appeared  at  the 
end  of  the  column,  he  dashed  for  them  at  full  speed  and 
opened  fire  at  close  quarters.  The  Gloucester  was  entirely 
unprotected,  and  had  a  battery  inferior  in  weight  to  that 
of  either  of  the  destroyers.  In  a  few  minutes  the  leading 
destroyer,  the  Pluton,  turned  and  ran  upon  the  beach, 
where  a  moment  later  she  was  broken  in  two  by  an 
explosion.  The  Furor  kept  going  a  few  minutes  longer, 
though  in  evident  distress,  hounded  by  the  guns  of  the 
Gloucester  and  the  secondary  battery  of  the  Indiana. 
Finally,  a  shot  from  the  approaching  New  York  sent  her 
to  the  bottom  in  deep  water.  It  should  be  added  that 
during  this  plucky  attack  at  close  quarters,  the  Glou 
cester  was  under  the  fire  of  the  Socapa  shore  battery  as 
well  as  that  of  the  destroyers,  but  it  is  an  astonishing 
fact  that  she  was  not  hit  once  by  either. 

Hardly  had  the  cruisers  turned  westward  before  they 
began  to  show  the  effect  of  the  American  guns.  In  about 
fifteen  minutes  the  Maria  Teresa  caught  fire,  and  in  less 
than  three-quarters  of  an  hour  from  the  time  she  was 
sighted  in  the  harbor  entrance,  she  turned  and  ran  ashore 
in  flames.  Five  minutes  later,  the  Oquendo  also  was 
beached  in  the  same  condition.  The  Colon,  the  fastest 
vessel  in  the  two  squadrons,  now  passed  the  Vizcaya  and 
forged  ahead,  beyond  the  range  of  the  leading  American 
ships.  Shortly  before  the  Colon  outstripped  and  passed 
the  Vizcaya,  the  Brooklyn,  which  was  heading  in  shore 
toward  the  approaching  Vizcaya,  suddenly  ported  her 
helm  and  made  a  wide  turn  to  the  south  off  shore.  She 
then  resumed  a  course  parallel  to  that  of  the  Spanish 
column,  though  at  a  much  greater  range.  This  much- 
discussed  maneuver  was  due,  according  to  Commodore 
Schley's  testimony  before  the  Senate  Committee,  to  his 


The  Battle  of  Santiago  455 

desire  to  avoid  blanketing  the  fire  of  the  other  American 
vessels. 

At  about  eleven  o'clock  the  Vizcaya  also  was  set  on 
fire,  and,  having  been  thwarted  in  her  evident  intention 
of  ramming  the  Brooklyn  by  the  latter 's  maneuver,  was 
compelled  to  turn  and  run  ashore.  At  this  time  the 
speedy  Colon,  the  only  remaining  vessel  of  the  Spanish 
squadron,  was  six  miles  ahead  of  the  Brooklyn  and  the 
Oregon.  In  the  pursuit  the  latter  vessel  had  outstripped 
and  passed  both  the  Iowa  and  the  Texas  and  taken  second 
place.  As  the  Colon  was  supposed  to  have  a  speed  of 
twenty  knots,  she  seemed  to  have  an  excellent  chance  of 
escape. 

Sampson  now  detailed  the  slower  vessels  to  remain 
behind  to  attend  to  the  rescue  of  prisoners,  and  with 
the  New  York  joined  the  Brooklyn,  Vixen,  Oregon,  and 
Texas  in  the  chase.  By  the  end  of  an  hour  it  was 
evident  that  the  Colon,  for  some  reason,  was  not  able  to 
keep  up  her  spurt,  and  that  the  American  ships  were 
gaining.  About  one  o'clock  the  Oregon  dropped  a  13-inch 
shell  just  ahead  of  the  Spaniard,  and  fifteen  minutes  later, 
though  practically  uninjured,  the  latter  fired  a  gun  to  lee 
ward,  lowered  her  colors,  and  ran  ashore.  After  striking 
on  the  beach,  her  crew  treacherously  opened  the  sea 
valves  and  sank  her.  This  incident  completed  the  destruc 
tion  of  Admiral  Cervera's  fleet. 

The  following  extract  from  Admiral  Sampson's  report 
of  the  battle  bears  gratifying  testimony  to  the  efforts  of 
the  American  officers  and  men  in  the  work  of  rescue : 

"When  about  ten  miles  west  of  Santiago  the  Indiana 
had  been  signaled  to  go  back  to  the  harbor  entrance,  and 
at  Acerraderos  the  Iowa  was  signaled  to  '  resume  block 
ading  station.'  The  Iowa,  assisted  by  the  Ericsson  and 
the  Hist,  took  off  the  crew  of  the  Vizcaya,  while  the 
Harvard  and  the  Gloucester  rescued  those  of  the  Infanta 


456  The  United  States  Navy 

Maria  Teresa  and  the  Almirante  Oquendo.  This  rescue 
of  prisoners,  including  the  wounded  from  the  burning 
Spanish  vessels,  was  the  occasion  of  some  of  the  most 
daring  and  gallant  conduct  of  the  day.  The  ships  were 
burning  fore  and  aft,  their  guns  and  reserve  ammunition 
were  exploding,  and  it  was  not  known  at  what  moment 
the  fire  would  reach  the  main  magazine.  In  addition  to 
this,  a  heavy  surf  was  running  just  inside  of  the  Spanish 
ships.  But  no  risk  deterred  our  officers  and  men  until 
their  work  of  humanity  was  complete. ' ' 2 

The  number  of  prisoners  amounted  to  1300,  including 
the  Spanish  admiral.  According  to  the  latter 's  estimate, 
some  600  Spaniards  were  killed.  On  the  American  side 
but  one  man  was  killed  (on  the  Brooklyn),  and  one  man 
was  seriously  wounded.  Although  some  of  our  ships  were 
repeatedly  struck,  not  one  was  seriously  injured ;  and  the 
Oregon,  Indiana,  Gloucester,  Vixen,  and  New  York  were 
untouched. 

A  comparison  of  forces  at  the  battle  of  Santiago  shows 
that  the  advantage  lay  with  the  Americans.  Cervera's 
four  cruisers  were  modern  steel  vessels,  three  of  7000  tons, 
and  one  of  6840  tons.  Besides  these  he  had  two  destroy 
ers.3  On  the  other  hand,  Sampson  had  four  battleships 
of  more  than  10,000  tons,  besides  two  armored  cruisers 
upward  of  8000  tons  and  a  small  converted  yacht. 

COMMENTS  ON  THE  BATTLE 

Commander  Jacobsen,  of  the  German  Navy,  made  the 
following  suggestive  comments  on  the  disastrous  attempt 
of  Cervera's  fleet: 

"There  was  only  one  chance  for  the  success  of  the 

2Goode,  With  Sampson  Through  the  War,  p.  299. 
3  Admiral  Cervera  had  to  leave  his  third  destroyer,  the  Terror, 
at  Martinique. 


Comments  on  the  Battle  457 

sortie.  It  should  have  been  made  at  night  in  scattered 
formation.  After  a  personal  investigation  of  the  locality, 
it  is  my  opinion  that  it  is  entirely  practicable  for  a  fleet 
to  leave  Santiago  harbor  at  night.  The  wreck  of  the 
Merrimac  did  not  constitute  an  obstruction.  The  dark 
nights  at  the  time  of  the  new  moon  about  the  middle  of 
June  would  have  been  best  suited  for  the  enterprise.  The 
vessels  should  have  steered  different  courses,  previously 
determined,  with  orders  not  to  fight  except  when  com 
pelled  to  do  so  by  the  immediate  vicinity  of  a  hostile  ship 
or  when  there  was  no  possibility  of  escaping  the  enemy 
in  the  darkness.  A  rendezvous  should  have  been  fixed 
for  the  next  day,  where  the  ships  that  succeeded  in  escap 
ing  were  to  assemble. 

"If  the  fleet  did  not  dare  to  attempt  a  night  sortie, 
and  was  nevertheless  compelled  to  leave  the  harbor  in 
obedience  to  orders,  then  the  ships  should  have  been 
headed  straight  at  the  enemy.  All  weapons,  including 
the  torpedo  and  the  ram,  should  have  been  used.  A  bold 
attack  in  close  formation  was  the  only  chance  of  success 
against  the  superior  hostile  fighting  forces,  who  would 
hardly  have  found  time  to  form  their  lines. ' ' 4 

In  connection  with  the  views  of  Commander  Jacobsen, 
it  is  interesting  to  note  that  at  conferences  called  on 
board  the  Spanish  flagship  in  Santiago  harbor  on  May 
26  and  June  8,  to  consider  the  advisability  and  means  of 
a  sortie,  the  chief  of  staff,  Captain  Bustamente,  and 
Captain  Concas  of  the  Maria  Teresa,  voted  in  favor  of 
an  immediate  sortie  at  night,  in  which  the  vessels  should 
scatter  and  create  as  much  confusion  in  the  blockading 
squadron  as  possible,  in  much  the  same  manner  as  that 
suggested  by  the  German  officer.  The  other  officers  of 

4  Jacobsen,  Sketches  from  the  Spanish- American  War,  Office 
of  Naval  Intelligence,  War  Notes,  No.  iv,  pp.  17,  18. 


458  The  United  States  Navy 

the  squadron,  including  the  admiral,  voted  against  the 
sortie. 

Commander  Jacobsen  mentions  among  the  lessons  to 
be  learned  from  this  battle  the  following:  the  abolition 
of  all  woodwork  and  of  unprotected  torpedo  tubes ;  better 
protection  for  gun  crews  and  for  fire  extinguishing  appa 
ratus  against  shell  fire;  the  greatest  possible  simplicity 
in  gun  mechanism,  and  the  greatest  possible  rapidity  of 
fire;  good  speed  of  ships  under  normal  conditions;  and 
thorough  training  of  crews  in  all  branches  of  the  service.5 

The  capitulation  of  Santiago  followed  very  shortly 
after  the  destruction  of  the  Spanish  fleet.  The  city  had 
been  closely  besieged  by  land,  and  the  entrance  of  our 
ships  into  the  harbor  had  cut  off  all  relief  on  that  side. 
On  the  17th  General  Shafter  occupied  the  city.  The 
capitulation  embraced  the  entire  eastern  end  of  Cuba. 
The  number  of  Spanish  soldiers  surrendered  was  22,000, 
all  of  whom  were  subsequently  conveyed  to  Spain  at  the 
charge  of  the  United  States. 

OCCUPATION  OF  PORTO  Rico 

With  the  fall  of  Santiago,  the  occupation  of  Porto 
Rico  became  the  next  strategic  necessity.  General  Miles 
had  previously  been  assigned  to  organize  an  expedition 
for  that  purpose.  Fortunately  he  was  already  at  San 
tiago,  where  he  had  arrived  on  the  llth  of  July  with  rein 
forcements  for  General  Shafter 's  army.  With  these 
troops,  consisting  of  3415  infantry  and  artillery,  two 
companies  of  engineers,  and  one  company  of  the  Signal 
Corps,  General  Miles  left  Guantanamo  on  July  21,  having 
nine  transports  convoyed  by  a  squadron  under  Captain 
Higginson.  The  expedition  landed  at  Guanica,  Porto 
Rico,  July  25,  which  port  was  entered  with  little  opposi- 

0  Jacobsen,  Sketches  from  the  Spanish- American  War,  Office 
of  Naval  Intelligence,  War  Notes,  No.  iv,  p.  18. 


Conclusion  of  the  War  459 

tion.  From  here  two  of  the  ships  went  to  San  Juan  and 
thence  to  Fajardo  and  Ponce.  On  July  27  the  major- 
general  commanding  entered  Ponce,  one  of  the  most 
important  ports  of  the  island,  from  which  place  he  there 
after  directed  operations  for  the  capture  of  the  island. 
The  campaign,  which  met  with  no  serious  resistance, 
was  now  prosecuted  with  great  vigor,  and  by  the  12th  of 
August  much  of  Porto  Rico  was  in  our  possession,  and 
the  acquisition  of  the  remainder  was  only  a  matter  of  a 
short  time.  At  most  of  the  points  in  the  island  our  troops 
were  enthusiastically  welcomed. 


CONCLUSION  OP  THE  WAR 

With  the  catastrophe  of  Santiago,  Spain's  efforts  upon 
the  ocean  virtually  ceased.  A  spasmodic  attempt  toward 
the  end  of  June  to  send  her  Mediterranean  fleet  under 
Admiral  Camara  to  relieve  Manila  was  abandoned,  the 
expedition  being  recalled  after  it  had  passed  through  the 
Suez  Canal. 

The  last  scene  of  the  war  was  enacted  at  Manila,  its 
starting  place.  On  August  13,  after  a  brief  assault  upon 
the  works  by  the  land  forces,  in  which  the  squadron 
assisted,  the  capital  surrendered  unconditionally.  The 
casualties  were  comparatively  few.  By  this  the  conquest 
of  the  Philippine  Islands,  virtually  accomplished  when 
the  Spanish  capacity  for  resistance  was  destroyed  by 
Admiral  Dewey  's  victory  of  the  1st  of  May,  was  formally 
sealed. 

The  total  casualties  in  the  American  Navy  in  killed 
and  wounded  during  the  war  were:  killed,  seventeen; 
wounded,  sixty-seven;  died  as  result  of  wounds,  one; 
invalided  from  service,  six ;  total,  ninety-one.  Among  the 
number  of  American  killed  was  Ensign  Worth  Bagley, 
who  lost  his  life  on  the  torpedo-boat  Winslow  in  its  attack 


460  The  United  States  Navy 

on  May  11,  on  some  batteries  at  Cardenas,  Cuba.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  Spaniards  had  at  least  1000  killed  and 
wounded;  this  is  a  conservative  estimate,  as  Cervera 
reported  600  and  Montojo  381  killed  and  wounded  in  the 
two  great  battles.  This  disparity  in  casualties  was  caused 
by  the  greater  accuracy  of  Dewey's  and  Sampson's  gun 
nery.  Even  if  we  admit  that  the  American  weight  of 
metal  was  fifty  per  cent  greater  than  the  Spanish — a 
conservative  estimate — it  nevertheless  remains  true  that 
the  hits  were  out  of  all  proportion  to  the  respective 
numbers  of  guns,  or  respective  weight  of  metal  thrown. 
For  instance,  at  Santiago  the  United  States  vessels  made 
about  123  hits  to  thirty-five  of  the  Spaniards,6  and  the 
latter  were  mostly  by  small  projectiles  that  did  little  or 
no  damage.  With  such  a  difference,  the  enemy  might  have 
had  a  much  larger  number  of  ships  and  guns,  with  the 
victory  still  on  the  side  of  the  United  States. 

It  is  noteworthy,  further,  that  while  the  American 
Navy  was  engaged  in  two  great  battles,  besides  difficult 
and  perilous  undertakings  in  blockade  and  bombardment, 
and  transported  more  than  50,000  troops  to  the  scenes  of 
action,  it  did  not  lose  a  gun  or  a  ship,  and  the  crew  of  the 
Merrimac  were  the  only  prisoners  captured  by  the 
Spaniards  during  the  war. 

THE  PEACE  TREATY 

The  annihilation  of  Admiral  Cervera 's  fleet,  followed 
by  the  capitulation  of  Santiago,  brought  to  the  Spanish 
Government  a  realizing  sense  of  the  hopelessness  of  con 
tinuing  a  struggle  now  become  wholly  unequal ;  and  over 
tures  of  peace  were  made  through  the  French  ambassador, 


6  Figures  compiled  by  the  Scientific  American,  from  the  official 
report  of  the  Survey  Board,  quoted  by  Spears,  Our  Navy  in  the  War 
with  Spain,  p.  341. 


The  Treaty  of  Peace  461 

who  had  acted  as  the  friendly  representative  of  Spanish 
interests  during  the  war.  On  the  afternoon  of  August  12, 
M.  Cambon,  as  the  plenipotentiary  of  Spain,  and  our 
Secretary  of  State,  as  the  plenipotentiary  of  the  United 
States,  signed  a  protocol  which  suspended  hostilities. 

The  protocol  was  followed  by  the  treaty  of  peace 
between  the  United  States  of  America  and  the  kingdom  of 
Spain,  signed  at  Paris,  December  10,  1898,  and  ratified 
and  proclaimed  at  Washington,  April  11,  1899.  It  was, 
in  brief,  as  follows : 

Article  I.  Spain  relinquishes  all  claim  of  sovereignty 
over  and  title  to  Cuba. 

Article  II.  Spain  cedes  to  the  United  States  the  island 
of  Porto  Rico  and  other  islands  now  under  Spanish  sov 
ereignty  in  the  West  Indies,  and  the  island  of  Guam  in 
the  Marianas  or  Ladrones. 

Article  III.  Spain  cedes  to  the  United  States  the 
archipelago  known  as  the  Philippine  Islands.  The  United 
States  will  pay  to  Spain  the  sum  of  twenty  million  dollars 
($20,000,000)  within  three  months  after  the  exchange  of 
the  ratifications  of  the  present  treaty. 


XXVII 
EVENTS  SINCE  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN 

DURING  the  years  following  the  conflict  with  Spain, 
the  navy  instead  of  falling  into  decay  as  after  the  Civil 
War  has  decidedly  grown  in  power.  The  period  has  been 
one  of  nominal  peace,  yet  our  new  relations  in  the  Pacific 
have  involved  the  United  States  in  troubles  which  required 
the  services  of  the  navy  and  led  the  country  to  put 
increased  reliance  upon  its  fleets. 

THE  PHILIPPINE  INSURRECTION  1 

No  sooner  had  Commodore  Dewey  annihilated  the 
Spanish  fleet  in  Manila  Bay  and  ended  the  sovereignty  of 
Spain  in  the  Philippines,  than  the  United  States  dis 
covered  she  had  a  new  problem  to  meet — What  should 
she  do  with  the  islands?  Europe  was  scarcely  less  inter 
ested  than  America,  and  it  was  suspected  that  the  reason 
several  countries  at  once  sent  their  ships  to  the  scene  of 
operations  was  to  seize  any  possible  advantage.  Had  Com 
modore  Dewey  not  been  firm  in  holding  to  the  rights 
accorded  by  international  law,  he  might  have  been  seri 
ously  embarrassed  by  a  German  fleet  stronger  than  his 
own  that  mobilized  at  Manila.  The  German  officers  and 
men  showed  sympathy  for  the  Spaniards,  and,  disre 
garding  the  blockade  that  Dewey  had  established,  they 
went  even  to  the  extent  of  landing  provisions  for  the 
Spaniards.  Dewey  promptly  stopped  this.  Some  mutter- 

1  This  and  the  two  narratives  that  follow  are  based  chiefly  on 
reports  of  Secretary  of  the  Navy  Long  and  on  his  The  New  Amer 
ican  Navy. 
462 


The  Philippine  Insurrection  463 

ings  followed,  but  although  it  is  reported  that  the  Germans 
wanted  the  English  to  join  with  them  in  protesting  against 
Dewey's  bombardment  of  Manila,  which  was  necessary 
if  he  was  to  gain  the  city,  their  threatenings  came  to 
nothing. 

At  the  close  of  the  war,  to  have  returned  the  Philip 
pines  to  Spain  when  she  was  powerless  to  contend  with 
the  widespread  native  uprising  would  have  been  imprac 
ticable  and  cruel;  to  have  sold  the  islands  to  some  other 
nation  would  not  have  been  according  to  American  ideas 
of  honor;  and  to  have  granted  the  natives  independence, 
with  their  utter  lack  of  preparation  and  fitness  for  self- 
rule,  would  have  insured  only  long-continued  trouble  and 
distress.  The  United  States  decided  on  the  only  remain 
ing  course,  to  hold  the  Philippines.  However,  before  the 
protocol  had  been  signed,  it  was  evident  that  the  natives 
were  preparing  to  turn  against  the  Americans. 

The  Filipinos  in  a  few  months  had  established  a  net 
work  of  intrenchments  about  Manila,  and  on  February  4, 
1899,  they  made  a  vigorous  effort  to  drive  the  Americans 
into  the  sea.  In  resisting  them,  the  navy  co-operated  with 
the  army  and  shelled  the  insurgents'  fortifications  where 
they  were  within  range.  The  combined  forces  quickly 
drove  the  Filipino  armies  from  the  vicinity  of  the  capital, 
and  from  that  time  until  the  end  of  the  insurrection  the 
navy  was  busily  employed  in  attacking  the  enemy  when 
there  was  opportunity,  as  well  as  in  patrolling  the  waters 
and  in  cutting  off  the  military  supplies  sent  from  Hong 
Kong.  A  mosquito  fleet  of  seventeen  vessels  was  secured, 
largely  by  purchase  from  Spain.  The  small  shallow-draft 
vessels  composing  it  could  not  only  sail  among  the  islands, 
but  make  their  way  up  the  rivers  into  the  country.  Thus 
they  had  considerable  fighting  and  rendered  important 
service. 

Although  the   navy  showed   great  efficiency,   it  met 


464  The  United  States  Navy 

with  some  reverses.  On  November  2,  1899,  the  cruiser 
Charleston  struck  on  an  uncharted  reef  a  few  miles  north 
of  Luzon,  and  was  lost.  Later,  when  the  Yorktown  had 
gone  to  the  rescue  of  a  Spanish  garrison  at  Baler,  in  imme 
diate  danger  of  capture  by  the  natives,  Lieutenant  James 
C.  Gillmore,  who  with  fourteen  men  was  making  a  recon- 
noissance  near  the  mouth  of  the  Baler  River,  was  am 
bushed.  Those  of  the  party  not  killed  were  taken  pris 
oners  and  held  in  captivity  eight  months.  At  another 
time  and  place  the  gunboat  Urdaneta,  while  aground,  was 
captured;  the  commanding  officer,  Naval  Cadet  W.  C. 
Wood,  and  several  of  his  men  were  killed,  the  rest  being 
taken  prisoners.  On  the  other  hand,  the  instances  of 
efficient  patrolling  of  the  coasts  and  rivers  and  of  success 
ful  brushes  with  the  Filipinos  are  too  numerous  to  be 
singled  out  for  particular  comment.  The  service  of  the 
navy  thus  rendered  was  absolutely  necessary  before  the 
United  States  could  establish  a  firm  government  in  the 
islands. 

THE  SAMOAN  TROUBLE 

While  the  insurrection  was  taking  place  in  the  Philip 
pines,  trouble  was  brewing  in  other  islands  of  the  Pacific 
where  the  United  States  had  an  interest.  According  to  a 
treaty  made  in  1889,  Samoa  was  to  be  governed  in  accord 
ance  with  native  laws  and  customs,  but  under  the  control 
of  England,  Germany,  and  the  United  States.  Our 
country  was  especially  concerned  because  in  1878  we  had 
been  granted  at  Pago  Pago,  on  the  island  of  Tutuila,  a 
site  for  a  naval  station. 

In  1898,  on  the  death  of  the  king,  there  arose  a  quarrel 
among  the  natives  as  to  his  successor.  The  law  said  when 
they  could  not  agree  on  this  question  they  should  refer 
it  for  settlement  to  the  chief  justice  of  the  island  court. 
Mr.  W.  L.  Chambers,  an  American  citizen,  who  held  that 


The  Samoan  Trouble  465 

office,  on  being  appealed  to,  gave  a  decision  marked  by 
impartiality  and  fairness.  The  trouble  would  probably 
then  have  ended,  had  not  the  German  consul  secretly 
encouraged  the  losing  faction.  Guards  became  necessary 
to  protect  the  English  and  American  consulates  in  Apia, 
the  chief  city  of  Samoa. 

The  one  act  of  heroism  in  this  trouble  occurred  in  an 
expedition  made  by  a  force  of  sixty-one  Americans  under 
Lieutenant  P.  V.  Lansdale,  U.  S.  N.,  and  sixty-three 
British  under  Lieutenant  A.  H.  Freeman,  R.  N.  They 
marched  against  Vailele,  near  Apia,  where  ammunition 
and  supplies  had  been  stored.  Not  encountering  any 
opposition,  they  destroyed  the  camp ;  but  on  the  return 
march  they  were  ambushed  by  an  overwhelming  force 
of  natives.  Lansdale  was  shot  below  the  knee  so  that 
he  could  not  walk,  and  Ordinary  Seaman  N.  E.  Edsall, 
who  came  to  his  assistance,  was  mortally  wounded.  The 
American  and  British  forces  happened  to  be  so  scattered 
that  they  were  unable  to  make  an  effective  resistance,  and 
slowly  gave  way.  But  Ensign  Monaghan,  after  doing 
his  utmost  to  remove  his  lieutenant  to  a  place  of  safety, 
seized  a  rifle  from  a  disabled  man,  and  "  stood  steadfast 
by  his  wounded  superior  and  friend — one  brave  man 
against  a  score  of  savages.  .  .  .  He  died  in  a  heroic 
performance  of  duty. ' ' 2 

In  this  engagement  the  American  loss  was,  besides 
Lieutenant  Lansdale  and  Ensign  Monaghan,  two  sailors 
killed  and  five  wounded;  the  British  loss  was  Lieutenant 
Freeman  and  two  sailors  killed  and  two  wounded. 

Shortly  after  this  trouble,  a  commission,  with  repre 
sentatives  from  England,  Germany,  and  the  United  States, 
visited  the  islands  in  one  of  our  warships.  As  a  result  of 
the  negotiations  that  followed,  the  tripartite  control  of 

2  Report  of  Captain  Edwin  White,  quoted  by  Long,  The  New 
American  Navy,  p.  125. 
30 


466  The  United  States  Navy 

tne  islands  ended;  Germany  was  granted  the  largest  of 
the  islands,  Upolu,  on  which  is  Apia;  and  the  United 
States,  Tutuila  and  some  of  the  smaller  islands.  In 
Tutuila  is  Pago  Pago,  one  of  the  very  finest  harbors  in  all 
the  southern  Pacific.  England  ceded  her  claims  in  Samoa 
in  exchange  for  concessions  elsewhere. 


THE  BOXER  TROUBLE 

In  1899  there  were  more  than  2000  American  citizens 
in  China,  and  our  trade  with  that  power  was  inferior  in 
volume  only  to  that  of  Great  Britain  and  Japan.  Further, 
Secretary  of  State  Hay  had  just  won  considerable  prestige 
for  the  United  States  by  inducing  other  nations  to  join 
with  us  in  a  declaration  in  favor  of  an  "open  door" 
policy  in  the  Celestial  Empire.  Thus  the  American  people 
were  vitally  concerned  when  in  1900  there  was  a  wide 
spread  movement,  secretly  favored  by  the  reactionary 
Empress  Dowager,  to  drive  out  all  foreigners.  To  effect 
this  purpose  the  Chinese  had  organized  the  society  of 
the  "I-Ho  Ch'uan,"  or  "Fist  of  Righteous  Harmony," 
popularly  known  among  the  foreigners  as  the  "Boxers." 

Disorder  and  acts  of  violence  soon  followed.  Mission 
stations  in  various  places  were  attacked  and  destroyed. 
Towards  the  last  of  May,  Minister  Conger,  the  United 
States  representative  in  Pekin,  believing  that  the  Boxer 
movement  was  likely  to  become  an  open  rebellion,  tele 
graphed  Admiral  Kempff,  who  was  with  the  Newark  at 
Taku,  that  the  American  legation  had  immediate  need  of 
a  strong  guard.  United  States  marines  were  sent  forward 
and  reached  the  capital  just  in  time,  for  only  a  few 
days  afterwards  all  railroad  communications  were  cut 
off,  and  the  American  and  the  European  legations  were 
in  a  state  of  siege.  The  situation  promised  soon  to  be  so 
serious  that,  when  the  consuls  and  naval  officers  of  the 


The  Boxer  Rebellion  467 

several  nations  at  Tien-tsin  could  agree  on  no  plan  for 
relieving  the  legations  at  Pekin,  Captain  McCalla,  U.  S.  N., 
in  command  of  112  officers  and  men,  proposed  to  set  out 
at  once  for  Pekin,  even  if  his  force  should  have  to  act 
alone.  This  decisive  utterance  had  a  good  effect,  and  the 
British,  Japanese,  Austrian,  and  Italian  officers  joined 
with  McCalla.  Eventually  the  Germans,  French,  and 
Russians  added  their  detachments.  The  whole  force, 
amounting  to  2066  officers  and  men,  was  commanded  by 
Vice- Admiral  Seymour  of  the  British  Navy.  They  suc 
ceeded  in  reaching  Langfang,  forty  miles  from  Pekin,  on 
June  13,  without  great  difficulty.  Meanwhile  the  imperial 
forces  had  joined  with  the  Boxers  and  had  cut  the  rail 
road  communications  in  their  rear.  The  railroad  to 
Pekin  had  also  been  destroyed.  Lacking  food  supplies  and 
ammunition,  and  threatened  by  an  enormous  host  of 
Boxers  and  Imperial  troops,  the  council  of  senior  officers 
decided  to  fall  back  to  Tien-tsin.  On  the  return  march, 
which  was  not  made  without  considerable  fighting,  the 
most  dangerous  position,  that  of  advance  guard,  was  given 
to  the  American  sailors.  Captain  McCalla  was  wounded 
three  times,  but  he  held  to  his  post  till  the  force  reached 
Tien-tsin.  Seven  hundred  allied  troops  remained  here 
and  were  soon  besieged  by  several  thousand  Boxers. 

It  then  became  imperative  to  hurry  forward  men  and 
supplies  from  Taku  to  Tien-tsin.  The  railway  between 
these  points,  on  being  abandoned,  had  been  plundered  by 
Boxers  and  roving  bands,  and  in  places  had  been  de 
stroyed.  To  an  American  naval  officer,  with  a  force  of 
bluejackets,  was  given  the  task  of  putting  the  miserably 
equipped  single-track  system  into  commission,  and  of 
operating  it.  It  was  new  work  for  our  sailors,  but  in  a 
few  weeks  they  transported  13,000  troops,  besides  horses, 
ammunition,  provisions,  and  water,  as  required. 

Grave  anxiety  had  in  the  meantime  prevailed  through- 


468  The  United  States  Navy 

out  the  western  nations  for  the  safety  of  their  people  in 
China,  It  was  commonly  believed  that  all  the  ministers 
in  Pekin  had  perished.  Large  reinforcements  of  men 
and  ships  had  been  sent  to  China  or  were  on  their  way, 
and  the  dismemberment  of  the  Empire  seemed  probable. 
Thus  very  timely  was  Secretary  Hay's  note,  written  to 
the  European  powers  at  this  crisis,  in  which  he  stated 
"the  purpose  of  the  United  States  to  be  the  relief  and 
protection  of  American  interests,"  and  "reiterated  the 
principles  of  Chinese  territorial  and  administrative  entity, 
protection  of  treaty  rights,  and  preservation  of  the  'open 
door.'  "  The  stand  taken  by  the  United  States  had  influ 
ence  with  the  other  nations,  and  the  dissolution  of  China 
did  not  take  place. 

A  battle  was  fought  on  July  14  at  Tien-tsin,  in  which 
the  American  naval  loss  was  six  men  killed  and  eighteen 
wounded.  On  the  arrival  of  adequate  reinforcements, 
another  international  expedition  was  organized,  and  on 
August  14  it  entered  Pekin.  It  was  none  too  soon,  for, 
since  June  19,  when  Baron  von  Ketteler,  the  German  min 
ister,  was  killed,  the  besieged  had  been  subjected  to  many 
fierce  attacks.  Our  marines  had  intrenched  themselves  on 
the  ancient  city  wall  near  the  American  legation,  and  there 
made  a  brave  defense.  Twice  they  were  driven  from  their 
position,  but  both  times  they  succeeded  in  retaking  it. 

The  several  western  nations  later  required  China  to 
pay  large  indemnities.  The  United  States,  however,  in 
May,  1908,  decided  to  restore  to  the  Imperial  Government 
the  balance  still  due,  which  was  $12,000,000  or  about 
one-half.  At  once  China  expressed  her  gratitude  and 
announced  her  intention  of  using  the  money  to  send 
selected  students  to  American  schools  and  universities. 
Not  unmindful  also  of  the  forbearance  that  our  Govern 
ment  showed  during  the  time  of  hostilities,  China  has  come 
to  look  upon  the  United  States  as  her  best  friend. 


Cruise  of  the  ''Battle  Fleet"  469 

CRUISE  OF  THE  ''BATTLE  FLEET" 

The  three  "troubles"  just  narrated  satisfied  all  those 
acquainted  with  the  facts  as  to  the  efficiency  of  the  part 
of  the  navy  concerned  with  them;  but,  curiously  enough, 
that  which  was  especially  to  draw  the  attention  of  the 
world  to  our  navy  was  not  fighting,  but  a  mere  practice 
cruise.  The  cruise  was  extraordinary  because  of  its  large 
scale.  Sixteen  first-class  battleships,  a  force  such  as  had 
probably  never  assembled  before  under  one  flag  except 
Great  Britain's,  all  equipped  as  in  war,  sailed  around  the 
world,  covering  altogether  about  46,000  sea  miles. 

The  voyage,  as  first  announced,  was  to  begin  with 
Hampton  Roads  and  end  at  San  Francisco.  It  was  Presi 
dent  Roosevelt's  idea,  and  it  aroused  criticism  even  in 
technical  quarters.  It  was  urged  that  "the  undertaking 
was  too  monumental;  that  a  battleship  is  too  vast  and 
complicated  a  piece  of  mechanism  to  send  around  the 
globe  on  any  ordinary  occasion;  that  dangers  more  than 
multiplied  with  numbers  in  such  a  case;  that  disaster 
lurked  on  every  submerged  ledge  and  was  borne  on  every 
unknown  tidal  current;  .  .  .  that,  if  the  fleet  should 
succeed  in  rounding  South  America,  it  was  reasonably 
certain  that  the  individual  ships  would,  one  by  one,  arrive 
with  machineries  loose  and  almost  unserviceable. ' ' 3 

Nevertheless  the  Department  proceeded  to  make  its 
preparations,  and  on  December  16,  1907,  the  fleet,  con 
sisting  of  sixteen  battleships,  accompanied  by  six  destroy 
ers,  passed  in  review  before  the  President  at  Hampton 
Roads  as  it  started  on  the  great  cruise.  Almost  immediately 
on  the  ships'  departure,  it  was  announced  that  they  would 
go  not  only  to  the  Calif ornian  coast,  but  to  our  insular 
possessions  in  the  Pacific,  and  would  return  by  way  of 
Suez.  As  soon  as  this  news  was  known,  urgent  invita- 

3  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  1908,  p.  6. 


470  The  United  States  Navy 

tions  came  from  Australia  and  New  Zealand,  as  well  as 
from  Japan  and  China,  that  the  fleet  should  make  them 
a  friendly  visit;  and  those  countries  began  to  prepare  a 
fitting  reception. 

The  fleet  touched  at  Port  of  Spain,  Rio  de  Janeiro,  and 
three  other  cities  in  South  America  on  the  way  to  Cali 
fornia.  At  each  a  stop  of  a  few  days  was  made  for  the 
purpose  of  coaling  and  taking  on  supplies,  as  well  as  of 
accepting  the  hospitality  that  was  so  eagerly  proffered. 
The  Straits  of  Magellan,  where  the  prophets  of  evil  had 
seen  the  skeletons  of  the  ships  left  on  the  rocks,  proved 
harmless,  and  the  fleet  reached  San  Francisco  on  May  6, 
1908,  without  mishap.  In  the  meantime  the  ships  had 
not  neglected  the  spring  target  practice,  but  in  Magdalena 
Bay — thanks  to  the  courtesy  of  the  Mexican  Government— 
had  spent  thirty  days  in  close  competition,  far  surpassing 
all  previous  records. 

At  San  Francisco,  Rear  Admiral  R.  D.  Evans,  who 
had  been  in  command  of  the  fleet  thus  far,  was  relieved, 
and  Rear  Admiral  C.  S.  Sperry  assumed  that  duty  and 
held  it  till  the  ships  were  again  in  Hampton  Roads. 

From  San  Francisco  the  fleet  went  to  Honolulu,  and 
then  visited  several  cities,  among  which  the  following  are 
the  most  important:  Auckland,  Sydney,  Melbourne, 
Manila,  Yokohama,  Amoy,  and  Suez;  in  the  Mediter 
ranean  they  scattered  to  various  ports.  As  had  been  the 
case  when  they  rounded  South  America,  the  voyage  in 
the  Pacific  and  Indian  Oceans  proved  uneventful.  The 
entire  trip  was  accomplished  without  accident.  The  fleet 
had  become  more  and  more  a  unit,  and  calmly  progressed 
from  point  to  point,  while  at  sea  averaging  about  ten 
knots  an  hour.  The  six  destroyers  had  separated  from 
the  fleet  on  reaching  San  Francisco,  and  had  gone  to 
Samoa  and  thence  home.  At  the  same  time  the  battle 
ships  Alabama  and  Maine  had  been  detached,  and  their 


Cruise  of  the  "  Battle  Fleet "  471 

places  had  been  taken  by  the  newer  ships  Wisconsin  and 
Nebraska.  On  reaching  Suez,  January  3,  1909,  the  fleet 
heard  of  the  appalling  disaster  caused  by  earthquake  in 
Sicily  and  southern  Italy.  At  once  several  ships  pro 
ceeded  to  the  stricken  regions,  and  Admiral  Sperry  in  the 
Connecticut  personally  directed  the  work  of  relief. 

The  ships  later  rendezvoused  at  Gibraltar,  and,  cross 
ing  the  Atlantic,  entered  Hampton  Roads  on  February  22. 
There  they  were  reviewed  by  President  Roosevelt,  just 
as  he  had  reviewed  them  fourteen  months  before. 

Some  of  the  benefits  resulting  from  the  cruise  at  once 
became  apparent  to  those  who  had  taken  part  in  it.  The 
fleet  had  found  itself,  the  men  had  got  the  "sea  habit," 
and  the  vast  aggregation  had  become  a  unit  in  a  sense 
such  as  scarcely  had  ever  been  realized  before.  The  fleet 
had  been  self-sustaining  in  the  matter  of  repairs,  and 
despite  its  long  absence  from  the  navy  yards,  had  come 
back  in  the  best  of  condition.  New  standards  in  steam 
engineering  had  been  established,  with  economy  in  coal 
consumption  and  increased  radius  in  action.  During  the 
long  stretches  between  ports,  the  officers  and  men  had 
obtained  daily  practice  in  technical  work  of  all  kinds; 
they  had  profited  from  the  unusual  opportunities  of 
maneuvering,  and  had  greatly  improved  in  gunnery.4 

The  cruise  also  meant  practice  for  the  officials  at 
Washington.  The  providing  of  coal  and  general  supplies 
needed  at  the  start  and  at  various  points  on  the  route  was 
a  gigantic  task,  but  the  Bureau  of  Equipment,  on  which 
it  fell  most  heavily,  proved  equal  to  the  emergency.  The 
experience  was  valuable  because  it  furnished  problems 
precisely  such  as  the  Navy  Department  would  have  to 
meet  in  case  of  war.  In  the  Spanish-American  conflict 

4  Based  on  the  statement  of  Admiral  Sperry,  quoted  in  Bras- 
sey's  Naval  Annual,  1909,  p.  35. 


472  The  United  States  Navy 

it  was  Spain's  inability  properly  to  equip  her  ships  with 
coal  and  ammunition  that  was  a  principal  reason  why 
they  failed  to  give  a  better  account  of  themselves  in  the 
West  Indies.  Previous  to  the  Battleship  Cruise  it  was  a 
debated  question,  if  there  were  war  in  the  Pacific,  whether 
the  United  States  could  send  a  strong  fleet  to  the  western 
coast  without  a  long  delay,  and,  if  she  could,  whether  the 
fleet  on  arrival  would  not  be  in  a  demoralized  condition 
similar  to  that  of  the  Russian  ships  after  their  long 
voyage  just  preceding  the  battle  of  Japan  Sea.  The  suc 
cessful  voyage  made  by  our  fleet  was  considered  by  the 
naval  experts  of  Europe  as  well  as  of  America  to  be  a 
sufficient  answer. 

The  cruise  also  disclosed  weaknesses  in  the  American 
Navy;  it  showed  the  great  need  of  more  colliers,  for 
reliance  had  in  a  large  degree  to  be  placed  on  those  of 
other  nations.  The  hiring  of  foreign  colliers  the  laws  of 
neutrality  would  make  impossible  in  case  of  war.  The 
officers  became  convinced  that  their  ships  had  much  unnec 
essary  top  hamper  and  that  the  type  of  military  masts 
was  capable  of  improvement.  Immediately  on  the  return 
of  the  ships  to  the  navy  yards  of  the  United  States, 
changes  were  made  in  these  and  other  particulars. 

There  was  much  speculation  throughout  the  country 
at  the  time  of  the  fleet's  departure  as  to  whether  the 
cruise  did  not  have  a  political  or  diplomatic  significance. 
This  the  President  did  not  see  fit  to  answer.  Without 
doubt,  however,  among  the  greatest  benefits  of  the  cruise 
were  the  attention  drawn  to  the  navy  throughout  the 
country,  and  the  eager  interest  shown  in  sections  where 
before  there  had  been  only  ignorance  and  indifference. 
Equally  important  was  the  good  feeling  promoted  in  our 
insular  possessions  and  in  the  various  countries  visited. 
This  was  especially  fortunate  in  the  Far  East,  for  there 
had  been  for  some  months  before  the  fleet's  departure 


Development  in  Ships  473 

friction  with  Japan,  which  though  seemingly  slight  had 
been  watched  with  growing  concern.  As  Japan,  however, 
was  particularly  cordial  and  friendly  in  the  reception 
given  to  the  fleet,  the  war  scare  was  dissipated.  Referring 
to  this,  Secretary  Metcalf  wrote  felicitously  of  the  voyage : 
"It  has  been  everywhere,  in  the  South  American  coun 
tries  and  most  notably  in  Australia  and  Japan,  under 
stood  and  accepted,  as  it  was  intended,  as  the  reaching 
out  of  a  strong  hand  in  friendly  greeting  on  the  part  of 
America.  .  .  .  [It]  has  marked  a  long  stride  in  the 
direction  of  international  peace. ' ' B 

RECENT  DEVELOPMENT  IN  SHIPS,  GUNS,  AND  PERSONNEL 

Many  of  the  frigates  used  in  the  Civil  War  were  iden 
tical  in  type  with  those  of  the  War  of  1812,  whose  keels 
were  laid,  it  will  be  remembered,  in  1794.  The  fleet  of 
sixteen  battleships  that  went  on  the  cruise  belong  alto 
gether  to  a  different  epoch;  in  them  one  can  imagine 
Farragut  almost  as  much  bewildered  as  Hull. 

The  Civil  War  saw  the  introduction  of  the  ironclad. 
In  the  years  following,  the  ironclad  has  developed  into 
the  steel-clad,  and  even  in  the  brief  period  since  the 
Spanish  War  there  has  been  such  marked  improvement 
that  the  strongest  ships  of  1898  would  be  to-day  useless 
if  opposed  to  one  of  the  latest  type  of  Dreadnoughts. 
Recent  progress  in  the  battleship  has  been  in  speed,  size, 
and  the  number  of  big  guns.  The  North  Dakota,  showing 
a  speed  of  twenty-one  knots  on  her  trial  trip,  is  two  to 
three  times  as  fast  as  the  ironclads  of  the  Civil  War,  and 
at  least  a  third  faster  than  the  battleship  of  the  Spanish 
War.  Her  great  size,  20,000  tons,  makes  possible  the 
decided  increase  in  the  number  of  turrets  and  big  guns. 

5  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  1908,  p.  6. 


474  The  United  States  Navy 

Modern  battleships  are  expensive ;  they  cost  about  thirty 
times  as  much  as  the  old-time  frigate,  but  power  has  been 
gained  in  a  like  proportion. 

Of  comparatively  recent  introduction  are  torpedo- 
boats,  torpedo-boat  destroyers,  and  submarines.  In  the 
Kusso- Japanese  War  (1904^5)  the  Japanese  torpedo-boats 
accomplished  much,  and  demonstrated  the  helplessness 
of  large  ships  when  surprised  by  these  insidious  foes. 
The  automobile  torpedo  has  since  been  improved  in  accu 
racy  and  range,  and  it  can  be  used  by  a  boat  two  or  three 
miles  distant  with  at  least  a  chance  of  success.  The 
special  defense  against  torpedo-boats  is  the  rapid-fire 
guns ;  but  in  order  to  use  them,  lookouts  on  the  ship  must 
locate  the  quick  and  elusive  enemy,  and  this  at  night  is 
often  extremely  difficult.  For  the  purpose  of  guarding 
the  battleship,  a  boat  swifter  and  larger  than  the  torpedo- 
boat  has  been  developed — the  destroyer — which  by  reason 
of  its  size  is  capable  of  making  long  sea  trips.  The  sub 
marine,  though  old  in  idea,  has  only  of  late  passed  beyond 
the  experimental  stage.  It  is  "reliable  now  from  every 
stand-point,  mobile  to  as  great  a  degree  as  the  warship  of 
ten  years  ago,  and  as  capable  of  maneuvering  under  water 
as  any  ship  on  the  surface."6  It  adds  greatly  to  the 
accuracy  with  which  torpedoes  may  be  used,  and  though 
its  serviceability  has  not  yet  been  demonstrated  in  war, 
it  is  regarded  as  an  important  part  of  the  navy. 

Great  as  has  been  the  progress  in  ships  in  the  past 
half  century,  it  is  not  more  remarkable  than  that  in 
guns.  The  most  highly  developed  12-inch  gun  of  1864,  at 
its  maximum  range  of  6000  yards,  could  penetrate  wrought 
iron  eight  inches  thick,  whereas  the  modern  gun  of  the 
same  calibre  at  four  times  this  range,  or  24,000  yards, 

6  Dawson,  A.  T.,  The  Engineering  of  Ordnance  ( in  Engineering, 
1909,  p.  100). 


Improvement  in  Personnel  475 

can  penetrate  seventeen  and  a  half  inches  of  wrought  iron. 
Notwithstanding  the  advance  in  power,  the  weight  of  the 
modern  gun  has  only  been  trebled.  The  increase  in  power 
has  been  made  possible  largely  by  substituting,  for  the 
old  black  powder,  the  smokeless  nitro-cellulose  explosive 
compound  of  to-day.  The  latter  gives  "a  much  greater 
propelling  force,  but  as  it  is  more  regularly  sustained, 
the  maximum  pressure  is  not  greatly  increased  if  at 
all."7 

In  the  War  of  1812  Captain  Hull  shipped  a  crew 
largely  green,  and  within  a  few  weeks  had  them  so  splen 
didly  drilled  that  he  gained  his  famous  victory  over  the 
Guerriere.  Such  a  thing  is  not  possible  under  present  con 
ditions.  Officers  and  men  alike  require  long  training.  The 
intricate  system  of  electrical  apparatus  on  the  ships  of 
to-day,  by  which  the  various  divisions  are  co-ordinated 
arid  the  turrets  and  big  guns  manipulated,  requires  expert 
electricians;  to  secure  the  best  marksmanship,  the  highly 
organized  gun  crews  must  be  carefully  prepared;  and  to 
use  the  explosive  material,  as  in  planting  mines  and  in 
doing  the  practical  work  on  torpedo-boats,  instruction  is 
invaluable.  That  the  enlisted  men  may  be  educated  for 
these  purposes,  there  are  schools  in  connection  with  the 
naval  stations  at  Newport,  New  York,  and  Washington. 

Similar  provisions  have  been  made  that  the  officers 
may  be  prepared  for  their  still  more  complex  duties. 
Courses  of  a  technical  character  have  been  planned  at  the 
Naval  Academy  so  as  to  give  at  least  all  the  groundwork. 
Advanced  courses  are  later  offered  for  officers  at  the 
School  of  Marine  Engineering,  Annapolis,  the  Torpedo 
School,  Newport,  and  the  War  College,  Newport. 

The  results  of  this  training  have  been  in  nothing  more 


7  Dawson,  A.  T.,  The  Engineering  of  Ordnance  (in  Engineering, 
1909,  p.  32). 


476  The  United  States  Navy 

noteworthy  than  in  the  immense  improvement  in  gunnery, 
both  in  accuracy  and  rapidity.  This  is  fundamentally 
due  to  competition  and  has  been  made  possible  by  the 
new  and  superior  methods  of  practice  and  by  the  highly 
co-ordinated  character  of  the  present  gun  crew.  In  the 
system  of  to-day,  each  officer  and  each  enlisted  man  feels 
that  he  is  an  integral  contributing  factor.  Thus,  while 
one  group  has  the  sole  function  of  sighting  and  firing 
the  gun,  another  has  that  of  loading.  At  the  same  time 
a  range-finding  group  makes  it  their  special  duty  to  obtain 
the  distance  of  the  enemy  and  to  send  it  to  the  guns  of 
the  battery;  and  in  case  there  is  more  than  one  vessel  of 
the  enemy  they  designate  at  which  one  each  gun  or  battery 
shall  fire.  Related  to  this  last  group  is  another  whose 
duty  it  is  to  control  the  fire  by  signaling  when  to  begin 
and  when  to  cease.  The  men  are  all  trained  for  their 
special  work,  first  individually,  next  by  groups,  and  then 
as  a  whole.  Target  practice  twice  a  year  for  guns  of  all 
calibres  is  held  at  sea  under  the  same  unfavorable  con 
ditions  that  may  be  expected  in  war,  and  a  moving  target 
is  used,  in  size  and  outline  resembling  a  modern  warship. 
Trophies  are  given  for  the  best  scores,  and  the  whole  has 
been  made  a  game  in  which  officers  and  men  alike  take 
the  keenest  interest.  This  has  been  done  with  an  increased 
cost  of  personnel  and  material,  but  in  less  than  ten  years 
it  has  almost  revolutionized  the  service  efficiency  in  hits 
per  gun  per  minute  for  the  entire  fleet. 


THE  UNITED  STATES  A  WORLD  POWER 

The  year  1898  marks  a  new  epoch  in  the  history  of  the 
United  States.  On  the  conclusion  of  the  Spanish  War 
this  country  had  embarked  on  an  entirely  new  policy,  and 
had  become  a  government  with  colonies.  In  the  West 


The  United  States  a  World  Power        477 

Indies  it  had  added  Porto  Rico  to  its  territory  and  had 
assumed  a  responsibility  for  Cuba  that  is  almost  a  pro 
tectorate;  in  the  Pacific  it  had  annexed  the  Hawaiian 
and  the  Philippine  Islands,  as  well  as  Guam  and  several 
other  small  islands.  Just  a  little  later  certain  of  the 
Samoan  group  were  acquired. 

This  is  not  the  place  to  discuss  the  wisdom  of  the 
change  in  policy  which  suddenly  made  of  the  United 
States  a  world  power.  The  truth  soon  was  recognized 
that  with  the  added  territory,  somewhat  remote  and  scat 
tered,  and  with  the  enlarged  responsibilities,  a  strong  navy 
was  essential.  Congress  made  liberal  appropriations,  and 
ships  of  the  latest  and  best  type  were  contracted  for  and 
built.  As  a  result,  the  United  States  has  now  for  some 
years  been  classed  with  England  and  Germany  as  one  of 
the  three  great  naval  powers  of  the  world. 

With  our  democratic  ideas  and  frequent  changes  of 
administration,  it  is  not  possible  to  formulate  a  building 
program  as  Germany  has  done  for  a  decade  and  more  in 
advance.  Yet  there  has  been  in  this  latest  epoch  of 
American  history  a  good  deal  of  firmness  and  consistency 
in  the  naval  policy,  and  Congress  has  shown  the  foresight 
to  order  the  building  of  ships  that  would  take  three  years 
in  construction  when  the  country  was  not  in  dire  straits. 
It  has  recognized  the  truth  of  what  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  wrote  in  his  report  of  1902,  "Among  the  most 
important  lessons  learned  in  the  war  with  Spain  was 
that  a  modern  navy  cannot  be  improvised  during  a  war 
or  upon  the  threshold  of  war." 

Annual  naval  appropriations  upwards  of  a  hundred 
millions  have  seemed  appalling  to  some  people.  Yet  when 
the  navy  is  regarded  as  a  means  to  guard  our  rights  if 
attacked,  or  better,  to  discourage  all  thought  of  attacking 
them,  the  expense  is  small.  It  becomes  then  merely  the 
price  of  insurance.  Secretary  Meyer  compares  from  1800 


478  The  United  States  Navy 

to  1910  the  cost  of  the  navy  (which  can  be  accurately 
determined  from  the  records)  with  the  estimated  wealth 
of  the  country  in  1800,  1810,  etc.  The  whole  period 
shows  an  average  annual  expenditure  of  $.0012  for  each 
dollar  of  the  valuation  of  the  property  in  the  United 
States.  In  the  decade  1900-1910,  large  as  have  been  the 
appropriations,  so  rapidly  has  the  total  wealth  of  the 
country  increased  that  the  expenditure  has  averaged  only 
$.0009,8  not  an  exorbitant  charge  for  reliable  insurance. 
Further,  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  America's  immu 
nity  from  attack,  just  like  England's,  depends  on  her 
control  of  the  sea,  A  reasonably  strong  navy  makes 
necessary  only  a  comparatively  sma}l  army. 

In  the  new  epoch,  as  previous  to  it,  the  navy  has  done 
more  than  merely  protect  our  own  coasts.  Its  altruistic 
service  in  China  in  1900  has  already  been  narrated.  It 
hurried  succor  to  the  victims  of  the  volcanic  eruption  in 
Martinique  and  St.  Vincent  in  1902.  It  was  of  assistance 
in  preventing  a  revolution  in  Cuba  in  1906.  It  carried  a 
commission  to  Liberia  to  advise  and  assist  in  the  troubled 
affairs  of  that  republic  in  1909.  It  cared  for  the  wounded 
and  insisted  that  the  recognized  laws  of  warfare  be 
observed  in  Nicaragua  in  her  trouble  of  1909-1910.  Con 
stantly,  its  influence  with  the  revolutionary  governments 
of  Central  and  South  America  has  been  towards  stability 
and  peace. 

During  the  period  since  the  Spanish  War  the  navy  has 
enjoyed  greater  popularity  than  ever  before.  As  history 
has  frequently  shown,  prosperity  is  almost  as  dangerous 
to  an  army  or  navy  as  it  is  to  an  individual.  The  self- 
satisfied  spirit  that  so  often  results  from  popular  favor  is 
fatal  to  progress.  There  never  comes  the  time  when  there 
is  no  longer  need  of  large  ideals  of  service  and  sacrifice, 

8  Report  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  1909,  p.  23. 


The  United  States  a  World  Power        479 

as  well  as  of  constant  practice  and  alertness.  Happily,  our 
navy  is  rich  in  its  memories,  and,  being  the  direct  descend 
ant  of  the  English  Navy,  is  heir  also  to  the  traditions  of 
the  mother  service.  It  is  well  to  link  the  present  and 
future  to  the  best  of  the  past,  and  often  to  go  back  to 
such  men  as  Hull  and  Macdonough,  Farragut  and  Porter, 
men  who,  as  they  themselves  would  say,  simply  did  their 
duty,  but  whose  conception  of  duty  was  so  large  that 
their  destiny  became  interwoven  with  that  of  the  nation. 


AUTHORITIES 

This  list  includes  the  most  important  sources  consulted, 
together  with  some  general  works  that  will  be  found  of  special 
help  to  the  student  who  wishes  to  pursue  the  subject  further. 

BIBLIOGRAPHIES 

R.  W.  NEESER,  Statistical  and  Chronological  History  of  the 
United  States  Navy,  1115-1901.  1909  to  date  (in  progress).  Vols. 
I-II. 

C.  T.  HARBECK,  A  Contribution  to  the  Bibliography  of  the 
History  of  the  United  States  Navy.  1906. 

J.  N.  LAENED,  History  for  Ready  Reference.     1894-1901.    6  V. 

Excellent  bibliographies  of  a  general  character  will  be  found 
in  the  several  volumes  of  The  American  Nation,  edited  by  A. 
B.  Hart. 

GENERAL 

E.  S.  MACLAY,  A  History  of  the  United  States  Navy.  1901. 
3  v. 

J.  R.  SPEARS,  The  History  of  Our  Navy.     1897-99.     5  v. 

J.  F.  COOPER,  The  History  of  the  Navy  of  the  United  States 
of  America.  1839.  2  v. 

G.  F.  EMMONS,  The  Navy  of  the  United  States,  1115-1853. 
1853.  A  careful  compilation  of  statistics. 

The  American  Nation:  a  History.  Edited  by  A.  B.  Hart. 
1904-08.  27  v. 

E.  McK.  AVERT,  A  History  of  the  United  States  and  its 
People.  1904  to  date  (in  progress).  Six  volumes  have  thus  far 
been  published.  They  contain  excellent  maps  and  illustrations 
from  rare  sources. 

The  Cambridge  Modern  History.  1903  to  date  (in  progress). 
Vol.  VII  is  devoted  to  the  United  States. 

THE   REVOLUTION 

The  Annual  Register  (Dodsley's  Annual  Register),  1758  to 
date  (in  progress).  Published  in  London;  state  papers  of 
various  kinds. 

481 


482  Authorities 

FRANCIS  WHARTON,  The  Revolutionary  Diplomatic  Corre 
spondence  of  the  United  States.  1889.  6  v. 

C.  0.  PAULLIN,  The  Navy  of  the  American  Revolution.     1906. 
Deals  largely  with  the  administrative  side  of  the  early  navy. 

John  Paul  Jones  Commemoration.  Edited  by  C.  VV.  Stewart. 
1907.  This  contains  official  reports  and  much  valuable  matter 
relating  to  Jones. 

J.  H.  SHERBURNE,  Life  and  Character  of  the  Chevalier  John 
Paul  Jones.  1825. 

A.  S.  MACKENZIE,  The  Life  of  Paul  Jones.     1848.     2  v. 

JOHN  FISKE,  The  American  Revolution.     1898.     2  v. 

WARS  WITH  FRANCE  AND  THE  BARBARY   STATES 

The  United  States'  Naval  Chronicle.  Edited  by  C.  W.  Golds- 
borough.  1824.  2  v.  Contains  official  reports  and  letters  relat 
ing  to  the  navy  between  the  Revolution  and  the  War  of  1812. 

G.  W.  ALLEN,  Our  Naval  War  with  France.     1909. 

G.  W.  ALLEN,  Our  Navy  and  the  Barbary  Corsairs.     1905. 

The  Autobiography  of  Commodore  Charles  Morris.     1880. 

A.  S.  MACKENZIE,  Life  of  Stephen  Decatur.     1846. 

D.  D.  PORTER,  Memoir  of  Commodore  David  Porter.     1875. 

WAR  OF  1812 

Niles's  Weekly  Register,  1811-1849.  75  v.  A  weekly,  pub 
lished  in  Baltimore,  containing  official  reports  and  other  con 
temporary  matter. 

The  Naval  Chronicle,  1799-1818  (London).  40  v.  Contains 
British  reports,  court-martial  proceedings,  etc. 

The  Naval  Monument.  Edited  by  Abel  Bowen.  1816.  Also 
contains  official  reports. 

WILLIAM  JAMES,  The  Naval  History  of  Great  Britain.  1878. 
6  v.  (Originally  published  1822-24.) 

WILLIAM  JAMES,  Naval  Occurrences  in  the  Late  War  Between 
Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  of  America.  1817.  "  Seri 
ously  marred  by  the  bitterest  controversial  and  partisan  spirit." 
( Babcock. ) 

A.  T.  MAHAN,  Sea  Power  in  its  Relations  to  the  War  of  1812. 
1905.  2  v.  Unquestionably  the  best  work  on  the  war. 

THEODORE  ROOSEVELT,  The  Naval  War  of  1812.  1882.  Next 
to  Mahan's,  the  most  reliable  and  scientific  treatment  of  this 
subject. 

The  Royal  Navy.     Edited  by  W.  L.  Clowes.     1897.     7  v.     A 


Authorities  483 

valuable  collection  of  articles  on  the  history  of  the  British  Navy. 
Among  the  American  contributors  are  Mahan  and  Roosevelt. 

I.  N.  HOLLIS,  The  Frigate  Constitution.     1900. 

SAMUEL  LEECH,  Thirty  Years  from  Home.  1843.  Contains  a 
vivid  narrative  of  the  battle  between  the  United  States  and  the 
Macedonian,  the  author  being  an  English  lad  in  the  Macedonian's 
crew. 

ALBERT  GLEAVES,  James  Lawrence.  1904.  The  work  which 
exposed  the  myths  surrounding  the  loss  of  the  Chesapeake. 

J.  F.  COOPER,  Lives  of  Distinguished  American  Naval  Officers. 
1846.  2  v. 

See  also  biographies  of  Decatur,  Morris,  and  Porter,  already 
mentioned,  and  the  biography  of  Farragut  mentioned  in  connection 
with  the  Civil  War. 

SUPPRESSION  OF  WEST  INDIAN  PIRACY,  SLAVE  TRADE,   MUTINY  ON  THE 
SOMERS,    ETC. 

A.  H.  FOOTE,  Africa  and  the  American  Flag.     1854. 

J.  R.  SPEARS,  The  American  Slave  Trade.     1900. 

Proceedings  of  the  Naval  Court- Martial  in  the  Case  of  A.  8. 
Mackenzie,  etc.  Edited  by  J.  F.  Cooper.  1844.  A  complete 
record  of  the  court-martial,  to  which  is  added  the  criticisms  of 
the  editor  on  the  conduct  of  Commander  Mackenzie. 

PARK  BENJAMIN,  The  United  States  Naval  Academy.  1900. 
This  contains  also  an  excellent  treatment  of  the  mutiny  on  the 
Corners. 

S«e  also  biographies  of  Farragut  and  Porter. 

MEXICAN  WAR 

Annual  Reports  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

H.  H.  BANCROFT,  History  of  California.     1884-90.     7  v. 

See  biographies  of  Farragut  and  David  D.  Porter. 

PERRY'S  EXPEDITION  TO  JAPAN 

Narrative  of  the  Expedition  of  an  American  Squadron  to  the 
China  Seas  and  Japan.  1856.  3  v.  This  was  published  by  order 
of  Congress  and  was  compiled  from  original  notes  and  journals 
of  Commodore  Perry  and  his  officers,  under  his  supervision.  The 
first  volume,  by  Francis  L.  Hawks,  contains  the  material  of  chief 
interest. 

W.  E.  GRIFFIS,  Matthew  Calbraith  Perry.     1887. 


484  Authorities 


CIVIL  WAR 

Of  the  first  importance,  together  with  the  Reports  of  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  are  the  two  following  works: 

Official  Records  of  the  Union  and  Confederate  Navies  in  the 
War  of  the  Rebellion.  1894  to  date  (in  progress).  Vols.  1-23. 

Official  Records  of  the  Union  and  Confederate  Armies.  1880- 
1902.  70  v. 

Of  scarcely  less  value  and  interest  is  the  Century  Company's 
Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War.  1888.  4  v.  (Narratives  by 
the  Union  and  Confederate  officers.) 

Also  of  importance  are  many  of  the  papers  read  before  the 
Loyal  Legion  and  various  other  societies  of  veterans. 

D.  D.  PORTER,  The  Naval  History  of  the  Civil  War.     1886. 

J.  T.  SCHARF,  History  of  the  Confederate  States  Navy.     1887. 

Rear  Admiral  Du  Pont,  Official  Dispatches  and  Letters  of. 
1883. 

LOYALL  FARRAGUT,  The  Life  of  David  Glasgow  Farragut.     1879. 

A.  T.  MAHAN,  Admiral  Farragut.     1892. 

J.  R.  SOLEY,  Admiral  Porter.     1903. 

W.  C.  CHURCH,  The  Life  of  John  Ericsson.     1891.     2  v. 

J.  M.  HOPPIN,  Life  of  Andrew  Hull  Foote.     1874 

Gideon  Welles,  The  Diary  of.     In  Atlantic  Monthly,  1909. 

J.  G.  NICOLAY  and  JOHN  HAY,  Abraham  Lincoln,  a  History. 
1890.  10  v. 

J.   M.   ELLICOTT,   The  Life  of  John  Ancrum  Winslow.     1902. 

RAPHAEL  SEMMES,  Memoirs  of  Service  Afloat.     1869. 

ARTHUR  SINCLAIR,  Two  Years  on  the  Alabama.     1896. 

U.  S.  GRANT,  Personal  Memoirs.  1885-86.  2  v.  Chapters 
20-22  and  31-39  relate  to  the  combined  movements  of  the  army 
and  navy  against  Forts  Henry  and  Donelson  and  against  Vicksburg. 

HENRY  WALKE,  Naval  Scenes  and  Reminiscences  of  the  Civil 
War.  1877.  As  commander  of  the  Carondelet,  the  author  had 
part  in  the  most  stirring  scenes  on  the  Western  rivers. 

Captain  George  Hamilton  Perkins,  Letters  of.  1908.  Written 
by  a  young  officer  who  took  a  distinguished  part  in  the  battles 
of  New  Orleans  and  Mobile  Bay;  and  being  intended  only  for  his 
home  they  have  an  added  charm  because  of  their  fresh,  unstudied 
character. 

J.  WILKINSON,  The  Narrative  of  a  Blockade-Runner.  1877. 
The  account  of  a  captain  in  the  Confederate  Navy,  highly  success 
ful  in  eluding  the  blockade. 


Authorities  485 

W.  H.  PARKER,  Recollections  of  a  Naval  Officer,  1841-1865. 
1883. 

DANIEL  AMMEN,  The  Atlantic  Coast.     1883. 

A.  T.  MAHAN,  The  Gulf  and  Inland  Waters.     1883. 

A.  T.  MAHAN,  From  Sail  to  Steam.     1907. 

J.  R.  SOLEY,  The  Blockade  and  the  Cruisers.     1883. 

H.  W.  WILSON,  Ironclads  in  Action.     189G.     2  v. 

J.  S.  BARNES,  Submarine  Warfare.  1869.  An  account  by  a 
Union  officer  of  the  torpedoes,  torpedo-boats,  and  submarines  used 
during  the  war. 

J.  F.  RHODES,  History  of  the  United  States  from  1850.  1893- 
1906.  7  v. 

B.  J.  LOSSING,  Pictorial  History  of  the  Civil  War.     1866.     3  v. 
T.   L.   HARRIS,    The  Trent   Affair.     1896.     A   careful   and  ex 
haustive  study. 

MOUNTAGUE  BERNARD,  A  Historical  Account  of  the  Neutrality 
of  Great  Britain  During  the  American  Civil  War.  1870. 

J.  W.  H.  PORTER,  A  Record  of  Events  in  Norfolk  County. 
1892.  Interesting  data  on  the  construction  of  the  ironclad  Mer 
rimac. 

F.  M.  BENNETT,  The  Monitor  and  the  Navy  Under  Steam. 
1900. 

D.  B.  PHILLIPS,  The  Career  of  the  Ironclad  Virginia.  (In 
Virginia  Historical  Collection,  vol.  6.) 

CHARLES  MARTIN,  Personal  Reminiscences  of  the  Monitor  and 
Merrimac  Engagement.  1886. 

T.  O.  SELFRIDGE,  JR.,  The  Story  of  the  Cumberland.  (Pub 
lished  for  the  Military  Historical  Society  of  Massachusetts. 
1902.) 

I.  N.  STILES,  The  Merrimac  and  the  Monitor.  (In  Military 
Essays  and  Recollections.  1891.) 

Senate  Report,  No.  37,  37th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.  By  Sen.  Hale  on 
the  surrender  of  the  navy  yards  at  Pensacola  and  Norfolk. 

House  Report,  No.  1725,  48th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.  (in  vol.  6).  Re 
lating  to  the  U.  S.  S.  Monitor. 

F.  A.  PARKER,  The  Battle  of  Mobile  Bay.     1878. 

THE   NAVY    AFTER    THE    CIVIL    WAR 

Annual  Reports  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 
CHARLES  MORRIS,  The  Nation's  Navy.  1898. 
J.  D.  LONG,  The  New  American  Navy.  1903.  2  v. 


486  Authorities 

G.  W.  MELVILLE,  In  the  Lena  Delta.  1885.  A  personal  narra 
tive  of  the  chief  engineer  of  the  Jeannette  Expedition. 

The  Voyage  of  the  Jeannette.  1884.  2  v.  DeLong's  journal, 
edited  by  his  wife,  Emma  DeLong. 

A.  W.  GBEELY,  Handbook  of  Polar  Discoveries.     190G. 

W.  S.  SCIILEY  and  J.  R.  SOLEY,  The  Rescue  of  Greely.     1885. 

R.  E.  PEARY,  Nearest  the  Pole.     1907. 

R.  E.  PEARY,  The  North  Pole.     1910. 

FRANKLIN  MATTHEWS,  With  the  Battle  Fleet.     1908. 

FRANKLIN  MATTHEWS,  Back  to  Hampton  Roads.     1909. 


THE    WAR    WITH    SPAIN 

Annual  Reports  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy. 

W.  A.  M.  GOODE,  With  Sampson  Through  the  War.     1899. 

A.  T.  MAHAN,  Lessons  of  the  War  with  Spain  and  Other 
Articles.  1899. 

The  Naval  Annual.  Edited  by  F.  A.  Brassey.  1893  to  date 
(in  progress).  A  reliable  authority  on  naval  statistics. 

.H.  W.  WILSON,  The  Downfall  of  Spain.  1900.  An  able  work, 
non-partisan  in  character,  written  by  an  Englishman. 

R.  H.  TITHERINGTON,  A  History  of  the  Spanish- American 
War  of  1898.  1900. 

Office  of  Naval  Intelligence.  Notes  on  the  Spanish-American 
War.  1900.  Contains  comments  by  Spanish,  German,  and  Ameri 
can  officers  on  the  war. 


INDEX 


Act  for  the  Better  Government  of 
the  Navy,  60. 

Adams,  Capt.,  230,  231. 

Adams,  Minister,  371. 

Adams,  68. 

Aeolus,  102,  106. 

Africa,  102. 

Agrippina,  371,  374. 

Aguinaldo,  434. 

Alabama,  hunted  by  the  Wyoming, 
365;  cruise  of,  371  ff.;  map  of 
cruise,  373;  engages  the  Kear- 
sarge,  376  ff.;  diagram  of  action, 
381;  the  controversy,  383  ff.; 
Claims,  387. 

Alabama,  in  the  Battle  Fleet,  470. 

Albatross  passes  Port  Hudson,  327. 

Albatross  and  the  Fisheries  Com 
mission,  425. 

Albemarle,  350  ff. 

Albemarle  Sound,  operations  on, 
348  ff.;  and  Pamlico  Sound, 
map  of,  349. 

Alden,  James,  sent  to  Norfolk, 
257;  battle  of  Mobile  Bay,  334, 
336. 

Alert,  captures  the  Lexington,  19; 
taken  by  Barry,  30. 

Alert,  in  Polar  expedition,  418. 

Alert,  in  Central  American 
waters,  423. 

Alfred,  13,  24. 

Algiers,  treaty  with  Spain,  42; 
treaty  with  Portugal,  43;  treaty 
with  United  States,  61;  Dey  of, 
makes  use  of  the  George  Wash- 


States,    203-206;    treaty    with 
United  States,  206. 

Alleghany,  203,  204. 

Allen,  W.  H.,  on  the  Chesapeake, 
96;  defeated  by  Maples,  151, 
152. 

Allen,  W.  H.,  Jr.,  151,  152. 

Alliance,  in  Jones's  fleet,  31  ff.; 
under  Barry,  40;  sold,  42. 

Almirante  Oquendo,  447  ff. 

Alphonso  XII,  428. 

Alwyn,  Lt.,  114,  131. 

America,  39,  42. 

Amphitrite,  411,  449. 

Amy,  422. 

Anderson,  Thomas  O.,  77. 

Andrea  Doria,  13. 

Aquia  Creek,  243. 

Arbuthnot,  James,  158. 

Arctic  Regions,  map  of,  417. 

Argus,  in  the  Tripolitan  War,  84, 
88,  89,  91;  in  Rodgers'  squad 
ron,  102,  118;  captured  by  the 
Pelican,  151,  152;  injures  Brit 
ish  commerce,  160. 

Ariel,  166,  169. 

Arkansas,  324,  325. 

Arkansas  Post,  326. 

Armada,  157. 

Arnold,  Benedict,  15  ff. 

Aroostook,  287. 

Arthur,  Pres.,  409. 

Atlanta,  British  brig,  158. 

Atlanta,  Confederate  ram,  396, 
397. 

Atlanta,  U.  S.  cruiser,  410. 

Atlantic,  177. 


ington,  61;  encouraged  by  Great    Augustin,  Gen.,  434,  440,  443. 
Britain,  203;  war  with  United   Avon,  157,  158. 

487 


488 


Index 


Bagley,  Worth,  459. 

Bahama,  371,  372. 

Bailey,  Capt.,  314,  320. 

Bainbridge,  Joseph,  76. 

Bainbridge,  Wm.,  surrenders  the 
Retaliation,  53,  54;  commands 
the  George  Washington,  61,  62; 
commands  the  Essex,  64;  loses 
the  Philadelphia,  69  ff.;  plan 
for  destroying  the  Philadelphia, 
76;  report  of  the  Intrepid  disas 
ter,  90;  captures  the  Java,  126 
ff.;  career  of,  132;  commands 
squadron  for  Algiers,  204,  206. 

Ballard,  Acting  Lt.,  135. 

Baltimore,  435  ff. 

Baltimore  affair,  53,  54. 

Bancroft,  George,  218,  219. 

Bankhead,  J.  P,  287. 

Banks,  Gen.,  327. 

Barbary  States,  map  of,  63. 

Barclay,  Robert  H.,  defeated  by 
Perry,  165  ff. 

Barclay,  Thomas,  43. 

Barclay,  177,  178. 

Barnard,  John  G.,  243. 

Barney,  Joshua,  50. 

Barron,  James,  commands  the 
President,  64;  commands  the 
Chesapeake,  96;  court-martial 
of  Porter,  209. 

Barron,  Samuel,  commands  the 
Philadelphia,  64,  66;  court- 
martial  of  Morris,  69;  super 
sedes  Preble,  87;  relieved,  90. 

Barron,  Samuel  (2d),  244,  377. 

Barry,  John,  commands  the  Lex 
ington,  29,  30;  the  Alliance,  40; 
appointed  captain,  50;  com 
mands  the  United  States,  51. 


Bastard,  Capt.,  102. 

Battle  Fleet,  cruise  of,  469  ff. 

Beagle,  209. 

Bear,  416. 

Bell,  H.  H.,  313,  314. 

Belmont,  battle  of,  292. 

Belvidera,  102. 

Benham,  A.  E.  K.,  422  ff. 

Benton,  290. 

Berceau,  59. 

Beresford,  Capt.,  149. 

Berkeley,  Vice-Admiral,  95,  96. 

Bernadou,  Lt.,  425. 

Beauregard,  Gen.,  393,  394. 

Biddle,  James,  in  the  Hornet,  134; 
boards  the  Frolic,  147;  captures 
the  Penguin,  158,  159;  service 
in  West  Indies,  208;  goes  to 
Japan,  226. 

Biddle,  Nicholas,  13,  29. 

Bienville,  247. 

Black  Rock,  162. 

Black  Warrior,  426. 

Blakely,  Johnston,  captures  the 
Reindeer,  154  ff.;  captures  the 
Mary,  157;  sinks  the  Avon,  157 
ff.;  captures  the  Atlanta,  158. 

Blanco,  Gen.,  427,  434. 

Blockade  of  Southern  ports,  241, 
242,  388  ff.,  404. 

Blockade-runner,  390  ff. 

Blyth,  Samuel,  153. 

Board  of  Admiralty,  12. 

Bombshell,  352. 

Bonhomme  Richard,  cruise  of,  map, 
28;  captures  the  Serapis,  30  ff. 

Bonne  Citoyenne,  127,  133,  149. 

Boston,  frigate,  59,  68. 

Boston,  cruiser,  375,  410,  435  ff. 

Boxer,  capture  of,  152,  153. 

Boxer  trouble,  466-8. 

Bragg,  Gen.,  401. 


Index 


489 


Breaking  the  line,  explanation  of 
the  term,  172. 

Breese,  Lt.-Comdr.,  403. 

Brilliante,  212. 

British  Navy,  during  the  Revo 
lution,  13;  in  the  War  of  1812, 
101. 

Broke,  J.  M.,  262,  264. 

Broke,  Philip  B.  V.,  chases  the 
Constitution,  102  ff.;  captures 
the  Chesapeake,  135  ff. 

Brooklyn,  steam  sloop,  battle  be 
low  New  Orleans,  315  if.;  below 
Vicksburg,  324;  battle  of  Mobile 
Bay,  330  ff. 

Brooklyn,  cruiser,  battle  of  San 
tiago,  452  ff. 

Brown,  Surgeon,  385. 

Buchanan,  Franklin,  in  expedi 
tion  to  Japan,  230,  231;  battle 
of  Hampton  Roads,  266  ff.; 
battle  of  Mobile  Bay,  338  ff. 

Buchanan,  Pres.,  239. 

Buckner,  Gen.,  296. 

Budd,  Lt.,  140,  142. 

Buford,  Col.,  301. 

Burgoyne,  Gen.,  18. 

Burnside,  Gen.,  348,  349. 

Burrows,  Wm.,  152,  153. 

Bush,  Lt.,  113. 

Bushnell,  David,  355. 

Bustamente,  Capt.,  457. 

Butler,  Benjamin  F.,  at  Hatteras 
Inlet,  244;  New  Orleans,  312, 
319;  Fort  Fisher,  399,  400. 

Butt,  Lt.,  281. 

Byron,  Capt.,  102. 


Cabot,  13. 
Cairo,  290. 
Caldwell,  Lt.,  87. 


Caledonia,  captured  by  Elliott, 
162,  164;  battle  of  Lake  Erie, 
166  ff. 

Camara,  Admiral,  459. 

Cambon,  Ambassador,  461. 

Campos,  Gen.,  426. 

Cand,  Jack,  119. 

Canonicus,  399. 

Garden,  John  S.,  118  ff. 

Carleton,  Guy,  15. 

Carleton,  Thomas,  17. 

Carolina,  198. 

Carondelet,  building  of,  290;  at 
tacks  Fort  Donelson,  297,  298; 
passes   Island    No.    10,   303-6; 
engages  the  Arkansas,  325. 

Carronades,  explanation  of  the 
term,  46. 

Casembroot,  Capt.,  367,  370. 

Cassin,  Lt.,  196. 

Castilla,  442. 

Catalano,  Salvatore,  77. 

Cayuga,  314  ff. 

Celia,  70,  71. 

Ceres,  352. 

Cerf,  31  ff. 

Cervera,  Admiral,  430,  433,  446  ff. 

Chads,  Lt.,  129. 

Chambers,  W.  L,,  464. 

Chandler,  Sec.,  416. 

Charleston,  naval  operation  be 
fore,  393-7. 

Charleston,  building  of,  411;  sent 
to  Philippines,  444;  lost,  464. 

Chase,  Samuel,  12. 

Chauncey,  Isaac,  162,  165,  173, 
189. 

Cherub,  engagement  with  the 
Essex,  178  ff. 

Chesapeake,  building  of,  50;  sent 
to  Tripoli,  68;  encounter  with 
the  Leopard,  95-7;  captured  by 


490 


Index 


the  Shannon,  133  ff.;  diagram 
of  action,  138. 

Chicago,  410. 

Chickamauya,  375. 

Chickasaw,  battle  of  Mobile  Bay, 
334,  337,  343-5. 

Chicora,  394. 

China  and  the  Boxer  trouble, 
466-8. 

Chipp,  Lt.,  415. 

Chippewa,  166,  170. 

Chub,  192  ff. 

Cincinnati,  building  of,  290;  at 
tacks  Fort  Henry,  294;  attacked 
at  Fort  Pillow,  308. 

Civil  War,  238  ff. 

Clark,  Charles  E.,  430. 

Cleveland,  Pres.,  421. 

Collins,  Pilot,  336. 

Colonel  Lloyd  Aspinwall,  426. 

Colonial  Navy,  9  ff. 

Colorado,  399. 

Columbia,  259. 

Columbiads,  259. 

Columbus,  in  Esek  Hopkins'  fleet, 
13. 

Columbus,  goes  to  Japan,  226; 
destroyed  at  Norfolk,  259. 

Commodore  Hull,  352. 

Concas,  Capt.,  457. 

Concord,  435. 

Conestoga,  building  of,  292;  goes 
up  the  Tennessee,  296;  attacks 
Fort  Donelson,  297. 

Confiance,  captured  by  Macdon- 
ough,  191  ff. 

Conger,  Minister,  466. 

Congress,  on  Lake  Champlain,  17. 

Congress,  building  of,  50;  in 
Rodgers'  squadron,  102,  118; 
sails  from  Boston,  134;  block 
aded  in  Portsmouth,  144. 


Congress,  destroyed  by  the  Merri- 
mac,  265,  268  ff. 

Connecticut,  471. 

Conner,  David,  in  the  action  with 
the  Peacock,  150;  in  the  Mexi 
can  War,  222. 

Constellation,  building  of,  50,  51; 
captures  the  Insurgente,  55,  56; 
engages  the  Vengeance,  57,  58; 
sent  to  Tripoli,  68,  90;  block 
aded,  144;  sent  to  Algiers,  204, 
205. 

Constitution,  building  of,  50,  51; 
in  the  Tripolitan  War,  69,  84, 
88;  chased  by  British  squadron, 
102  ff.;  captures  the  Guerriere, 
109  ff.;  diagram  of  action,  111; 
captures  the  Java,  126  ff.;  dia 
gram  of  action,  128;  blockaded 
in  Boston,  134,  143;  captures 
the  Cyane  and  Levant,  198,  200, 
201;  in  1881,  408. 

Contee,  Lt.,  229. 

Continental  Navy,  15. 

Conyngham,  Gustavus,  19  ff. 

Cooke,  Capt.,  350-4. 

Cornwallis,  Lord,  41. 

Corvette,  explanation  of  the  term, 
46. 

Cottineau,  Capt.,  32. 

Cotton  Plant,  352. 

Countess  of  Scarborough,  captured, 
32,  38. 

Couronne,  377,  378. 

Cox,  Acting  Lt.,  135,  142,  143. 

Cox,  Capt.,  105. 

Crane,  Lt.,  107. 

Craney,  Lt.,  217. 

Craven,  T.  A.  M.,  battle  of  Mobile 
Bay,  334  ff. 

Craven,    T.    T.,    in   command   of 


Index 


491 


Potomac  Flotilla,  243;  battle 
below  New  Orleans,  315-7. 

Cristobal  Colon,  447  ff. 

Cromwell,  Boatswain's  Mate,  215, 
216. 

Croyable,  captured,  53. 

Cuba,  insurrection  in,  426  ff.; 
blockade  of,  432,  434,  445,  446. 

Cumberland,  saved  at  Norfolk, 
257,  258;  sunk  by  the  Merrimac, 
264-8. 

Gushing,  Wm.  B.,  354  ff.;  diagram 
of  his  launch,  357. 

Cyane,  captured  by  the  Constitu 
tion,  198,  200,  201. 


Dacres,  James,  commands  the 
Guerriere,  102;  defeated  by  Hull, 
110  ff.;  challenge  to  Rodgers, 
116. 

Dahlgren,  Rear-Admiral,  com 
mands  South  Atlantic  squadron, 
390;  operations  before  Charles 
ton,  397. 

Dahlgren  gun,  260. 

Dale,  Richard,  in  Mill  prison,  19; 
in  engagement  with  the  Ser- 
apis,  31  ff.;  appointed  captain, 
50;  commands  the  Ganges,  52; 
sent  to  Tripoli,  64,  66. 

Daniel  Webster,  368  ff. 

Dauphin,  42. 

Davids.    See  Submarines. 

Davidson,  Lt.,  278,  284. 

Davis,  Charles  H.,  member  of 
board  of  operations,  243;  at 
Port  Royal,  245;  member  of 
board  on  ironclads,  274;  en 
gages  fleet  at  Fort  Pillow,  308; 
moves  down  the  Mississippi, 
322. 


Davis,  John,  77. 

Davis,  Pres.,  388,  389. 

Davis,  Rear-Admiral,  425. 

Deane,  42. 

Dearborn,  Gen.,  161,  162,  165. 

Decatur,  James,  86. 

Decatur,  Stephen  (Sr.),  52. 

Decatur,  Stephen,  in  the  Mediter 
ranean,  69;  burns  the  Philadel 
phia,  76  ff.;  gunboat  attack  on 
Tripoli,  84  ff.;  captures  the 
Macedonian,  117  ff.;  loses  the 
President,  199,  200;  expedition 
to  Algiers,  204-6. 

Decatur,  110. 

Deerhound,  378,  382  ff. 

De  Grasse,  Count,  41. 

De  Haven,  E.  J.,  413. 

Delaware,  takes  the  Croyable,  52, 
53. 

Delaware,  destroyed  at  Norfolk, 
259. 

De  Long,  G.  W.,  414  ff. 

De  Sartine,  Minister,  30. 

Detroit,  115,  162,  174. 

Detroit,  British  brig,  destroyed, 
162,  164. 

Detroit,  Barclay's  flagship,  166  ff. 

Detroit,  U.  S.  cruiser,  423. 

Dewey,  George,  services  after 
battle  of  Manila,  424;  battle  of 
Manila  Bay,  435  ff.;  prevents 
German  interference,  462,  463. 

Dickinson,  Capt.,  159. 

Dolphin,  brig,  destroyed  at  Nor 
folk,  257,  259. 

Dolphin,  cruiser,  410. 

Don  Antonio  de  Ulloa,  441,  442. 

Don  Juan  de  Austria,  442. 

Dorsey,  Midn.,  87. 

Douglas,  Charles,  17. 

Downes,  Capt.,  396. 


492 


Index 


Dowries,  John,  178,  182,  186,  205. 

Downie,  Capt.,  191  ff. 

Dragon,  280. 

Drake,  captured  by  the  Ranger, 
27  ff. 

Drayton,  Percival,  334,  338,  339, 
342. 

Du  Pont,  Samuel,  member  of 
board  of  operations,  243;  cap 
tures  Port  Royal,  244  ff.;  com 
mands  South  Atlantic  squad 
ron,  390;  operations  before 
Charleston,  393-7. 

E 

Eads,  J.  B.,  288. 

Eagle,  sloop,  191. 

Eagle,  brig,  191  ff. 

Eastport,  296. 

Eaton,  Wm.,  66-8,  91,  92. 

Edsall,  N.  E.,  465. 

Edward,  29. 

Edwin,  204. 

Effingham,  29. 

Ellet,  Lt.-Col.,  324,  325. 

Elliott,  Gilbert,  350. 

Elliott,  Jesse  D.,  work  on  Lake 
Erie,  162  ff.;  battle  of  Lake 
Erie,  167  ff.;  controversy,  169, 
171,  172. 

Ettis,  354. 

Embargoes,  in  War  of  1812,  94,  97, 
98,  100. 

Endymion,  199,  200. 

Enlistment,  term  of,  57,  67. 

Enterprise,  on  Lake  Champlain, 
17. 

Enterprise  (2d),  cruise  in  West 
Indies,  59;  sent  to  Tripoli,  64; 
captures  the  Tripoli,  65;  in 
second  squadron  before  Tri 
poli,  68,  69:  burning  of  the 


Philadelphia,  76;  bombardment 
of  Tripoli,  84  ;  captures  the 
Boxer,  152,  153. 

Epervier,  captured  by  the  Peacock, 
153;  sent  to  Algiers,  204;  en 
gages  the  Mashuda,  205. 

Ericsson,  John,  274,  453,  455. 

Erie,  223. 

Espiegle,  150. 

Essex,  frigate,  sent  to  Tripoli,  64, 
68;  in  Bainbridge's  squadron, 
126;  cruise  of,  under  Porter, 
175  ff.;  map  of  cruise,  181. 

Essex,  merchantman,  93,  94. 

Essex,  gunboat,  attacks  Ft.  Henry 
294;  engages  the  Arkansas,  325. 

Essex  Junior,  178  ff. 

Evans,  R.  D.,  470. 

Everard,  Capt.,  191. 

Experiment,  30. 


Fairfax,  D.  M.,  252. 

Fajardo  affair,  209,  210. 

Farragut,  David  G.,  commands 
the  Barclay,  178;  account  of  the 
loss  of  the  Essex,  180  ff.;  ser 
vice  in  West  Indies,  208;  in 
Mexican  War,  222,  223;  joins 
Davis,  308,  309;  captures  New 
Orleans,  310  ff.;  at  Vicksburg, 
322  ff.;  passes  Port  Hudson, 
327;  victorious  at  Mobile  Bay, 
330  ff.;  subsequent  honors,  347. 

Farrand,  Comdr.,  404. 

Finch,  192  ff. 

Finnis,  Capt.,  170. 

Firefly,  204. 

Flambeau,  204. 

Fleet  in  being,  defined,  450. 

Florida,  371,  375,  387. 

Floyd,  Gen.,  296. 


Index 


493 


Flusser,  Lt,,  351,  352. 

fly,  13. 

Foote,  A.  H.,  and  the  slave  trade, 
213;  construction  of  river  gun 
boats,  290;  takes  Ft.  Henry, 
293  ff.;  attacks  Ft.  Donelson, 
296  ff.;  attacks  Island  No.  10, 
299  ff.;  moves  on  Ft.  Pillow, 
307;  relieved  by  Davis,  308. 

Fort  Beauregard,  246  ff. 

Fort  Clark,  244. 

Fort  Donelson,  296  ff . 

Fort  Fisher,  398  ff.;  plan  of  second 
assault,  402. 

Fort  Gaines,  331  ff. 

Fort  George,  165. 

Fort  Hatteras,  244. 

Fort  Henry,  293  ff. 

Fort  Jackson,  312  ff. 

Fort  McAllister,  394,  395. 

Fort  Morgan,  331  ff. 

Fort  Pillow,  307,  308. 

Fort  Powell,  331  ff. 

Fort  St.  Philip,  312  ff. 

Fort  Walker,  246  ff. 

Forton  prison,  22. 

Fox,  Gustavus,  made  Ass't  Sec. 
of  the  Navy,  240,  241;  plans 
New  Orleans  expedition,  310; 
faith  in  monitors,  393. 

France,  alliance  with  the  U.  S., 
30;  war  with  the  U.  S.,  51  ff.; 
map  of  scene  of  war,  55;  treaty 
of  peace  with  the  U.  S.,  59. 

Franklin,  Benj.,  goes  to  France, 
19;  commissions  Conyngham, 
20. 

Franklin,  Sir  John,  412. 

Franklin,  68. 

Freeman,  A.  H.,  465. 

French,  assistance  of,  41. 

French  floating  batteries,  261. 


Frigate,  explanation  of  the  term, 

46;  illustration,  47. 
Frigate  and  sloop  actions  in  War 

of  1812  (map),  145. 
Frolic,    defeated    by    the    Wasp, 

146  ff. 

Frolic  (2d),  153. 

Fullam,  Master's-Mate,  372,  383. 
Fulton,  Robt.,  355. 
Fulton,  261. 
Furor,  447,  449,  454. 


Gaines,  334,  339. 

Galena,  gunboat,  339. 

Galena,  ironclad,  274,  287. 

Gamble,  Lt.,  179. 

Ganges,  52,  137. 

Garfield,  Pres.,  408,  409. 

Gates,  Gen.,  17. 

General  Lezo,  442. 

General  Monk,  40,  41. 

General  Pike,  192. 

George  Washington,  61,  68. 

Georgia,  371,  375. 

Georgiana,  178. 

Germantown,  256  ff. 

Ghent,  treaty  of,  198,  201,  202. 

Gillmore,  J.  C.,  464. 

Gilmer,  J.  F.,  293,  299. 

Gilmore,  304. 

Gilmore.,  Gen.,  396. 

Glasgow,  14. 

Gloucester,  453  ff. 

Glynn,  Comdr.,  227. 

Goldsborough,    Flag-Officer,    348, 

349. 

Governor  Moore,  317,  318. 
Grampus,  306. 
Granger,  Gen.,  305. 
Grant,   U.   S.,   at   Belmont,   292, 

293;  captures  Ft.   Henry,   293 


494 


Index 


ff.;  captures  Ft.  Donelson,  296 
ff.;  at  Pittsburg  Landing,  306 
307;  at  Vicksburg,  326  ff.;  at 
Ft.  Fisher,  400. 

Graves,  Admiral,  10. 

Great  Lakes,  importance  in  1812- 
15,  161  ff.;  map  of  campaigns 
on,  163. 

Greely,  A.  W.,  416  ff. 

Green,  Chas.,  334. 

Greene,  S.  D.,  executive  officer  of 
the  Monitor,  277  ff.;  commands 
Monitor,  283. 

Greenwich,  178. 

Greer,  J.  A.,  252. 

Gridley,  Capt.,  439. 

Growler  (Lake  Ontario),  189. 

Growler  (Lake  Champlain),  191. 

Guanabora,  423. 

Guerricre,  boards  the  Spitfire,  99; 
in  Brake's  squadron,  102;  cap 
tured  by  the  Constitution,  109  ff . 

Guerriere  (2d),  sent  against  Al 
giers,  204;  captures  the  Mash- 
uda,  205. 

Gunnery,  at  end  of  18th  century, 
48;  recent  improvement  in,  476. 

Guns,  development  after  1812, 
259,  260;  recent  developments, 
474,  475. 


Halifax,  95,  96. 
Halleck,  Gen.,  293,  307,  324. 
Hamet  Karamauli,  91  ff. 
Hampton  Roads,  battle  of,  255  ff.; 

map  of,  265. 
Hancock,  John,  12. 
Hancock,  40. 
Hardee,  Gen.,  397. 
Harrison,  Gen.,  171. 


Hartford,  type  of  ship,  260;  at  New 
Orleans,  312  ff.;  up  the  Missis 
sippi,  323;  passes  Port  Hudson, 
327;  at  Mobile  Bay,  330  ff. 

Harvard,  447,  449,  455. 

Hatter  as,  374. 

Hatteras  Inlet,  243,  244. 

Hay,  John,  466,  468. 

Hayes,  Capt.,  199. 

Hayes,  Pres.,  407. 

Hebert,  Gen.,  354. 

Henley,  Midn.,  86. 

Hermann,  Lewis,  76. 

Higgins,  Samuel,  360,  364. 

Hillyar,  Capt.,  181  ff. 

Hist,  453,  455. 

Hobson,  Naval  Constructor,  451. 

Hoel,  Master,  304. 

Hoke,  Gen.,  351,  352. 

Hope,  David,  118,  123,  125. 

Hopkins,  Esek,  13,  14. 

Hopkins,  J.  B.,  13. 

Hornet,  sloop  in  Revolutionary 
Navy,  13. 

Hornet,  in  war  with  Tripoli,  91;  in 
Rodgers'  squadron,  102;  in 
Bainbridge's  squadron,  126  ff., 
175;  blockades  the  Bonne  Cito- 
yenne,  133;  captures  the  Pea 
cock,  149,  150;  captures  the 
Penguin,  158,  159,  198;  leaves 
the  Mediterranean  (1807),  203. 

Hotchkiss,  411. 

Housatonic,  356. 

Howe,  Gen.,  18. 

Howell,  Commodore,  446. 

Huger,  Maj.,  250. 

Hull,  Gen.,  161,  162. 

Hull,  Isaac,  exploit  at  Port  Plate, 
59;  before  Tripoli,  69;  escapes 
Broke's  squadron,  103  ff.;  takes 
prizes,  109;  captures  the  Guer- 


Index 


495 


riere,    109    ff.;    superiority    to 
Garden  in  maneuvering,  124. 

Humphreys,  Joshua,  44. 

Hunter,  166  ff. 

Hurlbut,  Gen.,  306. 

Hyder  Alt,  41. 

Hyslop,  Gen.,  131. 


Impressment,  53,  54,  93,  95,  201. 

Indiana,  411,  433,  452  ff. 

Indianola,  328. 

Ingram,  Lt.,  187. 

Insurgente,  takes  the  Retaliation, 
54;  captured  by  the  Constella 
tion,  55  ff.;  loss  of,  59,  60. 

Intrepid,  attack  on  the  Philadel 
phia,  77  ff . ;  blowing  up  of,  88  ff . 

Iowa,  433,  452  ff. 

Iris,  40. 

Ironclads,  introduction  of,  261  ff. 

Isherwood,  Engineer,  256,  409. 

Isla  de  Cuba,  440  ff. 

7s/a  de  Luzon,  441. 

Isla  de  Mindanao,  442. 

Island  No.  10,  captured,  299  ff.; 
map,  300. 

Israel,  Lt.,  88. 

Itasca,  318,  319. 

Izard,  Gen.,  192. 

Izard,  Ralph,  76. 


James,  Reuben,  86. 

Jamestown,  269,  271,  278. 

Japan,  Perry's  expedition  to,  225 
ff.;  map  of,  228;  treaty  with, 
236,  365;  civil  war  in,  365  ff. 

Jarvis,  Midn.,  58. 

Java,  captured  by  the  Constitu 
tion,  126  ff. 


Jay's  treaty,  93. 

Jeannette  expedition,  413  ff. 

Jeff.  Davis,  375. 

Jefferson,  Pres.,  97. 

Jersey,  22. 

John  Adams,  68,  87,  90,  218. 

Johnson,  Pres.,  404. 

Johnston,  A.  S.,  298,  306. 

Johnston,  J.  D.,  343,  344. 

Jones,  Catesby,  270  ff. 

Jones,  Jacob,  146  ff. 

Jones,  J.  P.,  commissioned  lieu 
tenant,  13;  early  career,  24  ff.; 
captures  the  Drake,  27  ff.;  cap 
tures  the  Serapis,  30  ff.;  later 
career,  39,  43;  letter  to  Marine 
Committee,  419. 

Jouett,  J.  E.,  334,  338. 

K 

Katahdin,  324. 
Kate,  393. 

Kearny,  Brig.-Gen.,  221. 
Kearsarge,  action  with  the  Ala 
bama,  376  ff.;  diagram,  381. 
Kell,  Lt.,  383,  385,  386. 
Kempff,  Admiral,  466. 
Kennebec,  318,  319,  324. 
Kennon,  Beverly,  318. 
Keokuk,  395. 
Keystone  State,  394. 
Kineo,  319. 
Knowles,  Quartermaster,  342. 


Lackawanna,  338,  342-4. 

Lady  Prevost,  166,  168. 

Lafittes,  207. 

Lake  Champlain,  first  battle  of, 
15  ff.;  map,  16;  second  battle  of, 
190  ff.;  plan  of  battle,  194. 


496 


Index 


Lake  Erie,  battle  of,  168  ff.;  plan 
of  battle,  169. 

Lake  Ontario,  operations  on,  189, 
190. 

Lamb,  Col.,  398  ff. 

Lambert,  Capt.,  129  ff. 

Laneefield,  368  ff . 

Landais,  Pierre,  31  ff. 

Lang,  Jack,  147. 

Langdon,  John,  26. 

Lanrick,  368  ff. 

Lansdale,  P.  V.,  465. 

Lawrence,  James,  at  Tripoli,  76 
ff.;  commands  the  Hornet,  102, 
126;  commands  the  Chesapeake, 
133  ff.;  action  with  the  Shan 
non,  137  ff.;  captures  the  Pea 
cock,  149,  150. 

Lawrence,  166  ff. 

Laws,  Alex.,  76,  77. 

Lay,  Engineer,  356. 

Lear,  Tobias,  90,  91,  203,  204. 

Lee,  Admiral,  398. 

Lee,  Consul-Gen.,  427. 

Lee,  R.  E.,  398,  404. 

Lee,  10. 

Lee  (blockade  runner),  392. 

Leech,  Samuel,  122. 

Leopard,  95  ff . 

Levant,  198,  200,  201. 

Lexington,  19,  29. 

Lexington,  gunboat,  292,  293,  296, 
306,  307. 

Lincoln,  Pres.,  and  Trent  affair, 
253;  election  in  1864,  346. 

Lindsay,  328,  329. 

Linnet,  192  ff . 

Little  Belt,  99. 

Little  Belt  (sloop),  166,  170. 

Llewellyn,  Asst.  Surg.,  372. 

Lockwood,  Lt.,  418. 

Long,  Sec.,  447. 


Long  guns,    explanation    of    the 

term,  46. 

Loring,  Commodore,  53,  54. 
Louisiana,  198. 
Louisiana,    Confederate  ironclad, 

321. 

Louisiana,  gunboat,  400. 
Louisville,       construction,       290; 

drawing    of,    291;    attacks    Ft. 

Donelson,  297,  298. 
Lovell,  Gen.,  320. 
Low,  Lt.,  372. 
Ludlow,  Lt.,  135. 
Lundy's  Lane,  190. 
Lyman,  Midn.,  187. 
Lynch,  Capt.,  348. 


M 


McCall,  Ed.  R.,  153. 

McCalla,  Capt.,  467. 

McCauley,  C.  S.,  255  ff. 

McClellan,  Gen.,  309,  310. 

McClernand,  Gen.,  292,  326. 

McCulloch,  435. 

Macdonough,  Thomas,  takes  part 

in  burning  the  Philadelphia,  76; 

defeats    the    British    on    Lake 

Champlain,  191  ff. 
McDougal,  David,  action  at  Shi- 

monoseki,  365  ff. 
Macedonian,     captured     by     the 

United  States,  117  ff.;  blockaded 

in  New  London,   144;  sent  to 

Algiers,  204. 
Mackenzie,     A.     S.,    mutiny    on 

Somers,  214-8. 
Mackinac,  162. 
McKinley,  Pres.,  423  ff. 
McKnight,  Lt.,  182,  187. 
Macomb,  Comdr.,  364. 
Macomb,  Gen.,  192. 


Index 


497 


Madison,  Pres.,  97,  98,  100. 
Mahan,  A.  T.,  424,  425. 
Mahopac,  399. 
Maine,  427-9. 
Maine  (2d),  470. 
Majestic,  199. 
Mallory,  Sec.,  262. 
Manassas,  316,  317,  321. 
Manhattan,  334,  339,  343. 
Manila,  battle  of,  437  ff.;  diagram, 

438;  the  city  taken,  459,  463. 
Manila,  442. 
Manly,  John,  11. 
Manners,  Wm.,  155  ff. 
Maples,  Capt.,  151,  152. 
Marblehead,  451,  452. 
Maria,  42. 

Maria  Teresa,  447  ff . 
Marine  Committee,  11  ff. 
Marine  Corps,  established,  52. 
Marques  del  Duero,  442. 
Marston,  Capt.,  278. 
Mary  Ann,  203. 
Mashuda,  205. 
Mason,  James  M.,  251  ff. 
Mastico,  76. 

Massachusetts,  411,  433,  451  ff. 
Mattabesett,  352,  353. 
Mease,  Purser,  35. 
Medusa,  367. 
Melampus,  95. 
Mellish,  24. 
Melville,   G.   W.,   with  Jeannette 

expedition,   414   ff.;   in   Greely 

relief  party,  418. 
Memphis,  captured,  308. 
Mercedita,  394. 
Merchant   marine,   disappearance 

of,  after  the  Civil  War,  387. 
Merrimac,    burned    at     Norfolk, 

256-9,  262;  a  new  type,  260; 

rebuilding  of,   262-4;  destroys 
32 


the  Cumberland,  264-8;  destroys 
the  Congress,  268-272;  engages 
the  Monitor,  278  ff.;  later  career, 
286;  attempt  to  break  the  block 
ade,  390. 

Merrimac  (collier),  451,  457. 

Merritt,  Gen.,  444. 

Metacomet,  334,  337-9. 

Metcalf,  Sec.,  473. 

Mexican  War,  220  ff. 

Mexico  refuses  to  sell  California, 
220;  treaty  with,  225. 

Meyer,  Sec.,  477. 

Miami,  351-3. 

Miantonomah,  411. 

Miles,  Gen.,  458,  459. 

Milford,  24. 

Mill  prison,  19,  22. 

Miller,  Rear-Admiral,  423. 

Minneapolis,  449. 

Minnesota,  at  Hampton  Roads, 
265,  270;  attacked  by  the  Mer 
rimac,  278  ff.;  at  Fort  Fisher, 
399. 

Mississippi,  in  Perry's  expedition 
to  Japan,  227  ff.;  the  battle 
below  New  Orleans,  317;  burned 
327. 

Mississippi  (Confederate  iron 
clad),  321. 

Mississippi  and  tributaries,  map 
of,  289. 

Mobile,  captured,  404. 

Mobile  Bay,  battle  of,  330  ff.;  dia 
gram,  333. 

Monadnock,  399,  411,  444. 

Monaghan,  Ensign,  465. 

Monitor,  contract  for,  273,  274; 
transverse  section  (drawing), 
275;  trip  to  Hampton  Roads, 
272,  277;  engages  the  Merrimac, 
278  ff.;  later  career,  286,  287. 


498 


Index 


Monocacy,  435. 

Monongahela,  338,  340,  344. 

Montague,  149,  175. 

Montauk,  394,  395. 

Monterey,  411,  444. 

Montezuma,  54. 

Montgomery,  Capt.,  220. 

Montojo,  Admiral,  436  ff. 

Morgan,  334,  339. 

Morocco,  61,  71. 

Morris,  Charles,  in  the  Tripolitan 
War,  76;  the  burning  of  the 
Philadelphia,  77  ff.;  the  chase 
of  the  Constitution,  103  ff.; 
battle  of  the  Constitution  and 
the  Guerriere,  113. 

Morris,  G.  U.,  264. 

Morris,  Richard  V.,  68,  69. 

Morris,  Robert,  12. 

Morrison,  226. 

Mound  City,  290. 

N 

Nahant,  396,  397. 

Nanshan,  435. 

Napoleon,  decrees  of,  94,  97,  98, 
100. 

Napoleon,  Louis,  328,  329. 

Napoleon,  211. 

Nashville,  375,  394. 

Naugatuck,  287. 

Nautilus,  69,  84,  88,  89,  91,  102. 

Naval  Academy,  218,  219. 

Naval  Boards,  in  the  Revolution, 
12. 

Naval  Committee,  in  the  Revolu 
tion,  11  ff. 

Navy,  in  the  Revolution,  size  of, 
15;  building  of  a  new,  44;  at 
outbreak  of  the  Civil  War,  238 
ff.;  changes  in,  after  1850,  406; 


decay  of,  after  the  Ci^il  War, 
406  ff.;  rehabilitation  of,  409  ff.; 
in  Polar  exploration,  412  ff.; 
diplomatic  and  special  services 
of,  419  ff.;  in  Spanish- American 
War,  433. 

Nebraska,  471. 

Newark,  411,  466. 

New  Ironsides,  contracted  for,  274; 
torpedo  attack  on,  356;  descrip 
tion  of,  395;  at  Ft.  Fisher,  399, 
401. 

New  Orleans,  battle  of,  198. 

New  Orleans,  expedition  against, 
310  ff. 

New  York,  frigate,  68. 

New  York,  ship-of-the-line,  259. 

New  York,  cruiser,  452  ff. 

Niagara,  166  ff. 

Nicholson,  Capt.,  40,  50,  51. 

Nields,  H.  C.,  338. 

Nissen,  Consul,  74,  206. 

Non-Importation  Act,  94,  98. 

Non-Intercourse  Act,  94,  97. 

Norfolk,  54. 

Norfolk  Navy  Yard,  abandoned, 
255  ff. 

North  Carolina,  217. 

North  Dakota,  50,  473. 

O 

O'Brien,  9,  10. 

Octorora,  334,  337,  338. 

Ohio,  166,  171. 

Olympia,  435  ff. 

Oneida,  317,  318,  338,  339. 

Ontario,  204. 

Orders  in  Council,  94,  97  ff.,  201. 

Oregon,  411,  430,  451  ff. 

Ossipee,  344,  345. 

Ottawa,  250. 


Index 


499 


Page,  Octavius,  135. 

Pallas,  31  ff.,  38. 

Palmer,  Surgeon,  340. 

Palmetto  State,  394. 

Pamlico  and  Albemarle  Sounds 
(map),  349. 

Paris,  Declaration  of,  388. 

Parrott  guns,  260. 

Patrick  Henry,  269,  271,  278. 

Patterson,  Master-Comdt.,  207. 

Paulding,  Hiram,  sent  to  Norfolk, 
257,  258,  262;  member  of  board 
on  ironclads,  274. 

Pawnee,  257,  258. 

Peacock,  captured  by  the  Hornet, 
149,  150. 

Peacock  (2d),  takes  the  Epervier, 
153,  154;  attack  on  British 
commerce,  160. 

Peake,  Wm.,  150. 

Pearson,  Capt.,  32  ff. 

Peary,  Robt.  E.,  418,  419. 

Pelican,  captures  the  Argus,  151, 
152. 

Pembroke,  366,  367. 

Pendergrast,  Lt.,  269. 

Penguin,  taken  by  the  Hornet, 
158,  159. 

Pennsylvania,  257,  259. 

Pensacola,  312  ff. 

Pensacola,  surrender  of  yard,  258. 

Perkins,  G.  H.,  at  New  Orleans, 
317,  318;  Mobile  Bay,  343. 

Perry,  M.  C.,  in  West  Indies,  208; 
the  slave  trade,  213;  Mexican 
War,  224-5;  commands  expedi 
tion  to  Japan,  225  ff.;  as  a  dip 
lomat,  419. 

Perry,  O.  H.,  Lake  Erie,  164  ff.; 
West  Indies,  208. 


Petrel,  411,  435. 

Phelps,  Lt.-Comdr.,  295. 

Philadelphia,  sent  to  Tripoli,  64, 
68;  blockade  duty,  66,  70;  under 
Preble,  69;  loss  of,  71  ff.;  burn 
ing  of,  77  ff. 

Philadelphia,  cruiser,  423. 

Philippines,  war  in,  434  ff.,  462-4. 

Phillips,  Capt.,  53,  54. 

Phoebe,  178,  180  ff. 

Pillow,  Gen.,  296. 

Pillsbury,  Rear-Admiral,  425. 

Pinkney,  Minister,  98. 

Piracy,  in  West  Indies,  207-11. 

Pittsburg,  building  of,  290;  attacks 
Ft.  Donelson,  297,  298;  passes 
Island  No.  10,  305,  306. 

Pittsburg  Landing,  battle  of,  306, 
307. 

Platt,  Lt.,  209. 

Pluton,  447,  454. 

Plymouth,  227,  257,  259. 

Poictiers,  149. 

Polar  explorations,  the  navy  in, 
412  ff. 

Polk,  Pres.,  220. 

Pomone,  199,  200. 

Pope,  Gen.,  at  Island  No.  10,  301- 
6;  Ft.  Pillow,  307. 

Porcupine,  166. 

Porter,  David,  in  action  with  the 
Insurgente,  56;  with  prize  crew, 
57;  first  It.  of  the  Philadelphia, 
72;  commands  Essex,  126;  cruise 
of  the  Essex,  175  ff.;  in  West 
Indies,  208-11;  court-martial 
of,  210. 

Porter,  David  D.,  in  Mexican  War, 
222-5;  plans  for  capture  of  New 
Orleans,  310;  commands  mortar 
boats,  312,  319;  suggests  tactics, 
321;  attacks  Vicksburg,  323; 


500 


Index 


commands  river  squadron,  326; 
attacks  Arkansas  Post,  326; 
co-operates  with  Grant,  326-8; 
ordered  against  Ft.  Fisher,  347; 
captures  Ft.  Fisher,  398  ff. 

Porter,  J.  L.,  262. 

Porter,  W.  D.,  294,  325. 

Port  Hudson,  327. 

Porto  Rico,  449,  458,  459. 

Port  Royal,  capture  of,  244  ff.; 
diagram  of  battle,  246. 

Port  Royal,  287. 

Post  captain,  explanation  of  the 
term,  136. 

Potomac  flotilla,  242,  243. 

Powhatan,  236,  408. 

Preble,  Edward,  commands  j 
squadron  before  Tripoli,  69;  | 
disciplinarian,  70;  loss  of  the 
Philadelphia,  74,  75;  plans  to 
destroy  the  Philadelphia,  76; 
blockade  and  bombardment  of 
Tripoli,  84  ff . ;  Interpid  disaster, 
88  ff.;  returns,  90;  comments  on 
treaty  with  Tripoli,  91;  services 
in  the  war,  92;  rounds  Cape  of 
Good  Hope,  176. 

Preble,  battle  of  Lake  Champlain, 
191  ff. 

Preble  goes  to  Japan,  227. 

President,  building  of,  50;  sent  to 
Tripoli,  64;  under  Barren,  90; 
action  with  the  Little  Belt,  99; 
cruise  under  Rodgers,  99,  102, 
118;  chase  of  the  Belvidera,  102; 
runs  the  blockade,  134;  cap 
tured,  198-200. 

Presqu'isle  (Erie),  naval  base,  164, 
166. 

Prevost,  Geo.,  191-2,  194,  198. 

Prince  of  Orange,  20. 

Princeton,  261,  274. 


Pring,  Capt.,  191. 

Prisoners,  in  the  Revolution,  22, 
23;  in  the  Civil  War,  389,  390. 

Privateering,  during  the  Revolu 
tion,  10,  40,  41;  War  of  1812, 
201;  Civil  War,  388,  389. 

Providence,  13,  24. 

Q 

Queen  Charlotte,  166  ff. 
Queen  of  the  West,  328. 
Quincy,  Josiah,  98. 

R 

Raccoon,  178,  180. 

Radford,  Wm.,  265,  268. 

Rais  Hammida,  205. 

Raleigh,  in  the  Revolution,  29. 

Raleigh,  Confederate  ram,  354. 

Raleigh,  battle  of  Manila,  435. 

Randolph,  29. 

Ranger,  cruise  of,  under  Jones, 
24  ff.;  map  of  cruise,  28;  en 
gagement  with  the  Drake,  27  ff. 

Ranks,  relative,  in  army  and  navy, 
14. 

Raritan,  259. 

Razee,  explanation  of  the  term,  46. 

Reina  Cristina,  439  ff. 

Reina  Mercedes,  451. 

Reindeer,  154-7. 

Reprisal,  19. 

Resolution,  149. 

Retaliation,  53,  54. 

Retribution,  375. 

Revenge,  21. 

Rhode  Island,  287. 

Richmond,  330  ff. 

Rifled  cannon,  260. 

River  Defense  Fleet,  at  Fort 
Pillow,  307,  308;  engages  Far- 
ragut,  321. 


Index 


501 


Roanoke,  265,  270. 

Roanoke  Island,  capture  of,  348, 
349. 

Roberts,  Col.,  302. 

Robertson,  Lt.,  197. 

Robinson,  Lt.,  69. 

Robion,  Capt.,  441. 

Rodgers,  John,  commands  prize 
crew  of  the  Insurgents,  57;  in 
the  Tripolitan  War,  90;  the 
Little  Belt  affair,  99;  chases  the 
Belvidera,  102. 

Rodgers,  John,  at  Port  Royal, 
250;  begins  construction  of 
Mississippi  River  flotilla,  290, 
292;  commands  the  Weehawken, 
396,  397. 

Roe,  Capt.,  353. 

Rogers,  Midn.,  215. 

Ronckendorff,  Comdr.,  374. 

Roosevelt,  Theodore,  469-472. 

Roosevelt,  418. 

Rowan,  Comdr.,  348,  349. 

Rowe,  John,  76. 

Russell,  Lord,  371. 


S 


Sagasta,  Prime  Minister,  427,  428. 

St.  Lawrence,  265,  270. 

St.  Louis,  building  of,  290;  attacks 
Ft.  Donelson,  297,  298;  attacks 
Island  No.  10,  301. 

St.  Louis,  scout  cruiser,  in  Span 
ish-American  War,  447. 

St.  Mary's  Isle,  27. 

St.  Paul,  449. 

Sallie,  375. 

Saltonstall,  Dudley,  13. 

Samoan  affair,  464-6. 

Sampson,  Wm.  T.,  commands 
North  Atlantic  squadron,  432; 


blockades  Cuba,  445  ff.;  battle 
of  Santiago,  452  ff. 

San  Jacinto,  and  the  Trent,  251 
ff.;  seeks  the  Alabama,  374,  377. 

San  Juan  de  Ulloa,  Vera  Cruz,  223, 
224. 

San  Juan,  Porto  Rico,  bombard 
ment  of,  449. 

Santiago,  battle  of,  452  ff. 

Saranac,  446. 

Saratoga,  battle  of  Lake  Cham- 
plain,  191  ff. 

Saratoga,  in  Perry's  expedition  to 
Japan,  227. 

Sassacus,  352,  353. 

Saugus,  399. 

Savannah,  389,  390. 

Sawyer,  Vice-Admiral,  102. 

Schley,  W.  S.,  conducts  relief  of 
Greely  party,  418;  commands 
Flying  Squadron,  446;  block 
ades  Cienfuegos,  449;  blockades 
Santiago,  450;  at  battle  of  San 
tiago,  454,  455. 

Schofield,  Gen.,  403. 

Schools  for  officers  and  enlisted 
men,  475.  See  also  Naval 
Academy. 

Scorpion,  166,  169,  170. 

Scott,  Winfield,  190,  222,  255. 

Scourge,  84. 

Screw  propellers,  260. 

Secretary  of  the  Navy,  office 
created,  52. 

Selkirk,  Earl  of,  27. 

Selma,  334,  339. 

Semmes,  Raphael,  371  ff. 

Serapis,  battle  with  the  Bonhomme 
Richard,  30  ff. 

Sever,  James,  50. 

Seymour,  Vice-Admiral,  467. 

Shafter,  Gen.,  452,  458. 


502 


Index 


Shannon,  flagship  of  Broke's 
squadron,  102;  captures  the 
Chesapeake,  137  ff. 

Shark,  208. 

Shaw,  John,  59. 

Shenandoah,  371,  375,  387. 

Sheridan,  Gen.,  346. 

Sherman,  Thomas  W.,  244. 

Sherman,  Wm.  T.,  captures  At 
lanta,  346;  captures  Savannah 
and  Charleston,  397. 

Ship-of-the-line,  illustration,  45; 
explanation  of  the  term,  46. 

Ships,  development,  1812-1861, 
260-2;  recent  developments, 
473-6. 

Shot,  comparative  weight  .of 
American  and  British,  117. 

Sibylle,  40. 

Sicard,  Rear-Admiral,  432. 

Simms,  Charles,  266. 

Sinclair,  Lt.,  commands  the  Argus, 
102. 

Sinclair,  Lt.,  of  the  Alabama,  ac 
count  of  the  action  with  the 
Kearsarge,  378  ff.;  testimony 
in  the  Alabama-Kearsarge  con 
troversy,  384,  386. 

Siren,  69,  77,  78,  84. 

Slave  trade,  211-4. 

Slidell,  John,  251  ff. 

Sloat,  Commodore,  220,  221. 

Sloop  actions  in  the  War  of  1812, 
144  ff.;  map,  145. 

Sloop  of  war,  explanation  of  the 
term,  46;  illustration,  49. 

Small,  Seaman,  215,  216. 

Smith,  John,  in  the  Tripolitan 
War,  69,  102. 

Smith,  Joseph,  on  a  board  to  in 
vestigate  building  of  armor- 
clads,  274. 


Smith,  Joseph  B.,  commands  the 
Congress  in  the  Civil  War,  268, 
269. 

Smith,  Melancton,  352. 

Solebay,  24. 

Somers,  Richard,  69,  85,  88  ff. 

Somers,  battle  of  Lake  Erie,  166  ff. 

Somers,  mutiny  on,  214-8;  loss  of, 
372. 

Southfield,  351,  352,  358. 

Spain,  alliance  with  the  United 
States,  30. 

Spanish-American  War,  causes, 
426  ff.;  comparison  of  navies, 
433;  campaign  in  the  West 
Indies  (map),  448;  losses,  459, 
460;  treaty  of  peace,  460,  461. 

Spark,  204. 

Spencer,  J.  M.,  335. 

Spencer,  Philip,  214-8. 

Sperry,  Rear-Admiral,  425,  470, 
471. 

Spitfire,  99,  224,  225. 

Springs,  explanation  of  the  term, 
184. 

Stack,  Lt.,  35. 

State  navies  in  the  Revolution,  41. 

Stembel,  Comdr.,  292. 

Sterrett,  Andrew,  64  ff. 

Stewart,  Charles,  commands  the 
Siren,  69,  76;  captures  the 
Cyane  and  the  Levant,  200,  201. 

Stimers,  Chief  Engineer,  279. 

Stockton,  Commodore,  220  ff. 

Stodder,  Master,  279. 

Stoddert,  Benj.,  52. 

Stonewall  Jackson,  318. 

Stringham,  Silas  H.,  244. 

Submarines,  early  forms  of,  355, 
356;  recent  developments  in, 474 

Sumter,  372,  375. 

Surprise,  20. 


Index 


503 


Susquehanna,   in   Perry's  expedi 
tion,  227  ff.;  at  Port  Royal,  245. 


Talbot,  Silas,  50. 

Tallahassee,  375. 

Tattnall,  Josiah,  in  the  Mexican 
War,  224;  at  Port  Royal,  248, 
249;  destroys  the  Merrimac, 
286. 

Taylor,  Capt.,  224. 

Taylor,  Gen.,  222. 

Tecumseh,  174. 

Tecumseh,  334-8,  345. 

Tenedos,  134,  136,  199,  200. 

Tennessee,  captured  by  Farragut, 
331  ff.;  illustration,  341. 

Terror,  monitor,  441,  449. 

Terror,  Spanish  torpedo-boat  de 
stroyer,  447. 

Terry,  Gen.,  400  ff. 

Texas,  452  ff. 

Thames,  battle  of,  174. 

Thetis,  416. 

Thorn,  Jonathan,  76. 

Thornton,  Lt.-Comdr.,  384. 

Thurot,  21. 

Ticonderoga,  191  ff. 

Tigress,  166  ff. 

Tilghman,  Gen.,  295,  296. 

Tingey,  Capt.,  137. 

Torpedo,  invention  of,  355  ff.;  im 
provements,  474. 

Torpedo-boat,  early  forms  of,  355 
ff.;  recent  development  of,  474. 

Torpedo-boat  destroyer,  474. 

Torpedo  bureau,  in  the  Confeder 
ate  Navy  Dept.,  356. 

Toucey,  Sec.,  239. 

Townsend,  Capt.,  102. 

Trajano,  423. 


Treaty,  with  France,  23,  59;  with 
Algiers,  50,  51,  206;  with  Great 
Britain,  52,  93,  201;  with  Mo 
rocco,  61;  with  Tunis,  61,  206; 
with  Tripoli,  61,  91,  206;  with 
Mexico,  225;  with  Japan,  236; 
365;  with  Spain,  460. 

Trent  affair,  251  ff. 

Tripoli,  treaty  with,  61,  91,  206; 
war  with,  64  ff.;  harbor  of 
(map),  79;  bombardment  of, 
84  ff. 

Tripoli,  action  with  the  Enter 
prise,  65. 

Trippe,  Lt.,  86. 

Trippe,  166,  170. 

Trumbull,  40. 

Truxtun,  Thomas,  promoted  to 
captaincy,  50;  commands  the 
Constellation,  51,  52;  captures 
Insurgente,  55,  56;  commands 
squadron  against  Tripoli,  67; 
resigns,  68. 

Tunis,  treaty  with,  61,  206. 

Tyler,  292,  293,  296,  297,  325. 

U 

Unicorn,  30. 

United  States,  building  of,  50,  51; 
in  Rodgers'  squadron,  102; 
captures  the  Macedonian,  117 
ff.;  plan  of  engagement  with  the 
Macedonian,  120;  blockaded  at 
New  London,  144,  199;  des 
troyed,  259. 

Urdaneta,  464. 


Valley  City,  363,  364. 

Van  Brunt,  Capt.,  280,  284. 

Vanderbilt,  377. 


504 


Index 


Varuna,  317,  318. 

Vengeance,  brig,  31  ff. 

Vengeance,  frigate,  57,  58. 

Vera  Cruz,  naval  operations  be 
fore,  221  ff. 

Vicksburg,  attacked  by  the  ships, 
322  ff. 

Vincennes,  226. 

Virginia.    See  Merrimac. 

Virginius  affair,  409,  426. 

Vixen,  schooner,  blockades  Tri 
poli,  69-71;  at  bombardment  of 
Tripoli,  84,  86;  in  the  Intrepid 
disaster,  88,  89. 

Vixen,  steamer,  224. 

Vixen,  gunboat,  453,  455,  456. 

Vizcaya,  battle  of  Santiago,  447 
ff. 

Volontier,  54. 

Von  Ketteler,  Baron,  468. 

W 

Wabash,  at  Port  Royal,  245  ff.; 

at  Ft.  Fisher,  399. 
Wads  worth,  Lt.,  88. 
Wainwright,  Lt.-Comdr.,  453. 
Wales,  Capt.,  153. 
Walke,  Henry,  292,  302-6. 
War  of  1812,  causes  of,  93  ff.,  100; 

declared,    100;   preparation  for 

by  Congress,    100;   comparison 

of  naval  forces,  101;  results  of, 

201. 

Ward,  J.  H.,  242,  243. 
Warley,  Lt.,  354  ff. 
Warrington,  Lewis,  153. 
Washington,  Geo.,  fits  out  a  fleet, 

10,  11;  assisted  by  De  Grasse, 

41. 

Washington,  42. 
Wasp,  schooner  in  Revolutionary 

Navy,  13. 


Wasp,  sloop  of  war  (1st),  defeats 
the  Frolic,  146-9. 

Wasp,  sloop  of  war  (2d),  building 
of,  153;  captures  the  Reindeer, 
154-7;  captures  the  Avon,  157, 
158;  success  against  British 
commerce,  160;  loss  of,  187. 

Wasp,  British  sloop  on  Lake 
Cham  plain,  191. 

Waterbury,  Gen.,  18. 

Watson,  Lt.,  209. 

Watson,  J.  C.,  342. 

Watson,  W.  H.,  151,  152. 

Watts,  Lt.,  140. 

Weather-gage,  explanation  of  the 
term,  119. 

Weehawken,  396,  397. 

Welles,  Gideon,  240,  241,  376. 

Wessells,  Gen.,  352. 

Weyler,  Gen.,  426,  427. 

Whinyates,  Thomas,  146  ff. 

Whipple,  Abraham,  13. 

Whipple,  Wm.,  26. 

White  Squadron,  410  ff. 

Whitehaven,  27. 

Whitehead,  352. 

Whiting,  J.  W.,  336. 

Wickes,  Lambert,  19. 

Wilkes,  Charles,  and  the  Trent 
affair,  251  ff.;  commands  Ant 
arctic  expedition,  412. 

Wilkinson,  Capt.,  392. 

Williams,  Col.,  322,  324. 

Williamson,  W.  P.,  262. 

Wilson,  Seaman,  304. 

Wilson,  Joseph,  385. 

Winnebago,  334,  337,  343. 

Winona,  318,  319. 

Winslow,  Comdr.,  376  ff. 

Winslow,  459. 

Wisconsin,  471. 

Wise,  Gen.,  348. 


Index 


505 


Wissahickon,  319. 

Wood,  E.  P.,  441. 

Wood,  J.  T.,  268. 

Wood,  W.  C.,  464. 

Woodford,  Minister,  429,  432. 

Woodman,  Acting  Master's  Mate, 

361,  364. 
Worden,    J.    L.,    commands    the 

Monitor,  277  ff.;  destroys  the 

Nashville,  394,  395. 
Wyalusing,  352. 
Wyoming,    at    Shimonose"ki,    365 

ff.;  search  for  the  Alabama,  374, 

377. 


Yale,  447. 

Yankee,  452. 

Y antic,  416. 

Yarmouth,  29. 

Yeo,  James  Lucas,  165,  173,  189. 

Yezaiman,  Kayama,  232,  233. 

York,  capture,  of  165. 

Yorktown,  411,  464. 


Zafiro,  435. 
Zouave,  269. 


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